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Contents
  1. 1Processes and equipment
  2. 2Flammable gases, liquids and chemicals
  3. 3Ignition sources and process areas
  4. 4Hazardous area classification and ventilation
  5. 5Ventilation calculation
  6. 6Construction and fire protection
  7. 7Fire service interface
  8. 8Limits of the guidance
  9. 9See also
  10. 10Notes
  11. 11References

A wastewater treatment plant is a facility that collects, pumps and treats the liquid wastes of a community. It removes or alters their objectionable constituents so that the treated water can be discharged without nuisance or danger.[1] Its processes fall into three groups: collection and pumping, liquid treatment and solids treatment.[2] In the United States about 16,250 municipal plants served 208 million people in 2004, and thousands of industries treat their own wastewater.[1]

Wastewater plants handle several flammable and reactive materials at once. Anaerobic digestion of sewage sludge produces a gas of about 65 % methane, and flammable liquids and gases spilled or dumped into the sewers arrive with the raw wastewater.[3][4] Disinfection and treatment add chlorine, oxygen, ozone and methanol.[5] The 20th edition of the NFPA Fire Protection Handbook (2008) places the highest risk in collection and pumping and in the early stages of liquid and solids treatment.[6] US practice, set out in NFPA 820, Standard for Fire Protection in Wastewater Treatment and Collection Facilities, relies mainly on ventilation, electrical area classification and control of ignition sources.[7][8]

Processes and equipment

Collection systems carry wastewater from homes, factories and other sources to the plant, by gravity where the terrain allows and by pumping elsewhere. A separate sanitary sewer excludes storm water, while a combined sewer carries domestic wastewater, storm water and industrial wastewater together.[2] Sanitary sewers of 0.2 to 1.2 m (8 to 48 in.) diameter are common, and combined sewers are often 6 m (20 ft) or more across. When the handbook was written only separate sanitary sewers were being built, but many older cities still had thousands of miles (several thousand kilometres) of large combined sewers.[2]

Most pumping stations have a wet well, which receives and temporarily stores the wastewater, and a dry well that houses the motors, pumps and switches.[9] Many newer stations use submersible pumps in the wet well and need no dry well. Motors can be supplied as explosionproof units for hazardous environments.[9] Where the public power supply may fail, larger stations have generators or gasoline or natural gas engines. Some dual-fuel engines run on natural gas or on methane produced by sludge digestion at the plant.[9]

Liquid treatment consists of preliminary, primary, secondary and tertiary treatment and disinfection.[9] Preliminary treatment removes lumber, rags, stones, plastic and grit with bar racks, screens and grit chambers.[10][11] Primary sedimentation can remove up to 60 % of the suspended solids and 30 % of the biochemical oxygen demand.[11] With secondary treatment a plant commonly removes 85 % of both. Most secondary processes are biological, among them trickling filters, rotating biological contactors and air or pure-oxygen activated sludge systems.[12]

Tertiary treatment uses chemicals such as lime, alum, ferric chloride, polymers, methanol, chlorine, carbon, ozone and oxygen. Disinfection may be chemical, with chlorine or ozone, or physical, with ultraviolet light, and chlorine remains the most widely used method.[3] Ozone and ultraviolet light are produced on site, whereas chlorine arrives as a gas or liquid.[3]

Solids treatment handles the sludge removed from the liquid stream, which may still be as much as 97 % water. Its steps are digestion, thickening, dewatering and disposal, and sludge handling is often the most difficult and costly part of treatment.[3] Anaerobic digestion takes place without free oxygen and produces an off-gas of about 65 % methane that is often collected and used as fuel.[3] Smaller plants send dewatered sludge to landfills or apply it to land. Larger plants often burn it in an incinerator, usually a multiple-hearth furnace or a fluid-bed unit, whose ash can be toxic.[13]

Flammable gases, liquids and chemicals

Wheeler (2008) identifies three sources of hazard: materials that enter the collection system, materials used in treatment and by-products of treatment.[13] The hazards include fuel gases, sewer and sludge gases, specialty gases, liquids, solids, dusts and construction materials.[13] Sewer and sludge gases are flammable gases formed by the fermentation or decomposition of organic matter. Explosive conditions can arise when they mix with air within certain limits, especially around anaerobic digestion.[4]

Flammability limits are the composition limits within which a flame can propagate through a premixed fuel and air mixture. For methane in air at normal temperature and pressure they are 5 % and 15 % by volume.[14] The limits depend on the oxygen and inert gas content and on the temperature and pressure of the mixture.[15] Sludge gas also contains about 30 % carbon dioxide, an inert gas, so its limits need not equal those of pure methane. The handbook gives 5 to 15 % in one table and 6.0 to 17.0 % in another.[16][17] Table 1 lists the gases that the handbook names as common in wastewater plants.

Table 1. Selected gases in wastewater treatment plants (Wheeler, 2008, p. 9-150)
Gas Lower limit (% vol.) Upper limit (% vol.) Density relative to air Main sources
Sludge gas (about 65 % methane, 30 % carbon dioxide) 5 15 Lighter Sludge digestion
Sewer gas (about 70 % carbon dioxide, 5 % methane) 5.3 19.3 Heavier Sewer systems
Natural gas 3.8–6.5 13–17 Lighter Gas piping leaks
Hydrogen sulfide 4.0 44 Heavier Sewer gas, sludge gas
Gasoline 1.3 7.1 Heavier Storage tanks, tank truck spills
Chlorine, oxygen, ozone Nonflammable Nonflammable Heavier Disinfection, activated sludge

Other handbook data differ slightly. Lemoff (2008) gives "sewage gas" a gross heating value of 24.9 MJ/m³ and flammability limits of 6.0 and 17.0 %. Its specific gravity is 0.79, and burning one cubic metre needs 6.5 m³ of air.[17] The stoichiometric mixture therefore contains 1/(1 + 6.5) = 13 % gas, inside both sets of limits. Its heating value is 62 to 66 % of that of high-methane natural gas, 37.6 to 39.9 MJ/m³, which is consistent with its methane content of about 65 %.[17]

Gases lighter than air rise and diffuse above a leak. Fuel gases contain little oxygen, so a release can also suffocate.[4] Wheeler warns that sewer gas can reach explosive limits in poorly ventilated spaces, though it is not used as fuel.[5] Hydrogen sulfide rarely reaches an explosive concentration in wastewater plants.[16]

Several process chemicals are not flammable but make fires worse. Chlorine is a strong oxidiser that can react explosively with acetylene, ammonia, hydrocarbons, most fuel gases and finely divided metals. It is about 2.5 times heavier than air, so a leak hugs the ground, and steel containers are attacked rapidly above about 110 °C (230 °F).[18] Smaller plants keep chlorine in cylinders of 68 to 907 kg (150 lb to 1 ton), and larger plants receive it in bulk by tank truck or rail tank car.[3] Pure-oxygen activated sludge systems use oxygen that, if released into the surrounding air, can form an oxygen-enriched atmosphere and accelerate combustion. Oxygen itself does not burn; the degree of added fire hazard depends on the mixture and pressure.[12][19]

The influent is the least controllable source and, according to the handbook, probably the greatest risk.[4] Industries may discharge alcohol, solvents or hexane, and sewers can collect natural gas or gasoline from leaking pipelines and underground tanks. Combined sewers also collect highway spills, and fire departments sometimes wash flammable hydrocarbons from traffic accidents into them.[4] Illegal dumping and deliberate attacks with flammable or explosive material are also possible.[4][16]

Two sewer explosions show the scale of the problem. In 1981 a massive release of hexane from a soybean plant in Louisville, Kentucky, entered the sewers and blew up about 10 km (6 miles) of the sewer system.[20] An explosion of chemicals released into the sewers of Guadalajara, Mexico, on 22 April 1992 killed 190 to 200 people. It ranks tenth in the handbook's list of the deadliest fires and explosions in Latin America and the Caribbean.[21]

Ignition sources and process areas

A fire or explosion also needs an ignition source of sufficient intensity.[4] Wheeler (2008) groups the sources into three classes. Open flames and hot surfaces include welding, boilers, incinerators, kerosene lanterns, combustion engines and smoking. Electrical sources include arcing faults in switchgear and sparks from worn equipment or static electricity. The third class covers chemical reactions, from spontaneous combustion to explosions.[4]

The hazards differ along the process. In a pumping station wet well, hydrocarbons float on the wastewater and lighter gases spread through the structure. Screening and grit chambers in buildings or pits share these hazards.[16] Open sedimentation tanks let light gases escape but can collect and concentrate floating flammable liquids. Granular or powdered activated carbon and some process dusts are combustible.[4][16] Digesters and digester gas handling areas are especially dangerous because they produce combustible gas.[3]

Construction materials add fuel. Plastics and fibreglass-reinforced plastics are used for rotating biological contactors, biotowers, trickling filter media, tube settlers and ventilation ducts because they resist corrosion. They are normally submerged but become exposed during maintenance, so cutting torches near them need extreme care.[8] Schwab (2008a) adds a general warning from chemical processing: an underground drain system without liquid seals at all entrance points can carry an explosion.[22]

Hazardous area classification and ventilation

Hazardous area classification in the United States follows the National Electrical Code. A Class I, Division 1 location is one in which ignitable concentrations of flammable gases or vapours exist under normal operation or frequently because of maintenance or leakage.[23] A Division 2 location handles such materials in closed systems, or is normally kept safe by positive mechanical ventilation that could fail, or adjoins a Division 1 location. Motors, luminaires and switches in Division 1 must be explosionproof or of the purged type.[23]

NFPA 820 applies these classes to wastewater structures. In the 1992 edition examples reproduced in the handbook, the entire wet well of a pumping station without mechanical ventilation is Division 1. A physically separated dry well or pumphouse without mechanical ventilation is Division 2.[10] For an anaerobic digester outside a building, the tank interior and an envelope extending 3 m (10 ft) around the tank and 7.6 m (25 ft) above the gas dome are Division 1.[3] A control building with digester gas processing equipment that is neither separated nor mechanically ventilated is Division 1 throughout.[13]

Wheeler (2008) states that explosion and fire hazards are best mitigated by copious flushing with fresh air. For enclosed spaces with exposed wastewater, the rate should rest on the calculated evaporation rate of the most volatile liquid expected, taking account of surface area, water and air temperature and turbulence.[7] The designer must use the minimum rates of Table 2 or the calculated rate, whichever is greater. Ventilation also sets the classification: a wet well with at least 12 air changes per hour can be Division 2 instead of Division 1.[7][8]

Table 2. Minimum ventilation and resulting classification, NFPA 820 as summarised by Wheeler (2008, p. 9-153)
Space Class I, Division 1 Class I, Division 2 Unclassified
Wet wells, screen rooms and other enclosed spaces with exposed wastewater Below 12 air changes/h 12 air changes/h or more –
Below-grade spaces with equipment using or processing flammable gas Below 12 air changes/h, or below 0.38 m/s (74 ft/min) in tunnels 12 air changes/h or more, or 0.38 m/s or more –
Below-grade spaces with gas piping – Below 6 air changes/h, or below 0.19 m/s (37 ft/min) 6 air changes/h or more, or 0.19 m/s or more
Below-grade dry wells without gas piping – Below 6 air changes/h 6 air changes/h or more

Ventilation calculation

An air change rate expresses the outside-air flow as a number of room volumes per hour, calculated on the largest normal volume of the space.[24] The flow follows directly from the rate and the volume. In a tunnel or gallery the flow is the cross-section multiplied by the mean air velocity.[25] A mass balance, in which the change in a space equals inflow minus outflow, gives the steady concentration of a small gas leak in a well-mixed space:[26]

V˙=nV3600V˙=AvC=V˙gV˙

Symbol Description Unit
V˙ Ventilation air flow m³/s
n Air change rate 1/h
V Volume of the space m³
A Cross-section of a tunnel or gallery m²
v Mean air velocity m/s
V˙g Leak rate of flammable gas m³/s
C Steady volume fraction of gas in the space –

The concentration formula holds only while the leak is small compared with the air flow and the gas mixes evenly. Lighter-than-air sludge gas tends to rise, so local concentrations under a ceiling can be higher than the average.[4] The table rates are minimums for classification and do not replace the evaporation-based calculation.[7]

As a worked example, take a wet well of 6.0 m × 4.0 m × 5.0 m, an assumed volume of 120 m³. Division 2 requires at least 12 air changes per hour, which is 12 × 120 = 1440 m³/h, or 0.40 m³/s of outside air. A 2.0 m × 2.5 m gallery with flammable gas equipment needs at least 0.38 m/s, which gives 5.0 × 0.38 = 1.9 m³/s, rounded up.[8]

Suppose sludge gas leaks into a 120 m³ dry well ventilated at 6 air changes per hour, at an assumed 1.0 m³/h. The steady concentration is then 1.0 / 720 = 0.14 %, about 2.8 % of the 5 % lower limit.[16] If the fan stops, a simple low-concentration, well-mixed estimate gives 0.25 × 0.05 × 120 / 1.0 = 1.5 hours to a quarter of the lower limit and about 6 hours to the limit itself. These times neglect leakage, residual air movement and displacement by the incoming gas; local concentrations can rise sooner.

Construction and fire protection

Wheeler (2008) lists six control procedures: hazard evaluation, risk evaluation, control of fire and explosions, ventilation, construction materials and education. Proper electrical classification and suitable equipment are part of them.[5] Hazard evaluation should begin early in design and be repeated when the plant changes. Risk control relies on well-maintained equipment, redundant instruments, fail-safe design, pressure relief and damage-limiting construction.[5][7] Fuel and oxygen are hard to control at a wastewater plant, so control of ignition sources is the most practical of the three basic methods. Manholes and pumping stations, where people enter, are of greatest concern.[7]

Construction materials are chosen by how critical the unit is. Noncombustible materials should be used where a few hours out of service could release raw wastewater or sludge, as at a raw wastewater pumping station.[7] Noncombustible or limited-combustible materials are recommended for important units such as biological treatment and for all combined sewers. Any suitable material may be used where a week out of service would cause no lasting harm.[7] Air ducts should be noncombustible or fitted with smoke and fire dampers, foamed plastics should not be used as interior finish, and roof coverings should be Class A.[8]

Automatic sprinkler systems to NFPA 13 should be installed where appropriate. Other measures should be considered in chemical stores, tunnels and electrical areas.[27] Foam systems are most effective for wet wells, grit and screening processes, primary clarifiers and tanks where floating flammable liquid may collect. Dry chemical systems suit chemical stores, tunnels and electrical areas where water damage would impair the plant.[27]

Treated effluent can supply fire water if contaminants have been eliminated. Where fire pumps are the only supply, they should meet the demand with the largest pump out of service.[27] Structures with a risk index of 4 or more under NFPA 780 should have a lightning protection system.[27]

Detectors for flame, heat or smoke should be chosen by hazard severity and electrical classification.[27][6] The chapter does not describe a combustible gas detection system. For enclosed fuel cell installations, which can run on biogas, the handbook recommends combustible gas detection that alarms at 25 % and shuts off the fuel at 60 % of the lower limit. The lower limit used should be that of the lowest gas or gas mixture present.[28] Training of all employees and close liaison with the local fire department complete the measures.[8][27]

Fire service interface

Firefighting can affect a treatment plant. Foam solutions have a high biochemical oxygen demand, and foaming in a plant can trap activated sludge and upset its operation. The handbook therefore advises contacting the plant operator before discharging foam, with its type, demand, volume and discharge period.[29] Scheffey (2002) notes that large amounts of aqueous film-forming foam (AFFF) can "shock load" a plant. In one bench-scale study, 10 to 60 ppm of AFFF did not inhibit biological nitrification, but higher concentrations did.[30][31]

In the Netherlands, NIPV guidance on car parks (2021) states that extinguishing water from electric vehicle fires can generally be drained through the sewers. Contaminated cooling water from an immersion tank, however, may not be discharged directly into the sewer.[32][33] Where foreign combustible liquid enters a US sewer, Wheeler (2008) suggests removal by vacuum or a foam blanket.[7] In the United States, OSHA requires positive-pressure self-contained breathing apparatus for fire service work in sewers and other confined spaces.[34]

Limits of the guidance

The handbook chapter describes US practice around 2008 and reproduces examples from the 1992 edition of NFPA 820.[10][3] That edition had already been replaced: a 2004 NRC report lists the 1999 edition as current.[35] The chapter gives no fire or explosion statistics for wastewater plants, so its risk ranking rests on the hazards described rather than on incident data.[6]

The gas data are approximate. The handbook gives two sets of limits for digester gas, and its natural gas limits of 3.8–6.5 % and 13–17 % differ from the 4.5–4.7 % and 14.0–15.0 % in its gases chapter.[16][17] Gas composition varies with the process, and the text quotes digester gas both as 5 % hydrogen and as 30 % carbon dioxide with 5 % other gases.[3][16] The table's 5.3 % lower limit for sewer gas is hard to reconcile with its stated 5 % methane content: methane alone could not reach its own 5 % lower limit after dilution with air. Other combustible gases may be present, but their fractions are unspecified.[16][14]

See also

Notes

  1. ↑ 1.0 1.1 Wheeler (2008), p. 9-141.
  2. ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 Wheeler (2008), p. 9-142.
  3. ↑ 3.00 3.01 3.02 3.03 3.04 3.05 3.06 3.07 3.08 3.09 Wheeler (2008), p. 9-147.
  4. ↑ 4.00 4.01 4.02 4.03 4.04 4.05 4.06 4.07 4.08 4.09 Wheeler (2008), p. 9-149.
  5. ↑ 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.3 Wheeler (2008), p. 9-151.
  6. ↑ 6.0 6.1 6.2 Wheeler (2008), p. 9-155.
  7. ↑ 7.0 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.6 7.7 7.8 Wheeler (2008), p. 9-152.
  8. ↑ 8.0 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.5 Wheeler (2008), p. 9-153.
  9. ↑ 9.0 9.1 9.2 9.3 Wheeler (2008), p. 9-143.
  10. ↑ 10.0 10.1 10.2 Wheeler (2008), p. 9-144.
  11. ↑ 11.0 11.1 Wheeler (2008), p. 9-145.
  12. ↑ 12.0 12.1 Wheeler (2008), p. 9-146.
  13. ↑ 13.0 13.1 13.2 13.3 Wheeler (2008), p. 9-148.
  14. ↑ 14.0 14.1 Beyler (2002b), p. 2-172.
  15. ↑ Beyler (2002b), p. 2-173.
  16. ↑ 16.0 16.1 16.2 16.3 16.4 16.5 16.6 16.7 16.8 Wheeler (2008), p. 9-150.
  17. ↑ 17.0 17.1 17.2 17.3 Lemoff (2008), p. 6-174.
  18. ↑ Lemoff (2008), p. 6-180.
  19. ↑ Rosales and Stoltzfus (2008), p. 9-226.
  20. ↑ Kingsbaker (2008), p. 9-135.
  21. ↑ Hall and Cote (2008), p. 3-12.
  22. ↑ Schwab (2008a), p. 8-22.
  23. ↑ 23.0 23.1 Milatovich (2008), p. 8-169.
  24. ↑ NFC Online Glossary, as cited in Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. F-68.
  25. ↑ Van Rossum (2027), §3.6.
  26. ↑ Van Rossum (2027), §3.7.
  27. ↑ 27.0 27.1 27.2 27.3 27.4 27.5 Wheeler (2008), p. 9-154.
  28. ↑ Biggins (2008), p. 8-110.
  29. ↑ Scheffey (2008), p. 17-69.
  30. ↑ Scheffey (2002), p. 4-118.
  31. ↑ Scheffey (2002), p. 4-119.
  32. ↑ Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 46.
  33. ↑ Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 47.
  34. ↑ Teele (2008), p. 12-151.
  35. ↑ Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. E-9.

References

  • Beyler, C. L. (2002b). Flammability limits of premixed and diffusion flames. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 2-172–2-187). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
  • Biggins, J. B. (2008). Stationary combustion engines and fuel cells. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 8-105–8-111). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Hall, J. R., Jr., & Cote, A. E. (2008). An overview of the fire problem and fire protection. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 3-3–3-30). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Iqbal, N., & Salley, M. H. (2004). Fire Dynamics Tools (FDTs): Quantitative fire hazard analysis methods for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Fire Protection Inspection Program (NUREG-1805). U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
  • Kingsbaker, C. L. (2008). Oilseed solvent extraction plants. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 9-131–9-140). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Lemoff, T. C. (2008). Gases. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 6-165–6-186). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Milatovich, R. M. (2008). Electrical systems and appliances. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 8-127–8-173). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Rosales, K., & Stoltzfus, J. M. (2008). Oxygen-Enriched atmospheres. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 9-225–9-243). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Scheffey, J. L. (2002). Foam agents and AFFF system design considerations. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 4-88–4-122). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
  • Scheffey, J. L. (2008). Foam extinguishing agents and systems. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 17-45–17-70). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Schwab, R. F. (2008a). Chemical processing equipment. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 8-17–8-29). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Teele, B. W. (2008). Fire and emergency services protective clothing and protective equipment. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 12-143–12-160). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Van der Graaf, J., Hessels, T., & Rosmuller, N. (2023). Fire safety of indoor car parks accommodating electrically powered vehicles. Nederlands Instituut Publieke Veiligheid. (Original work published 2021)
  • Van Rossum, E. (2027). Introduction to Fire Safety Engineering. Fire Safety Academy.
  • Wheeler, J. F. (2008). Protection of wastewater treatment plants. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 9-141–9-155). National Fire Protection Association.