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A '''flame safeguard''' is a burner control that senses whether a flame is present and shuts off the fuel when the flame fails to light or goes out. The ''Fire Protection Handbook'' (2008) describes such devices under several names. Oil burners have primary safety controls, gas appliances automatic gas ignition systems, and industrial ovens and furnaces combustion safeguards or flame detection units.<ref name="GW-10-17">Gore Willse (2008a), pp. 10-17–10-18.</ref><ref name="OS-8-77">Ostrowski (2008a), p. 8-77.</ref> The chapter on gases calls the same function a flame failure device.<ref name="LE-6-175">Lemoff (2008), p. 6-175.</ref>
A '''flame safeguard''' is a burner control that senses whether a flame is present and shuts off the fuel when the flame fails to light or goes out. The ''Fire Protection Handbook'' (2008) describes such devices under several names. Oil burners have primary safety controls, gas appliances automatic gas ignition systems, and industrial ovens and furnaces combustion safeguards or flame detection units.<ref name="GW-10-17">Gore Willse (2008a), pp. 10-17–10-18.</ref><ref name="OS-8-77">Ostrowski (2008a), p. 8-77.</ref> The chapter on gases calls the same function a flame failure device.<ref name="LE-6-175">Lemoff (2008), p. 6-175.</ref>


The device exists because unburned fuel that keeps flowing into a combustion chamber can form a flammable mixture with air, and a later [[Ignition]] of that mixture could result in an explosion.<ref name="GW-10-17" /> A flame safeguard is one part of a larger system of purge timers, interlocks and safety shutoff valves. In large boilers that system is called a burner management system.<ref name="MA-10-101">Mattern et al. (2008), p. 10-101.</ref> The requirements quoted below are those of US codes and practice as summarised in the 2008 handbook, not current or universal rules.
The device exists because unburned fuel that keeps flowing into a combustion chamber can form a flammable mixture with air, and a later [[ignition]] of that mixture could result in an explosion.<ref name="GW-10-17" /> A flame safeguard is one part of a larger system of purge timers, interlocks and safety shutoff valves. In large boilers that system is called a burner management system.<ref name="MA-10-101">Mattern et al. (2008), p. 10-101.</ref> The requirements quoted below are those of US codes and practice as summarised in the 2008 handbook, not current or universal rules.


== Terminology and scope ==
== Terminology and scope ==
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The handbook chapters on burners describe what a safeguard must sense rather than how its sensor works. For pulverised coal burners in boilers, a means of flame detection is needed at each burner. The ability to distinguish the main flame from the igniter flame is important, especially when starting and stopping a burner.<ref name="MA-10-99">Mattern et al. (2008), p. 10-99.</ref> In fluidised bed boilers, flame detectors are not useful. Instead, in-bed thermocouples prove that the bed is hot enough to ignite the fuel, and these readings are reliable only while the bed is actively fluidised and well mixed.<ref name="MA-10-103">Mattern et al. (2008), p. 10-103.</ref>
The handbook chapters on burners describe what a safeguard must sense rather than how its sensor works. For pulverised coal burners in boilers, a means of flame detection is needed at each burner. The ability to distinguish the main flame from the igniter flame is important, especially when starting and stopping a burner.<ref name="MA-10-99">Mattern et al. (2008), p. 10-99.</ref> In fluidised bed boilers, flame detectors are not useful. Instead, in-bed thermocouples prove that the bed is hot enough to ignite the fuel, and these readings are reliable only while the bed is actively fluidised and well mixed.<ref name="MA-10-103">Mattern et al. (2008), p. 10-103.</ref>


The optical principles are described for the [[Flame detector]] used in fire detection. Ultraviolet detectors respond to radiation of about 0.1 to 0.35 µm, typically with a vacuum photodiode Geiger-Muller tube that passes a burst of current for each photon received. Infrared detectors often use the 4.35 µm carbon dioxide band, which only carbon-containing fuels emit strongly, so they do not respond to hydrogen or sulphur flames.<ref name="DU-14-24">Dungan (2008a), p. 14-24.</ref> Some infrared detectors also look for flame flicker, typically at 5 to 30 Hz.<ref name="DU-14-24" />
The optical principles are described for the [[flame detector]] used in fire detection. Ultraviolet detectors respond to radiation of about 0.1 to 0.35 µm, typically with a vacuum photodiode Geiger-Muller tube that passes a burst of current for each photon received. Infrared detectors often use the 4.35 µm carbon dioxide band, which only carbon-containing fuels emit strongly, so they do not respond to hydrogen or sulphur flames.<ref name="DU-14-24">Dungan (2008a), p. 14-24.</ref> Some infrared detectors also look for flame flicker, typically at 5 to 30 Hz.<ref name="DU-14-24" />
[[File:fse-flame-safeguard-v2.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Wavelength axis with the ultraviolet band from 0.1 to 0.35 micrometres and the infrared carbon dioxide band at 4.35 micrometres marked|Wavelength bands used by ultraviolet and infrared flame detectors.]]
[[File:fse-flame-safeguard-v2.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Wavelength axis with the ultraviolet band from 0.1 to 0.35 micrometres and the infrared carbon dioxide band at 4.35 micrometres marked|Wavelength bands used by ultraviolet and infrared flame detectors.]]


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== Applications in codes and practice ==
== Applications in codes and practice ==
Flame safeguards appear throughout the handbook's chapters on fuel-fired equipment. For an [[Industrial oven and furnace]], Ostrowski, describing US practice under NFPA 86, states that all safety devices must be listed for the service intended.<ref name="OS-8-77" /> In multiburner Class B furnaces, combustion safeguards with flame supervision should be applied, interlocked with the ventilation, fuel supply, combustion air and safety shutoff valve.<ref name="OS-8-81">Ostrowski (2008a), p. 8-81.</ref> Ostrowski names the improper selection of combustion safeguards among the causes of past failures of such equipment.<ref name="OS-8-71">Ostrowski (2008a), p. 8-71.</ref> Gas- and oil-fired molten salt bath furnaces must have an approved flame safeguard for each burner, interlocked to shut off fuel to the affected burners and to sound an alarm.<ref name="OS-8-100">Ostrowski (2008b), p. 8-100.</ref> Dryers use the same burner controls, with flame failure protection, preventilation of the combustion chamber and manual restart.<ref name="OS-8-91">Ostrowski (2008a), p. 8-91.</ref>
Flame safeguards appear throughout the handbook's chapters on fuel-fired equipment. For an [[industrial oven and furnace]], Ostrowski, describing US practice under NFPA 86, states that all safety devices must be listed for the service intended.<ref name="OS-8-77" /> In multiburner Class B furnaces, combustion safeguards with flame supervision should be applied, interlocked with the ventilation, fuel supply, combustion air and safety shutoff valve.<ref name="OS-8-81">Ostrowski (2008a), p. 8-81.</ref> Ostrowski names the improper selection of combustion safeguards among the causes of past failures of such equipment.<ref name="OS-8-71">Ostrowski (2008a), p. 8-71.</ref> Gas- and oil-fired molten salt bath furnaces must have an approved flame safeguard for each burner, interlocked to shut off fuel to the affected burners and to sound an alarm.<ref name="OS-8-100">Ostrowski (2008b), p. 8-100.</ref> Dryers use the same burner controls, with flame failure protection, preventilation of the combustion chamber and manual restart.<ref name="OS-8-91">Ostrowski (2008a), p. 8-91.</ref>


Other equipment follows the same pattern. Incinerator burners should have automatic ignition systems, flame safeguards and management systems.<ref name="DG-11-9">Doucet and Gilyeat (2008), p. 11-9.</ref> In mining and mineral processing, the lack of fuel burner management controls on fired heaters, dryers, roasters and boilers has contributed to internal explosions. Such equipment is usually protected by process controls, burner management systems and operator training rather than by fixed explosion protection, for reasons of economics.<ref name="MO-9-216">L. J. Moore (2008), p. 9-216.</ref><ref name="MO-9-220">L. J. Moore (2008), p. 9-220.</ref> Under the US boat standards summarised by Eberly (2008), gas-fuelled appliances must have flame failure controls that prevent gas flow when the flame is extinguished.<ref name="EB-21-156" />
Other equipment follows the same pattern. Incinerator burners should have automatic ignition systems, flame safeguards and management systems.<ref name="DG-11-9">Doucet and Gilyeat (2008), p. 11-9.</ref> In mining and mineral processing, the lack of fuel burner management controls on fired heaters, dryers, roasters and boilers has contributed to internal explosions. Such equipment is usually protected by process controls, burner management systems and operator training rather than by fixed explosion protection, for reasons of economics.<ref name="MO-9-216">L. J. Moore (2008), p. 9-216.</ref><ref name="MO-9-220">L. J. Moore (2008), p. 9-220.</ref> Under the US boat standards summarised by Eberly (2008), gas-fuelled appliances must have flame failure controls that prevent gas flow when the flame is extinguished.<ref name="EB-21-156" />


Domestic gas appliances use related safety shutoffs. Listed unvented room heaters, which discharge their combustion products into the room instead of through [[Gas appliance venting]], carry an oxygen depletion safety shutoff. It stops the gas supply if the oxygen in the room falls below about 18 %.<ref name="GW-10-41">Gore Willse (2008a), p. 10-41.</ref> This device senses the atmosphere rather than the flame, but serves the same aim of stopping fuel before a hazardous condition develops.
Domestic gas appliances use related safety shutoffs. Listed unvented room heaters, which discharge their combustion products into the room instead of through [[gas appliance venting]], carry an oxygen depletion safety shutoff. It stops the gas supply if the oxygen in the room falls below about 18 %.<ref name="GW-10-41">Gore Willse (2008a), p. 10-41.</ref> This device senses the atmosphere rather than the flame, but serves the same aim of stopping fuel before a hazardous condition develops.


== Interlocks and burner management ==
== Interlocks and burner management ==
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== Limits and common failures ==
== Limits and common failures ==
A flame safeguard reduces but does not remove the risk of an [[Explosion]] in fuel-fired equipment. Ostrowski stresses that safety equipment cannot in itself ensure absolute safety, that there is no substitute for a well-trained operator, and that highly repetitive cycling of a safety device can shorten its life.<ref name="OS-8-74">Ostrowski (2008a), p. 8-74.</ref> After shutdown, fuel from open or leaking valves, or from safety shutoff valves that do not close tightly, can accumulate and be ignited by hot refractory at the next start-up. The first step of the fully supervised start-up sequence is to determine that all fuel valves are closed and not leaking.<ref name="OS-8-77" />
A flame safeguard reduces but does not remove the risk of an [[explosion]] in fuel-fired equipment. Ostrowski stresses that safety equipment cannot in itself ensure absolute safety, that there is no substitute for a well-trained operator, and that highly repetitive cycling of a safety device can shorten its life.<ref name="OS-8-74">Ostrowski (2008a), p. 8-74.</ref> After shutdown, fuel from open or leaking valves, or from safety shutoff valves that do not close tightly, can accumulate and be ignited by hot refractory at the next start-up. The first step of the fully supervised start-up sequence is to determine that all fuel valves are closed and not leaking.<ref name="OS-8-77" />


Gore Willse warns that safety controls are preset by the manufacturer or installer. Altering these settings or bypassing a control can have serious consequences, and a faulty control should be replaced by a similar model with the same setting.<ref name="GW-10-19" /> Listed appliances come with all required safety controls, whereas controls for burner systems assembled in the field should be entrusted only to specialists.<ref name="GW-10-19" /> Sensor limits matter as well. Infrared fire detectors that use the carbon dioxide band do not respond to hydrogen or sulphur flames, and flame detectors are not useful in a fluidised bed boiler.<ref name="DU-14-24" /><ref name="MA-10-103" /> For ovens, Ostrowski recommends testing the operating and supervisory controls preferably once a week, with a more thorough check by an expert probably once a year.<ref name="OS-8-79">Ostrowski (2008a), p. 8-79.</ref>
Gore Willse warns that safety controls are preset by the manufacturer or installer. Altering these settings or bypassing a control can have serious consequences, and a faulty control should be replaced by a similar model with the same setting.<ref name="GW-10-19" /> Listed appliances come with all required safety controls, whereas controls for burner systems assembled in the field should be entrusted only to specialists.<ref name="GW-10-19" /> Sensor limits matter as well. Infrared fire detectors that use the carbon dioxide band do not respond to hydrogen or sulphur flames, and flame detectors are not useful in a fluidised bed boiler.<ref name="DU-14-24" /><ref name="MA-10-103" /> For ovens, Ostrowski recommends testing the operating and supervisory controls preferably once a week, with a more thorough check by an expert probably once a year.<ref name="OS-8-79">Ostrowski (2008a), p. 8-79.</ref>

Latest revision as of 00:35, 16 November 2026

A flame safeguard is a burner control that senses whether a flame is present and shuts off the fuel when the flame fails to light or goes out. The Fire Protection Handbook (2008) describes such devices under several names. Oil burners have primary safety controls, gas appliances automatic gas ignition systems, and industrial ovens and furnaces combustion safeguards or flame detection units.[1][2] The chapter on gases calls the same function a flame failure device.[3]

The device exists because unburned fuel that keeps flowing into a combustion chamber can form a flammable mixture with air, and a later ignition of that mixture could result in an explosion.[1] A flame safeguard is one part of a larger system of purge timers, interlocks and safety shutoff valves. In large boilers that system is called a burner management system.[4] The requirements quoted below are those of US codes and practice as summarised in the 2008 handbook, not current or universal rules.

Terminology and scope

The handbook does not use a single term. In the chapter on heating systems, Gore Willse describes required primary safety controls that "cause the fuel to shut off in the event of ignition failure or flame failure". Both these controls and the automatic gas ignition systems of gas appliances "sense the presence or absence of flame".[1] In the chapter on industrial heat utilisation equipment, Ostrowski lists "flame detection units (combustion safeguards)" among the fuel supervisory controls of ovens and furnaces.[2] The chapters on gases and on marine vessels speak of flame failure devices that stop the gas flow if the flame is extinguished for any reason.[3][5]

The term burner management system describes something broader. The boiler chapter speaks of "modern burner management and flame detection systems" that assure proper sequencing and safe operation of the burner and fuel supply.[4] The flame safeguard is therefore the sensing and shutoff core inside a wider control system that also handles purging, light-off sequence and interlocks.

Why flame supervision is needed

Gore Willse states that the uncontrolled flow of unburned fuel into appliances and burners can lead to serious consequences. With pulverised coal, gas or oil, a combustible mixture could collect within the appliance and explode if ignited, which is why certain controls are required for all fuel burners.[1] With gas, a drop in supply pressure can put the flame out, and when normal pressure returns unburned gas may continue to flow. A rise in pressure can push the flow velocity through the burner above the flame propagation rate and force the flame away from the burner.[1]

The physics of this behaviour is that of premixed flames, which the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission's fire dynamics guide places mainly in engineered combustion systems such as boilers, furnaces, process heaters and gas burners.[6] Simmons explains that in turbulent flow the local gas velocity fluctuates: where it is high the flame front moves away from the burner, and where it is low it moves towards it. If the local flow velocity in a tube is too low to hold a stationary flame, the flame travels back through the mixture, provided the mixture lies within its flammability limits.[7] Ostrowski draws the practical conclusion for ovens: a mixture velocity that is too high causes blow-off, and one that is too low causes flashback.[2]

The danger grows with plant size. Mattern, Catania and Ehrlich write that a large boiler furnace is "always just a few seconds away from catastrophe" if fuel, air or ignition is interrupted. They credit flame detection, condition monitoring and other safety systems with helping operators keep this margin.[8] In a multiburner furnace, the undetected loss of flame at one burner can let an explosive mixture build up that other burners then ignite.[4] This failure mode is described under Boiler furnace explosion. For pulverised coal boilers the handbook calls for a means of flame detection at each burner.[9]

How a flame safeguard works

The basic function is a closed loop between a flame sensor, a control unit and a fuel shutoff valve. When the sensor reports no flame during ignition or firing, the control shuts off all fuel to the burner within a prescribed period.[1] Primary safety controls usually also start and stop the burner in response to demand from a thermostat or process controller. Controls for commercial and industrial burners may add a purge period in which air flows through the appliance before fuel is admitted. The control does not admit main burner fuel until it has proved the ignition flame.[1]

In a fully supervised industrial oven, the same logic forms the last step of a start-up sequence. The fuel valves supplying the burner, including the safety shutoff valve, open only after the combustion safeguard shows that the pilot flame has been ignited and that fuel and air pressures are correct.[2] If the burner flame is not promptly established, the safety shutoff valve closes and the entire cycle must start again from the beginning. During operation, any abnormal condition shuts down the entire system in the same way.[2]

Schematic of a burner with flame sensor, control unit and two safety shutoff valves in the fuel line, forming a closed loop
Basic loop of a flame safeguard on a gas burner.

The shutoff valves that the safeguard controls are designed to fail safe. Gore Willse states that safety shutoff valves should not be easy to restrain or block open and should close automatically when de-energised, whatever the position of a damper lever or reset handle. Electrically operated valves should not need power to close, and pressure-operated valves should close when the operating pressure fails.[10] The control circuits are two-wire circuits with one side grounded, not exceeding a nominal 120 V, with all switches in the ungrounded line, so that an accidental ground cannot bypass a safety control.[10] A burner that cannot restart safely by itself must require a manual restart after any control has extinguished its flame.[10]

Flame sensing

The handbook chapters on burners describe what a safeguard must sense rather than how its sensor works. For pulverised coal burners in boilers, a means of flame detection is needed at each burner. The ability to distinguish the main flame from the igniter flame is important, especially when starting and stopping a burner.[9] In fluidised bed boilers, flame detectors are not useful. Instead, in-bed thermocouples prove that the bed is hot enough to ignite the fuel, and these readings are reliable only while the bed is actively fluidised and well mixed.[11]

The optical principles are described for the flame detector used in fire detection. Ultraviolet detectors respond to radiation of about 0.1 to 0.35 µm, typically with a vacuum photodiode Geiger-Muller tube that passes a burst of current for each photon received. Infrared detectors often use the 4.35 µm carbon dioxide band, which only carbon-containing fuels emit strongly, so they do not respond to hydrogen or sulphur flames.[12] Some infrared detectors also look for flame flicker, typically at 5 to 30 Hz.[12]

Wavelength axis with the ultraviolet band from 0.1 to 0.35 micrometres and the infrared carbon dioxide band at 4.35 micrometres marked
Wavelength bands used by ultraviolet and infrared flame detectors.

Burner arrangements with many small flames need special solutions. For a continuous line burner, the handbook shows an approved combustion safeguard that supervises the pilot during lighting-off and the main flame alone during firing. A group of radiant-cup burners with reliable flame propagation from one burner to the next can be supervised by a single flame-sensing element.[13] Multiburner combustion safeguards had become available by 2008, allowing flame supervision for each burner where previously a supervising cock was the only safeguard.[13]

Two burner layouts: a continuous line burner with pilot and main flame sensors, and a row of radiant-cup burners with one flame sensor
Supervision of continuous line burners and of radiant-cup burner groups.

Applications in codes and practice

Flame safeguards appear throughout the handbook's chapters on fuel-fired equipment. For an industrial oven and furnace, Ostrowski, describing US practice under NFPA 86, states that all safety devices must be listed for the service intended.[2] In multiburner Class B furnaces, combustion safeguards with flame supervision should be applied, interlocked with the ventilation, fuel supply, combustion air and safety shutoff valve.[14] Ostrowski names the improper selection of combustion safeguards among the causes of past failures of such equipment.[15] Gas- and oil-fired molten salt bath furnaces must have an approved flame safeguard for each burner, interlocked to shut off fuel to the affected burners and to sound an alarm.[16] Dryers use the same burner controls, with flame failure protection, preventilation of the combustion chamber and manual restart.[17]

Other equipment follows the same pattern. Incinerator burners should have automatic ignition systems, flame safeguards and management systems.[18] In mining and mineral processing, the lack of fuel burner management controls on fired heaters, dryers, roasters and boilers has contributed to internal explosions. Such equipment is usually protected by process controls, burner management systems and operator training rather than by fixed explosion protection, for reasons of economics.[19][20] Under the US boat standards summarised by Eberly (2008), gas-fuelled appliances must have flame failure controls that prevent gas flow when the flame is extinguished.[5]

Domestic gas appliances use related safety shutoffs. Listed unvented room heaters, which discharge their combustion products into the room instead of through gas appliance venting, carry an oxygen depletion safety shutoff. It stops the gas supply if the oxygen in the room falls below about 18 %.[21] This device senses the atmosphere rather than the flame, but serves the same aim of stopping fuel before a hazardous condition develops.

Interlocks and burner management

A flame safeguard alone cannot detect every unsafe condition, so codes combine it with interlocks. Gore Willse lists interlocks that shut off fuel when a draft fan or air compressor fails and that stop oil at once if atomising air or steam fails. Pressure interlocks shut off the main burners when fuel pressure is too low or too high. Oil burners that need heated oil add a low oil temperature switch.[10] In the ovens chapter, partial or total failure of combustion air can cause an unstable flame and flame failure, so fuel must shut off with manual reset if the air supply fails.[2]

For large boilers, NFPA 85 is the governing US code named in the 2008 handbook. The boiler chapter states that a system of interlocks should prevent improper sequencing by operators and shut down operation after critical malfunctions.[22] New boilers should not be fired until adequate safeguards have been installed and tested. Bypassing safety interlocks, for example with electrical jumpers, should never be permitted by the contractor or the owner.[22] Bypassing burner management or flame detection equipment places a greater burden on operators, who may not be able to monitor every component of a modern boiler.[4] The safety valve and interlock arrangements of industrial gas and oil burners also include vent valves, which may be required above 3,663 kW (12,500,000 Btu/h).[23]

Ladder diagram with flame relay, air, atomising, pressure and oil temperature interlocks in series powering the safety shutoff valves
Interlocks in series with the flame safeguard.

Limits and common failures

A flame safeguard reduces but does not remove the risk of an explosion in fuel-fired equipment. Ostrowski stresses that safety equipment cannot in itself ensure absolute safety, that there is no substitute for a well-trained operator, and that highly repetitive cycling of a safety device can shorten its life.[24] After shutdown, fuel from open or leaking valves, or from safety shutoff valves that do not close tightly, can accumulate and be ignited by hot refractory at the next start-up. The first step of the fully supervised start-up sequence is to determine that all fuel valves are closed and not leaking.[2]

Gore Willse warns that safety controls are preset by the manufacturer or installer. Altering these settings or bypassing a control can have serious consequences, and a faulty control should be replaced by a similar model with the same setting.[10] Listed appliances come with all required safety controls, whereas controls for burner systems assembled in the field should be entrusted only to specialists.[10] Sensor limits matter as well. Infrared fire detectors that use the carbon dioxide band do not respond to hydrogen or sulphur flames, and flame detectors are not useful in a fluidised bed boiler.[12][11] For ovens, Ostrowski recommends testing the operating and supervisory controls preferably once a week, with a more thorough check by an expert probably once a year.[25]

See also

Notes

  1. ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 Gore Willse (2008a), pp. 10-17–10-18.
  2. ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 Ostrowski (2008a), p. 8-77.
  3. ↑ 3.0 3.1 Lemoff (2008), p. 6-175.
  4. ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 Mattern et al. (2008), p. 10-101.
  5. ↑ 5.0 5.1 Eberly (2008), pp. 21-156–21-157.
  6. ↑ Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. 3-12.
  7. ↑ Simmons (2002), p. 1-146.
  8. ↑ Mattern et al. (2008), p. 10-92.
  9. ↑ 9.0 9.1 Mattern et al. (2008), p. 10-99.
  10. ↑ 10.0 10.1 10.2 10.3 10.4 10.5 Gore Willse (2008a), p. 10-19.
  11. ↑ 11.0 11.1 Mattern et al. (2008), p. 10-103.
  12. ↑ 12.0 12.1 12.2 Dungan (2008a), p. 14-24.
  13. ↑ 13.0 13.1 Ostrowski (2008a), pp. 8-78–8-79.
  14. ↑ Ostrowski (2008a), p. 8-81.
  15. ↑ Ostrowski (2008a), p. 8-71.
  16. ↑ Ostrowski (2008b), p. 8-100.
  17. ↑ Ostrowski (2008a), p. 8-91.
  18. ↑ Doucet and Gilyeat (2008), p. 11-9.
  19. ↑ L. J. Moore (2008), p. 9-216.
  20. ↑ L. J. Moore (2008), p. 9-220.
  21. ↑ Gore Willse (2008a), p. 10-41.
  22. ↑ 22.0 22.1 Mattern et al. (2008), p. 10-104.
  23. ↑ Gore Willse (2008a), p. 10-20.
  24. ↑ Ostrowski (2008a), p. 8-74.
  25. ↑ Ostrowski (2008a), p. 8-79.

References

  • Doucet, L. G., & Gilyeat, S. S. (2008). Waste handling and control. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 11-3–11-25). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Dungan, K. W. (2008a). Automatic fire detectors. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 14-15–14-28). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Eberly, R. (2008). Marine vessels. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 21-151–21-185). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Gore Willse, P. J. (2008a). Heating systems and appliances. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 10-9–10-56). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Iqbal, N., & Salley, M. H. (2004). Fire Dynamics Tools (FDTs): Quantitative fire hazard analysis methods for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Fire Protection Inspection Program (NUREG-1805). U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
  • Lemoff, T. C. (2008). Gases. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 6-165–6-186). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Mattern, L. J., Catania, E., & Ehrlich, S. (2008). Boiler furnaces. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 10-91–10-104). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Moore, L. J. (2008). Mining and mineral processing. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 9-203–9-223). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Ostrowski, R. (2008a). Industrial and commercial heat utilization equipment. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 8-71–8-92). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Ostrowski, R. (2008b). Oil quenching and molten salt baths. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 8-93–8-103). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Simmons, R. F. (2002). Premixed burning. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 1-144–1-154). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.