Contents
Radioactive material is material that contains radionuclides and emits ionising radiation, such as alpha and beta particles or gamma rays. In the 2008 handbook's account of United States transport rules, a material counts as radioactive (hazard Class 7) when both its activity concentration and the total activity of the shipment exceed specified values.[1][2] Such materials are used in nuclear power, medicine, industrial controls, research and weapons, and even in household ionisation smoke detectors.[3] For fire protection, the key point is that radioactive elements and compounds have the same fire and explosion hazards as the same materials when not radioactive.[4] A fire adds a different danger: it can turn the material into smoke, dust and vapour that spread contamination through the building and beyond. Radiation cannot be detected by any human sense, so instruments are needed to find it.[4]
Fire protection for these materials therefore aims to prevent a release or loss of control during a fire and during its extinguishment. Fire fighters need respiratory protection and radiation monitoring, and contaminated smoke and runoff water must be controlled.[4][5] In the United States, NFPA 801, Standard for Fire Protection for Facilities Handling Radioactive Materials, first published in 1955, covers most licensed facilities other than power plants.[6][7]
Sources and forms
Radioactive materials arise in many places. Nuclear reactors can produce radioactive materials in the reactor or in material exposed to its radiation.[8] In particle accelerators, certain target materials become radioactive when bombarded with atomic particles, so radiation monitoring is needed during fire fighting there.[7] Radioactive metals include a few that occur naturally, such as uranium and thorium, and others produced artificially, such as plutonium and cobalt-60.[9] Hospitals and laboratories widely use radioactive isotopes of iodine, caesium, iridium, phosphorus and gallium for diagnosis and treatment.[10] At the small end of the scale, an ionisation smoke detector contains a very small amount of an alpha emitter that makes the air in its sensing chamber conductive.[11]
The strength of a source is expressed as its activity, the number of disintegrations per unit time. In SI units, activity has the unit "1 per second" (s−1). The older unit, the curie, equals exactly 3.70 × 1010 disintegrations per second.[12]
The kind of radiation decides how materials are handled. Small amounts of alpha or beta emitters need little or no shielding, and alpha emitters are dangerous mainly if they become airborne. Gamma emitters are handled behind heavy shielding.[13] The damage to a person depends on the type of radiation, how much of the body is exposed and whether the dose is received once or accumulated over time. Injuries from excessive exposure may not show for days, weeks, months or even years.[14]
Behaviour in a fire
Radioactivity neither influences nor is influenced by the fire properties of a metal, and radioactive compounds likewise burn as their non-radioactive forms do.[9][4] Most radioactive materials introduce little or no fire or explosion hazard of their own. The fire hazard of a facility that handles them is therefore set by the combustibility of the building and its furnishings and by the non-radioactive chemicals present.[4] What fire changes is the form of the material. Because fire cannot alter radioactivity, radiation continues wherever the material is spread during a fire.[9] Under fire conditions, vapours and dusts can form that contaminate the building of origin, neighbouring buildings and outdoor areas.[4] The hazard also depends on whether the material is a solid, liquid or gas, and on the container in which it is kept.
Contamination can cause more property damage than the fire itself. This damage is not physical: it is radioactive contamination that has to be cleaned up to avoid exposure.[9] Contamination can sift through openings and ventilation systems as dust or vapour and spread through a structure. People walking carelessly through a contaminated area can carry it into clean areas.[15] Whole buildings, land and equipment can be made unusable for long periods. Cleaning methods include vacuum cleaning with high-efficiency particulate filters on the exhaust, hosing, washing with detergents, sand or vacuum blasting and, for alpha contamination, covering with paint.[15]
The handbook names two ways in which radioactivity increases fire losses. Harmful radiation, or possible criticality, can interfere with manual fire fighting. Salvage and the return to normal operations can be delayed because buildings, equipment and materials must first be decontaminated.[5] In Tokai, Japan, a chemical reaction explosion on 11 March 1997 involved asphalt and sodium salts, and 37 people received some radioactive contamination.[16]
Radioactive metals
Uranium, thorium and plutonium are combustible as well as radioactive. They ignite easily as chips, turnings and fines, and react slowly with water to form hydrogen.[17] Fines collected under water in containers larger than 3.8 L (1 gal) can catch fire, because the water cannot cool the fines at the centre of the mass. Massive uranium is a low fire risk unless exposed to a severe and prolonged external fire. Once ignited it burns very slowly: a rod of 25.4 mm (1 in.) diameter takes about a day to burn out.[17] In still air, its dense oxide smoke tends to settle near the burning metal. Burning uranium reacts violently with carbon tetrachloride, 1,1,1-trichloroethane, the halons and many halon replacements.[17]
Plutonium is somewhat easier to ignite than uranium and is normally handled by remote control in an inert gas. As dust or chips it can ignite spontaneously in air, and the massive metal ignites at about 600 °C (1,112 °F).[17] Plutonium oxide smoke is harder to control and more hazardous than uranium oxide smoke. Water is generally not recommended on burning radioactive metals, because the steam spreads contamination through the fire area and beyond.[17] Water should not be applied continuously, and control of the contaminated runoff is a further complication.[18] Plutonium that ignites spontaneously is normally allowed to burn under conditions that limit the spread of both fire and contamination. Facilities that contain radioactive materials are nevertheless generally protected by automatic sprinklers, and prefire planning is particularly important.[17]
Fire tests have shown that an air gap of about 100 mm (4 in.) between containers of chips and turnings can stop a fire spreading from one container to the next.[17] Manual intervention is not recommended without self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA), because inhalation and ingestion are the worst types of exposure. NUREG-1805 adds that radioactive metals should, where possible, not be processed or stored with other pyrophoric materials, because a fire would then spread contamination widely.[19]
Facilities and equipment
Most equipment for handling radioactive materials falls into four types: benches, hoods, glove boxes and hot cells.[7] Benches serve for small amounts of alpha or beta emitters that will not easily become airborne. Glove boxes contain alpha emitters, which present little external radiation hazard but a serious problem if they become airborne.[14] Hot cells are heavily shielded enclosures in which gamma emitters are handled by remote manipulators. A fire inside a hood or glove box can raise the pressure enough to breach the enclosure. Any extinguishing agent introduced must not overpressurise it or increase the risk of an accidental nuclear chain reaction (criticality) where fissile material is present.[14]
The fire hazard of such facilities can be reduced substantially by a fire-resistive building, noncombustible finishes and strict control of flammable liquids and other chemicals.[4] One feature needs particular care: the exhaust duct system for contaminated vapours, gases and dusts can spread contamination to other parts of the building during a fire unless it is properly arranged. In the handbook's guidance for a chemical laboratory, laboratories that use radioactive materials must be identified in the facility emergency plan, and their entrances should carry warning signs.[20] Combustibles in nuclear power plants include low-level radioactive waste such as paper, plastic, protective clothing, rubber shoes and gloves, as well as bitumen used to condition compacted waste.[21]
Automatic sprinklers are strongly preferred where radioactive materials are handled. The handbook states that there can be no question about their desirability in radiation laboratories, because manual fire fighting would expose people to radiation.[4] Sprinklers or water spray systems are the first choice in reactor plants, radiation machine buildings and facilities handling radioactive materials. They keep working under conditions that would make approach by fire fighters impossible, and they use relatively little water.[5]
Contaminated water must be collected, so such spaces need waterproofed floors and controlled drainage. Where fissile materials are present, some criticality specialists object to water, because water moderates and reflects neutrons.[22] The handbook concludes that sprinkler protection can and should be provided in most such cases, since criticality analyses can include the effect of the water. Reactor sites are treated further in nuclear facility fire protection.
Fire fighting and radiation exposure
Fire fighters at these sites must be trained and given suitable protective clothing and respiratory protection. Radiological advisors with measuring instruments should guide them, and dosimeters record each person's dose.[5] The handbook calls the use of SCBA a "hard-and-fast rule" whenever airborne radioactivity is possible. Fumes, dust, smoke and gases from a fire may carry the material, so the fire toxicity of the smoke is joined by a radiological hazard.[23] Survey meters, personal dosimeters and pocket alarms give immediate readings, but film badges do not.[23]
Emergency exposures may exceed the limits for people who work with radiation every day. The handbook quotes recommendations of the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP Report No. 116, 1993). For a life-saving action, such as rescue of injured persons, the planned whole-body dose should not exceed 100 rem.[24] For entry to protect facilities, stop further releases or control fires, it should not exceed 25 rem, a quarter of the life-saving value. These recommendations apply to a single emergency, and further exposure is not recommended. A rescue that would combine external and internal exposure is usually not attempted.[23]
Plans for handling fires must be made well in advance, and they cannot rely on simply calling the public fire department.[5] The plant emergency organisation must preplan operations with the local fire department and arrange to limit and clean up contamination. In-plant fire brigades are recommended where atomic energy is a factor.
The emergency plan of the Fire Department of New York from 1994, reproduced in the World Trade Center investigation, placed incidents involving radioactive materials in its highest response level. It also required the city health department to be notified.[25] For advice in the United States, responders can contact the Department of Energy.[26] The 2007 edition of NFPA 1971, as described in the handbook, introduced optional requirements for protecting structural fire fighters against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear terrorism agents, including radiological particulates.[27]
Radioactive waste
The 2008 handbook discusses radioactive waste under hazardous waste control.[28] Most radioactive waste consists of ordinary materials contaminated with radionuclides in concentrations from parts per billion to as much as 50 %; this is called low-level waste. Its biological hazard comes from penetrating and ionising radiation rather than chemical toxicity.[28] The long-term hazard depends on the toxicity and decay rate of each radionuclide, not simply on the level of radioactivity.
Nuclear power plants produce waste such as spent fuel, contaminated instruments, piping, clothing, gloves and cleaning rags. Research laboratories and uranium mine tailings are further sources.[10] In the handbook's 2008 United States account, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulated packaging and the Department of Transportation (DOT) regulated transport. Combustible radioactive waste should not be allowed to accumulate and should not be stored near an air intake.[10] If combustion products of waste with long-lived radionuclides spread through air-conditioning or compressed-air systems, extensive decontamination may be needed.
Some short-lived radioactive waste is retained while it decays. In the handbook's 2008 account, radioactive medical waste with a half-life of less than 65 days could be stored securely for at least ten half-lives before disposal as sanitary waste.[10] After ten half-lives the activity has fallen to one part in 1,024, about 0.1 % of its starting value. For a hypothetical 60-day half-life, ten half-lives span 600 days, or about 1.6 years. In the handbook's account, most spent nuclear fuel was stored in deep water pools at reactor sites, and no permanent repository had been established as of 2006.[10]
Transport, labelling and security
The handbook gives a transport packaging principle: radioactive materials should present no health hazard in normal transport and should not be released in an accident.[29] In the hazard class list of the handbook's hazardous materials chapter, Class 7 examples are cobalt and uranium hexafluoride. They are described as possibly causing burns and biological effects, in the form of energy or matter.[30] Class 7 appears in the rail placard list, and protective overpacks for radioactive materials are among the containers responders may meet.[31][32] The marking system is described in hazardous materials placarding.
Radioactive material is also a security concern. NFPA 472, as cited in the handbook, includes in its definition of weapons of mass destruction any weapon designed to release radiation or radioactivity at a level dangerous to human life.[33] Such material can come from medical sources, from fuel or waste of power generation or weapons manufacturing, or from nuclear weapons. Of most concern is a "dirty bomb" with enough radioactive waste to pose a significant hazard in a building or a larger area.[34]
Modelling and limits
Fire models can follow released radioactive material. The CFAST zone model lets the user track a trace species carried by fire-induced flows, which its guide names as being of interest for radiological releases.[35] The Fire Dynamics Simulator models the deposition of aerosols such as radionuclides on surfaces. Its agglomeration model is based on VICTORIA, an NRC code for radioactive aerosol transport in severe accidents.[36] Fire risk studies of nuclear plants also record releases. In one event, hydrogen in a radioactive waste gas system exploded, broke open a bolted manway and released radioactive gas.[37]
The guidance summarised here describes United States practice around 2007 and uses the units of its sources, such as rem and curie. The handbook treats radiation protection only briefly. It refers to the radiological authorities having jurisdiction, which have set extremely low limits on concentrations of radioisotopes in air and water.[23] Those maximum permissible concentrations apply to continuous exposure and lie far below what could be tolerated in a single emergency. Detailed requirements are in NFPA 801, of which NUREG-1805 lists the 2003 edition.[38]
See also
Notes
- ↑ C. J. Wright (2008a), p. 13-120.
- ↑ Christman (2008), p. 6-154.
- ↑ Holmes (2008a), p. 9-191.
- ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7 Davenport (2008), p. 7-53.
- ↑ 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 Holmes (2008a), p. 9-199.
- ↑ Holmes (2008a), p. 9-193.
- ↑ 7.0 7.1 7.2 Holmes (2008a), p. 9-196.
- ↑ Holmes (2008a), p. 9-192.
- ↑ 9.0 9.1 9.2 9.3 Christman (2008), p. 6-161.
- ↑ 10.0 10.1 10.2 10.3 10.4 Severson (2008), p. 7-67.
- ↑ Dungan (2008a), p. 14-20.
- ↑ DiNenno et al. (2002), pp. A-1 and A-6.
- ↑ Holmes (2008a), pp. 9-196–9-197.
- ↑ 14.0 14.1 14.2 Holmes (2008a), p. 9-197.
- ↑ 15.0 15.1 Holmes (2008a), pp. 9-198–9-199.
- ↑ Zalosh (2008), p. 2-102.
- ↑ 17.0 17.1 17.2 17.3 17.4 17.5 17.6 Christman (2008), p. 6-162.
- ↑ Frank (2008), p. 17-41.
- ↑ Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. B-29.
- ↑ Anderson (2008a), pp. 9-162–9-163.
- ↑ Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. 1-6.
- ↑ Holmes (2008a), p. 9-200.
- ↑ 23.0 23.1 23.2 23.3 Holmes (2008a), p. 9-198.
- ↑ National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (1993), as cited in Holmes (2008a), p. 9-198.
- ↑ Lawson and Vettori (2005), Appendix A.
- ↑ C. J. Wright (2008a), p. 13-130.
- ↑ Teele (2008), p. 12-148.
- ↑ 28.0 28.1 Doucet and Gilyeat (2008), p. 11-13.
- ↑ Davenport (2008), p. 7-54.
- ↑ C. J. Wright (2008a), p. 13-119.
- ↑ C. J. Wright (2008b), p. 21-112.
- ↑ C. J. Wright (2008a), p. 13-126.
- ↑ C. J. Wright (2008a), p. 13-118.
- ↑ Meacham and Galioto (2008), p. 1-114.
- ↑ Peacock et al. (2026), p. 12.
- ↑ McGrattan et al. (2026), pp. 87 and 90.
- ↑ Nowlen et al. (2005b), p. N-4.
- ↑ Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. E-9.
References
- Anderson, R. R. (2008a). Fire protection of laboratories using chemicals. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 9-157–9-166). National Fire Protection Association.
- Christman, T. (2008). Metals. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 6-153–6-164). National Fire Protection Association.
- Davenport, J. A. (2008). Storage and handling of chemicals. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 7-43–7-55). National Fire Protection Association.
- DiNenno, P. J., Drysdale, D., Beyler, C. L., Walton, W. D., Custer, R. L. P., Hall, J. R., Jr., & Watts, J. M., Jr. (Eds.). (2002). SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed.). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
- Doucet, L. G., & Gilyeat, S. S. (2008). Waste handling and control. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 11-3–11-25). National Fire Protection Association.
- Dungan, K. W. (2008a). Automatic fire detectors. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 14-15–14-28). National Fire Protection Association.
- Frank, J. A. (2008). Characteristics and hazards of water and water additives for fire suppression. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 17-31–17-43). National Fire Protection Association.
- Holmes, W. D. (2008a). Nuclear facilities. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 9-191–9-201). National Fire Protection Association.
- Iqbal, N., & Salley, M. H. (2004). Fire Dynamics Tools (FDTs): Quantitative fire hazard analysis methods for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Fire Protection Inspection Program (NUREG-1805). U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
- Lawson, J. R., & Vettori, R. L. (2005). The emergency response operations (NIST NCSTAR 1-8). National Institute of Standards and Technology.
- McGrattan, K., Hostikka, S., Floyd, J., McDermott, R., Vanella, M., Mueller, E., & Paul, C. (2026). Fire Dynamics Simulator technical reference guide: Vol. 1. Mathematical model (6th ed., NIST Special Publication 1018-1). National Institute of Standards and Technology. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.1018
- Meacham, B. J., & Galioto, C. (2008). Protecting against extreme events. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 1-109–1-136). National Fire Protection Association.
- Nowlen, S. P., Najafi, B., Wyant, F. J., Forester, J., Kazarians, M., Kolaczkowski, A., Joglar, F., Funk, D., Hannaman, G., & Anoba, R. (2005b). EPRI/NRC-RES fire PRA methodology for nuclear power facilities: Vol. 2. Detailed methodology (NUREG/CR-6850; EPRI 1011989). Electric Power Research Institute; U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research.
- Peacock, R. D., McGrattan, K. B., Forney, G. P., & Reneke, P. A. (2026). CFAST – Consolidated Fire and Smoke Transport: Vol. 1. Technical reference guide (Version 7, NIST Technical Note 1889v1). National Institute of Standards and Technology. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.TN.1889v1
- Severson, P. R. (2008). Hazardous waste control. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 7-57–7-69). National Fire Protection Association.
- Teele, B. W. (2008). Fire and emergency services protective clothing and protective equipment. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 12-143–12-160). National Fire Protection Association.
- Wright, C. J. (2008a). Managing the response to hazardous material incidents. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 13-117–13-144). National Fire Protection Association.
- Wright, C. J. (2008b). Rail transportation systems. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 21-109–21-134). National Fire Protection Association.
- Zalosh, R. (2008). Explosions. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 2-93–2-106). National Fire Protection Association.