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Contents
  1. 1Terms and definitions
  2. 2Scale of the problem in the United States
  3. 3Who is involved
  4. 4Motives and types of firesetter
  5. 5Intervention programmes
  6. 6Organisation, staff and training
  7. 7Evaluation and limits of the evidence
  8. 8See also
  9. 9Notes
  10. 10References

Juvenile firesetting is the starting of fires by children and adolescents, ranging from curiosity-driven play with matches or lighters to fires set deliberately. Schwartzman (2008) wrote the chapter on the subject in the Fire Protection Handbook of the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). He treats intent as the main distinction between the labels used for this behaviour and notes that no neutral term had yet been agreed.[1] In United States arrest statistics, a juvenile is a person under the age of 18.[2] In 2002, fires attributed to children playing with fire caused an estimated 210 civilian deaths in US structure fires, and juveniles made up 51 percent of the people arrested for arson.[3] Most of the people killed in child-playing fires were children under 6, often siblings or playmates of the child who started the fire.[3]

Since the mid-1970s the US fire service has worked with mental health professionals to understand and change this behaviour.[4] The resulting intervention programmes screen each child for the risk of further firesetting and then provide education, counselling or juvenile justice measures, depending on that risk.[5] NFPA 1035, as described by Schwartzman (2008), sets job performance requirements for the specialists who run these programmes.[6] All statistics in this article are for the United States.

Terms and definitions

A child who does not understand the consequences of using fire and has no specific intent to start one has traditionally been described as engaged in "fireplay". The words accidental and unintentional have also been used.[4] Both labels have drawn objections. Many have questioned whether linking play to fire minimises the risk and makes the behaviour seem normal. Accidental implies an event that could not have been avoided, whereas better supervision or storage of ignition materials can usually prevent these fires.[4]

Alternatives such as "fire experimentation" or "fire starting" are criticised for suggesting more conscious intent than is typically present.[3] The term firesetting implies a deliberate effort and is often associated with Arson, a legal term that implies a deliberate intent to cause damage or injury. Firefighters are reluctant to call a young child an arsonist, and in many jurisdictions the legal age of accountability prevents young people from being charged.[3] Schwartzman argues that common terminology would give more precise statistics, but his chapter does not attempt to set a standard.[1]

In US national estimates, "playing with fire" is taken from the data element on factors contributing to ignition, while intentional fires come from a separate cause field.[7] Version 5.0 of the National Fire Incident Reporting System (NFIRS) replaced the older codes incendiary and suspicious with "intentional", which does not imply an illegal act as strongly.[8][9] Because Version 5.0 records the age of the person involved, the data can show a fire intentionally set by a five-year-old. Such a child is below the age of responsibility in most, if not all, US states.[8] The categories also overlap, since some "playing with fire" incidents are intentional.[10]

Before the mid-1970s there were few, if any, programmes to change children's behaviour with fire. One view held that "kids will be kids" and that fire play was a normal, harmless stage of development. The opposite view held that children who misused fire were psychologically disturbed, so that the behaviour could not be prevented. Neither view offered any response other than effective fire fighting.[4]

Scale of the problem in the United States

In 2002, US fire departments attended an estimated 13,900 structure fires attributed to children playing with fire. These fires caused 210 civilian deaths, 1,250 civilian injuries and $339 million in direct property loss.[3] Many fires involving young people go beyond play. In the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Uniform Crime Report for 2002, 51 percent of the people arrested for arson were under 18. It was the ninth year in a row with a juvenile share of 50 percent or more.[3]

In the same year, 68,245 incendiary fires caused an estimated 630 civilian deaths, 2,030 injuries and $1.9 billion in direct property loss. Schwartzman notes that assigning half of these fires to juveniles would attribute some 34,000 fires to juvenile incendiarism.[3] Combining the juvenile share of arson arrests with the fires from incendiary or suspicious causes, and adding the child-playing fires, he estimated at least 50,000 reported fires started by children in 2002. These fires caused 545 civilian deaths, 2,212 injuries and $1 billion in direct property loss, although precise numbers will remain elusive.[3]

Past studies have estimated unreported fires at 10 to 20 times the number of reported fires, although most of these are small cooking fires.[3] The national Fire statistics for homes in 1999 to 2002 show a pattern of low frequency and high severity.[11] Playing with a heat source accounted for 4 percent of home structure fires but 8 percent of civilian deaths and 9 percent of civilian injuries.[12] With 1.6 civilian deaths per 100 fires, these fires had one of the highest death rates per fire, together with smoking-material and intentional fires.[13]

Juveniles typically accounted for around 40 percent of arson arrests in the early 1980s and roughly 50 percent from 1994 onwards.[2] Child-playing fires ranked fourth among causes of home fire deaths in 1993.[14] With the help of the requirement for the Child-resistant lighter, introduced by the US Consumer Product Safety Commission in 1994, child-playing fire deaths plunged. In the years before the handbook appeared, they consistently stayed below 10 percent of fire deaths.[15] Mental health professionals assessing the problem believe that a significant part of the decline since 1994 is due to systematic fire service programmes together with the lighter requirement.[3]

In 1999 to 2002, almost half of the fires in US educational occupancies were intentionally set or resulted from fireplay, so Szachnowicz (2008) recommends juvenile firesetter programmes there.[16] School fire deaths were rare, with an average of one civilian death per year in grades K to 12 in 1994 to 1998. NFPA analysts found that the few deaths that do occur are all or nearly all adults or juvenile firesetters fatally injured by the fires they set.[17]

Who is involved

In Rochester, New York, the city fire department tracked fire incidents involving young people over nine years. The children ranged from 18 months to 18 years of age, and the majority were between 4 and 9 years old.[3] A third were between 10 and 17, and 98 percent of this older group were under 15.[18]

The youngest children carry the highest risk of death. Preschool children under 6, only 9 percent of the population, accounted for more than 66 percent of deaths in child-playing home fires and about 15 percent of deaths in incendiary or suspicious fires.[3] Schwartzman gives no year; Gamache (2008) gives 55 percent of child-playing deaths for 1999 to 2002.[19] The child who dies is very often a sibling or playmate of the child who started the fire.[3]

Bar chart: children under 6 were 9 percent of the population but over 66 percent of deaths in child-playing home fires
Children under 6 compared with their share of the US population: share of deaths in child-playing home fires and in incendiary or suspicious fires.

Preschool children are one of the High-risk populations for fire, and children playing with fire is the single greatest source of their above-average risk.[20] Gamache (2008) reports that the child-playing share of home fire deaths of children aged 4 or younger fell from 36 percent in 1994 to 1998 to 26 percent in 1999 to 2002. Part of this decline was linked to the lighter standard and part reflected changes in incident coding.[21]

Young people who come to the attention of the fire service average 85 percent boys and 15 percent girls, close to the split among arson arrestees of all ages.[22] In a developmental study of school children in grades 1 to 8, however, boys outnumbered girls by only 2 to 1 among those who had experimented with fire. Girls reported lighting matches and lighters, whereas boys tended to use them to ignite other things. Their experimentation was therefore riskier and perhaps more detectable.[22]

Firesetting occurs in all family types but is somewhat overrepresented in single-parent households, which is believed to reflect stress and less time for supervision rather than family structure itself.[22] Poverty is highly correlated with firesetting. In one longitudinal study, over 90 percent of the children who came to the attention of the fire department received free or reduced-price school lunches, against 35 percent in the district as a whole.[22] Race and ethnicity show no association once conditions such as poverty are taken into account.[22] Gamache (2008) suggests a possible explanation for the higher risk of child-playing and incendiary fires among the poor in large cities. Just over half (52 percent) of poor US families were headed by single women, against 18 percent of all families, and such households have less time for close supervision of children.[23]

Motives and types of firesetter

One of the major outcomes of the cooperation with mental health professionals was the Dynamic-Behavioral Theory. It was developed mainly by the clinical psychologist Kenneth Fineman, working with the Los Angeles County Fire Service and the US Fire Administration (USFA).[22] The theory treats firesetting as an interaction between the individual, the family and social circumstances, and the immediate environmental conditions before, during and after the fire.[24] It is an additive factor model, similar to models with wide acceptance in injury control studies.[22]

Diagram of the Dynamic-Behavioral model: three groups of factors added together lead to firesetting behaviour
The Dynamic-Behavioral model treats firesetting as the combined result of personal, family and social, and immediate environmental factors.

Schwartzman stresses that the types of firesetter overlap and that one child may have several motives. Any typology should help to describe the risk of further dangerous firesetting and to guide intervention.[25] The six types he describes are summarised below.

Types of juvenile firesetter described by Schwartzman (2008)
Type Typical age Main features
Curiosity Mainly 5 to 10 years Most common type; does not understand the consequences; usually one reported incident[25]
Cry for help All ages Draws attention to intolerable stress such as depression, anger or family conflict; more likely to continue without intervention[26]
Delinquent Usually 11 to 15 years Part of wider conduct and aggression problems; often in groups; usually avoids harming people; significant property damage[27]
Severely disturbed Not stated (rarest type) Serious mental health problems; fire may give sensory reinforcement; includes a self-harm subgroup[27]
Cognitively impaired Not stated Developmental or organic impairment; lacks judgement rather than intending harm[27]
Sociocultural Not stated Fires set during civil unrest or to call attention to a cause[27]

Curiosity-driven fire play is apparently not pathological, but it is still potentially dangerous, and children often overrate their ability to control a small fire.[25] It is associated with access to ignition materials, momentary lapses in supervision, the belief that they would not be disciplined, and premature exposure to, and responsibility for, activities involving fire.[25] Schwartzman illustrates the type with a nine-year-old who lit school papers in his bedroom with his mother's cigarette lighter, then beat out the spreading flames, frightened and remorseful.[25]

A handbook of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) translates these profiles into three categories of risk.[6] Curiosity or experimentation accounts for 60 to 65 percent of children's involvement in fire. These cases fall in the "little risk" category, in which most children are at little risk of repeating the behaviour if they receive proper supervision and education. About 30 to 40 percent are of "definite risk" and need more than education; the cry-for-help and delinquent types typically belong here. Fewer than 1 percent are of "extreme risk", the category into which the severely disturbed types most likely fall.[6]

Range bars for three risk categories: little risk 60 to 65 percent, definite risk 30 to 40 percent, extreme risk under 1 percent
Approximate share of children involved in fire in each FEMA risk category, with the firesetter types that typically fall in each.

Intervention programmes

Schwartzman describes juvenile firesetting as a community problem in which the fire service is usually in the best position to manage the response.[28] An initiative of the US Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) and the USFA identified seven components of effective programmes, and a later review confirmed that they remained state of the art.[28] They are programme management, screening and evaluation, intervention services, referral links with community agencies, publicity and outreach, monitoring, and links with the juvenile justice system.[28]

A referral can come from a reported fire, a parent's call or another agency. The programme assesses motivation, directs the child to educational, mental health or juvenile justice intervention, and follows up to check the effect.[28] Screening usually consists of structured interviews by a trained specialist, who interviews children and parents separately and then explains the outcome to the family.[6] FEMA and the USFA supported manuals that include structured interview forms. Fineman developed these forms in the late 1970s on the basis of the Dynamic-Behavioral Theory, and the answers are scored and totalled to indicate the degree of risk.[6]

Flowchart from three referral sources through the intervention programme to three types of intervention and follow-up
Referral flow of a juvenile firesetter intervention programme. The same process applies whether or not a fire has occurred.

Primary prevention aims to reduce the chance that children use fire without supervision. It follows the three E's of education, engineering (also called environmental change) and enforcement.[29] Education messages stress supervision, restricted access to ignition materials, fire safety skills and age-appropriate responsibility. A developmental study linked the premature assignment of tasks involving fire, such as cooking or lighting the fireplace, to later unsupervised use of fire.[29] Engineering examples include the child-resistant lighter, flame-retardant sleepwear and bedding, and residential sprinklers.[29] Children are also less likely to misuse fire if they perceive that their behaviour will have a consequence.[30]

For most children who have shown an inappropriate interest in fire, Fire and life safety education is the recommended intervention, because most cases are motivated by curiosity.[29] Education should be age appropriate, concrete and free of scare tactics. For preschool children the priority is to teach that matches and lighters are for adults only and that a child who finds them should tell a grown-up.[29] Research by David Kolko at the University of Pittsburgh demonstrated that a structured intervention including fire safety education reduced the likelihood of future misuse of fire. It was compared with a more casual intervention, a brief home visit by firefighters.[31]

Children whose firesetting reflects personal or family problems need referral for individual and family counselling. The counsellors should be mental health professionals with specific knowledge of juvenile firesetters.[31] Documented neglect and abuse are a critical predictor of repeat firesetting. In the Rochester study, recidivism increased fivefold in families in which children were victims of chronic neglect and physical or sexual abuse.[31] In initial case studies at a residential treatment facility in Pennsylvania, all the adjudicated juvenile firesetters had suffered chronic neglect, and they had set an average of 27 fires each.[31] Programmes therefore need an established relationship with the child welfare agency.[31]

Effective intervention depends on a network of services, and many programmes have community advisory panels. The Phoenix Fire Department panel, for example, included child protective services, the police, schools and a burn centre.[31] Confidentiality is often seen as a barrier, but information can be shared with a parent's signed consent or under a memorandum of agreement between agencies.[32] The juvenile justice system can mandate services and hold juveniles and their families accountable. In the United States the age from which a child can be held accountable varies by state, typically between 7 and 16 years.[30] Effective programmes use graduated sanctions, from mandated counselling and restitution up to secure confinement.[30]

Organisation, staff and training

Most juvenile firesetter intervention programmes are part of existing fire department units such as fire prevention, investigation or inspection.[28] Some specialists favour investigation units, so that the fire circumstances are reviewed and law enforcement remains possible for intentional fires. Others favour education units, because most cases involve curiosity.[28] The sample organisation chart in the handbook places the programme within fire investigation, beside cause and origin work and adult investigation, under the Fire marshal.[28] In much of the United States and in all Canadian provinces, the state or provincial fire marshal's office is responsible for investigating incendiary fires.[33]

NFPA 1035, Standard for Professional Qualifications for Public Fire and Life Safety Educator, first included requirements for Juvenile Firesetter Intervention Specialist I and II in its 2000 edition. They were revised in 2005.[6] A specialist I keeps records, conducts assessment interviews, delivers educational interventions and makes referrals under supervision. A specialist II manages the programme, including supervision, interagency networks and evaluation, and in a small department one person may fill both roles.[6] The 2005 requirements ask the specialist I to report any suspected abuse or neglect, and the specialist II to analyse programme effectiveness, including recidivism.[34]

The National Fire Academy in Emmitsburg, Maryland, offered courses for both specialist levels.[30] Schwartzman argues that the subject belongs in all fire service training, because suppression, prevention, investigation and inspection divisions all play a part.[30] A common pitfall is a programme that depends on one committed individual and ends when that person retires, is promoted or burns out.[30] Rural communities may combine the resources of a few departments in a regional or county programme, and Oregon built a statewide structure with a full-time coordinator in the State Fire Marshal's office.[35] Coverage was far from complete. A second national needs assessment of 2006, by the Department of Homeland Security, the USFA and NFPA, found that two-fifths of the population were protected by fire departments with no juvenile firesetter programme.[36]

Evaluation and limits of the evidence

Programmes with several years of records in New York, Oregon, Arizona, Massachusetts, Indiana and Illinois consistently showed lower rates of repeat firesetting.[30] Communities with primary prevention programmes documented fewer fires and deaths, especially among preschool children.[30] Portland, Oregon, evaluated its preschool fire safety programmes by the share of children aged 3 to 5 who had to be referred to the juvenile firesetting programme for low knowledge and skills. That share fell from 6.2 percent before the programmes to 1.8 percent by fiscal year 1996–1997.[37] According to the department's evaluation, deaths from child-set fires in the city fell from an average of two a year to one every six years.[37]

Evaluating such programmes requires care. Hall and Weller (2008) advise monitoring both children-playing fires and arson, because fires are sometimes relabelled rather than reduced.[38] A "get-tough" policy can turn fires previously called children playing into arson, while a more sympathetic attitude can shift them the other way. Recidivism should also be measured separately for curious and for disturbed firesetters, because the curious are easier to "cure". Curious firesetters may also have low recidivism even without a programme. In their example, a recidivism rate of 5 percent looks good until it is compared with 4 percent without the programme.[38]

Programmes can also change the data by which they are judged. Asking the public to refer children who set fires may lead to the reporting of fires that would otherwise have gone unreported.[39] Raising the subject of fire with children can backfire and increase their curiosity.[40] Hall (2008) adds that conventional educational techniques are of limited or unproven effectiveness against children playing with fire, and recommends considering product changes as well.[41]

Since 1999, the NFPA trend series on child-playing home fires has included all fires attributed to "playing", so it may not be limited to children.[15] Most national estimates allocate fires with an unknown ignition factor in proportion to the known cases. This assumes that the unknown fires contain the same share of child-playing fires as those with a reported factor.[42] The Juvenile Firesetter Module of NFIRS 5.0, which captures information about the child, the family and risk factors, was optional and depended on state and local requirements.[43]

See also

Notes

  1. ↑ 1.0 1.1 Schwartzman (2008), pp. 5-87–5-88.
  2. ↑ 2.0 2.1 Ahrens et al. (2008), p. 3-64.
  3. ↑ 3.00 3.01 3.02 3.03 3.04 3.05 3.06 3.07 3.08 3.09 3.10 3.11 3.12 Schwartzman (2008), p. 5-88.
  4. ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 Schwartzman (2008), p. 5-87.
  5. ↑ Schwartzman (2008), pp. 5-92–5-93.
  6. ↑ 6.0 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.6 Schwartzman (2008), p. 5-93.
  7. ↑ Hall and Cote (2008), p. 3-14.
  8. ↑ 8.0 8.1 Ahrens and Stewart (2008), p. 3-49.
  9. ↑ Ahrens et al. (2008), p. 3-68.
  10. ↑ Ahrens et al. (2008), p. 3-71.
  11. ↑ Hall (2008), p. 5-105.
  12. ↑ Hall and Cote (2008), p. 3-15.
  13. ↑ Ahrens et al. (2008), pp. 3-74, 3-76.
  14. ↑ Hall (2008), p. 5-108.
  15. ↑ 15.0 15.1 Hall (2008), pp. 5-108, 5-110.
  16. ↑ Szachnowicz (2008), p. 20-115.
  17. ↑ Hall and Cote (2008), p. 3-23.
  18. ↑ Schwartzman (2008), pp. 5-88–5-89.
  19. ↑ Gamache (2008), p. 5-64.
  20. ↑ Gamache (2008), pp. 5-63–5-64.
  21. ↑ Gamache (2008), p. 5-63.
  22. ↑ 22.0 22.1 22.2 22.3 22.4 22.5 22.6 Schwartzman (2008), p. 5-89.
  23. ↑ Gamache (2008), p. 5-72.
  24. ↑ Schwartzman (2008), pp. 5-89–5-90.
  25. ↑ 25.0 25.1 25.2 25.3 25.4 Schwartzman (2008), p. 5-90.
  26. ↑ Schwartzman (2008), pp. 5-90–5-91.
  27. ↑ 27.0 27.1 27.2 27.3 Schwartzman (2008), p. 5-91.
  28. ↑ 28.0 28.1 28.2 28.3 28.4 28.5 28.6 Schwartzman (2008), p. 5-92.
  29. ↑ 29.0 29.1 29.2 29.3 29.4 Schwartzman (2008), p. 5-97.
  30. ↑ 30.0 30.1 30.2 30.3 30.4 30.5 30.6 30.7 Schwartzman (2008), p. 5-100.
  31. ↑ 31.0 31.1 31.2 31.3 31.4 31.5 Schwartzman (2008), p. 5-98.
  32. ↑ Schwartzman (2008), p. 5-99.
  33. ↑ Custer and Sheppard (2008), p. 3-32.
  34. ↑ Schwartzman (2008), p. 5-95.
  35. ↑ Schwartzman (2008), p. 5-101.
  36. ↑ Jenaway (2008), pp. 12-42, 12-50.
  37. ↑ 37.0 37.1 Gamache (2008), p. 5-66.
  38. ↑ 38.0 38.1 Hall and Weller (2008), p. 5-134.
  39. ↑ Hall and Weller (2008), p. 5-131.
  40. ↑ Hall and Weller (2008), p. 5-135.
  41. ↑ Hall (2008), p. 5-112.
  42. ↑ Hall and Ahrens (2002), p. 5-68.
  43. ↑ Ahrens and Stewart (2008), pp. 3-50, 3-52.

References

  • Ahrens, M., Frazier, P., & Kelch, G. (2008). Use of fire incident data and statistics. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 3-61–3-92). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Ahrens, M., & Stewart, S. (2008). Fire data collection and databases. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 3-43–3-59). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Custer, R. L. P., & Sheppard, D. T. (2008). Fire loss investigation. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 3-31–3-41). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Gamache, S. (2008). Reaching high-risk groups. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 5-63–5-85). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Hall, J. R., Jr. (2008). Using data for public education planning and decision making. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 5-103–5-118). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Hall, J. R., Jr., & Ahrens, M. J. (2002). Data for engineering analysis. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 5-65–5-78). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
  • Hall, J. R., Jr., & Cote, A. E. (2008). An overview of the fire problem and fire protection. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 3-3–3-30). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Hall, J. R., Jr., & Weller, M. W. (2008). Evaluation techniques for fire and life safety education. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 5-119–5-137). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Jenaway, W. F. (2008). Needs assessment and hazard analysis. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 12-41–12-50). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Schwartzman, P. (2008). Juvenile firesetting. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 5-87–5-102). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Szachnowicz, A. L. (2008). Educational occupancies. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 20-115–20-122). National Fire Protection Association.