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Contents
  1. 1Tenants, shared circulation and escape demand
  2. 2Smoke strategy and protection interfaces
  3. 3What the system is intended to protect
  4. 4Fire locations and communicating spaces
  5. 5Smoke filling before extraction operates
  6. 6Extraction points and replacement air
  7. 7Choosing an analysis method
  8. 8Queues and route capacity
  9. 9Notes
  10. 10References

A covered mall building contains an enclosed pedestrian space connecting shops or other tenant areas. Its fire-safety strategy considers that shared space together with the uses opening onto it. The Society of Fire Protection Engineers (SFPE) Handbook explains how smoke from a communicating shop can enter the mall by a different plume path from a fire on the mall floor.[1]

The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Fire Protection Handbook describes a systems approach combining escape width, controlled uses, sprinkler protection and smoke management. The mall can form a principal escape route for several tenants. Its suitability depends on those associated conditions and the actual population using it.[2]

Mercantile occupancy supplies one part of the classification, but restaurants, cinemas and other assembly occupancy uses can add different demands. Underground and windowless structures can also overlap with the mall classification. The assessment therefore needs the combined occupancy, geometry and operational conditions rather than a single building label.[3]

Tenants, shared circulation and escape demand

A mall connects several areas through a common pedestrian route. The NFPA handbook distinguishes treating that route as ordinary exit access from a more integrated approach with particular protective assumptions. The distinction matters because extended travel arrangements depend on the safety of the shared space. The assumptions should remain attached to any design conclusion.[4]

Covered mall building: tenants, shared circulation and escape demand, showing the relationships described in the text.
Tenants, shared circulation and escape demand in the assessment of a covered mall building.

Tenant use may be unknown when the original building is designed. Later leasing can change the balance of retail, storage, food service and assembly areas. The handbook therefore discusses projecting occupant demand and maintaining flexibility; a change of tenant should be checked against the population and protection assumed for the common routes.[4]

Travel distance includes movement through the tenant and along the mall to an available exit; the actual path can be affected by counters, displays and temporary amenities. The NFPA handbook describes maintaining clear access beside tenant frontages. The measured route should represent the operating arrangement, rather than a vacant shell before fit-out.[5]

The familiar entrance can strongly influence route choice. The handbook's mall concept recognises that customers often leave by the route used to enter. A rear service route therefore has a different practical role from the main pedestrian space; both routes need their intended capacity and availability, with their assumptions stated clearly.[6][7]

Shared circulation combines demand from several tenants. A wide mall can still discharge through a smaller collection of exits or passages. Nelson and Mowrer's treatment of transitions explains why queues form where demand exceeds downstream flow. Assessment should therefore follow the population through the complete route, including the final discharge.[8]

The handbook's dimensional examples describe its historical NFPA framework. They include conditions concerning tenant arrangement, population and protection. They are not presented here as universal current limits; the engineering purpose is to preserve a usable shared escape system throughout the building's changing commercial use.[9]

Smoke strategy and protection interfaces

Smoke control must address where smoke originates and where people need protection. The NFPA handbook describes removing smoke after it enters the mall, controlling it within the tenant spaces, and using the mall volume as a reservoir. These approaches have different physical assumptions. A fan schedule alone does not identify which outcome the design intends.[10]

Covered mall building: smoke strategy and protection interfaces, showing the relationships described in the text.
Smoke strategy and protection interfaces in the assessment of a covered mall building.

Atrium smoke control provides relevant plume and layer methods for connected large volumes; however, a regulatory mall classification and an atrium classification are not automatically identical. The NFPA handbook describes special mall provisions within its code context. Physical similarities can inform the engineering without erasing the separate classification requirements.[11][12]

The historical discussion cites NFPA 92A and NFPA 92B. NFPA 92 is identified by title in the supplied ABCB data sheets, which list the 2018 edition; the source set does not contain the complete standard itself. The principles described here therefore remain tied to the supplied handbooks and guidelines rather than an unverified claim of compliance with every current clause.[10][13]

Sprinkler protection is part of the NFPA mall strategy. Controlling the fire can change the heat released and the smoke movement. Cooling and mixing also affect plume and layer assumptions. The assessment should therefore identify the assumed suppression response and consider the consequences when a system does not operate as expected.[10][14]

Changes above ceilings and at tenant boundaries can alter smoke paths. The NFPA handbook links tenant partitions with the chosen smoke-control arrangement. Fit-out work should therefore preserve the required separation or communication rather than treat every partition change as independent of the engineering. Continued management keeps the physical building aligned with the documented strategy.[10][15]

What the system is intended to protect

Atria connect spaces that might otherwise be separated into smaller compartments. Without suitable barriers, smoke can spread through the shared volume and reach communicating areas; Milke identifies this as a different problem from smoke control in a well-compartmented building. Pressure differences across barriers cannot perform the same function where the required physical separation is absent.[16]

The large volume can initially moderate the hazard. Air mixed into the plume reduces the concentration of combustion products and lowers the smoke temperature; however, dilution also increases the quantity of gas delivered to the layer. A benefit in concentration therefore accompanies an increased smoke-handling demand.[17]

Life-safety assessment considers several properties of the smoke environment. These include layer-interface height, visibility, temperature and the concentrations of harmful gases. The layer height describes whether an occupied level becomes immersed in smoke; it does not, by itself, describe the severity of every possible exposure within that layer.[17]

Reduced visibility can slow movement and increase disorientation. Milke also describes the potential for trips and falls where occupants cannot see obstructions or balcony edges. Longer evacuation then extends the period of exposure to smoke. A low predicted temperature does not remove these visibility-related effects.[17]

Property objectives can differ from life-safety objectives. Smoke can stain contents, expose equipment to corrosive products and interrupt the use of a building. A smoke concentration that permits short-term movement can still be unacceptable for sensitive contents. The chosen performance objective therefore influences the conditions that the system is intended to maintain.[17]

Fire locations and communicating spaces

The design distinguishes a fire on the atrium floor from a fire in an adjoining room. A fire remote from walls can produce an approximately axisymmetric plume, with air entering around its perimeter. Wall and corner locations restrict some of that air access. Their entrainment behaviour therefore differs from the free-plume case.[18]

A fire in a shop or another communicating space can produce a balcony spill plume. Smoke first rises to an intermediate ceiling, travels beneath it and then spills around an edge. Its subsequent rise into the atrium has a different geometry from a plume rising directly above a floor-level fire. The width and route of the spill become relevant inputs.[19]

An adjoining-room scenario can involve several stages of mixing before smoke reaches the upper layer; modelling only a fire in the open atrium can omit those stages. Milke therefore distinguishes a balcony spill plume from a plume rising directly above a fire in the open volume. The assessment includes the actual connections between the room of origin and the smoke-exhausted space.[20]

A balcony is not represented solely by subtracting its height from the plume rise. Milke identifies horizontal travel, the opening from the adjoining room and the width of the spill as relevant characteristics. Vertical barriers beneath a balcony can restrict lateral spreading. Their effect belongs to the particular smoke route being assessed.[19]

A fire curtain also raises a barrier-performance question within the overall strategy. Milke relates the effectiveness of separating barriers to leakage, pressure differences and resistance to the smoke's thermal exposure. A nominal boundary on a drawing does not determine those properties; the barrier arrangement and its role in the smoke path remain explicit parts of the scenario.[21]

Smoke filling before extraction operates

Smoke does not necessarily form a complete upper layer immediately after ignition; it first travels upwards in the plume and then spreads horizontally beneath the ceiling. Milke calls these intervals the plume and ceiling-jet transport lags. In a large atrium, the time required to establish a layer can be appreciable.[22]

Once a layer develops, its interface can descend rapidly. A high interface permits a long plume rise, with substantial entrainment before the plume enters the layer. As the interface descends, the clear plume height decreases and the entrainment changes; this makes the filling process time-dependent even when a simplified fire source is used.[23]

The period before system actuation therefore matters separately from the eventual exhaust capacity. A calculation of a steady layer after extraction begins does not establish the conditions during detection and start-up. Smoke can already have reached occupied levels during that earlier period; Milke evaluates the filling and vented periods as distinct stages of the same hazard analysis.[22][24]

Smoke stratification can also occur at an intermediate elevation below the roof. Warm air accumulated near the top of an atrium can reduce the relative buoyancy of an arriving plume; the plume may then stop rising before reaching ceiling-mounted detectors. This condition differs from a smoke layer that has formed at the ceiling and subsequently descended.[25]

Milke discusses beam detection below the expected stratification elevation as one response to this scenario. The objective is to intercept smoke where it actually travels. The source also describes how operating exhaust can remove the warm upper air and change the subsequent smoke movement. Detection and ventilation assumptions therefore need a consistent account of the initial temperature profile.[25]

Extraction points and replacement air

The location and distribution of extraction affect how effectively the system removes the upper layer. Excessive withdrawal at one point can draw air from below the interface. This plugholing effect reduces the smoke fraction of the extracted flow. Several lower-capacity points can reduce the local demand associated with a single concentrated extract.[25]

Layer depth is part of that assessment. A shallow layer provides less separation between an outlet and the cleaner lower air. The nominal total exhaust therefore needs to be considered alongside the depth available at individual outlets. The capacity calculation and the local extraction arrangement address connected but different questions.[25]

Makeup air is introduced below the smoke layer in Milke's treatment. Air supplied above the interface adds mass directly to the layer and increases the necessary extraction. Supply close to the interface can also promote mixing. The location of an inlet therefore matters as well as its total capacity.[26]

Strong incoming jets can deflect a plume and increase its entrainment. Milke also identifies the possibility of changing the burning rate. The source's frequently cited 1 m/s guidance concerns the vicinity of the plume. It does not imply that every diffuser face must have that same velocity regardless of its distance and discharge pattern.[26]

The supply air also needs to remain uncontaminated by discharged smoke; Milke discusses separating intake locations from the smoke discharge and considering the response to contaminated intake air. He also specifies a supply mass rate below the exhausted mass rate to avoid pressurising the atrium relative to communicating spaces. These conditions describe the cited design treatment and its objective of limiting outward smoke spread.[26]

Choosing an analysis method

A zone model represents an atrium using a small number of regions with uniform properties. This can describe layer development efficiently where its assumptions fit the geometry and smoke behaviour. Van Rossum identifies uniform layers, simple geometry and relatively undisturbed plume rise as central limitations. Complex local flow cannot be inferred merely from the model's average layer conditions.[27]

Milke identifies situations where that simplification becomes questionable. A narrow atrium can confine the widening plume before it reaches the ceiling. A broad atrium can have relevant horizontal differences within the smoke. Sprinkler cooling and spray-driven mixing can also alter the assumed separation between upper and lower regions.[21][25]

Field models and physical scale models provide other ways to investigate selected problems; Milke discusses their use for irregular geometries and situations where local conditions matter. Their selection still depends on the phenomena and accuracy required. A more detailed representation does not remove the need to define the fire, openings, thermal boundaries and operating sequence.[21]

Comparing model results requires a consistent definition of the smoke interface. Milke distinguishes the first detectable smoke in experiments from the boundary between idealised zones; their numerical elevations can differ without either calculation describing exactly the same quantity. The assessment therefore identifies which interface definition is being compared with an occupied level or another design criterion.[23]

Environmental and system assumptions also influence the appropriate method. Milke includes wind, stack effects, interacting ventilation systems and the period of interest among the selection considerations. A calculation that excludes an influence cannot demonstrate its insignificance merely through a precise numerical result. Its applicability instead rests on the stated relationship between the chosen model and the actual scenario.[21]

Queues and route capacity

Travel along a route differs from passing through a restriction. Proulx distinguishes movement time to a destination from flow time through part of the circulation system. A complete assessment needs both forms of time.[28]

Covered mall building: queues and route capacity, showing the relationships described in the text.
Queues and route capacity in the assessment of a covered mall building.

Exit capacity can govern how quickly a group leaves even where travel distance is short. If arrival demand exceeds the flow through a doorway or stair, a queue develops. The delay depends on the number of people and the effective flow through that restriction.[28]

C/VM2 compares the time to reach a doorway with the time required for occupants to flow through it. The greater governs evacuation from the space in that method. This procedure identifies two distinct time components rather than treating distance as always dominant.[29]

Downstream restrictions can be more important than the nearest exit. C/VM2 calls for the entire escape route to be checked, because occupants can encounter another limitation closer to the final exit. Measuring only distance to the first door would miss that constraint.[30]

Effective width can be smaller than measured width. Boundary layers near walls, rails and obstacles reduce the stream width used in flow calculations. Travel distance and effective width are therefore separate geometric inputs with different effects on the result.[30][28]

Notes

  1. ↑ Milke (2002), pp. 4-292–4-295, 4-299–4-302.
  2. ↑ Cote et al. (2008), §20.10, pp. 20-99–20-100, 20-102.
  3. ↑ Cote et al. (2008), §20.10, pp. 20-99–20-100; §20.20, pp. 20-225–20-226.
  4. ↑ 4.0 4.1 Cote et al. (2008), §20.10, pp. 20-99–20-100.
  5. ↑ Cote et al. (2008), §20.10, pp. 20-100, 20-102.
  6. ↑ Cote et al. (2008), §20.10, p. 20-100.
  7. ↑ Proulx (2002), pp. 3-342–3-350.
  8. ↑ Nelson and Mowrer (2002), pp. 3-371–3-372.
  9. ↑ Cote et al. (2008), §20.10, pp. 20-99–20-102.
  10. ↑ 10.0 10.1 10.2 10.3 Cote et al. (2008), §20.10, p. 20-102.
  11. ↑ Cote et al. (2008), §20.10, pp. 20-99, 20-102.
  12. ↑ Milke (2002), pp. 4-292–4-295.
  13. ↑ Australian Building Codes Board (2020), Data Sheet B1, pp. 11, 23.
  14. ↑ Milke (2002), pp. 4-294–4-295, 4-304–4-305.
  15. ↑ Australian Building Codes Board et al. (2005), pp. 1.8-13–1.8-14.
  16. ↑ Milke (2002), pp. 4-292–4-294.
  17. ↑ 17.0 17.1 17.2 17.3 Milke (2002), pp. 4-292–4-293.
  18. ↑ Milke (2002), pp. 4-299–4-300.
  19. ↑ 19.0 19.1 Milke (2002), pp. 4-301–4-302.
  20. ↑ Milke (2002), pp. 4-301–4-302.
  21. ↑ 21.0 21.1 21.2 21.3 Milke (2002), pp. 4-294–4-295.
  22. ↑ 22.0 22.1 Milke (2002), pp. 4-295–4-296.
  23. ↑ 23.0 23.1 Milke (2002), pp. 4-296–4-298.
  24. ↑ Milke (2002), pp. 4-302–4-303.
  25. ↑ 25.0 25.1 25.2 25.3 25.4 Milke (2002), pp. 4-304–4-305.
  26. ↑ 26.0 26.1 26.2 Milke (2002), p. 4-306.
  27. ↑ Van Rossum (2027), §§9.1–9.2.
  28. ↑ 28.0 28.1 28.2 Proulx (2002), pp. 3-347–3-348.
  29. ↑ Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2025), p. 32.
  30. ↑ 30.0 30.1 Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2025), p. 33.

References

  • Australian Building Codes Board, National Research Council of Canada, International Code Council, & Department of Building and Housing New Zealand. (2005). International fire engineering guidelines. Australian Building Codes Board.
  • Australian Building Codes Board. (2020). Fire safety verification method: Data sheets (Handbook annex, Print version 1.1).
  • Cote, A. E., Grant, C. C., Hall, J. R., Jr., & Solomon, R. E. (Eds.). (2008). Fire protection handbook (20th ed.). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Milke, J. A. (2002). Smoke management in covered malls and atria. In P. J. DiNenno (Ed.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 4-292–4-310). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment. (2025). C protection from fire: Verification method C/VM2 (2nd ed.).
  • Nelson, H. E., & Mowrer, F. W. (2002). Emergency movement. In P. J. DiNenno (Ed.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 3-367–3-380). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Proulx, G. (2002). Movement of people: The evacuation timing. In P. J. DiNenno (Ed.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 3-342–3-366). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Van Rossum, E. (2027). Introduction to Fire Safety Engineering. Fire Safety Academy.