Skip to content
From Fire Safety Academy Wiki
Revision as of 00:37, 16 November 2026 by Peter (talk | contribs) (Wiki review: corrected 4 errors: typo (4) (Claude Opus 5.5))
(diff) ← Older revision | Latest revision (diff) | Newer revision → (diff)
Contents
  1. 1Definition and terminology
  2. 2Types of agents and their effects
  3. 3Incidents described in the sources
  4. 4Blast effects and standoff distance
  5. 5Protecting buildings
  6. 6Emergency response
  7. 7Preparedness and limits
  8. 8See also
  9. 9Notes
  10. 10References

Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are weapons intended to injure, incapacitate or kill large numbers of people.[1] The 2008 Fire Protection Handbook quotes a definition from NFPA 472, a standard of the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). The definition covers bombs and other explosive or incendiary devices, and weapons that involve toxic chemicals, disease organisms or dangerous levels of radiation.[2] Teele (2008) calls WMD the military term in this context. In civilian emergency response the same threats are called chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) terrorism agents, because on the civilian side they may take a different form and concentration than battlefield agents.[3]

In the handbook's hazardous materials chapter, a WMD release counts as a hazardous materials incident, which ties the subject to hazardous materials response.[2] Another handbook author records the saying that the only difference between a WMD release and a hazardous materials incident is intent.[4] The handbook treats WMD from two sides. Building designers can reduce the effects of a bomb or an airborne agent through standoff distance, blast-resistant facades and protected ventilation systems.[5][6] Emergency responders need specialised protective equipment and must protect themselves before they can help others.[1] This article describes the US approach around 2008, with examples from the attacks of 1993, 1995 and 2001.

Definition and terminology

The NFPA 472 definition quoted in the handbook's chapter on hazardous materials incidents has four parts. The first covers any destructive device, such as an explosive, incendiary or poison gas bomb, or a grenade. It also covers a rocket with a propellant charge of more than 4 ounces (112 g) and a missile with an explosive or incendiary charge of more than a quarter ounce (7 g). The other three cover any weapon involving toxic or poisonous chemicals, any weapon involving a disease organism, and any weapon designed to release radiation or radioactivity at a level dangerous to human life.[2] The same chapter defines a hazardous material as a substance that on release can harm people, property or the environment, including WMD. A hazardous material incident is then any release or potential release of hazardous materials or WMD, with or without fire.[2]

Four boxes for explosive, chemical, biological and radiological weapons in the NFPA 472 definition, mapped to the CBRNE letters
The four parts of the NFPA 472 definition of weapons of mass destruction, as described in 2008, and the CBRNE grouping used by responders.

Several overlapping labels are used. Teele (2008) explains that the military calls these agents WMD, while civilian responders speak of CBRN terrorism agents.[3] Penney (2008) adds explosives and uses CBRNE: chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear or explosive.[7] In building design, Meacham and Galioto (2008) call events consciously instigated against buildings and their occupants "deliberate events". The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in 2001 are the examples that come readily to mind.[8] On that day, in Kreckie's words, aircraft became weapons of mass destruction and airports their launching pads.[4]

The link with terrorism also defines who leads. In premises security, a threat that is large in scale and can affect the public beyond a private site is considered terrorism, and public law enforcement agencies usually take over.[9] For a terrorism-related hazardous materials event in the United States, the Federal Bureau of Investigation acts as federal on-scene coordinator during the emergency phase. The Department of Homeland Security and its Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) take that role after the emergency.[10]

Types of agents and their effects

Meacham and Galioto (2008) describe explosives as easy and cheap to obtain or make. Their spectacular and fatal effects make them a preferred tactic of terrorists, as the vehicle bombs at the World Trade Center in 1993 and at the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in 1995 showed. An explosion near primary structural members could lead to catastrophic collapse. Even where the structure survives, overpressure and flying debris, especially glass, are still likely to cause casualties. Inside a building, reflected pressures make even a charge carried in a satchel or backpack lethal.[11]

Chemical agents fall into five broad groups. In sufficient concentrations, choking agents such as chlorine and phosgene attack the respiratory system and fill the lungs with fluid. Blood agents, the cyanides, prevent the cells from using oxygen. Blister agents such as sulphur mustard and Lewisite damage the eyes and lungs and blister the skin. Nerve agents, perhaps the most feared, disrupt the transmission of nerve impulses and are lethal in much smaller quantities than the other groups. Their rapid action calls for immediate treatment.[12]

Riot-control agents such as tear gas are generally not counted as chemical weapons.[12] Toxic industrial chemicals need no sophisticated knowledge to use, while other chemicals and biological agents will likely pose serious technical challenges to an attacker.[11] Some of these substances are not unique to weapons. Hydrogen cyanide, a blood agent, is also formed in ordinary fires when nitrogen-containing polymers smoulder or burn, which links CBRN hazards to fire toxicity.[13] Likewise, accidental releases of common chemicals such as chlorine, from a broken container or a truck or train crash near a building, can create the same exposure as an attack.[6]

Biological agents are grouped as bacteria, viruses and toxins. Bacteria such as anthrax, brucellosis and plague often respond to antibiotics. Viruses such as smallpox and the haemorrhagic fever viruses generally do not, and the few antiviral drugs are of limited use. Toxins such as botulinum and ricin can be countered by specific antisera and selected drugs. Radiological and nuclear material can come from medical sources, from fuel or waste of power generation or weapons manufacture, or from nuclear weapons. Perhaps of most concern is a "dirty bomb", which may spread enough radioactive material to create a significant hazard in a building or part of a community.[14]

Incidents described in the sources

In the NFPA fire statistics, the United States had only five incidents with a death toll of 100 or more from 1955 to the time of writing. Two of them were the Oklahoma City bombing of 1995 and the World Trade Center attack of 2001.[15] The aircraft impacts at the World Trade Center caused 2,749 deaths. NIST reports 421 emergency-response personnel lost across the fire, police and other services.[16] The Oklahoma City bombing killed 168 people, including 19 children, and injured more than 500. It was described as the first presidentially declared disaster in the United States that was also a crime scene.[17]

Other attacks show the range of agents. From October 2001, anthrax was found at a Florida publisher and in letters addressed to news media and politicians. The attacks killed five people and made 17 ill. The resulting "white powder" scare led to many emergency calls, and one Florida fire department used all its staff, including educators, to tell the public what to do with suspicious letters.[18] In February 2003, a car bomb of about 600 pounds (270 kg) of ammonium nitrate and chlorate mixed with fuel oil exploded on the fourth floor of the El Nogal club building in Bogotá, Colombia. Of the 750 people inside, 38 were killed and 170 injured, and the handbook attributes the limited death toll to the building remaining standing.[19]

After the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, the New York fire department identified problems in its response. The scope of the event was beyond anything previously experienced, and information overload occurred at the command level. The department revised its incident command system. After a recommendation that every agency be represented at the command post, the fire and police departments agreed a joint protocol in 1994.[20] The NIST report also compares the dispersal of patients in 2001 with the sarin attack in Tokyo, where injured people sought aid from many medical facilities in different jurisdictions.[21]

Blast effects and standoff distance

The strength of a blast wave is described by its peak overpressure, the sudden rise in pressure at the shock front. Zalosh (2008) explains that this overpressure correlates with an energy-scaled distance: the distance from the explosion divided by the cube root of the explosive mass. That mass is expressed as an equivalent mass of TNT (trinitrotoluene), which releases 4.2 × 106 J per kilogram; most high explosives release similar energy per unit mass.[22] For a ground-level explosion, the handbook doubles the energy, or the TNT mass, before applying its tabulated scaled distances. These two source steps give the following working relation:[23]

Z=z(2WTNT)1/3⟺z=Z(2WTNT)1/3

Symbol Description Unit
z Distance from the explosion m
WTNT TNT-equivalent mass of the explosive kg
Z Energy-scaled distance (tabulated by Zalosh in ft/kg1/3; 1 ft = 0.3048 m) m/kg1/3
Ps0 Peak overpressure of the blast wave, read from the table for a given Z (1 psi = 6.9 kPa) kPa

The handbook's table links ranges of scaled distance and overpressure to selected consequences. Scaled distances of 12.5 to 25 m/kg1/3 (41 to 82 ft/kg1/3) correspond to 3.5 to 7.6 kPa (0.5 to 1.1 psi) and shattered windows. Its 9.8 to 13.4 m/kg1/3 band corresponds to 6.9 to 10.4 kPa and personnel being knocked down. The listed bands for eardrum rupture, lung damage and lethality are 2.7 to 4.6, 1.4 to 2.0 and 0.82 to 1.16 m/kg1/3, respectively.[23]

As a worked example, the Oklahoma City bomb of 1995 contained about 1,800 kg of ammonium nitrate fuel oil, with an estimated TNT equivalence of 1,540 kg.[24] For a ground-level charge, (2 × 1,540 kg)1/3 = 14.6 kg1/3. In this table-based illustration, the knock-down overpressure band corresponds to z = (9.8 to 13.4 m/kg1/3) × 14.6 kg1/3, or about 140 to 200 m. The table's lethality band corresponds to about 12 to 17 m.

Bar chart of table-based overpressure consequence bands from a 1540 kg TNT ground-level blast
Illustrative overpressure consequence bands for a ground-level charge of 1,540 kg TNT equivalent, using tabulated scaled distances with doubled energy for ground reflection. These bands are not safety perimeters.

As a scaling illustration, because z grows with the cube root of the charge, a charge eight times larger produces the same tabulated overpressure at twice the distance. These bands illustrate the method under idealised open-air conditions; they are not safety perimeters. Real assessments must also consider blast impulse, fragments and reflections from buildings and terrain, for which a variety of computer codes had been developed. Oswald and co-workers used data from Oklahoma City and other incidents to develop a separate correlation for life-threatening injuries from glass, roof and wall damage.[22][24]

Meacham and Galioto (2008) state the practical rule that, at close range and leaving aside local effects, peak blast pressure is broadly inversely proportional to the square of the distance. Every metre of standoff therefore counts. Keeping an attack away from its target, through standoff distance, bollards and barriers, is the only defence that will succeed against a large vehicle bomb.[25] As an illustration of that rule, doubling the standoff from 10 m to 20 m would reduce the peak pressure to about a quarter.

Protecting buildings

For design, Meacham and Galioto recommend starting from a threat, vulnerability and risk assessment. It identifies potential threats, evaluates the likelihood of each scenario and assesses its consequences.[26] Target performance can then be set with matrices such as the levels of protection of the US Department of Defense antiterrorism standard (2003). These range from "below standards", where the frame collapses and most occupants die, to "high", with only superficial damage and injuries.[27]

Five-row colour-graded table of levels of protection from below standards to high, with structural damage, glazing hazard and injury for each
Levels of protection for new buildings in the US Department of Defense antiterrorism standard (2003), from severe damage to superficial damage.

Blast-resistant design rests on four tenets: prevent glazing and facade materials from entering occupied spaces, keep the blast energy outside, protect occupants from fragments and blast pressure, and prevent global, local and progressive collapse.[5] The most widespread cause of injury from an external bomb is window glass broken and thrown into the building. Plain annealed glass is the most hazardous because it breaks into dagger-like shards, while antishatter film, laminated glass and better anchored frames reduce the hazard. Most steel or in-situ concrete frames can perform well under typical vehicle bombs: local damage can be severe, but catastrophic collapse is relatively rare.[28] The authors stress that there are no exact answers and no universally established design codes for counterterrorist blast protection.[29]

Heating, ventilation and air-conditioning (HVAC) systems link many parts of a building and can carry a released agent to every area they serve. The most effective protection is to separate the system serving the room where an agent is released from the rest of the building. Where an agent may arrive in a package, the areas where packages are opened should be protected. In most commercial buildings, reception areas, mailrooms and loading docks should therefore have independent systems that recirculate air only within those rooms and exhaust it away from the air intakes.[6]

Air intakes should be placed high, because most chemical and biological agents are heavier than air, and away from public areas and horizontal surfaces where a projectile could lodge.[30] The handbook describes filtration suitable for particles of 0.3 to 35 microns for bacteria and 0.01 to 0.3 microns for viruses, far smaller than standard building filters remove. Because of the energy and maintenance cost, such filtration is recommended only for high-risk buildings or areas.[31]

Section through an office building showing a high-level air intake with filtration, a mailroom with its own exhaust system, and a secured plant room
Ventilation measures against airborne chemical and biological agents: high, protected air intakes, independent systems for mailrooms and reception areas, and controlled access to plant rooms.

Emergency response

Local fire departments, police, hazardous materials teams and emergency medical services (EMS) will most likely be the first to meet a CBRN attack. In Teele's 2008 account, federal and military help may be delayed; in the United States, state and federal agencies assist the local jurisdiction while local crews remain involved throughout the incident. This describes the local response role, alongside the FBI's federal coordination role for terrorism-related hazardous materials incidents. Because these agents are meant to injure or kill many people, responders must recognise the situation quickly and protect themselves first.[1][10] Kreckie (2008) urges fire fighters to reassess every incident they approach. They should consider whether it could be a diversion, whether a secondary device could be present, and whether a fire could be spreading radiation or another WMD.[4]

Ordinary protective clothing is not enough. Teele (2008) warns that in-service fire fighting, EMS or hazardous materials clothing not certified for CBRN protection will most likely give no protection at all, or only a few seconds.[1] The 2007 edition of NFPA 1981 required all emergency services self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) to have NIOSH CBRN certification; NIOSH is the US National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. NIOSH tests had shown that chemical warfare agents could cause catastrophic failure of non-hardened apparatus within minutes. Sarin and sulphur mustard were chosen as representative test agents after a review of 151 toxic industrial chemicals and warfare agents.[32] The 2007 edition of NFPA 1971 added optional CBRN protection for fire fighting ensembles, valid only for the complete ensemble with its specified breathing apparatus.[33]

NFPA 1994, the product standard for CBRN terrorism ensembles, covered Classes 2, 3 and 4 in its 2007 edition, while the highest level of protection had moved to the vapour-protective suits of NFPA 1991. Class 4 protects against particulates, including "white powder" incidents. The ensembles are intended for one exposure and then disposal, for use by fire, police, EMS and other personnel during assessment, extrication, rescue, decontamination, triage and treatment. The class must be chosen through a risk assessment of the incident.[1] In many US jurisdictions, fire departments had also acquired mobile decontamination trailers and radiological detection and monitoring units as part of domestic preparedness.[34]

Responders in full chemical protective suits and breathing apparatus at a decontamination shower tent during an exercise
Responders in CBRN protective ensembles at a decontamination line during an exercise.

Large attacks require several agencies to work as one. The National Incident Management System (NIMS) was developed after the attacks of 2001 as a national approach for all levels of government, with the incident command system as one of its components. Incidents with mass casualties, such as acts of terrorism, would most likely be managed by a combination of state and federal agencies.[35] State and local governments were strongly encouraged to adopt NIMS as their single approach to terrorist attacks and other emergencies.[36]

Preparedness and limits

Federal funding supported US preparedness training. Funding for training related to WMD and other large-scale events grew from the first courses funded under the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Act in the 1990s, and was commonly allocated to state or regional initiatives.[37] The Office of Domestic Preparedness, founded in 1998 and moved to the Department of Homeland Security in 2002, trained the full range of first responders for terrorism involving WMD.[38] Planning for WMD incidents should involve planners from all response agencies.[39] Exercises can range from a tabletop exercise to a statewide disaster drill.[40] Even so, the 2005 national needs assessment found that 70 percent of departments lacked written agreements for using non-local hazardous materials and EMS resources at a defined chemical or biological agent incident.[41]

Preparedness has to be weighed against other risks. A small rural community may find large investment in terrorism preparedness cost prohibitive, while it may need substantial plans for tornadoes, earthquakes or hurricanes.[42] Teele (2008) notes, however, that responders from small communities may be called to help overwhelmed urban areas. He adds that, terrorist attacks aside, CBRN-certified breathing apparatus gives greater protection at very minimal cost.[32] Catastrophic events, including WMD attacks, are likely to overwhelm both local and state resources for at least a short period.[43]

Building codes give little guidance. Hall and Twomey (2008) call terrorist events neither predictable nor quantifiable: there is no return interval or probabilistic data to support a design approach that codes could include.[44] Schwartz (2008) adds that an engineer cannot be expected to design for an unknown or unforeseeable hazard.[45] In a chapter on transport vehicles, the SFPE Handbook gives designing against a terrorist attack as an example of protection from a hazard clearly beyond control, which a reasonable person does not expect.[46] The International Fire Engineering Guidelines (2005) were produced jointly by agencies of Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States. They warn that some large-scale arson attacks and terrorist events may exceed the capacity of a building's fire safety system, so that other measures are needed.[47]

See also

Notes

  1. ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 Teele (2008), p. 12-158.
  2. ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 C. J. Wright (2008a), p. 13-118.
  3. ↑ 3.0 3.1 Teele (2008), p. 12-157.
  4. ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 Kreckie (2008), p. 13-113.
  5. ↑ 5.0 5.1 Meacham and Galioto (2008), p. 1-122.
  6. ↑ 6.0 6.1 6.2 Meacham and Galioto (2008), p. 1-128.
  7. ↑ Penney (2008), p. 5-30.
  8. ↑ Meacham and Galioto (2008), pp. 1-112–1-113.
  9. ↑ Freidenfelds (2008), p. 1-96.
  10. ↑ 10.0 10.1 Hildebrand and Noll (2008), p. 13-92.
  11. ↑ 11.0 11.1 Meacham and Galioto (2008), p. 1-113.
  12. ↑ 12.0 12.1 Meacham and Galioto (2008), pp. 1-113–1-114.
  13. ↑ Gann and Bryner (2008), p. 6-13.
  14. ↑ Meacham and Galioto (2008), p. 1-114.
  15. ↑ Hall and Cote (2008), p. 3-5.
  16. ↑ Lawson and Vettori (2005), p. 1.
  17. ↑ Penney (2008), pp. 5-31–5-32.
  18. ↑ Penney (2008), pp. 5-30–5-31.
  19. ↑ Penney (2008), p. 5-31.
  20. ↑ Lawson and Vettori (2005), pp. 17–19.
  21. ↑ Strasser (1995), as cited in Lawson and Vettori (2005), p. 67.
  22. ↑ 22.0 22.1 Zalosh (2008), pp. 2-94–2-95.
  23. ↑ 23.0 23.1 Zalosh (2008), p. 2-96.
  24. ↑ 24.0 24.1 Zalosh (2008), p. 2-97.
  25. ↑ Meacham and Galioto (2008), pp. 1-122–1-124.
  26. ↑ Meacham and Galioto (2008), p. 1-115.
  27. ↑ Meacham and Galioto (2008), pp. 1-116–1-117.
  28. ↑ Meacham and Galioto (2008), pp. 1-124–1-125.
  29. ↑ Meacham and Galioto (2008), p. 1-126.
  30. ↑ Meacham and Galioto (2008), p. 1-129.
  31. ↑ Meacham and Galioto (2008), p. 1-130.
  32. ↑ 32.0 32.1 Teele (2008), p. 12-153.
  33. ↑ Teele (2008), pp. 12-148–12-149.
  34. ↑ Denlinger (2008), p. 12-64.
  35. ↑ Schmidt (2008), p. 1-143.
  36. ↑ Van Helden and Stewart (2008), p. 12-199.
  37. ↑ Denlinger (2008), p. 12-54.
  38. ↑ Laughlin (2008), p. 12-171.
  39. ↑ Denlinger (2008), p. 12-57.
  40. ↑ Van Helden and Stewart (2008), p. 12-202.
  41. ↑ Jenaway (2008), p. 12-43.
  42. ↑ Van Helden and Stewart (2008), p. 12-205.
  43. ↑ Van Helden and Stewart (2008), p. 12-209.
  44. ↑ Hall and Twomey (2008), p. 1-3.
  45. ↑ Schwartz (2008), p. 1-78.
  46. ↑ Bukowski (2002), p. 5-232.
  47. ↑ National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), pp. 1.2-27–1.2-28.

References

  • Bukowski, R. W. (2002). Fire hazard assessment for transportation vehicles. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 5-227–5-233). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
  • Denlinger, R. F. (2008). Managing fire-rescue departments. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 12-51–12-78). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Freidenfelds, L. V. (2008). Premises security. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 1-95–1-107). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Gann, R. G., & Bryner, N. P. (2008). Combustion products and their effects on life safety. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 6-11–6-34). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Hall, J. R., Jr., & Cote, A. E. (2008). An overview of the fire problem and fire protection. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 3-3–3-30). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Hall, J. R., Jr., & Twomey, E. R. (2008). Challenges to safety in the built environment. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 1-3–1-29). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Hildebrand, M. S., & Noll, G. G. (2008). Public fire protection and hazmat management. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 13-81–13-98). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Jenaway, W. F. (2008). Needs assessment and hazard analysis. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 12-41–12-50). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Kreckie, J. (2008). Aircraft rescue and fire fighting (ARFF). In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 13-99–13-115). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Laughlin, J. W. (2008). Training programs for fire and emergency service personnel. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 12-161–12-175). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Lawson, J. R., & Vettori, R. L. (2005). The emergency response operations (NIST NCSTAR 1-8). National Institute of Standards and Technology.
  • Meacham, B. J., & Galioto, C. (2008). Protecting against extreme events. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 1-109–1-136). National Fire Protection Association.
  • National Research Council of Canada, International Code Council, Department of Building and Housing, & Australian Building Codes Board. (2005). International fire engineering guidelines (2005 ed.). Australian Building Codes Board.
  • Penney, G. (2008). Disaster preparedness education. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 5-29–5-43). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Schmidt, D. L. (2008). Emergency management and business continuity. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 1-137–1-156). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Schwartz, A. E. (2008). Legal issues for the designer and enforcer. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 1-73–1-80). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Teele, B. W. (2008). Fire and emergency services protective clothing and protective equipment. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 12-143–12-160). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Van Helden, W., & Stewart, T. (2008). Disaster planning and response services. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 12-199–12-214). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Wright, C. J. (2008a). Managing the response to hazardous material incidents. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 13-117–13-144). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Zalosh, R. (2008). Explosions. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 2-93–2-106). National Fire Protection Association.