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Contents
  1. 1Mines and why their fires differ
  2. 2History and statistics
  3. 3Fuels and ignition sources
  4. 4Methane and coal dust explosions
  5. 5Conveyor belts and material selection
  6. 6Detection, warning and escape
  7. 7Fire fighting, inerting and sealing
  8. 8See also
  9. 9Notes
  10. 10References

A mine fire is a fire in a mine, above all in its underground workings. The fuel may be the coal or ore itself, the timber and machinery in the mine, or methane and coal dust, which can also explode.[1][2] The 2008 NFPA handbook described underground mining as a leading industry worldwide for fatalities and injuries. In US coal mines alone, more than 100,000 miners died from all unintentional-injury causes between 1900 and 1999, and about 10–15% of the deaths were caused directly by fires and explosions.[3] Mine fires differ from building fires because the workings are long, narrow and hard to reach. Smoke travels with the ventilation air, and a fire in a shaft can contaminate the intake air or block a critical escape route.[1]

Once coal ignites, the entire mine becomes the available fuel supply.[1] Protection therefore concentrates on preventing ignition, detecting a fire while it is small and getting the miners out. The largest fires may only be controllable by inerting, flooding or sealing the mine.[4]

Mines and why their fires differ

Mining is the process of gaining access to and extracting minerals, materials or coal from the earth. Surface strip and open pit mining are the most common forms, and underground mining is used where the overlying strata are too thick to reach the deposit economically from the surface.[5] An underground mine is reached by a shaft (a vertical opening), a slope (an inclined opening) or an adit or entry (a horizontal opening into a hillside). Large mines may comprise miles of drifts or entries on many levels, connected by shafts, raises and ramps.[6]

Underground coal is mined by the room-and-pillar method, in which rooms are cut between pillars of coal that support the roof, or by longwall mining. The 2008 handbook attributed about 35% of US underground coal production to longwall mining.[6][7] It described most coal mining equipment as electrically powered through trailing cables, whereas most mobile equipment in noncoal mines ran on diesel.[7][1] After extraction, ore and coal go to a mineral processing plant or a coal preparation plant, usually on or near the mine site.[5]

Fire and explosion safety in mines rests on the same principles as in other industries: limiting combustible loading, preventing ignition, early detection, fixed suppression and emergency response. The inaccessibility of underground workings adds special requirements that normal industrial plants do not need.[8] Automation adds another problem. An unattended machine has no operator to spot a fire while it is small, and a small underground workforce makes it hard to gather a fire brigade quickly.[1]

History and statistics

The worst US mine disasters were explosions. The Monongah coal mine explosion in West Virginia on 6 December 1907 killed 361 people, the tenth highest toll of any US fire or explosion up to 2004.[9] Of the 101 US fires and explosions that killed 50 or more people between 1900 and 1999, 59 were in mining, and only three of these were not in coal mines. Fifteen such mining incidents in 1900–1909 killed 2,286 people, while the decades from 1980 to 1999 had none. The decline was steeper than the decline in coal mining employment.[10]

Documented US mine disasters with five or more deaths peaked at 356 in 1901–1925 (305 in coal mines) and fell to 14 from 1976 until the handbook was written. Fires and explosions, followed by collapse, caused the vast majority of these disasters.[3] The five worst US coal mine disasters since 1940 were all explosions, led by Orient No. 2 in Illinois in 1951 with 119 deaths. The worst metal and nonmetal disaster in that period was a fire in the Sunshine silver mine at Kellogg, Idaho, which killed 91 miners on 2 May 1972. A fire in the Belle Isle salt mine in Louisiana killed 21 in 1968.[3]

US coal mine deaths from all causes averaged 1,040 a year over 1900–1999 but only 45 a year over 1990–1999. In 2000–2004, 116 people died in all types of US mining, 83 of them in underground coal mines and 16 in underground metal mines.[3] In January 2006, 11 miners died at the Sago coal mine in West Virginia after suspected surface lightning ignited underground gases. In the same month a rubber belt conveyor fire in the Alma coal mine killed two, and smoke from burning plastic piping in a Canadian potash mine trapped 72 miners, who were all rescued.[3] In 1994–1998, US mines and quarries averaged US$12.3 million a year in direct damage in fires reported to local fire departments.[1]

Fuels and ignition sources

The US Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) classified underground mine fires in 1991–2000 by ignition source. In coal mines, friction was the largest category (24%), followed by mobile equipment (15%), cutting and welding (14%), electrical sources (14%) and spontaneous combustion (12%). In metal and nonmetal mines, mobile equipment dominated with 46%, followed by cutting and welding with 16%.[1]

Diesel equipment burns when a broken hydraulic, fuel or lubricating oil line sprays a combustible mist onto a hot surface such as an engine manifold. On surface mining equipment such a fire can engulf the cab before the driver is even aware of it.[1] More fires in surface mines involve flammable and combustible liquids than any other material, and hydraulic fluid at high temperature and pressure is a primary hazard.[2] Frictional heat between a conveyor belt and a drive roller is a renewed concern as belts replace rail haulage in older mines, and welding and cutting are an important cause of shaft fires.[1]

Coal and metal sulfide ores oxidise slowly and release heat. When the heat is not dissipated, the rock mass or pile warms up and can reach rapid combustion, and such fires are hard to extinguish in remote, abandoned sections of a mine.[1] Self-heating coal stockpiles large enough to retain heat may ignite after a few months.[11] A diffusion-based model makes the penetration time of a smouldering front grow with the square of the layer thickness. In that model, a uniform 10 m fuel layer, as might occur in a coal mine tailing pile, would take more than four years. Real deep piles are unlikely to be uniform, and convective airflow can dominate the movement of the front.[12] The same self-heating occurs in Coal storage piles, bins and silos at coal preparation plants.[13]

Timber long provided roof support, and older mines still contain large amounts of it. Only about 10% of underground fires involve wood, but timber fires spread faster, burn longer and are harder to extinguish than fires in most other combustibles.[1] Equipment fires are generally limited by the amount of fuel on the machine, so the ultimate aim of underground coal mine fire protection is to stop the coal itself from igniting. More than one-third of fires involving burning coal last longer than 24 hours, with an average duration of six days. If a developing fire is not extinguished, there is a 50% chance that control will take more than 8 hours. There is also a 5% chance that part or all of the mine will have to be sealed.[1]

Methane and coal dust explosions

Practically all underground coal mine explosions, and many in noncoal mines, start with the ignition of methane. This colourless, odourless gas is present in coal seams and escapes into the mine during mining. Ventilation normally dilutes it and carries it away, but poor ventilation or a sudden outburst can create explosive mixtures. Pockets or layers can be explosive even when the average concentration is safe.[2] The lower explosive limit (LEL) of methane in air is 5%, and as little as 0.3 mJ of electrical energy can ignite it.[2] Flame spreads through stratified fuel-air layers near the ceilings of mine tunnels at rates similar to the 1.3–2.2 m/s measured over flammable liquids above their flash point.[14]

The stoichiometric mixture, in which all fuel and all oxygen are used, follows from the reaction CH4 + 2 O2 → CO2 + 2 H2O.[15] Air contains 21% oxygen by volume, so the two volumes of oxygen for one volume of methane come with 2/0.21 = 9.5 volumes of air.[16] The stoichiometric methane fraction is therefore 1/(1 + 9.5) ≈ 9.5%, and the LEL of 5% is about half of it. The handbook attributes the high number of mine explosions to this small amount of methane and to the low ignition energy.[2]

Beyond a few hundred feet of travel, coal dust swept up from the floor, roof and walls becomes the main fuel of a mine explosion. The methane flame ignites it, and the shock wave raises the settled dust into the air. The LEL of high-volatile bituminous coal dust is given as 0.05 oz/ft³ (about 50 g/m³), and methane lowers it linearly.[2] Pittsburgh coal from the US experimental mine is the reference dust of the explosibility index, with a minimum explosible concentration of 55 g/m³ and a minimum cloud ignition energy of 0.060 J.[17][18] A Dust explosion in a mine can produce flame temperatures of 1,982 °C (3,600 °F) and static pressures above 345 kPa (50 psig).[2]

Frictional sparking between rock and the cutting tools of continuous miners, roof bolters, drills and longwall machines caused more than 85% of ignitions and explosions in US underground coal mines. Electric arcs caused only about 2.5%, while ignitions from welding and cutting have increased since 1970.[2] Prevention relies on ventilation and, where methane levels are high, on degasification ahead of mining. Where methane may be present, electrical equipment must be "permissible" or intrinsically safe and diesel machines permissible, and smoking is prohibited. Methanometers check the gas frequently, and all electrical equipment is shut down when methane reaches a set level.[19] Permissible explosives, approved by MSHA for underground coal mines, have a reduced tendency to ignite gas-air and gas-air-coal dust mixtures.[20] Special anti-incendive Blasting agent products exist for metal mines with sulfide dust.[19]

A floor layer of coal dust only 0.005 in. (about 0.13 mm) thick can propagate an explosion if it is raised into the air, and less is needed when methane is present. Coal dust mixed with enough inert rock dust, such as pulverised limestone, dolomite or gypsum, does not propagate an explosion.[19] For coal mine entries, enough rock dust is usually added to make the inert material at least 65% of the total dust.[21] Treating the coal dust as fully combustible, the rock dust needed per square metre of floor follows from this criterion: mrock≥finert1−finertmcoal,mcoal=1000ρbh

Symbol Description Unit
mrock Rock dust mass per unit floor area g/m²
mcoal Coal dust mass per unit floor area; factor 1000 converts kg to g g/m²
finert Required inert fraction of the total dust (0.65) –
ρb Bulk density of the dust layer kg/m³
h Thickness of the coal dust layer m

As a worked example, take the 0.127 mm layer with a typical bulk density for coal dust layers of 500 kg/m³.[22] The layer holds 500 × 0.000127 ≈ 0.064 kg, or about 64 g of coal dust per square metre. Raised into a cloud 1 m deep, it would give about 64 g/m³, just above the minimum explosible concentration of 60 g/m³ listed for high-volatile bituminous coal.[23] To make the deposit inert, at least 0.65/0.35 × 64 ≈ 120 g of rock dust per square metre is needed. The estimate ignores ash and moisture in the coal and assumes well-mixed dusts. Regulations therefore require frequent checks of the incombustible content of mine dust, followed by more rock dusting where needed.[19]

Conveyor belts and material selection

Rubber conveyor belts, especially in coal handling, remain a major cause of fire loss in mining. FM Global data on 24 coal industry conveyor belt fires in 1978–1999 list open flame (25%), spontaneous ignition (21%) and friction (21%) as the main probable causes. Hot surfaces, overheating and unknown causes account for the rest.[13] Slippage and sequence switches prevent heat build-up, and thermal detectors are common over belts, drives and take-ups.[8][4] Conveyor fire protection can also include manual or automatic suppression at belt drives.[4]

The other basic measure is to use less hazardous materials. Fire-resistive hydraulic fluids, conveyor belting, hydraulic hoses and ventilation tubing are all required in US underground mines under certain conditions.[8] Fire-resistant hydraulic fluid is such a substitute for ordinary hydraulic fluid, which the handbook names as a primary hazard in surface mine fires.[2] Many countries have banned polyurethane foam, once widely used for ventilation seals, because of its toxic combustion products.[8]

For conveyor belts, a small-scale test can predict large-scale behaviour through the fire propagation index (FPI). The index combines the chemical heat release rate per unit width during upward fire propagation with the thermal response parameter (TRP), which describes how readily a material ignites under a given heat flux:[24] FPI=1000(0.42Q˙'ch)1/3TRP=750(Q˙'ch)1/3TRP

Symbol Description Unit
FPI Fire propagation index (m/s1/2)/(kW/m)2/3
Q˙'ch Peak chemical heat release rate per unit width during upward propagation kW/m
TRP Thermal response parameter of the material kW·s1/2/m²

Materials with an FPI below 7 do not propagate fire beyond the ignition zone. Values of 7–10 indicate decelerating propagation, 10–20 nonaccelerating, slow propagation and values above 20 accelerating propagation.[24] The tests use belt samples about 600 mm long and 100 mm wide in the ASTM E2058 fire propagation apparatus. An oxygen mass fraction of 0.40 simulates the strong flame radiation of large fires. Belts with an FPI of 7 or less showed limited fire propagation in the large-scale fire gallery of the US Bureau of Mines.[25]

In a worked example from the same source, a polychloroprene (CR) belt has a TRP of 760 kW·s1/2/m² and a peak Q˙'ch of 114 kW/m. A belt of polychloroprene and styrene-butadiene rubber (CR/SBR) has 400 kW·s1/2/m² and 73 kW/m.[25] The CR belt gives FPI = 750 × 1141/3/760 ≈ 4.8, so fire does not propagate. The CR/SBR belt gives 750 × 731/3/400 ≈ 7.8, so it does. This matches large-scale tunnel tests, in which fire on the CR belt did not propagate and fire on the CR/SBR belt did.[25] To reach an FPI of 7 at 73 kW/m, the CR/SBR belt would need a TRP of about 450 kW·s1/2/m².

Detection, warning and escape

Early detection lets the emergency plan start while the fire is still small. Smoke or gas detection is the most cost-effective way to cover large areas or a whole mine. Instruments sampling the ventilation air can detect particles smaller than 1 µm at 1 mg/m³ and tell diesel smoke from fire smoke. Fixed underground instruments can reliably detect carbon monoxide at 2 ppm.[4]

Warning every miner is difficult because the workforce is widely scattered and far from telephones. In US coal mines the usual warning is a shutdown of electric power with telephone calls and messengers. In noncoal mines, where little equipment is electric, a stench gas released into the ventilation air is the most common warning. Radio systems with leaky feeder cables and ultralow-frequency transmitters that reach receivers in the miners' cap lamps are also used.[4]

Smoke and toxic fire gases are the greatest threat, and toxic atmospheres are the principal cause of death in mine fires.[26] The flow of smoke through the ventilation system, and the changes the fire itself causes in that flow, are normally too complex to understand without computer models. Such models can simulate throttling and reversal of airflow by buoyant fire gases and track contaminants.[27][26] The 2008 handbook stated that US coal mines had to provide self-contained breathing apparatus with at least one hour of oxygen, and noncoal mines one-hour self-rescuers that convert carbon monoxide to carbon dioxide. Smoke can obscure escapeways long before it becomes acutely toxic, so smoke-free escapeways, frequent drills and rope lifelines are used.[26]

Fire fighting, inerting and sealing

Underground coal mines use dry chemical extinguishers, water hoselines and sprinklers, rock dust and foam generators. Manual or automatic suppression systems are increasingly fitted to mobile equipment, fuel stores, conveyor drives and electrical installations, above all on unattended machines.[4] High-expansion foam was first developed for coal mine fires by the Safety in Mines Research Establishment in England. Foam of about 1,000 times the volume of the solution could be forced along long corridors to fires out of reach of hose streams. The US Bureau of Mines extended this work after the Second World War.[28] Coal mines and conveyor tunnels remain typical applications of foam.[29]

Large fires in coal or timber may be complicated by roof falls, uncertain ventilation and explosive gas. The only practical options may then be Inerting with nitrogen, carbon dioxide or the products of an inert gas generator, flooding with water, or sealing all or part of the mine.[4] Carbon dioxide inerts mainly by absorbing heat, lowering the flame temperature of a stoichiometric mixture from about 1,900 °C to 1,200–1,300 °C; nitrogen needs a somewhat larger volume.[30] Methane burns in air between about 5% and 15%, and the flammable region closes when roughly 20% carbon dioxide is added.[31] Only highly trained and specially equipped teams fight advanced mine fires.[4]

Construction and storage rules limit fire spread. In US underground coal mines, oil and grease must be kept in closed, fire-resistant containers, and transformer stations, battery chargers and shops must be in fire-resistant areas. Materials for bulkheads and seals must be at hand in each working section, and stoppings and fire doors limit the spread of fire and smoke.[27] Some European coal mines use explosion barriers: rows of tubs with water or rock dust that the blast tips over ahead of the flame, or triggered systems that release suppressant.[32]

In the United States, MSHA is the principal federal mine regulator. The 2008 handbook names NFPA 120 for underground coal mines and NFPA 122 for underground metal and nonmetal mines.[8] A 2004 list of NFPA documents from the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission still shows an older arrangement. There, NFPA 120 covered coal preparation plants (1999 edition), NFPA 121 mobile surface mining equipment (2001) and NFPA 123 underground bituminous coal mines (1999).[33]

See also

Notes

  1. ↑ 1.00 1.01 1.02 1.03 1.04 1.05 1.06 1.07 1.08 1.09 1.10 1.11 L. J. Moore (2008), p. 9-213.
  2. ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 L. J. Moore (2008), p. 9-214.
  3. ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 L. J. Moore (2008), p. 9-212.
  4. ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7 L. J. Moore (2008), p. 9-218.
  5. ↑ 5.0 5.1 L. J. Moore (2008), p. 9-203.
  6. ↑ 6.0 6.1 L. J. Moore (2008), p. 9-205.
  7. ↑ 7.0 7.1 L. J. Moore (2008), p. 9-206.
  8. ↑ 8.0 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 L. J. Moore (2008), p. 9-216.
  9. ↑ Hall and Cote (2008), p. 3-10.
  10. ↑ Hall and Cote (2008), p. 3-27.
  11. ↑ Gray (2002), p. 2-224.
  12. ↑ Ohlemiller (2002), p. 2-202.
  13. ↑ 13.0 13.1 L. J. Moore (2008), p. 9-215.
  14. ↑ Gottuk and White (2002), p. 2-303.
  15. ↑ Van Rossum (2027), §3.3.
  16. ↑ Van Rossum (2027), §4.2.
  17. ↑ Schwab (2008c), p. 6-142.
  18. ↑ Schwab (2008c), p. 6-143.
  19. ↑ 19.0 19.1 19.2 19.3 L. J. Moore (2008), p. 9-217.
  20. ↑ Santis (2008), p. 6-250.
  21. ↑ Schwab (2008c), p. 6-144.
  22. ↑ Zalosh (2002), p. 3-410.
  23. ↑ Zalosh (2002), p. 3-404.
  24. ↑ 24.0 24.1 Tewarson (2002), p. 3-92.
  25. ↑ 25.0 25.1 25.2 Tewarson (2002), p. 3-94.
  26. ↑ 26.0 26.1 26.2 L. J. Moore (2008), p. 9-221.
  27. ↑ 27.0 27.1 L. J. Moore (2008), p. 9-220.
  28. ↑ Scheffey and Hickey (2002), p. 4-128.
  29. ↑ Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. B-61.
  30. ↑ Yu and Newman (2008), p. 2-89.
  31. ↑ Yu and Newman (2008), p. 2-90.
  32. ↑ L. J. Moore (2008), p. 9-219.
  33. ↑ Iqbal and Salley (2004), pp. E-4–E-5.

References

  • Gottuk, D. T., & White, D. A. (2002). Liquid fuel fires. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 2-297–2-316). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
  • Gray, B. (2002). Spontaneous combustion and self-heating. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 2-211–2-228). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
  • Hall, J. R., Jr., & Cote, A. E. (2008). An overview of the fire problem and fire protection. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 3-3–3-30). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Iqbal, N., & Salley, M. H. (2004). Fire Dynamics Tools (FDTs): Quantitative fire hazard analysis methods for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Fire Protection Inspection Program (NUREG-1805). U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
  • Moore, L. J. (2008). Mining and mineral processing. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 9-203–9-223). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Ohlemiller, T. J. (2002). Smoldering combustion. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 2-200–2-210). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
  • Santis, L. D. (2008). Explosives and blasting agents. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 6-247–6-256). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Scheffey, J. L., & Hickey, H. E. (2002). Foam system calculations. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 4-123–4-148). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
  • Schwab, R. F. (2008c). Dusts. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 6-141–6-152). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Tewarson, A. (2002). Generation of heat and chemical compounds in fires. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 3-82–3-161). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
  • Van Rossum, E. (2027). Introduction to Fire Safety Engineering. Fire Safety Academy.
  • Yu, H.-Z., & Newman, J. S. (2008). Theory of fire extinguishment. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 2-79–2-92). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Zalosh, R. (2002). Explosion protection. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 3-402–3-421). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.