Contents
An industrial dryer is process equipment that uses heat to reduce the moisture content of a product, such as grain, milk powder or lumber, or to drive a flammable liquid out of a solid.[1][2] The Fire Protection Handbook (2008) names three basic hazards: ignition of combustible materials near the dryer, the fuel or electricity used as the heat source, and ignition of the stock being dried.[1] Many dryers are direct-fired, so that hot combustion gases pass straight through the product, and some run close to or above the ignition temperature of the material.[3][4] Dust concentrations above the explosible limit occur routinely in dryers, and deposits on hot surfaces can heat themselves to ignition.[5][6] Protection therefore relies on temperature and airflow interlocks, burner safeguards, noncombustible construction, regular cleaning and, depending on the type, sprinklers, spark detection or explosion protection downstream.[3][7] In US practice described in the handbook, dryers fall under NFPA 86 and several occupancy standards, such as NFPA 61 for grain and NFPA 664 for wood.[7][8][9]
Types of dryers
Ostrowski (2008a) divides dryers for agricultural products into three groups by the way the drying chamber works. Continuous dryers include drum, spray, flash, gravity, tunnel and rotary dryers, used for products ranging from milk, eggs and soup to forage crops, grains and seeds. Batch dryers include pan dryers for sugar, puree and sludges. Bulk dryers dry seeds, grains, nuts, tobacco, hay and forage in the bin, crib or compartment where the product will be stored.[1][3] In chemical processing, Schwab (2008a) lists six general types: spray, fluidised bed, vacuum, tray, belt and drum dryers, all of which work by transferring heat.[2]
Dryers are heated in two ways. In a direct-fired dryer the products of combustion contact the material being dried; in an indirect-fired dryer they do not. Heat sources include oil, gas and solid fuel burners, electric heaters and heat transfer media such as steam.[3] The typical modern grain dryer, for example, is direct-fired with natural gas, fuel oil or propane, and passes the heated air directly through the moist grain.[10] Dryers with a fuel-fired heating enclosure share many hazards with other heat-processing equipment, described in Industrial oven and furnace.
Wood products use their own dryer types. Lumber is dried in kilns, which Ostrowski (2008a) describes as ovens with controlled heat and humidity. A kiln can be a batch or compartment kiln, where the wood stays in place, or a progressive kiln, where green lumber enters at one end and dry lumber leaves at the other.[11] Cholin (2008d) reports kiln temperatures often as high as 149 °C (300 °F) at 100 percent humidity, for a cycle of usually several weeks.[12][13] Veneer dryers dry plies only 0.8 to 3.2 mm thick, and rotary drum driers dry particles for particle board, medium-density fibreboard and oriented strand board.[13] Each dryer type in a Woodworking facility presents its own fire hazard, and dryer heat sources can be a serious source of ignition.[14]
Grain elevators dry grain to a moisture level low enough to preserve it in storage, mostly in batch dryers or continuous-flow column and rack dryers.[10] Large grain dryers can need more than 21 million kJ/h (20,000,000 Btu/h), roughly 5.9 MW, and stand up to 24.4 m high.[15] Oilseed plants dry seeds in a flue gas dryer to about 10 or 11 percent moisture before extraction, and some use fluidised bed dryers.[16]
Fire and explosion hazards
Every dryer combines heat with a combustible product. Lumber kilns are a clear example: large quantities of combustible material are exposed to temperatures that can approach ignition temperatures, so Ostrowski (2008a) rates kilns as a high fire hazard.[11] Cholin (2008d) notes that kilns heat wood close to 200 °C, usually taken as sufficient for the onset of endothermic pyrolysis. Kiln productivity also creates a financial incentive to run them as hot as possible.[13] Direct-fired kilns present the greatest hazard, because open ignition sources are close to the wood. Indirectly heated kilns with steam coils and controlled humidity are usually considered low hazard.[17]
The process itself can ignite the product. In a rotary drum drier for wood particles, the flue gas usually enters at a temperature close to, or even above, the ignition temperature of the wood. Only careful control of gas temperature, gas flow, particle flow and drum speed prevents ignition, and imbalances in these parameters can ignite the particles.[4] In grain dryers, failure to remove accumulations of dust and debris, or a blockage such as a broken bucket from a bucket elevator, lets grain overheat. The resulting "hang-ups" and overdried particles ignite readily when the burner runs too hot or small embers are carried in the plenum air.[10] In lumber kilns, broken stickers and sawdust can fall through floor gratings and collect around heating coils and fan motors, especially where high-pressure steam coils are used.[17]
Drying can also create explosive atmospheres. Ostrowski (2008a) notes that explosions can arise from flammable vapour–air mixtures formed by the fuel or by volatiles released from the material being dried. He states that ventilation and controls that keep the vapour below 25 percent of the lower flammable limit prevent such explosions.[18] Under NFPA 86, as summarised in the handbook, equipment at about atmospheric pressure with an explosion or fire hazard from flammable volatiles or combustible material is a Class A oven. Ostrowski (2008a) states that direct-fired kilns should be treated as analogous to Class A ovens.[18][17] Schwab (2008a) adds that removing a flammable liquid or vapour from a powder in a dryer increases the danger of igniting a dust explosion.[2]
Dust is the second explosion source. Zalosh (2008) lists dryers among the process equipment in which concentrations above the minimum explosible concentration are experienced routinely. In German records for 1965 to 1985, 78 percent of all dust explosions originated in such equipment.[5] Dryers are also connected to mills, collectors and silos. Ural and Garzia (2008) warn that a deflagration entering connecting pipes can produce a more powerful explosion than the first one, and may even turn into a detonation.[19] For rotary drum driers, Cholin (2008d) describes spark and ember detection with water spray, together with deflagration protection, as the usual measures for the downstream conveyors and storage vessels.[4]
US grain industry data put the hazard in proportion. Of 355 facilities with dust explosions for which data were available between 1958 and 1995, the grain dryer was the probable location of the primary explosion at 3, or 0.8 percent.[20] Maness and Sargent (2008) write that the multiple severe grain dryer fires and explosions of 20 to 25 years earlier had not recurred, which they attribute to safety devices and better operating procedures.[10] Fires remain the more frequent event, and the most severe grain dryer fire hazard is ignition of grain, dust and foreign material that has accumulated on ledges and surfaces inside the dryer.[15]
Self-heating of deposits
Deposits inside a dryer can ignite without any flame. A layer of powder on a hot surface can generate heat internally, and if the layer is too thick the heat cannot be lost fast enough; this self-heating then runs away to ignition.[21] Gray (2002) describes this in the SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering with the Frank-Kamenetskii theory. The theory gives a critical size for each ambient temperature: a smaller body loses heat fast enough to stay stable, while a larger one ignites.[22] Laboratory tests on baskets of different sizes give the critical ambient temperature for each size. Plotting the logarithm of the critical temperature squared divided by the size squared against the inverse critical temperature then gives a straight line, whose slope is set by the activation energy.[22]
Gray (2002) reports an example by Beever for a milk-drying plant. Air entering the spray dryer was heated to 200 °C, and surfaces near the inlet could reach this temperature. Further down the dryer, where powder was more likely to collect, surfaces ran at 80 °C.[6] Cubic baskets with half side-lengths of 0.025, 0.0375 and 0.050 m had critical ambient temperatures of 171, 156 and 141.5 °C. These results give the fitted relation below.[6]
| Symbol | Description | Unit |
|---|---|---|
| δc | Frank-Kamenetskii critical parameter, set by the shape of the body: 2.52 for a cube, 0.88 for an infinite slab | – |
| Ta,c | critical ambient (surface) temperature | K |
| r | half side-length of a cube, or half-thickness of a slab heated on both sides | m |
| 41.85, 9497 | fitted constants for this milk powder; 9497 K is the activation energy divided by the gas constant | –, K |
The constants apply only to the milk powder tested. Gray (2002) notes that the critical parameters are sensitive to moisture content, and that the critical thickness increases significantly with moisture, which can be up to 4 percent.[23] The surface temperatures of 80 °C and 200 °C also lie outside the 141.5 to 171 °C range of the laboratory tests, so the results are extrapolations.[6]
Worked example. For a flat layer with both sides at 200 °C, Ta,c = 473.15 K and δc = 0.88. The right-hand side is 41.85 − 9497/473.15 = 21.78, so r² = 0.88 × 473.15² / e21.78 ≈ 6.9 × 10−5 m². This gives r ≈ 0.0083 m, and the critical layer thickness 2r is about 0.017 m, the value Gray (2002) reports.[6] At 80 °C (353.15 K) the same steps give 2r ≈ 0.37 m, which Gray (2002) rounds to 0.4 m.
At an intermediate 120 °C, the fitted relation gives about 0.11 m. A deposit only about 2 cm thick can therefore ignite near a 200 °C inlet. On this basis the plant decided that regular cleaning inside the dryer was needed to remove buildup.[6]
The example shows why the hottest zones matter most. The critical thickness falls steeply as the surface temperature rises, so a deposit that is harmless at 80 °C can be supercritical near the inlet. Gray (2002) also notes that ignition of such a deposit can spoil the product and act as an ignition source for a dust explosion. Such explosions have occurred in milk-drying plants with devastating consequences.[6]
Controls and safeguards
Ostrowski (2008a) lists controls for dryers in addition to those on the heating equipment. A dryer should shut down automatically in the event of fire or excessive temperature. Where product is fed automatically to storage, an exhaust thermostat should shut off heat, stop the product flow and sound an alarm. It should also stop the airflow, except where the product is dried in suspension.[3][24] In dryers built of combustible materials, a thermostat should shut off heat at 74 °C (165 °F) while letting unheated air pass. Further devices shut off heat if air movement stops and provide a high-limit thermostat between the heater and the dryer.[24]
Burner controls are the same as for other automatically fired equipment. They include a manual quick-closing shutoff valve in the fuel supply, manual restart after any automatic shutdown, flame failure protection and preventilation of the combustion chamber, all with devices listed for the service.[7] Such devices are described under Flame safeguard. For grain dryers, the US OSHA rule described by Maness and Sargent (2008) requires automatic controls that shut off fuel on power failure or on interruption of flame or exhaust air. They must also stop the feed if the exhaust becomes too hot.[8] Large grain dryers also rely on temperature sensors, ultraviolet flame detectors, limit switches and fuel cutoff devices.[15]
Construction and location limit the consequences. Because dryers run hot, they should be made of fire-resistant or noncombustible materials. If combustible materials must be used, sustained temperatures should not exceed approximately 74 °C (165 °F).[7] Secondary air openings of direct-fired dryers are screened with 12.7 mm (½ in.) mesh and primary air openings with 6.4 mm (¼ in.) mesh or smaller, so that material cannot enter the combustion chamber.[7] Conductive parts should be bonded and grounded where the stock generates static electricity. Where the building has a combustible dust hazard, the heater and blowers belong in a separate dust-free room, and ducts should be noncombustible.[7]
Some rules are specific to an industry. US OSHA rule 29 CFR 1910.272(p), as described in the 2008 handbook, prohibits bulk grain dryers inside a Grain elevator unless they are in a separate fire area or protected by explosion suppression.[8] Ideally, a grain dryer is housed in a structure completely separate from the storage facility, and grain temperature should not exceed 65.5 °C (150 °F).[10][8] In oilseed plants, seeds are cleaned of trash, dirt and foreign material before drying to eliminate fire hazards in the dryer.[16] For wood, NFPA 664 covers veneer and fibreboard dryers, rotary dryers, flash-tube dryers, kilns and finish dryers, as listed in the handbook.[9]
Fire protection and fire fighting
Automatic sprinklers are the main fixed protection where the dryer and its contents can burn. For lumber kilns, Ostrowski (2008a) names sprinkler protection, sound construction, good housekeeping, humidity control, good air circulation and ventilation as the important requirements. Sprinklers should extend into fan houses and control rooms, and kilns should be kept at safe distances from yards and mill buildings.[17] For ovens, he states that supplementary carbon dioxide, foam, dry chemical or halon systems are not a substitute for sprinklers. Steam smothering in ovens and dryers is generally not recommended and is accepted only above 107 °C (225 °F) where large supplies of steam are always available.[25]
Grain dryers are hard to fight with hose streams. Maness and Sargent (2008) name moving the burning grain to a safe area, where water can be applied selectively, as probably the most effective measure. Small smouldering fires can be shovelled out, and modern dryers can have an emergency dump door or chute on the discharge conveyor.[15] Sprinklers or fixed water spray can help inside dryers whose design makes hose streams ineffective.[26] For rotary drum driers in wood plants, the handbook places spark and ember detection with intermittent water spray on the downstream conveying and storage equipment.[4]
Limits and uncertainties
Most guidance in this article describes US standards and practice as summarised in the 2008 handbook, which gives no editions for NFPA 86, NFPA 61 or NFPA 664. Dryers vary so widely in size, complexity and use that Ostrowski (2008a) considers it difficult to write rules for every type. Safe operation depends on the right combination of controls, protective devices and operator training.[27][7] He also attributes many equipment failures to ignored or unknown safety procedures, inadequate training, faulty design, complacency and poorly chosen combustion safeguards.[27]
Fire load data for drying plants are scarce in the source documents. The International Fire Engineering Guidelines (2005) list 800 MJ/m² for a wood drying plant, from Swiss surveys of 1967 to 1969.[28] The self-heating calculation depends strongly on the test data for the actual product, its moisture content and the shape of the deposit, so the milk powder constants cannot be transferred to other materials.[23]
See also
- Spark detection and extinguishing system
- Explosion venting
- Explosion isolation
- Heat transfer fluid system
- Oilseed solvent extraction plant
Notes
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 Ostrowski (2008a), p. 8-88.
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 Schwab (2008a), p. 8-27.
- ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 Ostrowski (2008a), p. 8-89.
- ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 Cholin (2008d), p. 9-8.
- ↑ 5.0 5.1 Zalosh (2008), p. 2-100.
- ↑ 6.0 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.6 Gray (2002), p. 2-226.
- ↑ 7.0 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.6 Ostrowski (2008a), p. 8-91.
- ↑ 8.0 8.1 8.2 8.3 Maness and Sargent (2008), p. 9-91.
- ↑ 9.0 9.1 Cholin (2008d), p. 9-18.
- ↑ 10.0 10.1 10.2 10.3 10.4 Maness and Sargent (2008), p. 9-90.
- ↑ 11.0 11.1 Ostrowski (2008a), p. 8-86.
- ↑ Cholin (2008d), p. 9-6.
- ↑ 13.0 13.1 13.2 Cholin (2008d), p. 9-7.
- ↑ Cholin (2008d), p. 9-9.
- ↑ 15.0 15.1 15.2 15.3 Maness and Sargent (2008), p. 9-92.
- ↑ 16.0 16.1 Kingsbaker (2008), pp. 9-131–9-132.
- ↑ 17.0 17.1 17.2 17.3 Ostrowski (2008a), pp. 8-87–8-88.
- ↑ 18.0 18.1 Ostrowski (2008a), p. 8-72.
- ↑ Ural and Garzia (2008), p. 17-157.
- ↑ Maness and Sargent (2008), p. 9-94.
- ↑ Gray (2002), p. 2-224.
- ↑ 22.0 22.1 Gray (2002), p. 2-220.
- ↑ 23.0 23.1 Gray (2002), p. 2-227.
- ↑ 24.0 24.1 Ostrowski (2008a), p. 8-90.
- ↑ Ostrowski (2008a), p. 8-81.
- ↑ Maness and Sargent (2008), p. 9-102.
- ↑ 27.0 27.1 Ostrowski (2008a), p. 8-71.
- ↑ National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), p. 3.4-7.
References
- Cholin, J. M. (2008d). Woodworking facilities and processes. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 9-3–9-25). National Fire Protection Association.
- Gray, B. (2002). Spontaneous combustion and self-heating. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 2-211–2-228). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
- Kingsbaker, C. L. (2008). Oilseed solvent extraction plants. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 9-131–9-140). National Fire Protection Association.
- Maness, J. E., & Sargent, L. M. (2008). Storage and handling of grain mill products. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 9-85–9-103). National Fire Protection Association.
- National Research Council of Canada, International Code Council, Department of Building and Housing, & Australian Building Codes Board. (2005). International fire engineering guidelines (2005 ed.). Australian Building Codes Board.
- Ostrowski, R. (2008a). Industrial and commercial heat utilization equipment. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 8-71–8-92). National Fire Protection Association.
- Schwab, R. F. (2008a). Chemical processing equipment. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 8-17–8-29). National Fire Protection Association.
- Ural, E. A., & Garzia, H. W. (2008). Explosion prevention and protection. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 17-141–17-165). National Fire Protection Association.
- Zalosh, R. (2008). Explosions. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 2-93–2-106). National Fire Protection Association.