FSE wiki: Fact-check sources: correct spill units and exit-fire cases; scope historical statistics (written by Claude Opus 5.5) |
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Incendiary and suspicious both imply an illegal act, whereas "intentional" does not carry that implication as strongly.<ref name="Ahrens-3-68" /> A fire set on purpose by a five-year-old is intentional, but the child is below the age of responsibility in most, if not all, US states.<ref name="AhrensStewart-3-49" /> NFPA tables therefore note that an intentional fire may not be arson in the legal sense.<ref name="Ahrens-3-72">Ahrens et al. (2008), p. 3-72.</ref> The investigation guide [[NFPA 921]] does not accept "suspicious" as a valid [[fire cause]], and there is broad consensus that it is never a valid final determination after an investigation.<ref name="Ahrens-3-68" /> | Incendiary and suspicious both imply an illegal act, whereas "intentional" does not carry that implication as strongly.<ref name="Ahrens-3-68" /> A fire set on purpose by a five-year-old is intentional, but the child is below the age of responsibility in most, if not all, US states.<ref name="AhrensStewart-3-49" /> NFPA tables therefore note that an intentional fire may not be arson in the legal sense.<ref name="Ahrens-3-72">Ahrens et al. (2008), p. 3-72.</ref> The investigation guide [[NFPA 921]] does not accept "suspicious" as a valid [[fire cause]], and there is broad consensus that it is never a valid final determination after an investigation.<ref name="Ahrens-3-68" /> | ||
[[File:fse-arson-v2.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Diagram linking the older NFIRS codes incendiary and suspicious to the NFIRS 5.0 code intentional and to the legal term arson|From statistical codes to the legal term: older NFIRS codes, the NFIRS 5.0 cause "intentional" and arson. Based on Ahrens and Stewart (2008), p. 3-49, and Ahrens et al. (2008), p. 3-68.]] | |||
== Scale of the problem in the United States == | == Scale of the problem in the United States == | ||
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In homes, the same period gave an annual average of 34,400 intentional fires (9% of home structure fires), 550 civilian deaths (19%), 1,500 injuries (10%) and US$738 million in damage (14%). With 1.6 civilian deaths per 100 fires and an average loss of US$21,500 per fire, intentional home fires were among the most severe per incident. Only smoking-material fires, with 3.4 deaths per 100 fires, had a clearly higher death rate.<ref name="Ahrens-3-74">Ahrens et al. (2008), p. 3-74.</ref> In nonhome structures, intentional fires were the leading cause: 25,100 fires (18%), 40 civilian deaths (22%) and US$872 million in damage (27%) per year.<ref name="HallCote-3-16">Hall and Cote (2008), p. 3-16.</ref> | In homes, the same period gave an annual average of 34,400 intentional fires (9% of home structure fires), 550 civilian deaths (19%), 1,500 injuries (10%) and US$738 million in damage (14%). With 1.6 civilian deaths per 100 fires and an average loss of US$21,500 per fire, intentional home fires were among the most severe per incident. Only smoking-material fires, with 3.4 deaths per 100 fires, had a clearly higher death rate.<ref name="Ahrens-3-74">Ahrens et al. (2008), p. 3-74.</ref> In nonhome structures, intentional fires were the leading cause: 25,100 fires (18%), 40 civilian deaths (22%) and US$872 million in damage (27%) per year.<ref name="HallCote-3-16">Hall and Cote (2008), p. 3-16.</ref> | ||
[[File:fse-arson-v1.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Grouped bar chart of the share of intentional fires in US structure fires, deaths, injuries and property damage, 1999 to 2002|Share of intentional fires in US structure fires, civilian deaths, civilian injuries and direct property damage, annual averages 1999–2002. Based on Hall and Cote (2008), pp. 3-14–3-16.]] | |||
For the single year 2002, 68,245 incendiary fires were reported to US fire departments, with an estimated 630 civilian deaths, 2,030 injuries and US$1.9 billion in direct property loss.<ref name="Schwartzman-5-88" /> In the 2008 handbook's account, intentional burning, or arson, was the leading cause of US wildfires, accounting for one-quarter to one-third of the fires and of the burned-over area.<ref name="Smalley-13-56" /> As a cause of home fire deaths, confirmed and suspected arson declined more slowly than smoking and heating, and in the late 1980s it passed heating as the second leading cause.<ref name="Hall-5-108">Hall (2008), p. 5-108.</ref> | For the single year 2002, 68,245 incendiary fires were reported to US fire departments, with an estimated 630 civilian deaths, 2,030 injuries and US$1.9 billion in direct property loss.<ref name="Schwartzman-5-88" /> In the 2008 handbook's account, intentional burning, or arson, was the leading cause of US wildfires, accounting for one-quarter to one-third of the fires and of the burned-over area.<ref name="Smalley-13-56" /> As a cause of home fire deaths, confirmed and suspected arson declined more slowly than smoking and heating, and in the late 1980s it passed heating as the second leading cause.<ref name="Hall-5-108">Hall (2008), p. 5-108.</ref> | ||
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One-fifth of it is about 450 kW/m², close to the roughly 450 kW/m² measured for a 1 L spill on wood.<ref name="Babrauskas-3-26" /> The spill fire therefore reaches about 1.5 × 450 ≈ 680 kW. The litre weighs 0.74 kg and holds 0.74 × 43.7 ≈ 32 MJ, so it burns out in about 32,000 / 680 ≈ 47 s. A three-seat sofa contains about 1,884 MJ, and a burning living-room sofa reaches about 2.5 MW.<ref name="VR-4.4">Van Rossum (2027), §4.4.</ref><ref name="VR-4.5" /> The poured litre carries less than 2% of the energy of one sofa. Its effect therefore depends mainly on the fuel that its brief, large flame ignites. | One-fifth of it is about 450 kW/m², close to the roughly 450 kW/m² measured for a 1 L spill on wood.<ref name="Babrauskas-3-26" /> The spill fire therefore reaches about 1.5 × 450 ≈ 680 kW. The litre weighs 0.74 kg and holds 0.74 × 43.7 ≈ 32 MJ, so it burns out in about 32,000 / 680 ≈ 47 s. A three-seat sofa contains about 1,884 MJ, and a burning living-room sofa reaches about 2.5 MW.<ref name="VR-4.4">Van Rossum (2027), §4.4.</ref><ref name="VR-4.5" /> The poured litre carries less than 2% of the energy of one sofa. Its effect therefore depends mainly on the fuel that its brief, large flame ignites. | ||
[[File:fse-arson-v3.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Bar chart comparing heat release rate per square metre of a deep gasoline pool, a spill on carpet and a thin spill on a smooth floor|Heat release rate per square metre of 1 L of gasoline over 1.5 m²: deep-pool correlation, spill on carpet (70–80 %) and thin spill on a smooth floor (about one-fifth). Based on Babrauskas (2002b), pp. 3-25–3-26.]] | |||
The World Trade Center investigation described arson in the same way when it studied an intense conventional fire in an undamaged tower. Several gallons of accelerant (one US gallon is about 3.8 L) might be applied to the building combustibles, igniting the equivalent of several workstations. Several small fires might be set on a few floors, and the water supply to the sprinklers and standpipes might be maliciously compromised.<ref name="Gann-180">Gann, Hamins, et al. (2005), p. 180.</ref> Such a fast, accelerant-driven fire challenges built-in fire protection in different ways than an ordinary flaming or smouldering fire.<ref name="HallWatts-3-135">Hall and Watts (2008), p. 3-135.</ref> | The World Trade Center investigation described arson in the same way when it studied an intense conventional fire in an undamaged tower. Several gallons of accelerant (one US gallon is about 3.8 L) might be applied to the building combustibles, igniting the equivalent of several workstations. Several small fires might be set on a few floors, and the water supply to the sprinklers and standpipes might be maliciously compromised.<ref name="Gann-180">Gann, Hamins, et al. (2005), p. 180.</ref> Such a fast, accelerant-driven fire challenges built-in fire protection in different ways than an ordinary flaming or smouldering fire.<ref name="HallWatts-3-135">Hall and Watts (2008), p. 3-135.</ref> | ||
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A 1973 lounge fire set in the stairway of the normal exit killed 32 people, about half of those present. A 1976 fire set in the only exit of a New York City social club killed 25, again about half. In 1990 an arson fire in the main exit of the Happy Land social club in New York City left only six of the 93 occupants alive. None of these buildings had complete sprinkler systems. Among the four cases with documented exit conditions, the share of occupants killed generally increased as the exits deviated further from the code.<ref name="HallCote-3-26" /> | A 1973 lounge fire set in the stairway of the normal exit killed 32 people, about half of those present. A 1976 fire set in the only exit of a New York City social club killed 25, again about half. In 1990 an arson fire in the main exit of the Happy Land social club in New York City left only six of the 93 occupants alive. None of these buildings had complete sprinkler systems. Among the four cases with documented exit conditions, the share of occupants killed generally increased as the exits deviated further from the code.<ref name="HallCote-3-26" /> | ||
[[File:fse-arson-v4.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Bar chart of deaths in four US arson fires set at or in exits, 1965 to 1990|Deaths in four US arson fires started in or at the normal exit, 1965–1990. Based on Hall and Cote (2008), p. 3-26.]] | |||
The [[DuPont Plaza Hotel fire]] in San Juan, Puerto Rico, in December 1986 killed 98 people in the hotel casino. Arsonists started the fire in a ballroom across a wide stair from the casino. Within an estimated 12 minutes the fire flashed over the stair and blocked the main casino doors. The single rear door opened inward, and fleeing victims piled up against it and jammed it shut. With other hotel fires, it led to the US Hotel and Motel Fire Safety Act of 1990.<ref name="Fruin-4-97">Fruin (2008), p. 4-97.</ref> A table of hotel fires elsewhere in the handbook gives 97 deaths for this fire.<ref name="Berkol-20-24">Berkol et al. (2008), p. 20-24.</ref> | The [[DuPont Plaza Hotel fire]] in San Juan, Puerto Rico, in December 1986 killed 98 people in the hotel casino. Arsonists started the fire in a ballroom across a wide stair from the casino. Within an estimated 12 minutes the fire flashed over the stair and blocked the main casino doors. The single rear door opened inward, and fleeing victims piled up against it and jammed it shut. With other hotel fires, it led to the US Hotel and Motel Fire Safety Act of 1990.<ref name="Fruin-4-97">Fruin (2008), p. 4-97.</ref> A table of hotel fires elsewhere in the handbook gives 97 deaths for this fire.<ref name="Berkol-20-24">Berkol et al. (2008), p. 20-24.</ref> | ||
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In New Zealand, Verification Method C/VM2 (second edition, 2025) includes design scenario BE, "fire blocks exit". For each space for more than 50 people, the fire is assumed to lie near the primary escape route and to prevent its use; it may be deliberately lit or accidental.<ref name="CVM2-37-38">Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2025b), pp. 37–38.</ref> The 2013 commentary on the first edition notes that such a fire could be deliberately lit with introduced fuels such as a mattress.<ref name="CVM2C-123">Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2013), p. 123.</ref> The Australian Fire Safety Verification Method Standard 2022 makes the same assumption for evacuation routes.<ref name="ABCB2022-11">Australian Building Codes Board (2022), p. 11.</ref> The ABCB handbook for the verification method (2020) treats an arson attack with cardboard boxes at the base of the single stair of an office building as a credible reference scenario. It adds that the security and management of a building can strongly affect how often such attacks occur.<ref name="ABCB2020b-67-68">Australian Building Codes Board (2020b), pp. 67–68.</ref> | In New Zealand, Verification Method C/VM2 (second edition, 2025) includes design scenario BE, "fire blocks exit". For each space for more than 50 people, the fire is assumed to lie near the primary escape route and to prevent its use; it may be deliberately lit or accidental.<ref name="CVM2-37-38">Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2025b), pp. 37–38.</ref> The 2013 commentary on the first edition notes that such a fire could be deliberately lit with introduced fuels such as a mattress.<ref name="CVM2C-123">Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2013), p. 123.</ref> The Australian Fire Safety Verification Method Standard 2022 makes the same assumption for evacuation routes.<ref name="ABCB2022-11">Australian Building Codes Board (2022), p. 11.</ref> The ABCB handbook for the verification method (2020) treats an arson attack with cardboard boxes at the base of the single stair of an office building as a credible reference scenario. It adds that the security and management of a building can strongly affect how often such attacks occur.<ref name="ABCB2020b-67-68">Australian Building Codes Board (2020b), pp. 67–68.</ref> | ||
[[File:fse-arson-v5.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Plan of a room for more than 50 people with a fire blocking the primary exit and occupants leaving by a separated second exit|Design scenario BE (fire blocks exit) in New Zealand's C/VM2, second edition (2025): the fire is assumed at the primary escape route. Based on Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2025b), pp. 37–38.]] | |||
== Limits of the data == | == Limits of the data == | ||
Revision as of 13:01, 12 November 2026
Arson is the crime of setting a fire deliberately, with the intent to cause damage or injury.[1] Fire statistics use narrower terms. An incendiary fire is one shown to have been set deliberately, while an intentional fire is one that someone meant to start, whether or not a crime was committed.[2][3] In the United States in 1999–2002, intentional fires caused about one in five civilian structure fire deaths and nearly one in five dollars of structure fire property damage.[4] The 2008 handbook also described arson as the leading cause of US wildfires.[5]
Arson can usually be determined only after an investigation has ruled out other causes and found physical evidence of an incendiary fire.[6] Arson also shows the limits of fire prevention, so fire protection must still work after a deliberate ignition.[7] Some of the deadliest US arson fires were started in the main or only exit of a crowded building.[8]
Definition and terminology
Arson is a legal term that implies a deliberate intent to cause damage or injury. The related word firesetting implies a deliberate effort to start a fire and is often associated with arson. Fire fighters are reluctant to call a young child a firesetter or an arsonist, and in many jurisdictions the legal age of accountability prevents young people from being charged at all.[1]
Fire statistics use their own vocabulary. In the older versions of the US National Fire Incident Reporting System (NFIRS), "incendiary" was used when a legal decision or physical evidence showed that a fire was deliberately set. "Suspicious" was used when the circumstances suggested deliberate ignition, when multiple ignitions were found, or when no natural or unintentional cause could be found. For statistics the two codes were usually grouped together as arson. Version 5.0 of NFIRS replaced both with one cause category, "intentional", and converts older incendiary and suspicious records to it. None of these terms corresponds exactly to the legal term arson.[2]
Incendiary and suspicious both imply an illegal act, whereas "intentional" does not carry that implication as strongly.[3] A fire set on purpose by a five-year-old is intentional, but the child is below the age of responsibility in most, if not all, US states.[2] NFPA tables therefore note that an intentional fire may not be arson in the legal sense.[9] The investigation guide NFPA 921 does not accept "suspicious" as a valid fire cause, and there is broad consensus that it is never a valid final determination after an investigation.[3]
Scale of the problem in the United States
These fire statistics cover fires reported to US municipal fire departments and derive from NFIRS and the NFPA survey. The 1999–2002 structure-fire tables exclude the events of 11 September 2001, and their property damage is not adjusted for inflation.[4] In that period, intentional fires averaged 59,500 structure fires a year, 12% of all US structure fires. They caused 600 civilian deaths (19%), 1,800 civilian injuries (10%) and US$1,592 million in direct property damage (18%) per year.[4][10]
In homes, the same period gave an annual average of 34,400 intentional fires (9% of home structure fires), 550 civilian deaths (19%), 1,500 injuries (10%) and US$738 million in damage (14%). With 1.6 civilian deaths per 100 fires and an average loss of US$21,500 per fire, intentional home fires were among the most severe per incident. Only smoking-material fires, with 3.4 deaths per 100 fires, had a clearly higher death rate.[11] In nonhome structures, intentional fires were the leading cause: 25,100 fires (18%), 40 civilian deaths (22%) and US$872 million in damage (27%) per year.[12]
For the single year 2002, 68,245 incendiary fires were reported to US fire departments, with an estimated 630 civilian deaths, 2,030 injuries and US$1.9 billion in direct property loss.[1] In the 2008 handbook's account, intentional burning, or arson, was the leading cause of US wildfires, accounting for one-quarter to one-third of the fires and of the burned-over area.[5] As a cause of home fire deaths, confirmed and suspected arson declined more slowly than smoking and heating, and in the late 1980s it passed heating as the second leading cause.[13]
The share of arson varies between occupancies. In US data from 1980–1998 and 1999–2002, arson led fire causes in libraries and places of worship by number and property damage. In the earlier period, it caused 85% of library-fire property loss and 42% of losses in places of worship.[14] The 2008 handbook described most US detention and correctional facility fires as incendiary or suspicious.[15] In US educational occupancies in 1999–2002, almost half of fires were intentionally set or involved fireplay.[16] The handbook also reported incendiary or suspicious causes in nearly half of construction-site contractors' shed fires.[17]
Motives and offenders
Premises security analysis starts from the two components of any crime: motive and opportunity. A deep-seated motive is difficult to eliminate, whereas opportunity is easier to manage. Most police and security professionals regard the elimination of opportunity as the single most effective way to prevent a crime.[18]
The traditional motives for arson include profit, revenge and emotional disturbance, and the 1990s added arson as a weapon of domestic terrorism.[19] Those who might wish to harm a business include competitors, disgruntled employees, angry customers and owners in financial difficulty. Arson more often results from less direct motives such as emotional disturbance, so security controls and housekeeping that reduce the number of easy targets are emphasised.[7] In prisons and jails, the motives include escape, protest, a show of force during a riot, a suicide attempt, a diversion and the use of fire as a weapon.[15]
Young people form a large share of offenders. According to the FBI Uniform Crime Reports for 2002, 51% of those arrested for arson in the United States were under 18. One-third of the juveniles arrested were under 15, and 3% were younger than 10.[1] The juvenile share had been around 40% in the early 1980s and roughly 50% since 1994.[20] Youths who come to the attention of the fire service are on average 85% male, which closely matches the gender split of arson arrestees of all ages.[21] The types of young firesetters and the intervention programmes for them are treated under juvenile firesetting.
Investigation and cause determination
In the United States the local fire department generally documents a fire and makes the first determination of its origin and cause. When the fire may be incendiary, other organisations may take over the legal responsibility; in much of the United States and in all Canadian provinces, the state or provincial fire marshal's office investigates incendiary fires.[22] Where fire service investigators have police powers, they may investigate up to an arrest; elsewhere the police or the state fire marshal's office carries out the follow-up.[23] For their findings to be admissible in court, investigators need a legal right to be on the scene. That right comes from exigent circumstances, from the owner's permission, or from a search warrant when an incendiary fire is suspected.[24]
The basic rule of fire investigation is that arson can usually be determined only after a thorough investigation that rules out other causes and establishes physical evidence of an incendiary fire. Investigators should not come to believe that their role is to find arson, and "fire investigation" describes the work better than "arson investigation".[6] The 2004 edition of NFPA 921 has a chapter on incendiary fires, and the guide underlies the performance criteria for investigators in NFPA 1033.[25]
Several kinds of evidence are easily misread. Burn patterns such as a "V", low burns and multiple "points of origin" should be used only when they are unambiguous or supported by other physical evidence. Char depth must also be used with care. The traditional burning rate of wood, about 0.6 mm/min (1.4 in. per hour), was used to estimate burning time and to detect flammable liquids. Research shows that the rate depends on heat flux and ventilation and can reach about 4.2 mm/min (10 in. per hour). Burn patterns alone do not prove a flammable liquid; corroboration such as chemical traces is needed, and smoke colour is not necessarily evidence of one.[26]
Fires that grew "unusually fast" are often labelled suspicious or incendiary, although the speed may have come from the materials and the compartment.[27] Spontaneous combustion is another trap. A self-heating pile often forms more than one charred "chimney", and this has led to wrong arson charges based on the myth that more than one seat of fire means deliberate ignition.[28] Laboratories identify residues of ignitable liquids used as accelerants with gas chromatography and mass spectrometry, following standards such as ASTM E1618.[29] When a body is found at an arson scene, investigators must also establish whether the victim died before the fire or because of it.[2]
Accelerants and fire development
In the 1947 and 1965 US arson fires described by Hall and Cote, gasoline was thrown or poured on the floor or at an entrance.[8] Liquid spill fires range from industrial accidents to arson fires with flammable fuels.[30] A liquid poured on a flat floor without low spots forms a layer less than 1 mm thick. Such thin-layer pools, which can occur in arson cases, release less heat per square metre than deeper pools.[31]
Tests by Putorti with gasoline found that on a flat floor the spill area grows in proportion to the volume poured, with a constant that depends on the surface. For deep pools above about 0.2 m in diameter, the heat release rate of most organic liquids follows a correlation with two empirical constants. These are the mass burning rate of a very large pool and a term kβ that lowers the burning rate per square metre of smaller pools. A thin layer on a smooth floor gives only about one-fifth of this deep-pool value, and carpet about 70–80%.[31] The burning time follows from the energy of the spill and the heat release rate.[32]
| Symbol | Description | Unit |
|---|---|---|
| Spill area | m² | |
| Surface constant: 1.5 for wood parquet, 1.8 for vinyl tile | m²/L | |
| Volume of liquid poured | L | |
| Heat release rate of a deep pool of the same area | kW | |
| Heat release rate of the thin spill | kW | |
| Net heat of combustion (gasoline 43.7 MJ/kg) | kJ/kg | |
| Mass burning rate of a very large pool (gasoline 0.055 kg/(m²·s)) | kg/(m²·s) | |
| Empirical constant of the pool burning correlation (gasoline 2.1 m⁻¹) | m⁻¹ | |
| Pool diameter | m | |
| Liquid density (gasoline 740 kg/m³) | kg/m³ | |
| Energy content of the spill | kJ | |
| Burning time at constant heat release rate | s |
The gasoline constants come from the SFPE Handbook pool-burning table.[33] The factor converts litres to cubic metres. The area relation holds only on dead-flat, smooth floors, for measured spill areas of 0.4–1.8 m²; on rough or absorbent surfaces the layer thickness varies, and low spots collect deeper pools.[31] These rates apply to open burning. If the fire heats a room by more than about 100 °C, radiation from hot gases raises the burning rate.[33]
In a worked example, 1 L of gasoline is poured on a wood parquet floor. The spill covers m², a layer of 0.67 mm. A circle of this area has m. A deep pool of this size would burn at 0.055 × 43,700 × (1 − e−2.1 × 1.38) ≈ 2,270 kW/m². This lies within the range of 1,900–2,400 kW/m² given for such pools.[31]
One-fifth of it is about 450 kW/m², close to the roughly 450 kW/m² measured for a 1 L spill on wood.[33] The spill fire therefore reaches about 1.5 × 450 ≈ 680 kW. The litre weighs 0.74 kg and holds 0.74 × 43.7 ≈ 32 MJ, so it burns out in about 32,000 / 680 ≈ 47 s. A three-seat sofa contains about 1,884 MJ, and a burning living-room sofa reaches about 2.5 MW.[34][32] The poured litre carries less than 2% of the energy of one sofa. Its effect therefore depends mainly on the fuel that its brief, large flame ignites.
The World Trade Center investigation described arson in the same way when it studied an intense conventional fire in an undamaged tower. Several gallons of accelerant (one US gallon is about 3.8 L) might be applied to the building combustibles, igniting the equivalent of several workstations. Several small fires might be set on a few floors, and the water supply to the sprinklers and standpipes might be maliciously compromised.[35] Such a fast, accelerant-driven fire challenges built-in fire protection in different ways than an ordinary flaming or smouldering fire.[36]
Fires set in exits and other notable cases
Hall and Cote discuss five deadly US arson fires from 1947 to 1990; in four, the fire was set at a documented exit. In 1947 a gallon of gasoline was thrown on the floor of a gambling hall and ignited, and 15 people died; its exit arrangement is unknown. In 1965 an arsonist poured gasoline at the main entrance of a restaurant, and 13 of the 40 to 50 occupants died.[8]
A 1973 lounge fire set in the stairway of the normal exit killed 32 people, about half of those present. A 1976 fire set in the only exit of a New York City social club killed 25, again about half. In 1990 an arson fire in the main exit of the Happy Land social club in New York City left only six of the 93 occupants alive. None of these buildings had complete sprinkler systems. Among the four cases with documented exit conditions, the share of occupants killed generally increased as the exits deviated further from the code.[8]
The DuPont Plaza Hotel fire in San Juan, Puerto Rico, in December 1986 killed 98 people in the hotel casino. Arsonists started the fire in a ballroom across a wide stair from the casino. Within an estimated 12 minutes the fire flashed over the stair and blocked the main casino doors. The single rear door opened inward, and fleeing victims piled up against it and jammed it shut. With other hotel fires, it led to the US Hotel and Motel Fire Safety Act of 1990.[37] A table of hotel fires elsewhere in the handbook gives 97 deaths for this fire.[38]
Detection and sprinklers shape the outcome of arson fires. In the Los Angeles Central Public Library fire of 1986, an arsonist set a fire on the fifth tier of a multitier bookstack, but the first detectors to activate were on the sixth tier. The delay cost the occupants the chance to stop the fire with portable extinguishers while it was small, with catastrophic results.[39] In the World Trade Center in New York, two sprinklers contained an incendiary fire in an unoccupied office in January 1985.[40] Six of the 16 significant fires in those towers and WTC 7 before 2001 were incendiary or suspicious, and five of these six occurred outside business hours.[41] In the Netherlands, the 2020 fire in the Singelgarage car park in Alkmaar, which involved an electric vehicle, was most probably deliberately lit.[42]
Prevention and design
Arson is a difficult crime to prevent. A determined arsonist can get round even a carefully defined prevention programme, but most arsonists are not so determined and have no special knowledge of fire or safety systems. A prevention programme with a strong security component can therefore limit the risk. Its basis is strict access control, written opening and closing procedures, and measures that deter and detect unauthorised entry.[14]
For cultural properties, the measures include searches for people who stay behind after closing, alarms on doors and windows, closed-circuit television and exterior lighting. Book drops are favourite targets for arsonists and vandals, and routine checks of waste receptacles can reveal a hidden time-delay igniter.[43] Increased security surveillance is described as vital against fires of incendiary origin.[44]
Building design can make arson more or less likely by making security and housekeeping easier or harder.[45] Storage buildings are exposed because an arsonist can often enter unseen, and fires set out of sight can grow very large before detection, especially if several are set.[46] Security must still be balanced against fire safety, because well-intended security can obstruct free egress.[47] Because prevention can never be complete, fire protection that works after ignition is needed as well.[7] Thorough investigation of all incendiary or suspicious fires is a powerful deterrent.[48] Conventional public education, by contrast, has limited or unproven effect on arson.[49]
Performance-based codes treat deliberate fires differently. According to the International Fire Engineering Guidelines (2005), the Building Code of Australia was silent on fires set with malicious intent, and the US International Codes did not address arson or terrorism.[50][51] The guidelines handle scenarios with malicious ignition like accidental ones when design fire scenarios are selected. Some large arson attacks and terrorist events may, however, exceed the capacity of the fire safety system and need other measures.[52]
In New Zealand, Verification Method C/VM2 (second edition, 2025) includes design scenario BE, "fire blocks exit". For each space for more than 50 people, the fire is assumed to lie near the primary escape route and to prevent its use; it may be deliberately lit or accidental.[53] The 2013 commentary on the first edition notes that such a fire could be deliberately lit with introduced fuels such as a mattress.[54] The Australian Fire Safety Verification Method Standard 2022 makes the same assumption for evacuation routes.[55] The ABCB handbook for the verification method (2020) treats an arson attack with cardboard boxes at the base of the single stair of an office building as a credible reference scenario. It adds that the security and management of a building can strongly affect how often such attacks occur.[56]
Limits of the data
Several features of the data make arson statistics uncertain. Death certificate data often exclude or miss arson deaths, which may be classified as homicides, whereas NFPA estimates include them.[57][58] NFIRS 5.0 dropped the "suspicious" choice, and many small trash fires, a substantial share of which had been coded incendiary or suspicious, now need no cause data. Both changes are likely to produce an artificial drop in reported arson and make trend analysis very difficult during the transition.[2]
Fires coded "cause under investigation" count as unknown, although many may be intentional.[59] National estimates allocate unknown causes in proportion to the known ones, which assumes the same share of incendiary fires among the unknowns.[60] Yet causes are harder to determine in the largest fires, and intentional fires have among the largest losses per fire, so allocation should ideally consider fire size.[61]
Labelling also depends on policy. A strict approach to children can label fires as arson that were previously recorded as children playing, and a more sympathetic approach can shift them the other way.[62] The US Consumer Product Safety Commission excludes intentional fires from its product analyses, whereas NFPA generally includes them.[59]
See also
Notes
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 Schwartzman (2008), p. 5-88.
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 Ahrens and Stewart (2008), p. 3-49.
- ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 Ahrens et al. (2008), p. 3-68.
- ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 Hall and Cote (2008), p. 3-14.
- ↑ 5.0 5.1 Smalley (2008), p. 13-56.
- ↑ 6.0 6.1 Custer and Sheppard (2008), p. 3-39.
- ↑ 7.0 7.1 7.2 Marburger (2008), p. 20-110.
- ↑ 8.0 8.1 8.2 8.3 Hall and Cote (2008), p. 3-26.
- ↑ Ahrens et al. (2008), p. 3-72.
- ↑ Hall and Cote (2008), pp. 3-14–3-15.
- ↑ Ahrens et al. (2008), p. 3-74.
- ↑ Hall and Cote (2008), p. 3-16.
- ↑ Hall (2008), p. 5-108.
- ↑ 14.0 14.1 McDaniel (2008), p. 20-180.
- ↑ 15.0 15.1 Jaeger (2008), p. 20-131.
- ↑ Szachnowicz (2008), p. 20-115.
- ↑ Davis (2008a), p. 11-49.
- ↑ Freidenfelds (2008), p. 1-95.
- ↑ Berkol et al. (2008), p. 20-27.
- ↑ Ahrens et al. (2008), p. 3-64.
- ↑ Schwartzman (2008), p. 5-89.
- ↑ Custer and Sheppard (2008), p. 3-32.
- ↑ Farr and Sawyer (2008), p. 1-91.
- ↑ Custer and Sheppard (2008), pp. 3-32–3-33.
- ↑ Custer and Sheppard (2008), p. 3-33.
- ↑ Custer and Sheppard (2008), p. 3-35.
- ↑ Custer and Sheppard (2008), p. 3-37.
- ↑ Gray (2002), p. 2-225.
- ↑ Custer and Sheppard (2008), p. 3-36.
- ↑ Gottuk and White (2002), p. 2-297.
- ↑ 31.0 31.1 31.2 31.3 Babrauskas (2002b), p. 3-25.
- ↑ 32.0 32.1 Van Rossum (2027), §4.5.
- ↑ 33.0 33.1 33.2 Babrauskas (2002b), p. 3-26.
- ↑ Van Rossum (2027), §4.4.
- ↑ Gann, Hamins, et al. (2005), p. 180.
- ↑ Hall and Watts (2008), p. 3-135.
- ↑ Fruin (2008), p. 4-97.
- ↑ Berkol et al. (2008), p. 20-24.
- ↑ McDaniel (2008), p. 20-195.
- ↑ Kuligowski et al. (2005), p. 8.
- ↑ Kuligowski et al. (2005), p. 12.
- ↑ Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 12.
- ↑ McDaniel (2008), p. 20-184.
- ↑ Wenzel (2008a), p. 14-90.
- ↑ Watts (2008b), p. 1-161.
- ↑ J. Moore (2008), p. 20-161.
- ↑ Freidenfelds (2008), p. 1-97.
- ↑ Denlinger (2008), p. 12-57.
- ↑ Hall (2008), p. 5-112.
- ↑ National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), p. 0.2-4 (Part 0, Australia).
- ↑ National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), p. 0.2-9 (Part 0, United States).
- ↑ National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), pp. 1.2-27–1.2-28.
- ↑ Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2025b), pp. 37–38.
- ↑ Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2013), p. 123.
- ↑ Australian Building Codes Board (2022), p. 11.
- ↑ Australian Building Codes Board (2020b), pp. 67–68.
- ↑ Hall and Cote (2008), p. 3-4.
- ↑ Ahrens et al. (2008), p. 3-91.
- ↑ 59.0 59.1 Ahrens et al. (2008), p. 3-71.
- ↑ Hall and Ahrens (2002), p. 5-68.
- ↑ Ahrens et al. (2008), p. 3-76.
- ↑ Hall and Weller (2008), p. 5-134.
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