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Add SVG figures fse-cryogenic-fluid-v1.svg, fse-cryogenic-fluid-v2.svg, fse-cryogenic-fluid-v3.svg, fse-cryogenic-fluid-v4.svg (list-2 visual plan)
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Correct errors identified in the editorial review of 9 November 2026
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| Oxygen || −183.0 || 1142 || 213.3 || 861
| Oxygen || −183.0 || 1142 || 213.3 || 861
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|-
| Argon || −158.9 || 1393 || 163.3 || 842
| Argon || −185.9 || 1393 || 163.3 || 842
|-
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| Methane || −161.5 || 424 || 509.8 || 636
| Methane || −161.5 || 424 || 509.8 || 636

Revision as of 16:08, 9 November 2026

A cryogenic fluid is a gas that has been liquefied by refrigeration and is kept in its container at a very low temperature, below −90 °C (−130 °F).[1] Unlike other liquefied gases, it cannot be kept indefinitely in a closed container, because heat leaking in from the surroundings keeps boiling the liquid and raising the pressure. If the gas were fully confined, the pressure could greatly exceed the strength of any feasible container.[1] Each volume of liquid produces several hundred volumes of gas, between about 490 and 860 times for the gases in the handbook's property table. Escaping liquid freezes skin, embrittles steel and plastics, displaces breathing air, and, depending on the fluid, burns or enriches the air with oxygen.[2][3] Containers are therefore insulated and fitted with relief devices, and emergency tactics differ from those for other gases.[4][5]

Definition and classification

The NFPA Fire Protection Handbook (2008) defines cryogenic gases as liquefied gases that exist in their container at temperatures below −90 °C (−130 °F).[1] NFPA 55, the US standard for the storage and handling of compressed gases and cryogenic fluids, lists cryogenic fluids among the health hazard classes of gases, alongside corrosive and toxic gases.[6] A glossary in a US nuclear regulatory guide defines a cryogenic gas in the same way, as a refrigerated liquid gas with a boiling point below −90 °C at atmospheric pressure.[7] The US Department of Transportation (DOT) uses the related term cryogenic liquid, for a refrigerated liquefied gas with a boiling point colder than −90 °C at 101.3 kPa absolute.[8] The handbook warns that codes and regulations describe compressed, liquefied and cryogenic gases in somewhat different ways. Under US DOT rules, for example, many liquefied gases count as compressed gases.[1]

Common examples are liquid nitrogen, liquid oxygen, liquid argon, liquid helium, liquid hydrogen and liquefied natural gas (LNG).[1] A cryogenic fluid can be inert, oxidising or flammable, and this property largely decides its fire hazard. Nitrogen, argon and helium are nonflammable and are hazardous mainly through cold and asphyxiation.[6][2] Oxygen is an oxidiser, and hydrogen, methane and ethylene are flammable.[3][9][10]

The same substance can be handled in different forms. Oxygen, for example, is shipped as a compressed gas in a compressed gas cylinder or as a cryogenic liquid in insulated containers, tank cars and trucks.[3] Hydrogen is shipped as a compressed gas in uninsulated cylinders and as a cryogenic liquid at about −253 °C (−423 °F) in insulated containers.[9]

Properties of common cryogenic fluids

The handbook gives the physical properties of common cryogenic gases in its Table 6.10.1, compiled from the Compressed Gas Association's Handbook of Compressed Gases.[1] The table below copies the boiling points, latent heats and expansion ratios. The liquid densities were converted here from the printed values in lb/ft³, because the printed metric density columns are a factor of ten too low.

Vertical temperature scale with the boiling points of helium, hydrogen, nitrogen, oxygen, argon, methane and ethylene below a minus 90 degree line
Normal boiling points of common cryogenic fluids and the −90 °C threshold of US definitions.
Properties of selected cryogenic gases (after Lemoff, 2008, Table 6.10.1)
Gas Normal boiling point (°C) Liquid density (kg/m³) Latent heat (kJ/kg) m³ of gas (21 °C, 101 kPa) from 1 m³ of liquid
Helium −268.9 125 23.9 754
Hydrogen −252.8 71 448.2 850
Nitrogen −195.8 808 199.3 696
Air −194.3 875 205.1 726
Oxygen −183.0 1142 213.3 861
Argon −185.9 1393 163.3 842
Methane −161.5 424 509.8 636
Ethylene −103.7 567 483.8 487

The expansion ratio is the key number for fire safety. A small leak of liquid turns into a large volume of gas, and in an enclosed space this gas displaces air or forms a flammable mixture. LNG, a mixture of mainly methane with some ethane, propane and butane, expands about 600 times.[10] The vehicle-fuel chapter of the handbook gives 618 m³ of gas for each cubic metre of LNG (17.4 m³ per 0.028 m³).[11] The handbook gives LNG a boiling point of −250 to −260 °F (about −157 to −162 °C), a liquid density of 0.42–0.48 g/cm³ and a heat of vaporisation of 512–577 kJ/kg.[10]

Cold vapour is dense. The gas densities of Table 6.10.1 show that methane vapour at its boiling point is about 1.5 times as dense as air at 21 °C. Nitrogen and oxygen vapour are about 3.8 and 4 times as dense, and hydrogen vapour about 1.1 times.[1] The handbook states the same for released gas: LNG vapour near its boiling point is about 1½ times heavier than air, and oxygen vapour approximately four times heavier.[10][3] Even hydrogen, normally about one-fifteenth as heavy as air, is slightly heavier than air when it boils off from the liquid.[10]

Containers and insulation

All containers for cryogenic liquefied gases are insulated as a matter of functional necessity.[4] A typical LNG container has an outer metal jacket around an insulating material kept under vacuum, which in turn surrounds an inner steel vessel that holds the liquid.[11] North American standards require the insulation of flammable cryogenic gas containers to be noncombustible. Where the insulation is powder or granules, which would be lost with the jacket, the jacket must be steel or concrete rather than aluminium.[12] For an LNG vehicle fuel container, a loss of liquid requires the outer shell, the insulation and the inner vessel all to fail.[13]

Cross-section of a cryogenic tank with outer jacket, vacuum insulation, inner vessel, liquid, vapour space and relief valve
Construction of a vacuum-insulated cryogenic container with heat leak and relief path.

Because heat always leaks in, cryogenic containers are protected by relief devices. Liquid hydrogen, for instance, is kept in insulated pressure vessels with reclosing pressure relief valves, which open when heat leakage boils off some of the hydrogen.[9] LNG tanks and insulated oxygen containers are also protected by relief valves.[10][3] The pressure in some cryogenic containers is less than 6.9 kPa (1 psi).[14] US transport rules exempted nonflammable cryogenic gas containers, including oxygen, shipped below 276 kPa absolute (40 psia).[4] Each pressure relief device thus handles the boil-off that heat leakage produces.[9]

The physics explains why. If liquid nitrogen were trapped in a closed container and warmed to 21 °C, it would form about 696 times its volume of gas. An ideal-gas estimate then gives about 696 × 101 kPa, or roughly 70 MPa, far above the strength of a container designed for low pressure.[1] Real gas behaviour changes the exact value, but not the conclusion. Frost or condensate on the outer wall of an insulated container may indicate a leak from the inner container, although it often shows only a void in the insulation; either way it should be investigated.[15]

In the United States, NFPA 55 (2005 edition), as summarised in the 2008 handbook, limits the quantity of cryogenic fluid per control area. Without sprinklers and without a gas cabinet or exhausted enclosure, the maximum allowable quantity is 0 L for flammable cryogenic fluids and 170 L (45 gal) for oxidising ones. With sprinklers and a cabinet or enclosure, the limits are 170 L for flammable and 681 L (180 gal) for oxidising cryogenic fluids.[16] In laboratories, systems that can freeze or liquefy the surrounding air must prevent the condensed air from contacting organic materials. The rooms must be ventilated according to the properties of the specific fluid.[17]

Hazards

The first hazard is cold. Contact with the escaping liquid can cause frostbite, which can be severe if exposure is prolonged.[2] LNG at −162 °C can cause burns or frostbite, prolonged exposure to its vapour can cause hypothermia, and breathing cold vapour for a long time can damage the lungs.[18] Low temperatures also affect structural materials, particularly carbon steel and plastics, which can become brittle and fail.[2]

The second hazard is asphyxiation. All gases except air endanger life if they displace breathing air. Nitrogen, helium and argon are particularly dangerous, because human senses cannot detect them.[2] LNG vapour is not toxic, but it is a simple asphyxiant.[18][10] Inert gases, often odourless, tasteless and colourless, can also asphyxiate in unventilated storage areas.[15]

The third hazard is oxygen. Liquid oxygen is an oxidiser, and almost any combination of liquid oxygen with a combustible material is potentially explosive.[3] Spilled liquid oxygen in contact with organic material, such as asphalt paving, forms a shock-sensitive combination that can detonate.[3] The handbook therefore notes that unloading areas for liquid oxygen trucks must be paved with concrete, because asphalt in contact with spilled liquid oxygen can explode when a tyre runs over it.[5]

Very cold fluids also create oxygen hazards indirectly. Liquid hydrogen is so cold that air in contact with it condenses, and a mixture of hydrogen and liquid oxygen is potentially explosive.[9] A liquid hydrogen release can thus produce an oxygen-enriched atmosphere nearby.[11]

The fourth hazard applies to flammable cryogens. LNG presents both fire and combustion explosion hazards when it escapes.[10] Its vapour forms a white cloud as moisture condenses, but the vapour itself is colourless and odourless. LNG carries no odorant, and only gas detection equipment designed for methane can establish safe exclusion zones.[18][11] Invisible ignitable mixtures often extend several feet (1 ft = 0.3 m) beyond the visible fog.[19]

Spills, vapour clouds and pool fires

A cryogenic liquid that escapes must obtain nearly all the heat for its vaporisation from the ground or the air. Unlike most noncryogenic liquefied gases, it therefore forms a pool if the leak continues long enough.[19] The vapour near the source is always heavier than air at normal temperatures, because it is so cold. Together with the water fog, this makes even gases that are normally lighter than air hug the ground for some distance.[19] LNG vapour sinks until it warms to about −118 °C (−180 °F), and then becomes buoyant and rises.[13]

The vehicle-fuel chapter names four factors that control how fast an LNG spill vaporises and how far its cloud travels. Wind speeds up evaporation but also mixes the vapour with air and breaks the cloud into puffs. A larger spill area gives a higher vaporisation rate. Wet ground, such as muddy soil, acts as a heat sink and vaporises the liquid fast, and dark asphalt also promotes vaporisation. At night, the lack of solar and ground heating slows evaporation but lets the flammable cloud travel further before it becomes buoyant.[13][11]

Side view of an LNG pool with white fog spreading along the ground, a dashed flammable zone beyond it and warmed vapour rising downwind
Vapour behaviour after an LNG spill.

Worked example 1. One cubic metre of LNG produces about 600–636 m³ of gas, using the handbook ratios for LNG and methane.[10][1] With a flammable range of 5–14 percent for methane at normal temperatures,[10] this gas could form at most about 12,000–12,700 m³ of mixture at the lower limit. At 14 percent, near the upper limit, the mixture volume would be about 4,300–4,500 m³. In reality, mixing is uneven, so parts of the cloud are too rich or too lean. The result shows why a modest spill can create a flammable cloud far larger than the spill itself.

When an LNG or liquid hydrogen pool ignites, it burns as a pool fire. The SFPE Handbook correlates the heat release rate of large pools in the radiative regime by the following expression, which needs two empirical constants per fuel. The same form correlates the data for most organic liquids burning in that regime:[20]

q˙=Δhcm˙′'∞(1−e−kβD)A

Symbol Description Unit
q˙ Heat release rate of the pool fire kW
Δhc Net heat of combustion kJ/kg
m˙′'∞ Mass burning rate per unit area of an infinitely large pool kg/(m²·s)
kβ Empirical constant for the pool size effect m−1
D Pool diameter m
A Pool area m²

For LNG, the SFPE table gives a heat of combustion of 50.0 MJ/kg, a mass burning rate of 0.078 kg/(m²·s) and a kβ of 1.1 m−1. For liquid hydrogen, it gives 120.0 MJ/kg, 0.017 kg/(m²·s) and 6.1 m−1.[21] The uncertainty is large for LNG, ±0.018 kg/(m²·s) on the burning rate and ±0.8 m−1 on kβ.[21] The correlation applies in the radiative regime, which covers pools above about 0.2 m in diameter.[20]

Worked example 2. An LNG pool of 10 m diameter has an area of 78.5 m², and the size factor 1 − e−11 is practically 1. The heat release rate is 50,000 kJ/kg × 0.078 kg/(m²·s) × 78.5 m² ≈ 306 MW. A 2 m pool gives about 10.9 MW, because its size factor is only 0.89. A liquid hydrogen pool of 2 m gives about 6.4 MW: hydrogen has the higher heat of combustion but a much lower burning rate. For comparison, the LNG burning rate corresponds to a liquid regression of about 11 mm/min, within the 5–15 mm/min the handbook gives for steady-state LNG pool burning.[10]

Two rising curves of pool fire heat release rate against diameter, LNG above liquid hydrogen, up to about 1200 MW at 20 metres
Heat release rate of LNG and liquid hydrogen pool fires calculated with the SFPE large-pool correlation.

Fire exposure and emergency control

Most cryogenic storage tanks are pressure vessels, but their design pressure is not high enough to hold the internal pressure if the liquid were heated to atmospheric temperature. Because the liquid is kept at or slightly above its boiling point, a BLEVE is not likely.[5] The handbook describes insulated cryogenic containers of hydrogen and LNG as theoretically subject to BLEVEs, but with a low probability.[9][10] Fire tests reported for LNG fuelling sites found that the relief valves of an uninsulated cryogenic vessel open within one hour of fire exposure. With intact insulation and vacuum, the relief valve does not open for several days.[11]

Water needs care around cryogenic containers. Water applied to a container can enter the pressure relief device and freeze, making it inoperative and leading to vessel failure.[5][19] Water is also far warmer than the liquid, so it acts as a heat source and increases vaporisation.[5] For this reason, the handbook advises against contact between water and pooled LNG, hydrogen or liquid oxygen, unless the vapour can be controlled.[10][3][22] Water spray can be used to disperse escaping gas, but applying water to a fire-exposed cryogenic container requires assessment: it adds heat and can freeze the pressure relief device.[19][5]

High-expansion foam has been studied for controlling vapour from a cryogenic pool. A thick enough foam blanket warms the gas so that it rises above the blanket instead of flowing along the ground. This works only on established pools, not in the first phase of a release, when vaporisation is fastest.[19] Foam can control a fire in a pool or tank of cryogenic liquid but cannot extinguish it. The degree of control depends on how much of the liquid the foam covers and how long the application can be kept up.[23]

Limits and common misconceptions

A common misconception is that a cold liquid cannot cause a pressure explosion. The opposite holds when a cryogen is confined, because heat leak alone can raise the pressure beyond any container strength.[1] A second misconception is that the visible white cloud marks the hazard area. The fog only roughly defines the gas area, and ignitable mixtures often extend beyond it.[19] A third is that lighter-than-air gases such as methane and hydrogen always rise. Cold vapour from the liquid first spreads along the ground until it warms.[13]

The data used here also have limits. The SFPE Handbook notes that pool burning correlations fit cryogenic fuels less well than other hydrocarbons, because their burning is difficult to measure and the data scatter more.[24][25] A table in NUREG-1805 that repeats the same pool fire data prints the heat of combustion of liquid hydrogen as 12,000 kJ/kg, ten times lower than the SFPE value of 120.0 MJ/kg.[26][21] The handbook's Table 6.10.1 prints its metric density columns a factor of ten too low, so the imperial values are the reliable ones. Finally, the rules quoted are US rules, such as NFPA 55 (2005) and DOT regulations, as summarised in the 2008 handbook, and other countries regulate cryogenic fluids differently.[16][8]

See also

Notes

  1. ↑ 1.00 1.01 1.02 1.03 1.04 1.05 1.06 1.07 1.08 1.09 Lemoff (2008), p. 6-167.
  2. ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 Lemoff (2008), p. 6-173.
  3. ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 Lemoff (2008), p. 6-185.
  4. ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 Lemoff and Rivkin (2008), p. 7-37.
  5. ↑ 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 Lemoff and Rivkin (2008), p. 7-40.
  6. ↑ 6.0 6.1 Lemoff (2008), p. 6-166.
  7. ↑ Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. F-19.
  8. ↑ 8.0 8.1 C. J. Wright (2008a), p. 13-120.
  9. ↑ 9.0 9.1 9.2 9.3 9.4 9.5 Lemoff (2008), p. 6-181.
  10. ↑ 10.00 10.01 10.02 10.03 10.04 10.05 10.06 10.07 10.08 10.09 10.10 10.11 10.12 Lemoff (2008), p. 6-182.
  11. ↑ 11.0 11.1 11.2 11.3 11.4 11.5 Rivkin (2008b), p. 21-59.
  12. ↑ Lemoff and Rivkin (2008), p. 7-38.
  13. ↑ 13.0 13.1 13.2 13.3 Rivkin (2008b), p. 21-58.
  14. ↑ Lemoff (2008), p. 6-170.
  15. ↑ 15.0 15.1 Lemoff and Rivkin (2008), p. 7-41.
  16. ↑ 16.0 16.1 Lemoff and Rivkin (2008), p. 7-39.
  17. ↑ Anderson (2008a), p. 9-165.
  18. ↑ 18.0 18.1 18.2 Rivkin (2008b), p. 21-60.
  19. ↑ 19.0 19.1 19.2 19.3 19.4 19.5 19.6 Lemoff (2008), p. 6-176.
  20. ↑ 20.0 20.1 Babrauskas (2002b), p. 3-25.
  21. ↑ 21.0 21.1 21.2 Babrauskas (2002b), p. 3-26.
  22. ↑ Lemoff (2008), p. 6-183.
  23. ↑ Lemoff (2008), p. 6-177.
  24. ↑ Gottuk and White (2002), p. 2-309.
  25. ↑ Gottuk and White (2002), p. 2-311.
  26. ↑ Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. 3-4.

References

  • Anderson, R. R. (2008a). Fire protection of laboratories using chemicals. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 9-157–9-166). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Babrauskas, V. (2002b). Heat release rates. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 3-1–3-37). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
  • Gottuk, D. T., & White, D. A. (2002). Liquid fuel fires. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 2-297–2-316). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
  • Iqbal, N., & Salley, M. H. (2004). Fire Dynamics Tools (FDTs): Quantitative fire hazard analysis methods for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Fire Protection Inspection Program (NUREG-1805). U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
  • Lemoff, T. C. (2008). Gases. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 6-165–6-186). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Lemoff, T. C., & Rivkin, C. H. (2008). Storage of gases. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 7-35–7-42). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Rivkin, C. H. (2008b). Vehicle fueling using gaseous fuels. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 21-41–21-76). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Wright, C. J. (2008a). Managing the response to hazardous material incidents. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 13-117–13-144). National Fire Protection Association.