New FSE wiki article: Rail transit system (written by Claude Opus 5.5) |
FSE wiki: fact-check: BART spacing misprint flagged, hedges restored, NFPA 502 attribution removed, units note, page and wording fixes (written by Claude Opus 5.5) |
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A '''rail transit system''' is a metropolitan passenger railway, such as a rapid transit (metro or subway) or light rail (trolley) line, that is not connected to the general railway network.<ref name="Wright-21-109">C. J. Wright (2008b), p. 21-109.</ref> The NFPA ''Fire Protection Handbook'' treats these systems as fixed guideway transit and passenger rail systems, made up of underground trainways, underground stations and surface-level or elevated lines.<ref name="Peacock-21-101">Peacock (2008), p. 21-101.</ref> Large numbers of people move through their underground enclosures and elevated structures, and in an emergency passengers may have to walk through smoke-filled trainways to an exit.<ref name="Peacock-21-101" /> The 1987 fire at King's Cross station in London, in which 31 people died, drew international attention to this hazard.<ref name="Peacock-21-101" /> Fire protection rests on rail car materials with | A '''rail transit system''' is a metropolitan passenger railway, such as a rapid transit (metro or subway) or light rail (trolley) line, that is not connected to the general railway network.<ref name="Wright-21-109">C. J. Wright (2008b), p. 21-109.</ref> The NFPA ''Fire Protection Handbook'' treats these systems as fixed guideway transit and passenger rail systems, made up of underground trainways, underground stations and surface-level or elevated lines.<ref name="Peacock-21-101">Peacock (2008), p. 21-101.</ref> Large numbers of people move through their underground enclosures and elevated structures, and in an emergency passengers may have to walk through smoke-filled trainways to an exit.<ref name="Peacock-21-101" /> The 1987 fire at King's Cross station in London, in which 31 people died, drew international attention to this hazard.<ref name="Peacock-21-101" /> Fire protection rests on tested rail car materials with a low combustible load, emergency ventilation that drives smoke away from passengers, protected walkways and exits, standpipes and joint emergency planning.<ref name="Peacock-21-102-105">Peacock (2008), pp. 21-102–21-105.</ref> In the United States, NFPA 130, ''Standard for Fixed Guideway Transit and Passenger Rail Systems'', has covered stations, trainways and vehicles since June 1983, according to the 2008 handbook.<ref name="Peacock-21-102">Peacock (2008), p. 21-102.</ref> | ||
== Definition and system components == | == Definition and system components == | ||
In the United States, railways fall into two broad groups. The first runs on the general railway system and includes freight carriers, intercity passenger services and commuter rail, regulated by the Federal Railroad Administration. The second consists of rapid transit and light rail lines in metropolitan areas that are not connected to that system. State and local bodies regulate these, with oversight by the Federal Transit Administration.<ref name="Wright-21-109" /> The handbook divides a transit system into underground trainways (the tunnels in which the trains run), underground stations, and surface-level and elevated sections.<ref name="Peacock-21-101" /> | In the United States, railways fall into two broad groups. The first runs on the general railway system and includes freight carriers, intercity passenger services and commuter rail, regulated by the Federal Railroad Administration. The second consists of rapid transit and light rail lines in metropolitan areas that are not connected to that system. State and local bodies regulate these, with oversight by the Federal Transit Administration.<ref name="Wright-21-109" /> The handbook divides a transit system into underground trainways (the tunnels in which the trains run), underground stations, and surface-level and elevated sections.<ref name="Peacock-21-101" /> | ||
The trains run on traction power, supplied through a third rail or an overhead contact system at a nominal 600 to 750 V direct current. A third rail is often covered by a board of electrically insulating material, which should carry a weight of 113 kg (250 lb). Disconnect switches throughout the system allow traction power to be removed quickly in an emergency.<ref name="Peacock-21-101" /> Even when told that the power is off, fire fighters should assume that the third rail or overhead wire is still energised.<ref name="Peacock-21-107">Peacock (2008), p. 21-107.</ref> | The trains run on traction power, supplied through a third rail or an overhead contact system at typically a nominal 600 to 750 V direct current. A third rail is often covered by a board of electrically insulating material, which should carry a weight of 113 kg (250 lb). Disconnect switches throughout the system allow traction power to be removed quickly in an emergency.<ref name="Peacock-21-101" /> Even when told that the power is off, fire fighters should assume that the third rail or overhead wire is still energised.<ref name="Peacock-21-107">Peacock (2008), p. 21-107.</ref> | ||
California, other jurisdictions and NFPA 101 classified places where people wait for transport as [[assembly occupancy|assembly occupancies]]. From June 1983, however, NFPA 130 has covered stations, trainways, vehicles and outdoor vehicle maintenance areas, as summarised in the 20th edition of the handbook (2008).<ref name="Peacock-21-102" /> It is one of three NFPA standards for the underground environment, next to NFPA 502 for road tunnels and NFPA 520 for subterranean spaces.<ref name="Bendelius-21-191">Bendelius (2008), p. 21-191.</ref> In the Netherlands, fire safety engineering is applied mainly to non-standard buildings, and public transport terminals and tunnels are named examples.<ref name="VR-1.5">Van Rossum (2027), §1.5.</ref> Tunnels do not fit Dutch building regulations, which aim mainly at buildings where people stay, so | California, other jurisdictions and NFPA 101 classified places where people wait for transport as [[assembly occupancy|assembly occupancies]]. From June 1983, however, NFPA 130 has covered stations, trainways, vehicles and outdoor vehicle maintenance areas, as summarised in the 20th edition of the handbook (2008).<ref name="Peacock-21-102" /> It is one of three NFPA standards for the underground environment, next to NFPA 502 for road tunnels and NFPA 520 for subterranean spaces.<ref name="Bendelius-21-191">Bendelius (2008), p. 21-191.</ref> In the Netherlands, fire safety engineering is applied mainly to non-standard buildings, and public transport terminals and tunnels are named examples.<ref name="VR-1.5">Van Rossum (2027), §1.5.</ref> Tunnels do not fit Dutch building regulations, which aim mainly at buildings where people stay, so several aspects are handled with a fire safety engineering approach. Tunnels usually have a smoke management system.<ref name="VR-11.2">Van Rossum (2027), §11.2.</ref> | ||
== Fire hazards and fire loads == | == Fire hazards and fire loads == | ||
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The rail car itself is the main concern. Modern cars use many plastics, foams and fibres that can be quite combustible and may give off toxic products. Transit vehicles can carry several thousand people, far more than a jumbo jet, so the potential for loss of life is large.<ref name="Peacock-21-103">Peacock (2008), p. 21-103.</ref> On the other hand, the fire load in a transit tunnel can be estimated with reasonable accuracy, because the operator controls both the vehicles and the passenger load. In a road tunnel, by contrast, any truck may carry an unknown cargo.<ref name="Bendelius-21-189">Bendelius (2008), p. 21-189.</ref> | The rail car itself is the main concern. Modern cars use many plastics, foams and fibres that can be quite combustible and may give off toxic products. Transit vehicles can carry several thousand people, far more than a jumbo jet, so the potential for loss of life is large.<ref name="Peacock-21-103">Peacock (2008), p. 21-103.</ref> On the other hand, the fire load in a transit tunnel can be estimated with reasonable accuracy, because the operator controls both the vehicles and the passenger load. In a road tunnel, by contrast, any truck may carry an unknown cargo.<ref name="Bendelius-21-189">Bendelius (2008), p. 21-189.</ref> | ||
Full-scale tests show how large a vehicle fire can become. In a European research programme with nearly two dozen vehicles, including trams, buses and rail vehicles, the peak [[heat release rate]] of many tests was about 10 to 35 MW.<ref name="Babrauskas-3-27">Babrauskas (2002b), p. 3-27.</ref> A subway car shown in the same chapter peaked at about 35 MW within roughly 400 seconds, read from the published curve.<ref name="Babrauskas-3-28">Babrauskas (2002b), p. 3-28.</ref> An array of train seats with wool covers and polyurethane foam peaked at about 2 MW.<ref name="Babrauskas-3-27-28">Babrauskas (2002b), pp. 3-27–3-28.</ref> | Full-scale tests show how large a vehicle fire can become. In a European research programme with nearly two dozen vehicles, including trams, buses and rail vehicles, the peak [[heat release rate]] of many tests was about 10 to 35 MW.<ref name="Babrauskas-3-27">Babrauskas (2002b), p. 3-27.</ref> A subway car shown in the same chapter peaked at about 35 MW within roughly 400 seconds, read from the published curve.<ref name="Babrauskas-3-28">Babrauskas (2002b), p. 3-28.</ref> An array of train seats with wool covers and polyurethane foam peaked at about 2 MW, also read from the published curve.<ref name="Babrauskas-3-27-28">Babrauskas (2002b), pp. 3-27–3-28.</ref> | ||
In the United States in 1994–1998, an average of 650 rail vehicle fires per year were reported to local fire departments, with 6 civilian deaths and 12 civilian injuries. Self-powered cars, trolleys and rapid transit cars accounted for 30 of these fires, with no deaths and one injury. Passenger and diner cars accounted for 60 fires and 3 of the 6 deaths.<ref name="Wright-21-119">C. J. Wright (2008b), p. 21-119.</ref> These statistics exclude fires reported only to federal or state agencies.<ref name="Wright-21-119" /> | In the United States in 1994–1998, an average of 650 rail vehicle fires per year were reported to local fire departments, with 6 civilian deaths and 12 civilian injuries. Self-powered cars, trolleys and rapid transit cars accounted for 30 of these fires, with no deaths and one injury. Passenger and diner cars accounted for 60 fires and 3 of the 6 deaths.<ref name="Wright-21-119">C. J. Wright (2008b), p. 21-119.</ref> These statistics exclude fires reported only to federal or state agencies.<ref name="Wright-21-119" /> | ||
In stations | In stations a significant fuel source, apart from the trains, is the concessions. Newspaper stands normally count as a low risk, while restaurants or theatres have a high potential for smoke and heat. Even so, an underground station generally has a very low fire load compared with a commercial basement.<ref name="Peacock-21-106">Peacock (2008), p. 21-106.</ref> Swiss surveys from 1967–69, reproduced in the International Fire Engineering Guidelines (2005), give a variable fire load density of 800 MJ/m² for a railway station, the same as for a business office.<ref name="IFEG-3.4-6">National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), pp. 3.4-2, 3.4-6.</ref> | ||
== Stations and the King's Cross fire == | == Stations and the King's Cross fire == | ||
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Emergency ventilation of underground trainways is of primary importance. Some systems install fully reversible fans in vent shafts, which purge smoke in a predetermined direction so that passengers can walk to the nearest station or exit. Fans and shafts are often placed at each end of a station and sometimes between stations. Control room operators must receive correct initial information, because the wrong ventilation scenario could move smoke towards the passengers.<ref name="Peacock-21-103" /> | Emergency ventilation of underground trainways is of primary importance. Some systems install fully reversible fans in vent shafts, which purge smoke in a predetermined direction so that passengers can walk to the nearest station or exit. Fans and shafts are often placed at each end of a station and sometimes between stations. Control room operators must receive correct initial information, because the wrong ventilation scenario could move smoke towards the passengers.<ref name="Peacock-21-103" /> | ||
Airflow has been used widely to manage smoke from fires in subway, railroad and highway tunnels. Large flow rates are needed, and this air also | Airflow has been used widely to manage smoke from fires in subway, railroad and highway tunnels. Large flow rates are needed, and this air can also supply extra oxygen to the fire.<ref name="MilkeKlote-18-52">Milke and Klote (2008), p. 18-52.</ref> [[Tunnel ventilation]] must also prevent backlayering, the movement of smoke and hot gases against the direction of the ventilation airflow.<ref name="Bendelius-21-196">Bendelius (2008), p. 21-196.</ref> The lowest steady air velocity towards the fire that prevents backlayering is the [[critical velocity]].<ref name="Bendelius-21-204">Bendelius (2008), p. 21-204.</ref> | ||
The handbook gives a method for the critical velocity in its road tunnel chapter | The handbook gives a method for the critical velocity in its road tunnel chapter; its transit chapter gives no separate formula. The critical velocity increases with the heat that the fire adds to the air and with the tunnel height, and decreases as the cross-section becomes larger. A grade factor raises it where the airflow runs downhill, with the grade taken in the direction of the airflow. Because the hot gas temperature itself depends on the air velocity, the two equations are solved together by iteration.<ref name="Bendelius-21-204" /><ref name="Bendelius-21-205">Bendelius (2008), p. 21-205. The handbook lists Q in MW and C<sub>p</sub> in kJ/(kg K); the symbol table uses W and J/(kg·K), which keep the equation dimensionally consistent.</ref> | ||
<math display="block">V_c = K_1 K_g \left( \frac{g H Q}{\rho C_p A T_f} \right)^{1/3}</math> | <math display="block">V_c = K_1 K_g \left( \frac{g H Q}{\rho C_p A T_f} \right)^{1/3}</math> | ||
<math display="block">T_f = \frac{Q}{\rho C_p A V_c} + T</math> | <math display="block">T_f = \frac{Q}{\rho C_p A V_c} + T</math> | ||
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Many systems run their underground tracks in separate trainways divided by noncombustible walls. These walls should have at least a 2-hour fire resistance rating, with 1½-hour fire doors in their openings. A door in the wall gives passengers a horizontal exit into the other trainway, which stays relatively free of smoke and heat. Such cross-passageways can replace emergency exit stairs to the surface, and they should be no more than 244 m (800 ft) apart.<ref name="Peacock-21-104" /> | Many systems run their underground tracks in separate trainways divided by noncombustible walls. These walls should have at least a 2-hour fire resistance rating, with 1½-hour fire doors in their openings. A door in the wall gives passengers a horizontal exit into the other trainway, which stays relatively free of smoke and heat. Such cross-passageways can replace emergency exit stairs to the surface, and they should be no more than 244 m (800 ft) apart.<ref name="Peacock-21-104" /> | ||
The number and position of emergency exits depend on train length, trainway depth, access at grade and at track level, travel time and distance, ventilation and fire service access. | The number and position of emergency exits depend on train length, trainway depth, access at grade and at track level, travel time and distance, ventilation and fire service access. Ventilation can control smoke, and unlimited vertical shafts are impractical. NFPA 130, as summarised in the handbook (2008), therefore allows exit shafts to be placed so that the maximum travel distance in a tunnel does not exceed 381 m (1250 ft).<ref name="Peacock-21-104" /> For [[walking speed]], NFPA 130 specifies a design exiting speed of 1 m/s (200 ft/min).<ref name="Bendelius-21-206">Bendelius (2008), p. 21-206.</ref> | ||
These two values give a simple worked example. The walking time is the travel distance divided by the walking speed: | These two values give a simple worked example. The walking time is the travel distance divided by the walking speed: | ||
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| <math>v</math> || Design walking speed || m/s | | <math>v</math> || Design walking speed || m/s | ||
|} | |} | ||
For the maximum travel distance of 381 m and a speed of 1.0 m/s, the walking time is 381 s, or about 6.4 minutes.<ref name="Peacock-21-104" /><ref name="Bendelius-21-206" /> A passenger halfway between two cross-passageways 244 m apart walks 122 m, which takes about 122 s. If the fire blocks the nearest passage, a passenger next to it must walk almost 244 m to the next one, about 244 s. These times cover walking only. | For the maximum travel distance of 381 m and a speed of 1.0 m/s, the walking time is 381 s, or about 6.4 minutes.<ref name="Peacock-21-104" /><ref name="Bendelius-21-206" /> A passenger halfway between two cross-passageways 244 m apart walks 122 m, which takes about 122 s. If the fire blocks the nearest passage, a passenger next to it must walk almost 244 m to the next one, about 244 s. These times cover walking at the design speed only. The time before passengers start to move and any delays on the way are not included. | ||
In stations, the dynamic exiting concept of NFPA 130 sets the occupant load from the estimated numbers of passengers waiting | In stations, the dynamic exiting concept of NFPA 130 sets the occupant load from the estimated numbers of passengers waiting in stations and leaving trains. Escalators are the main way in and out of most new stations. Reversible escalators may count as emergency exits, but only up to the number of exit units that NFPA 130 allows at any level. Fare barriers should open automatically during an evacuation, or special gates should be provided.<ref name="Peacock-21-102" /> In drills in an underground rapid transit station, directive public announcements with an alerting bell were the most effective way to start an immediate evacuation.<ref name="Bryan-4-4">Bryan (2008), p. 4-4.</ref> Crowd control also matters: the three subway stations in the World Trade Center complex could deliver many thousands of people within minutes, and on 11 September 2001 police stopped all trains from entering it.<ref name="Fruin-4-102">Fruin (2008), p. 4-102.</ref> | ||
In a [[tunnel fire|fire in a tunnel]], the smoke stays around the train and continues to expose people who have left the cars. Tunnels, bridges and other elevated sections also limit how people can move away from a train.<ref name="Bukowski-5-229" /> A train in a tunnel would keep moving until it is clear, if possible, and emergency procedures stress moving passengers into adjacent cars. Passengers who leave the train risk being struck by trains on an adjacent track.<ref name="Bukowski-5-230">Bukowski (2002), p. 5-230.</ref> Elevated trainways also need their own means of egress.<ref name="Peacock-21-107" /> | In a [[tunnel fire|fire in a tunnel]], the smoke stays around the train and continues to expose people who have left the cars. Tunnels, bridges and other elevated sections also limit how people can move away from a train.<ref name="Bukowski-5-229" /> A train in a tunnel would keep moving until it is clear, if possible, and emergency procedures stress moving passengers into adjacent cars. Passengers who leave the train risk being struck by trains on an adjacent track.<ref name="Bukowski-5-230">Bukowski (2002), p. 5-230.</ref> Elevated trainways also need their own means of egress.<ref name="Peacock-21-107" /> | ||
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Fires in underground trainways are among the most difficult to extinguish, because fire fighters have little room to work.<ref name="Peacock-21-103" /> Because of the variety of hazards, local fire authorities need a direct line to the system's top management and detailed information on floor plans, electrification, vehicles and communications. Map books known as "Fire Maps" have proven valuable.<ref name="Peacock-21-102" /> Every fire fighter who enters the underground system needs self-contained breathing apparatus, and keeping enough replacement air cylinders below grade is a challenge.<ref name="Peacock-21-105" /> | Fires in underground trainways are among the most difficult to extinguish, because fire fighters have little room to work.<ref name="Peacock-21-103" /> Because of the variety of hazards, local fire authorities need a direct line to the system's top management and detailed information on floor plans, electrification, vehicles and communications. Map books known as "Fire Maps" have proven valuable.<ref name="Peacock-21-102" /> Every fire fighter who enters the underground system needs self-contained breathing apparatus, and keeping enough replacement air cylinders below grade is a challenge.<ref name="Peacock-21-105" /> | ||
The standpipe hose system is a principal fire protection device, with Class I or Class III service to NFPA 14. Tunnel standpipes should be at least 102 mm (4 in.) in diameter or sized by hydraulic calculation, and they may be of the dry type. Some systems require outlets | The standpipe hose system is a principal fire protection device, with Class I or Class III service to NFPA 14. Tunnel standpipes should be at least 102 mm (4 in.) in diameter or sized by hydraulic calculation, and they may be of the dry type. Some systems require dry standpipe outlets no more than 61 m (200 ft) apart, while others accept 91, 122 or 152 m (300, 400 or 500 ft).<ref name="Peacock-21-105" /> The San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) system removed fire hose from its subway except in stations. Instead, it provided five fire engines that run on road or rail, each carrying 366 m (1200 ft) of 64 mm (2½ in.) hose and a 1136 L (300 gal) water tank.<ref name="Peacock-21-105" /> | ||
Communication is probably one of the most serious problems underground. Emergency telephones are usually marked by blue lights | Communication is probably one of the most serious problems underground. Emergency telephones are usually marked by blue lights, and on BART each blue-light station also has a power-disconnect button and a 9 kg (20 lb) dry chemical extinguisher. The handbook spaces these stations at 1000 ft intervals or within line of sight, whichever is shorter, but prints the metric value as 30 m. Since 1000 ft is 305 m and 30 m matches 100 ft, one of the two values is a misprint.<ref name="Peacock-21-104" /> Radio communication underground is sometimes very difficult, so many newer subways have equipment that lets fire department radios work in stations and tunnels.<ref name="Peacock-21-104" /> After the World Trade Center investigation, NIST recommended inspection and testing procedures for emergency and radio communications in large structures, including tunnels and subways.<ref name="NIST-219">National Institute of Standards and Technology (2005), p. 219.</ref> | ||
Water used in fire fighting has to drain away, because large amounts could hinder rescue. Fire fighting at street level near station entrances or ventilation grills can also send water into the system.<ref name="Peacock-21-105" /> Fires on surface-level and elevated lines are generally no harder to fight than other fires at grade. However, trainways in joint corridors with railways or freeways may | Water used in fire fighting has to drain away, because large amounts could hinder rescue. Fire fighting at street level near station entrances or ventilation grills can also send water into the system.<ref name="Peacock-21-105" /> Fires on surface-level and elevated lines are generally no harder to fight than other fires at grade. However, trainways in joint corridors with railways or freeways may have limited access over long distances.<ref name="Peacock-21-106-107">Peacock (2008), pp. 21-106–21-107.</ref> Rail emergencies on bridges, such as a [[bridge fire]], and in tunnels with several tracks are especially hazardous, because there is usually no working space except on the tracks. Until all train activity in the area has stopped, responders have no safe place to work.<ref name="Wright-21-114">C. J. Wright (2008b), p. 21-114.</ref> | ||
== Rail vehicle fire performance and hazard assessment == | == Rail vehicle fire performance and hazard assessment == | ||
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Rail transit and commuter vehicles are built more strongly than aircraft, with fire resistance requirements for floors, and for roofs where power comes from an overhead catenary.<ref name="Bukowski-5-228">Bukowski (2002), p. 5-228.</ref> ASTM E2061 gives a procedure for fire hazard assessment of rail vehicles, including specific design fire scenarios.<ref name="Bukowski-5-227">Bukowski (2002), p. 5-227.</ref> For an intercity coach car, NIST used the CFAST fire model and tenability criteria to calculate a fire performance curve. It showed that a fire growing no faster than a medium [[t-squared fire]] would not threaten passengers or crew. In replicate gas burner tests, the time to incapacitation was 126 ± 7 s for a medium fire, 40 ± 4 s for an ultra-fast fire and 230 ± 12 s for a slow fire.<ref name="Bukowski-5-230" /> | Rail transit and commuter vehicles are built more strongly than aircraft, with fire resistance requirements for floors, and for roofs where power comes from an overhead catenary.<ref name="Bukowski-5-228">Bukowski (2002), p. 5-228.</ref> ASTM E2061 gives a procedure for fire hazard assessment of rail vehicles, including specific design fire scenarios.<ref name="Bukowski-5-227">Bukowski (2002), p. 5-227.</ref> For an intercity coach car, NIST used the CFAST fire model and tenability criteria to calculate a fire performance curve. It showed that a fire growing no faster than a medium [[t-squared fire]] would not threaten passengers or crew. In replicate gas burner tests, the time to incapacitation was 126 ± 7 s for a medium fire, 40 ± 4 s for an ultra-fast fire and 230 ± 12 s for a slow fire.<ref name="Bukowski-5-230" /> | ||
These results have limits. Trains are long, narrow spaces, so some assumptions of zone models may not hold.<ref name="Bukowski-5-229" /> Most rail scenarios involve short exposures, because passengers can move to adjacent cars. The exception is a sleeping car without fire detection when the incident happens in a long tunnel.<ref name="Bukowski-5-230" /> In late 2001, ASTM adopted a guide for fire hazard assessment of rail cars, which the handbook sees as a step towards performance-based design.<ref name="Peacock-21-106" /> | These results have limits. Trains are long, narrow spaces, so some assumptions of zone models may not hold.<ref name="Bukowski-5-229" /> Most rail scenarios involve short exposures, because passengers can move to adjacent cars. The exception is a sleeping car without fire detection when the incident happens in a long tunnel.<ref name="Bukowski-5-230" /> In late 2001, ASTM adopted a guide for fire hazard assessment of rail cars, which the handbook sees as a step towards performance-based design.<ref name="Peacock-21-106-ASTM">Peacock (2008), p. 21-106. Bukowski (2002), p. 5-233, gives the year 2000 for ASTM E2061, ''Standard Guide for Fire Hazard Assessment of Rail Transportation Vehicles''.</ref> | ||
== See also == | == See also == | ||
Revision as of 22:39, 7 November 2026
A rail transit system is a metropolitan passenger railway, such as a rapid transit (metro or subway) or light rail (trolley) line, that is not connected to the general railway network.[1] The NFPA Fire Protection Handbook treats these systems as fixed guideway transit and passenger rail systems, made up of underground trainways, underground stations and surface-level or elevated lines.[2] Large numbers of people move through their underground enclosures and elevated structures, and in an emergency passengers may have to walk through smoke-filled trainways to an exit.[2] The 1987 fire at King's Cross station in London, in which 31 people died, drew international attention to this hazard.[2] Fire protection rests on tested rail car materials with a low combustible load, emergency ventilation that drives smoke away from passengers, protected walkways and exits, standpipes and joint emergency planning.[3] In the United States, NFPA 130, Standard for Fixed Guideway Transit and Passenger Rail Systems, has covered stations, trainways and vehicles since June 1983, according to the 2008 handbook.[4]
Definition and system components
In the United States, railways fall into two broad groups. The first runs on the general railway system and includes freight carriers, intercity passenger services and commuter rail, regulated by the Federal Railroad Administration. The second consists of rapid transit and light rail lines in metropolitan areas that are not connected to that system. State and local bodies regulate these, with oversight by the Federal Transit Administration.[1] The handbook divides a transit system into underground trainways (the tunnels in which the trains run), underground stations, and surface-level and elevated sections.[2]
The trains run on traction power, supplied through a third rail or an overhead contact system at typically a nominal 600 to 750 V direct current. A third rail is often covered by a board of electrically insulating material, which should carry a weight of 113 kg (250 lb). Disconnect switches throughout the system allow traction power to be removed quickly in an emergency.[2] Even when told that the power is off, fire fighters should assume that the third rail or overhead wire is still energised.[5]
California, other jurisdictions and NFPA 101 classified places where people wait for transport as assembly occupancies. From June 1983, however, NFPA 130 has covered stations, trainways, vehicles and outdoor vehicle maintenance areas, as summarised in the 20th edition of the handbook (2008).[4] It is one of three NFPA standards for the underground environment, next to NFPA 502 for road tunnels and NFPA 520 for subterranean spaces.[6] In the Netherlands, fire safety engineering is applied mainly to non-standard buildings, and public transport terminals and tunnels are named examples.[7] Tunnels do not fit Dutch building regulations, which aim mainly at buildings where people stay, so several aspects are handled with a fire safety engineering approach. Tunnels usually have a smoke management system.[8]
Fire hazards and fire loads
The handbook lists the main causes of fire in a transit system: mechanical failure of undercar components, high-energy electrical short circuits, and combustible debris along trainways and in vent shafts. Road film and oil on vehicle undersides, combustible car components, wooden crossties, and criminal or terrorist acts complete the list.[2] On passenger trains the causes include smoking materials, arson and mechanical or electrical faults.[9] Vandalism causes fires in subways and commuter rail, for example newspapers and small amounts of flammable liquid used to ignite slashed seats.[10]
The rail car itself is the main concern. Modern cars use many plastics, foams and fibres that can be quite combustible and may give off toxic products. Transit vehicles can carry several thousand people, far more than a jumbo jet, so the potential for loss of life is large.[11] On the other hand, the fire load in a transit tunnel can be estimated with reasonable accuracy, because the operator controls both the vehicles and the passenger load. In a road tunnel, by contrast, any truck may carry an unknown cargo.[12]
Full-scale tests show how large a vehicle fire can become. In a European research programme with nearly two dozen vehicles, including trams, buses and rail vehicles, the peak heat release rate of many tests was about 10 to 35 MW.[13] A subway car shown in the same chapter peaked at about 35 MW within roughly 400 seconds, read from the published curve.[14] An array of train seats with wool covers and polyurethane foam peaked at about 2 MW, also read from the published curve.[15]
In the United States in 1994–1998, an average of 650 rail vehicle fires per year were reported to local fire departments, with 6 civilian deaths and 12 civilian injuries. Self-powered cars, trolleys and rapid transit cars accounted for 30 of these fires, with no deaths and one injury. Passenger and diner cars accounted for 60 fires and 3 of the 6 deaths.[16] These statistics exclude fires reported only to federal or state agencies.[16]
In stations a significant fuel source, apart from the trains, is the concessions. Newspaper stands normally count as a low risk, while restaurants or theatres have a high potential for smoke and heat. Even so, an underground station generally has a very low fire load compared with a commercial basement.[17] Swiss surveys from 1967–69, reproduced in the International Fire Engineering Guidelines (2005), give a variable fire load density of 800 MJ/m² for a railway station, the same as for a business office.[18]
Stations and the King's Cross fire
Underground stations should be built of noncombustible materials, Type I or Type II construction under NFPA 220, often with a reinforced concrete shell and protected steel inside it.[19] Very few major fires have occurred in stations. The notable exception is the King's Cross fire in London on 18 November 1987, in which thirty passengers and one fire fighter died.[17] The fire started within an escalator, and the handbook cites it as an example of the loss of life possible in unsprinklered passenger terminals.[20]
The fire spread much faster than expected up the 30° incline of a wooden escalator and trapped many people in the ticket hall above. It had been assumed that a local fire would creep sideways, as in a horizontal pool fire. However, flames attach to an upward-facing burning surface inclined more than 15°, so spread becomes similar to that on a vertical wall. The escalator slope was more than double this angle, and scale-model tests and field model calculations confirmed the scenario.[21] The sidewalls of the escalator made the flames "hug" the steps, an effect that later experiments described as the trench effect.[22] During the official inquiry, computational fluid dynamics predicted that the flames would lie down in the trench rather than rise as a plume, and physical tests later confirmed this.[23]
The handbook names poor housekeeping and electrical fires in escalator machine rooms among the possible causes of station fires. It recommends automatic sprinklers in concessions, storage and fare collection areas, and in the steel truss area of all escalators in a single-entry station, an element of escalator fire protection. Trainways are excluded, and clean agent systems may replace sprinklers in train control rooms with approval of the authority having jurisdiction. Public areas should be separated from nontransit areas by a fire barrier of at least 3 hours.[17]
Underground stations usually have no traditional fire alarm system with pull stations and bells. Instead, the public address system alerts and directs passengers, and support areas without automatic suppression should have fire detection to NFPA 72. Some newer systems have undercar deluge systems with open sprinklers between the rails. Others have an overcar deluge system that forms a water curtain between a burning train and the platform; the Baltimore Metro has both types.[17]
Ventilation and smoke control in trainways
Emergency ventilation of underground trainways is of primary importance. Some systems install fully reversible fans in vent shafts, which purge smoke in a predetermined direction so that passengers can walk to the nearest station or exit. Fans and shafts are often placed at each end of a station and sometimes between stations. Control room operators must receive correct initial information, because the wrong ventilation scenario could move smoke towards the passengers.[11]
Airflow has been used widely to manage smoke from fires in subway, railroad and highway tunnels. Large flow rates are needed, and this air can also supply extra oxygen to the fire.[24] Tunnel ventilation must also prevent backlayering, the movement of smoke and hot gases against the direction of the ventilation airflow.[25] The lowest steady air velocity towards the fire that prevents backlayering is the critical velocity.[26]
The handbook gives a method for the critical velocity in its road tunnel chapter; its transit chapter gives no separate formula. The critical velocity increases with the heat that the fire adds to the air and with the tunnel height, and decreases as the cross-section becomes larger. A grade factor raises it where the airflow runs downhill, with the grade taken in the direction of the airflow. Because the hot gas temperature itself depends on the air velocity, the two equations are solved together by iteration.[26][27]
| Symbol | Description | Unit |
|---|---|---|
| Critical velocity | m/s | |
| Constant, 0.606 | – | |
| Grade factor: 1.0 for a level or upward grade, rising to about 1.2 for a 10 % downgrade | – | |
| Acceleration due to gravity | m/s² | |
| Height of the tunnel at the fire site | m | |
| Heat the fire adds directly to the air at the fire site | W | |
| Average density of the approach (upstream) air | kg/m³ | |
| Specific heat of air | J/(kg·K) | |
| Cross-sectional area perpendicular to the flow | m² | |
| Temperature of the approach air | K | |
| Average temperature of the fire site gases | K |
The Subway Environment Simulation (SES) program, a one-dimensional network model, is used for such airflows. It has subprograms for vehicle performance, aerodynamics, temperature and humidity, heat sinks and fire.[27] It was developed in the early 1970s for the agency that became the Federal Transit Administration. It has been used to size and place shafts and fans for new rail systems in Washington, Atlanta, San Francisco, Montreal, Toronto and elsewhere.[28]
Water-based suppression in tunnels is also gaining ground. After a decade of serious highway and rail tunnel fires in Europe, tunnel authorities there have become less reluctant to use water-based suppression such as water mist. For railway tunnels, both life safety and property protection are objectives.[29] Metro-station mechanical rooms are a niche market for water mist as a halon alternative.[30]
Evacuation and means of egress
A key consideration for evacuation is a train that stops between stations and has to be emptied. Passengers must reach a point of safety, which may be a station platform or direct access to open air through vertical exits.[11] In some older systems passengers climb down from the train to a walkway and walk to a vertical exit or a platform. In newer systems the walkway is built alongside the car, opposite the third rail, so that passengers step directly onto it.[11][31]
Many systems run their underground tracks in separate trainways divided by noncombustible walls. These walls should have at least a 2-hour fire resistance rating, with 1½-hour fire doors in their openings. A door in the wall gives passengers a horizontal exit into the other trainway, which stays relatively free of smoke and heat. Such cross-passageways can replace emergency exit stairs to the surface, and they should be no more than 244 m (800 ft) apart.[31]
The number and position of emergency exits depend on train length, trainway depth, access at grade and at track level, travel time and distance, ventilation and fire service access. Ventilation can control smoke, and unlimited vertical shafts are impractical. NFPA 130, as summarised in the handbook (2008), therefore allows exit shafts to be placed so that the maximum travel distance in a tunnel does not exceed 381 m (1250 ft).[31] For walking speed, NFPA 130 specifies a design exiting speed of 1 m/s (200 ft/min).[32]
These two values give a simple worked example. The walking time is the travel distance divided by the walking speed:
| Symbol | Description | Unit |
|---|---|---|
| Walking time to the exit | s | |
| Travel distance along the trainway | m | |
| Design walking speed | m/s |
For the maximum travel distance of 381 m and a speed of 1.0 m/s, the walking time is 381 s, or about 6.4 minutes.[31][32] A passenger halfway between two cross-passageways 244 m apart walks 122 m, which takes about 122 s. If the fire blocks the nearest passage, a passenger next to it must walk almost 244 m to the next one, about 244 s. These times cover walking at the design speed only. The time before passengers start to move and any delays on the way are not included.
In stations, the dynamic exiting concept of NFPA 130 sets the occupant load from the estimated numbers of passengers waiting in stations and leaving trains. Escalators are the main way in and out of most new stations. Reversible escalators may count as emergency exits, but only up to the number of exit units that NFPA 130 allows at any level. Fare barriers should open automatically during an evacuation, or special gates should be provided.[4] In drills in an underground rapid transit station, directive public announcements with an alerting bell were the most effective way to start an immediate evacuation.[33] Crowd control also matters: the three subway stations in the World Trade Center complex could deliver many thousands of people within minutes, and on 11 September 2001 police stopped all trains from entering it.[34]
In a fire in a tunnel, the smoke stays around the train and continues to expose people who have left the cars. Tunnels, bridges and other elevated sections also limit how people can move away from a train.[10] A train in a tunnel would keep moving until it is clear, if possible, and emergency procedures stress moving passengers into adjacent cars. Passengers who leave the train risk being struck by trains on an adjacent track.[35] Elevated trainways also need their own means of egress.[5]
Fire fighting and emergency planning
Fires in underground trainways are among the most difficult to extinguish, because fire fighters have little room to work.[11] Because of the variety of hazards, local fire authorities need a direct line to the system's top management and detailed information on floor plans, electrification, vehicles and communications. Map books known as "Fire Maps" have proven valuable.[4] Every fire fighter who enters the underground system needs self-contained breathing apparatus, and keeping enough replacement air cylinders below grade is a challenge.[19]
The standpipe hose system is a principal fire protection device, with Class I or Class III service to NFPA 14. Tunnel standpipes should be at least 102 mm (4 in.) in diameter or sized by hydraulic calculation, and they may be of the dry type. Some systems require dry standpipe outlets no more than 61 m (200 ft) apart, while others accept 91, 122 or 152 m (300, 400 or 500 ft).[19] The San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) system removed fire hose from its subway except in stations. Instead, it provided five fire engines that run on road or rail, each carrying 366 m (1200 ft) of 64 mm (2½ in.) hose and a 1136 L (300 gal) water tank.[19]
Communication is probably one of the most serious problems underground. Emergency telephones are usually marked by blue lights, and on BART each blue-light station also has a power-disconnect button and a 9 kg (20 lb) dry chemical extinguisher. The handbook spaces these stations at 1000 ft intervals or within line of sight, whichever is shorter, but prints the metric value as 30 m. Since 1000 ft is 305 m and 30 m matches 100 ft, one of the two values is a misprint.[31] Radio communication underground is sometimes very difficult, so many newer subways have equipment that lets fire department radios work in stations and tunnels.[31] After the World Trade Center investigation, NIST recommended inspection and testing procedures for emergency and radio communications in large structures, including tunnels and subways.[36]
Water used in fire fighting has to drain away, because large amounts could hinder rescue. Fire fighting at street level near station entrances or ventilation grills can also send water into the system.[19] Fires on surface-level and elevated lines are generally no harder to fight than other fires at grade. However, trainways in joint corridors with railways or freeways may have limited access over long distances.[37] Rail emergencies on bridges, such as a bridge fire, and in tunnels with several tracks are especially hazardous, because there is usually no working space except on the tracks. Until all train activity in the area has stopped, responders have no safe place to work.[38]
Rail vehicle fire performance and hazard assessment
Many existing fire test methods have proven inadequate in predicting how car materials behave in real fires. NFPA 130 contains a table of required test methods for transit car materials, based on a Federal Transit Administration guideline. The Federal Railroad Administration has a slightly different version for commuter rail cars.[11] Both require lining materials to pass the ASTM E162 radiant panel test, with indices from 25 to 100 depending on the application.[39] A complete hazard assessment of a new car should cover fire propagation, smoke emission, ease of ignition, and heat and smoke release rate. The total combustible load should be kept as low as possible.[11]
Rail transit and commuter vehicles are built more strongly than aircraft, with fire resistance requirements for floors, and for roofs where power comes from an overhead catenary.[40] ASTM E2061 gives a procedure for fire hazard assessment of rail vehicles, including specific design fire scenarios.[41] For an intercity coach car, NIST used the CFAST fire model and tenability criteria to calculate a fire performance curve. It showed that a fire growing no faster than a medium t-squared fire would not threaten passengers or crew. In replicate gas burner tests, the time to incapacitation was 126 ± 7 s for a medium fire, 40 ± 4 s for an ultra-fast fire and 230 ± 12 s for a slow fire.[35]
These results have limits. Trains are long, narrow spaces, so some assumptions of zone models may not hold.[10] Most rail scenarios involve short exposures, because passengers can move to adjacent cars. The exception is a sleeping car without fire detection when the incident happens in a long tunnel.[35] In late 2001, ASTM adopted a guide for fire hazard assessment of rail cars, which the handbook sees as a step towards performance-based design.[42]
See also
Notes
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 C. J. Wright (2008b), p. 21-109.
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 Peacock (2008), p. 21-101.
- ↑ Peacock (2008), pp. 21-102–21-105.
- ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 Peacock (2008), p. 21-102.
- ↑ 5.0 5.1 Peacock (2008), p. 21-107.
- ↑ Bendelius (2008), p. 21-191.
- ↑ Van Rossum (2027), §1.5.
- ↑ Van Rossum (2027), §11.2.
- ↑ C. J. Wright (2008b), p. 21-115.
- ↑ 10.0 10.1 10.2 Bukowski (2002), p. 5-229.
- ↑ 11.0 11.1 11.2 11.3 11.4 11.5 11.6 Peacock (2008), p. 21-103.
- ↑ Bendelius (2008), p. 21-189.
- ↑ Babrauskas (2002b), p. 3-27.
- ↑ Babrauskas (2002b), p. 3-28.
- ↑ Babrauskas (2002b), pp. 3-27–3-28.
- ↑ 16.0 16.1 C. J. Wright (2008b), p. 21-119.
- ↑ 17.0 17.1 17.2 17.3 Peacock (2008), p. 21-106.
- ↑ National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), pp. 3.4-2, 3.4-6.
- ↑ 19.0 19.1 19.2 19.3 19.4 Peacock (2008), p. 21-105.
- ↑ Miller and Roether (2008), p. 20-89.
- ↑ Alpert (2008), p. 2-25.
- ↑ Quintiere (2002b), pp. 2-254, 2-257.
- ↑ Cox and Kumar (2002), p. 3-207.
- ↑ Milke and Klote (2008), p. 18-52.
- ↑ Bendelius (2008), p. 21-196.
- ↑ 26.0 26.1 Bendelius (2008), p. 21-204.
- ↑ 27.0 27.1 Bendelius (2008), p. 21-205. The handbook lists Q in MW and Cp in kJ/(kg K); the symbol table uses W and J/(kg·K), which keep the equation dimensionally consistent.
- ↑ Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. B-83.
- ↑ Mawhinney (2008), pp. 16-140–16-141.
- ↑ Mawhinney and Back (2002), p. 4-335.
- ↑ 31.0 31.1 31.2 31.3 31.4 31.5 Peacock (2008), p. 21-104.
- ↑ 32.0 32.1 Bendelius (2008), p. 21-206.
- ↑ Bryan (2008), p. 4-4.
- ↑ Fruin (2008), p. 4-102.
- ↑ 35.0 35.1 35.2 Bukowski (2002), p. 5-230.
- ↑ National Institute of Standards and Technology (2005), p. 219.
- ↑ Peacock (2008), pp. 21-106–21-107.
- ↑ C. J. Wright (2008b), p. 21-114.
- ↑ Hirschler (2008b), p. 18-32.
- ↑ Bukowski (2002), p. 5-228.
- ↑ Bukowski (2002), p. 5-227.
- ↑ Peacock (2008), p. 21-106. Bukowski (2002), p. 5-233, gives the year 2000 for ASTM E2061, Standard Guide for Fire Hazard Assessment of Rail Transportation Vehicles.
References
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