New FSE wiki article: Conveyor fire protection (written by Claude Opus 5.5) |
NFPA wiki: fact-check corrections (written by Claude Opus 5.5) |
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'''Conveyor fire protection''' is the set of measures that prevent, detect and control fires in mechanical conveyors, above all belt conveyors, and stop fire from spreading along them or through the openings they pass. Conveyors and bucket elevators transport bulk and packaged materials in many industries.<ref name="Bouchard-8-35">Bouchard (2008), p. 8-35.</ref> | '''Conveyor fire protection''' is the set of measures that prevent, detect and control fires in mechanical conveyors, above all belt conveyors, and stop fire from spreading along them or through the openings they pass. Conveyors and bucket elevators transport bulk and packaged materials in many industries.<ref name="Bouchard-8-35">Bouchard (2008), p. 8-35.</ref> On coal conveyors, the most common [[Ignition source|ignition source]] is friction between the belt and its rollers, caused by a drive or a stuck idler, or heat from a misaligned belt.<ref name="Dungan-7-7">Dungan (2008b), p. 7-7.</ref> Protection combines fire-retardant belting, maintenance and housekeeping, speed and slippage switches, detection that stops the belt, and automatic sprinkler or water spray systems above and below it.<ref name="Bouchard-8-36">Bouchard (2008), p. 8-36.</ref><ref name="Sheridan-9-182">Sheridan (2008), p. 9-182.</ref><ref name="Dungan-7-7" /> Openings where conveyors pass through fire walls need fire doors with interlocks or water spray curtains.<ref name="Bouchard-8-36" /><ref name="Bouchard-8-37">Bouchard (2008), p. 8-37.</ref> The guidance described here is that of the US ''Fire Protection Handbook'' (2008), which summarises American practice and NFPA documents around 2007–2008, together with test methods from the SFPE Handbook. | ||
== Conveyors and their fire hazards == | == Conveyors and their fire hazards == | ||
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In underground mines, friction between a belt and a drive roller or idler remains a recognised fire cause. L. J. Moore (2008) notes that this hazard had become of renewed concern, despite sequence and slippage switches, as belt haulage replaced rail haulage in older mines.<ref name="Moore-9-213">L. J. Moore (2008), p. 9-213.</ref> Other sources named in the handbook include belt slippage, static electricity and uncontrolled hot work.<ref name="Sheridan-9-182" /> Cutting and welding, smoking and overheated bearings are named for wood-fuel conveyors.<ref name="Dungan-7-10">Dungan (2008b), p. 7-10.</ref> Hot work operations can also ignite rubber conveyor belts in mineral processing plants.<ref name="Moore-9-215" /> | In underground mines, friction between a belt and a drive roller or idler remains a recognised fire cause. L. J. Moore (2008) notes that this hazard had become of renewed concern, despite sequence and slippage switches, as belt haulage replaced rail haulage in older mines.<ref name="Moore-9-213">L. J. Moore (2008), p. 9-213.</ref> Other sources named in the handbook include belt slippage, static electricity and uncontrolled hot work.<ref name="Sheridan-9-182" /> Cutting and welding, smoking and overheated bearings are named for wood-fuel conveyors.<ref name="Dungan-7-10">Dungan (2008b), p. 7-10.</ref> Hot work operations can also ignite rubber conveyor belts in mineral processing plants.<ref name="Moore-9-215" /> | ||
A | A loss table for the coal industry, taken from FM Global Loss Prevention Data Sheet 7-12, shows how these causes compare.<ref name="Moore-9-215" /> Of 24 conveyor belt fires between 1978 and 1999, 6 (25 %) were attributed to open flame, 5 (21 %) to spontaneous ignition and 5 (21 %) to friction. Hot surfaces or radiant heat and overheating accounted for 2 each (8 %), and 4 (17 %) had unknown causes.<ref name="Moore-9-215" /> Friction, overheating and hot surfaces together thus account for 9 of the 24 losses, or 37.5 %. The table covers only 24 losses from one data sheet.<ref name="Moore-9-215" /> Its percentages therefore show the mix of recorded causes rather than general rates. | ||
== Prevention by design and maintenance == | == Prevention by design and maintenance == | ||
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Switches that monitor belt motion are widely used. "Zero speed" or slippage switches shut down the power to the drives if the belt speed falls below a safe threshold.<ref name="Dungan-7-7" /> L. J. Moore (2008) lists slippage and sequence switches on conveyors among the common means of preventing unwanted heat build-up.<ref name="Moore-9-216">L. J. Moore (2008), p. 9-216.</ref> Bucket elevators should likewise be protected against overheating or choking by automatic releases that act on overload or on a drop in operating speed.<ref name="Bouchard-8-38" /> | Switches that monitor belt motion are widely used. "Zero speed" or slippage switches shut down the power to the drives if the belt speed falls below a safe threshold.<ref name="Dungan-7-7" /> L. J. Moore (2008) lists slippage and sequence switches on conveyors among the common means of preventing unwanted heat build-up.<ref name="Moore-9-216">L. J. Moore (2008), p. 9-216.</ref> Bucket elevators should likewise be protected against overheating or choking by automatic releases that act on overload or on a drop in operating speed.<ref name="Bouchard-8-38" /> | ||
The belt material itself can be chosen to reduce the hazard. Fire-retardant or less combustible belts are available, and the importance of a conveyor may justify them.<ref name="Bouchard-8-36" /> Belts that meet the fire resistance standards of the US Mine Safety and Health Administration are harder to ignite than older, non-compliant belts.<ref name="Dungan-7-7" /> In underground mines, fire-resistant conveyor belting | The belt material itself can be chosen to reduce the hazard. Fire-retardant or less combustible belts are available, and the importance of a conveyor may justify them.<ref name="Bouchard-8-36" /> Belts that meet the fire resistance standards of the US Mine Safety and Health Administration are harder to ignite than older, non-compliant belts.<ref name="Dungan-7-7" /> In underground mines, the US rules described by L. J. Moore (2008) require fire-resistant conveyor belting under certain conditions, as well as [[Fire-resistant hydraulic fluid|fire-resistant hydraulic fluids]] and hoses; such belting is preferred in processing buildings.<ref name="Moore-9-216" /> Belt selection does not remove the need for protection, however. Even the best belts become coated with lubricants or coal residue in use, and fire-retardant belts still burn under certain circumstances.<ref name="Dungan-7-7" /><ref name="Sheridan-9-182" /> | ||
Static electricity is controlled by bonding and grounding all machinery and conveyor parts. Bouchard (2008) also names conductive belts, a conductive dressing on the belt and a grounded static collector placed just beyond the point where the belt leaves the pulley.<ref name="Bouchard-8-36" /> Dust is controlled by feeding dusty material through a choke feed, by aspiration to dust collectors and, where clouds cannot be avoided, by enclosed conveyors. Explosion chokes or suppression systems should stop an explosion from propagating along a conveyor between buildings or fire areas.<ref name="Bouchard-8-36" /> Grain facilities also reduce dust by limiting free-fall distances, lowering belt speeds and keeping belt tension adequate.<ref name="Maness-9-101">Maness and Sargent (2008), p. 9-101.</ref> | Static electricity is controlled by bonding and grounding all machinery and conveyor parts. Bouchard (2008) also names conductive belts, a conductive dressing on the belt and a grounded static collector placed just beyond the point where the belt leaves the pulley.<ref name="Bouchard-8-36" /> Dust is controlled by feeding dusty material through a choke feed, by aspiration to dust collectors and, where clouds cannot be avoided, by enclosed conveyors. Explosion chokes or suppression systems should stop an explosion from propagating along a conveyor between buildings or fire areas.<ref name="Bouchard-8-36" /> Grain facilities also reduce dust by limiting free-fall distances, lowering belt speeds and keeping belt tension adequate.<ref name="Maness-9-101">Maness and Sargent (2008), p. 9-101.</ref> | ||
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Bouchard (2008) states that automatic sprinkler or water spray protection is generally needed for important belt conveyors, particularly enclosed ones. Controls should shut down the conveyor when the sprinklers operate.<ref name="Bouchard-8-36" /> Hose streams should be able to reach all parts of the conveyor, for example from 38 mm (1½ in.) hose connections on sprinkler piping or from hydrants.<ref name="Bouchard-8-36" /> The height and route of a conveyor matter. Buildings, temporary structures or trailers next to an overhead conveyor create exposures. A high conveyor is also difficult to reach for manual fire fighting, which may justify automatic protection.<ref name="Bouchard-8-36" /> | Bouchard (2008) states that automatic sprinkler or water spray protection is generally needed for important belt conveyors, particularly enclosed ones. Controls should shut down the conveyor when the sprinklers operate.<ref name="Bouchard-8-36" /> Hose streams should be able to reach all parts of the conveyor, for example from 38 mm (1½ in.) hose connections on sprinkler piping or from hydrants.<ref name="Bouchard-8-36" /> The height and route of a conveyor matter. Buildings, temporary structures or trailers next to an overhead conveyor create exposures. A high conveyor is also difficult to reach for manual fire fighting, which may justify automatic protection.<ref name="Bouchard-8-36" /> | ||
For coal conveyors, the choice of fixed protection depends largely on the housing. Open conveyors within reach of hose streams can be protected manually. Enclosed galleries of light non-combustible construction and underground conveyors make manual fire fighting extremely difficult, so detection and automatic suppression | For coal conveyors, the choice of fixed protection depends largely on the housing. Open conveyors within reach of hose streams can be protected manually. Enclosed galleries of light non-combustible construction and underground conveyors make manual fire fighting extremely difficult, so detection and automatic suppression systems might be desirable.<ref name="Dungan-7-7" /> | ||
Dungan (2008b) describes two approaches. If the conveyor keeps running after a fire is detected, an open-head deluge system must cover the length of the belt, which may mean chasing a moving fire and operating many adjacent systems. Alternatively, thermal detectors shut down the conveyor and closed-head sprinklers operate only in the affected zone. In cold climates this system is often combined with a preaction valve that opens on the same signal that stops the belt.<ref name="Dungan-7-7" /> | Dungan (2008b) describes two approaches. If the conveyor keeps running after a fire is detected, an open-head deluge system must cover the length of the belt, which may mean chasing a moving fire and operating many adjacent systems. Alternatively, thermal detectors shut down the conveyor and closed-head sprinklers operate only in the affected zone. In cold climates this system is often combined with a preaction valve that opens on the same signal that stops the belt.<ref name="Dungan-7-7" /> | ||
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== Openings in fire walls == | == Openings in fire walls == | ||
A conveyor that passes through a fire wall or floor creates an opening that ordinary closures cannot easily seal. Where possible, rerouting the conveyor to avoid the fire wall is preferred.<ref name="Bouchard-8-37" /> Bouchard (2008) calls it a misconception that conveyor openings cannot be protected by fire doors. Interlocks can stop the conveyor with the stock spaced so that nothing blocks the door, or move a hinged or counterweighted conveyor section out of the door's path before release.<ref name="Bouchard-8-37" /> A labelled fire door that is cut out in the field to fit around a conveyor loses its label.<ref name="Bouchard-8-37" /> | A conveyor that passes through a fire wall or floor creates an opening that ordinary closures cannot easily seal. Where possible, rerouting the conveyor to avoid the fire wall is preferred.<ref name="Bouchard-8-37" /> Bouchard (2008) calls it a misconception that conveyor openings cannot be protected by fire doors. Interlocks can stop the conveyor with the stock spaced so that nothing blocks the door, or move a hinged or counterweighted conveyor section out of the door's path before release.<ref name="Bouchard-8-37" /><ref name="Bouchard-8-38" /> A labelled fire door that is cut out in the field to fit around a conveyor loses its label.<ref name="Bouchard-8-37" /> | ||
The handbook lists design guidelines for such openings. The design should be as simple and direct as possible and fail-safe. Any obstruction must be removed from the door's path before the door is released. A clearance of 9.5 mm (⅜ in.) between door and sill should be kept, and a second door or a sprinkler water curtain may be added for reliability.<ref name="Bouchard-8-38" /> Operating tests should be carried out after installation, and fire doors should be closed during idle periods.<ref name="Bouchard-8-38" /> | The handbook lists design guidelines for such openings. The design should be as simple and direct as possible and fail-safe. Any obstruction must be removed from the door's path before the door is released. A clearance of 9.5 mm (⅜ in.) between door and sill should be kept, and a second door or a sprinkler water curtain may be added for reliability.<ref name="Bouchard-8-38" /> Operating tests should be carried out after installation, and fire doors should be closed during idle periods.<ref name="Bouchard-8-38" /> | ||
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== Limits of the guidance == | == Limits of the guidance == | ||
The practices described are those of the 2008 US handbook. They draw on NFPA 850, NFPA 80 and US mining rules, whose editions the handbook does not state.<ref name="Dungan-7-8" /><ref name="Bouchard-8-37" /> NFPA 850 is a recommended practice, and the requirements for fire-resistant belting in US underground mines apply only under certain conditions.<ref name="Moore-9-216" /> The FPI method was developed with specific test apparatus and belt samples, and its threshold of 7 was calibrated against one large-scale gallery.<ref name="Tewarson-3-94" /> The chapter's table also | The practices described are those of the 2008 US handbook. They draw on NFPA 850, NFPA 80 and US mining rules, whose editions the handbook does not state.<ref name="Dungan-7-8" /><ref name="Bouchard-8-37" /> NFPA 850 is a recommended practice, and the requirements for fire-resistant belting in US underground mines apply only under certain conditions.<ref name="Moore-9-216" /> The FPI method was developed with specific test apparatus and belt samples, and its threshold of 7 was calibrated against one large-scale gallery.<ref name="Tewarson-3-94" /> The chapter's table also labels the CR belt (FPI 5) as propagating, which contradicts both its own classification, in which an FPI below 7 means no propagation, and the worked example.<ref name="Tewarson-3-92" /> The classification of a particular belt should therefore rest on test data.<ref name="Tewarson-3-93" /><ref name="Tewarson-3-94" /> | ||
== See also == | == See also == | ||
Revision as of 22:30, 7 November 2026
Conveyor fire protection is the set of measures that prevent, detect and control fires in mechanical conveyors, above all belt conveyors, and stop fire from spreading along them or through the openings they pass. Conveyors and bucket elevators transport bulk and packaged materials in many industries.[1] On coal conveyors, the most common ignition source is friction between the belt and its rollers, caused by a drive or a stuck idler, or heat from a misaligned belt.[2] Protection combines fire-retardant belting, maintenance and housekeeping, speed and slippage switches, detection that stops the belt, and automatic sprinkler or water spray systems above and below it.[3][4][2] Openings where conveyors pass through fire walls need fire doors with interlocks or water spray curtains.[3][5] The guidance described here is that of the US Fire Protection Handbook (2008), which summarises American practice and NFPA documents around 2007–2008, together with test methods from the SFPE Handbook.
Conveyors and their fire hazards
The choice of mechanical conveyor depends on the distance and slope to be covered, the atmosphere and locations along the route, and the properties of the material, such as lump size, density and abrasiveness.[1] Long distances usually require belt conveyors. Screw and en masse conveyors can handle high temperatures that rule out belts, and bucket elevators handle large vertical lifts. Dusty materials need equipment that can be adequately enclosed.[1] Bouchard (2008) lists location, housekeeping, temperature, dust and the conveyed material as the main fire protection considerations. Protection of openings and control of static electricity need attention when a conveyor is designed and installed.[3]
Belt conveyors have clear temperature limits. The upper limit for most belts is 93 °C (200 °F), and their use is normally restricted to atmospheres below 65 °C (150 °F).[3] Rubber belts show the highest rate of flame propagation, although the ignition characteristics of neoprene, rubber and polyvinyl chloride (PVC) differ little. For this reason most belts are unsuitable for hot or molten materials.[3] Belts made of fabric-reinforced rubber or synthetics can burn with high heat release rates and dense smoke.[2] The fire properties of these rubber and elastomer belts are treated further below.
The conveyed material adds its own hazard. On coal conveyors, burning coal can be carried through the plant and cause widespread damage.[2] Dusty materials create dust clouds at inlet and discharge points and along long chutes.[3] Grain belt conveyors are used for large capacities, often more than 700 m³/h (20,000 bushels per hour) and up to 2,800 m³/h (80,000 bushels per hour) at large export elevators. Their fire hazards are the combustible rubber belting, dust released at transfer points and mechanical failure due to poor maintenance.[6] In grain elevators, conveyor belting fires are described as difficult to deal with because of their intensity and the amount of smoke and vapours they produce.[7]
Conveyors are widely used in mining and mineral processing, from rubber belt haulage underground to the belts of concentrator mills and coal preparation plants.[8][9] L. J. Moore (2008) states that rubber conveyor belts, especially in coal handling facilities, continue to be a major cause of fire loss in the mining industry.[10] In January 2006, a rubber belt conveyor fire in the underground Alma coal mine in West Virginia caused two deaths and forced the rescue of many other miners.[11] Such events are a form of mine fire.
Above ground, one of the largest coal-handling fires in a 30-year US study began with a dust explosion in a crusher building. The fire burned several thousand feet of conveyor belt and caused $35.42 million in damage (2007 dollars) and a four-month outage. There were no fixed automatic suppression systems.[12]
Ignition sources
Friction is the classic cause of conveyor fires. Heat can build up from accumulated grease and dirt and from defective or unlubricated parts, especially rollers and bearings, on conveyors for raw cotton, grain, powders and coal.[13] On coal conveyors, Dungan (2008b) names friction between belt and rollers as the most common ignition source, caused either by a drive or by a stuck idler. Misalignment or misadjustment of a belt can also generate enough heat to ignite the belt or the coal.[2] Fires caused by hot idlers often appear only after a transfer operation has been shut down, when the stationary belt stays in contact with the hot idler.[2]
In underground mines, friction between a belt and a drive roller or idler remains a recognised fire cause. L. J. Moore (2008) notes that this hazard had become of renewed concern, despite sequence and slippage switches, as belt haulage replaced rail haulage in older mines.[14] Other sources named in the handbook include belt slippage, static electricity and uncontrolled hot work.[4] Cutting and welding, smoking and overheated bearings are named for wood-fuel conveyors.[15] Hot work operations can also ignite rubber conveyor belts in mineral processing plants.[10]
A loss table for the coal industry, taken from FM Global Loss Prevention Data Sheet 7-12, shows how these causes compare.[10] Of 24 conveyor belt fires between 1978 and 1999, 6 (25 %) were attributed to open flame, 5 (21 %) to spontaneous ignition and 5 (21 %) to friction. Hot surfaces or radiant heat and overheating accounted for 2 each (8 %), and 4 (17 %) had unknown causes.[10] Friction, overheating and hot surfaces together thus account for 9 of the 24 losses, or 37.5 %. The table covers only 24 losses from one data sheet.[10] Its percentages therefore show the mix of recorded causes rather than general rates.
Prevention by design and maintenance
The simplest prevention measure is to remove the heat source. Bouchard (2008) describes friction as a common hazard that is easily reduced by patrolling belts, frequent inspection and regular removal of dirt and grease. Early replacement of old and worn parts and a plant preventive maintenance programme complete these measures.[13] Dust that collects on rollers and bearings increases friction and can cause excessive temperatures. A seized roller can generate enough heat for ignition or produce a static charge.[3]
Switches that monitor belt motion are widely used. "Zero speed" or slippage switches shut down the power to the drives if the belt speed falls below a safe threshold.[2] L. J. Moore (2008) lists slippage and sequence switches on conveyors among the common means of preventing unwanted heat build-up.[16] Bucket elevators should likewise be protected against overheating or choking by automatic releases that act on overload or on a drop in operating speed.[13]
The belt material itself can be chosen to reduce the hazard. Fire-retardant or less combustible belts are available, and the importance of a conveyor may justify them.[3] Belts that meet the fire resistance standards of the US Mine Safety and Health Administration are harder to ignite than older, non-compliant belts.[2] In underground mines, the US rules described by L. J. Moore (2008) require fire-resistant conveyor belting under certain conditions, as well as fire-resistant hydraulic fluids and hoses; such belting is preferred in processing buildings.[16] Belt selection does not remove the need for protection, however. Even the best belts become coated with lubricants or coal residue in use, and fire-retardant belts still burn under certain circumstances.[2][4]
Static electricity is controlled by bonding and grounding all machinery and conveyor parts. Bouchard (2008) also names conductive belts, a conductive dressing on the belt and a grounded static collector placed just beyond the point where the belt leaves the pulley.[3] Dust is controlled by feeding dusty material through a choke feed, by aspiration to dust collectors and, where clouds cannot be avoided, by enclosed conveyors. Explosion chokes or suppression systems should stop an explosion from propagating along a conveyor between buildings or fire areas.[3] Grain facilities also reduce dust by limiting free-fall distances, lowering belt speeds and keeping belt tension adequate.[17]
Fire propagation along belts
Whether a fire on a belt dies out near the ignition point or spreads along the conveyor is the central question for belt selection. Tewarson (2002) describes a small-scale method that classifies materials by their tendency to propagate fire under highly radiating flames. The upward fire propagation test is run in the ASTM E2058 fire propagation apparatus, in air enriched to an oxygen mass fraction of 0.40 to simulate the flame radiation of large fires.[18] The fire propagation index (FPI) combines two measured quantities. The first is the thermal response parameter (TRP), which describes how quickly the material ignites under an external heat flux. The second is the chemical heat release rate per unit width during upward fire spread.[18]
| Symbol | Description | Unit |
|---|---|---|
| FPI | Fire propagation index | (m/s1/2)/(kW/m)2/3 |
| Chemical heat release rate per unit width of the sample during upward fire propagation | kW/m | |
| TRP | Thermal response parameter of the material | kW·s1/2/m² |
Tewarson (2002) groups materials by FPI. Below 7 a material is non-propagating, and the flame stays at the critical extinction condition in the ignition zone. Between 7 and 10 the fire propagates beyond the ignition zone but decelerates. Between 10 and 20 it spreads slowly without accelerating, and above 20 it accelerates rapidly.[18] For vertical belt samples about 600 mm long and 100 mm wide, an FPI of 7 or less matched the belts with limited fire propagation in the US Bureau of Mines test gallery.[19] A conveyor belt standard based on this method was being developed at Factory Mutual Research when the chapter was written.[19]
Tewarson (2002) works an example with two belts. Belts are made of woven layers or piles of elastomers such as styrene-butadiene rubber (SBR), polychloroprene rubber (CR) or PVC, reinforced with polymer fibres such as nylon.[19] In tunnel tests a CR belt did not propagate fire, whereas a CR/SBR belt did. In small-scale tests the CR belt had a TRP of 760 kW·s1/2/m² and a peak chemical heat release rate of 114 kW/m. The CR/SBR belt had 400 kW·s1/2/m² and 73 kW/m.[19]
For the CR belt, FPI = 750 × 1141/3/760 = 750 × 4.85/760 ≈ 4.8. For the CR/SBR belt, FPI = 750 × 731/3/400 = 750 × 4.18/400 ≈ 7.8.[19] Tewarson (2002) rounds these results to 5 and 8. The CR belt falls below the limit of 7 and the CR/SBR belt above it, which agrees with the large-scale behaviour.[19]
The same equation shows what the CR/SBR belt would have needed. With its heat release rate of 73 kW/m, a TRP of about 450 kW·s1/2/m² would have brought its FPI down to 7. The chapter's table lists FPI values of 8 to 11 for SBR belts, 5 for CR, 8 for CR/SBR and 4 to 10 for PVC belts 3 to 25 mm thick.[20]
Detection, suppression and stopping the belt
Bouchard (2008) states that automatic sprinkler or water spray protection is generally needed for important belt conveyors, particularly enclosed ones. Controls should shut down the conveyor when the sprinklers operate.[3] Hose streams should be able to reach all parts of the conveyor, for example from 38 mm (1½ in.) hose connections on sprinkler piping or from hydrants.[3] The height and route of a conveyor matter. Buildings, temporary structures or trailers next to an overhead conveyor create exposures. A high conveyor is also difficult to reach for manual fire fighting, which may justify automatic protection.[3]
For coal conveyors, the choice of fixed protection depends largely on the housing. Open conveyors within reach of hose streams can be protected manually. Enclosed galleries of light non-combustible construction and underground conveyors make manual fire fighting extremely difficult, so detection and automatic suppression systems might be desirable.[2]
Dungan (2008b) describes two approaches. If the conveyor keeps running after a fire is detected, an open-head deluge system must cover the length of the belt, which may mean chasing a moving fire and operating many adjacent systems. Alternatively, thermal detectors shut down the conveyor and closed-head sprinklers operate only in the affected zone. In cold climates this system is often combined with a preaction valve that opens on the same signal that stops the belt.[2]
Dungan (2008b) concludes that the best approach is to stop the belts on a fire signal, whichever system is used.[21] Where conveyors are on several levels, or coal can collect beneath the belt, the suppression should cover both above and below the belt.[21] Sheridan (2008) gives the same rule for power stations: an automatic sprinkler or water spray system protects the areas above and below the belt. Crusher buildings, transfer buildings and tripper galleries also need automatic sprinkler or water spray protection.[4][12] Wood-fuel and bark conveyors are likewise interlocked to shut down when the sprinkler or detection system operates.[22] Coal conveyors are the link between receiving, coal storage and the processing equipment of such plants.[2]
In mines and mineral processing plants, thermal fire detection is commonly installed over conveyor belts, belt drives, take-ups and other unattended equipment.[23] Manual or automatic suppression systems were becoming more common at conveyor belt drives.[23] Sprinklers are commonly provided over rubber belt conveyor systems in processing plants where construction is combustible and values or production justify them.[24] Methane detection and ventilation are installed in coal conveyor tunnels where the gas may be present.[25] The NUREG-1805 report lists conveyor tunnels and coal handling equipment tunnels among the areas where foam can be used to extinguish fires.[26]
Once a belt fire has started, it is hard to stop. In grain facilities, belting fires are difficult to put out and need large amounts of water. If such a fire cannot be extinguished, the belt can be cut and dropped to isolate the fire and stop it spreading.[7]
Openings in fire walls
A conveyor that passes through a fire wall or floor creates an opening that ordinary closures cannot easily seal. Where possible, rerouting the conveyor to avoid the fire wall is preferred.[5] Bouchard (2008) calls it a misconception that conveyor openings cannot be protected by fire doors. Interlocks can stop the conveyor with the stock spaced so that nothing blocks the door, or move a hinged or counterweighted conveyor section out of the door's path before release.[5][13] A labelled fire door that is cut out in the field to fit around a conveyor loses its label.[5]
The handbook lists design guidelines for such openings. The design should be as simple and direct as possible and fail-safe. Any obstruction must be removed from the door's path before the door is released. A clearance of 9.5 mm (⅜ in.) between door and sill should be kept, and a second door or a sprinkler water curtain may be added for reliability.[13] Operating tests should be carried out after installation, and fire doors should be closed during idle periods.[13]
Where fire doors or shutters are impractical, directed water spray nozzles can protect the opening. With suitable nozzle design and water pressure, the pressure effect of the spray overcomes the draft caused by the temperature difference across the wall, unless adverse air currents prevail.[3][5] Because the cooling effect depends on how long hot gases are exposed to the spray, a non-combustible enclosure around the opening increases heat absorption. For floor openings, the handbook shows a non-combustible enclosure 1.5 to 1.8 m (5 to 6 ft) high, with nozzles inclined no more than 30 degrees. A draft curtain 0.5 to 0.75 m (20 to 30 inches) deep hangs below the floor.[5]
Limits of the guidance
The practices described are those of the 2008 US handbook. They draw on NFPA 850, NFPA 80 and US mining rules, whose editions the handbook does not state.[21][5] NFPA 850 is a recommended practice, and the requirements for fire-resistant belting in US underground mines apply only under certain conditions.[16] The FPI method was developed with specific test apparatus and belt samples, and its threshold of 7 was calibrated against one large-scale gallery.[19] The chapter's table also labels the CR belt (FPI 5) as propagating, which contradicts both its own classification, in which an FPI below 7 means no propagation, and the worked example.[18] The classification of a particular belt should therefore rest on test data.[20][19]
See also
- Dust explosion
- Dust collector
- Pneumatic conveying system
- Spark detection and extinguishing system
- Explosion isolation
- Deluge system
Notes
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 Bouchard (2008), p. 8-35.
- ↑ 2.00 2.01 2.02 2.03 2.04 2.05 2.06 2.07 2.08 2.09 2.10 2.11 Dungan (2008b), p. 7-7.
- ↑ 3.00 3.01 3.02 3.03 3.04 3.05 3.06 3.07 3.08 3.09 3.10 3.11 3.12 3.13 Bouchard (2008), p. 8-36.
- ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 Sheridan (2008), p. 9-182.
- ↑ 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 Bouchard (2008), p. 8-37.
- ↑ Maness and Sargent (2008), p. 9-88.
- ↑ 7.0 7.1 Maness and Sargent (2008), p. 9-93.
- ↑ L. J. Moore (2008), p. 9-203.
- ↑ L. J. Moore (2008), p. 9-214.
- ↑ 10.0 10.1 10.2 10.3 10.4 L. J. Moore (2008), p. 9-215.
- ↑ L. J. Moore (2008), p. 9-212.
- ↑ 12.0 12.1 Sheridan (2008), p. 9-183.
- ↑ 13.0 13.1 13.2 13.3 13.4 13.5 Bouchard (2008), p. 8-38.
- ↑ L. J. Moore (2008), p. 9-213.
- ↑ Dungan (2008b), p. 7-10.
- ↑ 16.0 16.1 16.2 L. J. Moore (2008), p. 9-216.
- ↑ Maness and Sargent (2008), p. 9-101.
- ↑ 18.0 18.1 18.2 18.3 Tewarson (2002), p. 3-92.
- ↑ 19.0 19.1 19.2 19.3 19.4 19.5 19.6 19.7 Tewarson (2002), p. 3-94.
- ↑ 20.0 20.1 Tewarson (2002), p. 3-93.
- ↑ 21.0 21.1 21.2 Dungan (2008b), p. 7-8.
- ↑ Dungan (2008b), p. 7-11.
- ↑ 23.0 23.1 L. J. Moore (2008), p. 9-218.
- ↑ L. J. Moore (2008), p. 9-219.
- ↑ L. J. Moore (2008), p. 9-217.
- ↑ Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. B-61.
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