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'''Oxy-fuel gas cutting''' ('''OFC''') is a group of thermal cutting processes that sever metal by the reaction of high-purity oxygen with the hot metal. The torch burns a fuel gas with oxygen and also provides the jet of cutting oxygen.<ref name="MB-9-77">Manz and Blank (2008), p. 9-77.</ref> The processes are named after the fuel gas, as in oxy-acetylene cutting (OFC-A) and oxy-natural gas cutting (OFC-N). Burning iron in oxygen produces iron oxide, which melts below the melting point of the steel and runs off as slag.<ref name="MB-9-77" /> | '''Oxy-fuel gas cutting''' ('''OFC''') is a group of thermal cutting processes that sever metal by the reaction of high-purity oxygen with the hot metal. The torch burns a fuel gas with oxygen and also provides the jet of cutting oxygen.<ref name="MB-9-77">Manz and Blank (2008), p. 9-77.</ref> The processes are named after the fuel gas, as in oxy-acetylene cutting (OFC-A) and oxy-natural gas cutting (OFC-N). Burning iron in oxygen produces iron oxide, which melts below the melting point of the steel and runs off as slag.<ref name="MB-9-77" /> | ||
For fire safety, oxy-fuel gas cutting is a common form of [[ | For fire safety, oxy-fuel gas cutting is a common form of [[hot work]]. The ''Fire Protection Handbook'' (2008) describes the sparks from cutting, particularly oxy-fuel gas cutting, as generally more hazardous than those from welding, because they are more numerous and travel greater distances.<ref name="MB-9-79">Manz and Blank (2008), p. 9-79.</ref> The process also brings pressurised fuel gas and oxygen into the work area.<ref name="MB-9-77" /> Torch fires accounted for 1 percent of reported US structure fires in 1999–2002, but for 7 percent in industrial and manufacturing properties.<ref name="MB-9-73">Manz and Blank (2008), p. 9-73.</ref> The precautions summarised here are those of US practice around 2007–2008, mainly NFPA 51B as described in the 2008 handbook. | ||
== Definition and principle == | == Definition and principle == | ||
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== Equipment and fuel gases == | == Equipment and fuel gases == | ||
The basic equipment consists of a fuel gas supply, an oxygen supply, a pressure regulator for each, hoses or piping, and a torch. The torch mixes and burns the gases and provides the cutting oxygen jet.<ref name="MB-9-77" /> In its simplest form, the outfit is one [[ | The basic equipment consists of a fuel gas supply, an oxygen supply, a pressure regulator for each, hoses or piping, and a torch. The torch mixes and burns the gases and provides the cutting oxygen jet.<ref name="MB-9-77" /> In its simplest form, the outfit is one [[compressed gas cylinder]] of each gas on a cylinder truck. A steel mill can instead draw fuel gas from multicylinder manifolds, liquefied fuel tanks or the public gas main, and oxygen from its own oxygen plant, through a fixed piping network.<ref name="MB-9-77" /> A cutting torch resembles a welding torch, but it has separate passageways and valves for the cutting oxygen jet at the centre of the tip. Mechanised cutting is common, from simple portable machines to multitorch machines that trace shapes electronically.<ref name="MB-9-78">Manz and Blank (2008), p. 9-78.</ref> | ||
[[File:fse-oxy-fuel-gas-cutting-v1.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Fuel gas and oxygen cylinders with regulators, hoses and a cutting torch producing a preheat flame and oxygen jet|Basic oxy-fuel gas cutting outfit: one cylinder of each gas, a regulator on each, hoses and a cutting torch.]] | |||
Protective devices on the piping, as described in NFPA 51, | Protective devices on the piping, as described in NFPA 51, should prevent three events. These are backflow of oxygen into the fuel gas system and of fuel gas into the oxygen system, flame flashback into the fuel gas supply, and pressures above the ratings of the components. Backflow devices may also be required at station outlets.<ref name="MB-9-78" /> Lemoff (2008) gives the reason: piping systems that deliver both oxygen and a flammable gas can develop gas-oxygen mixtures inadvertently. In an oxygen-fuel gas metal cutting system, special backflow prevention devices are installed to prevent such mixtures in containers.<ref name="Lemoff-6-173">Lemoff (2008), p. 6-173.</ref> | ||
[[Acetylene]] is used primarily in chemical processing and as the fuel gas in oxygen-fuel gas cutting and welding.<ref name="Lemoff-6-177">Lemoff (2008), p. 6-177.</ref> It remains the preferred welding fuel because it has the highest flame temperature of the fuel gases. Other hydrocarbons such as propane, propylene, butane and natural gas are not suitable for welding ferrous metals.<ref name="MB-9-76" /> The neutral flame temperatures that Manz and Blank (2008) list for common fuel gases burning with oxygen are given below. | [[Acetylene]] is used primarily in chemical processing and as the fuel gas in oxygen-fuel gas cutting and welding.<ref name="Lemoff-6-177">Lemoff (2008), p. 6-177.</ref> It remains the preferred welding fuel because it has the highest flame temperature of the fuel gases. Other hydrocarbons such as propane, propylene, butane and natural gas are not suitable for welding ferrous metals.<ref name="MB-9-76" /> The neutral flame temperatures that Manz and Blank (2008) list for common fuel gases burning with oxygen are given below. | ||
[[File:fse-oxy-fuel-gas-cutting-v3.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Bar chart of neutral flame temperatures with oxygen, acetylene highest at 3,087 °C and propane lowest at 2,526 °C|Neutral flame temperatures of fuel gases burning with oxygen.]] | |||
{| class="wikitable" | {| class="wikitable" | ||
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Cutting produces literally thousands of ignition sources in the form of sparks and hot slag.<ref name="MB-9-74" /> The sparks from oxy-fuel gas cutting are, in a sense, jet-propelled by the oxygen stream.<ref name="MB-9-79" /> Sparks and molten slag can fly or roll long distances and ignite hidden combustibles such as wall insulation, dust or lint above suspended ceilings, or flammable vapours in an adjacent area. They can fall into openings that are not easily seen or be drawn into ductwork, where combustibles can smoulder undetected for hours before breaking out into fire.<ref name="MB-9-74" /> Sparks that fall through cracks in floors and partitions can ignite combustibles if they have enough mass to retain heat for a time.<ref name="MB-9-79" /> | Cutting produces literally thousands of ignition sources in the form of sparks and hot slag.<ref name="MB-9-74" /> The sparks from oxy-fuel gas cutting are, in a sense, jet-propelled by the oxygen stream.<ref name="MB-9-79" /> Sparks and molten slag can fly or roll long distances and ignite hidden combustibles such as wall insulation, dust or lint above suspended ceilings, or flammable vapours in an adjacent area. They can fall into openings that are not easily seen or be drawn into ductwork, where combustibles can smoulder undetected for hours before breaking out into fire.<ref name="MB-9-74" /> Sparks that fall through cracks in floors and partitions can ignite combustibles if they have enough mass to retain heat for a time.<ref name="MB-9-79" /> | ||
The flame itself, the hot workpiece and the sections cut from it are inherent and obvious ignition sources.<ref name="MB-9-79" /> Heat conducted along pipes or other metal can ignite combustible walls, partitions, ceilings or roofs in contact with them.<ref name="MB-9-80">Manz and Blank (2008), p. 9-80.</ref> Each [[ | [[File:fse-oxy-fuel-gas-cutting-v5.jpg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Worker in protective clothing cutting a steel plate with an oxy-fuel torch, with a wide shower of sparks|Sparks from oxy-fuel gas cutting are numerous and travel long distances, propelled by the oxygen jet.]] | ||
The flame itself, the hot workpiece and the sections cut from it are inherent and obvious ignition sources.<ref name="MB-9-79" /> Heat conducted along pipes or other metal can ignite combustible walls, partitions, ceilings or roofs in contact with them.<ref name="MB-9-80">Manz and Blank (2008), p. 9-80.</ref> Each [[ignition source]] described here comes with the process itself. Manz and Blank (2008) therefore point out that two sides of the fire triangle, ignition and air, are always present, so that the combustible material is the element left to control.<ref name="MB-9-74" /> | |||
The gases add their own hazards. Oxygen is a far more powerful oxidiser than air: materials that burn in air burn violently in pure oxygen and explosively in pressurised oxygen. Oxygen equipment must therefore be kept free of oil and grease, and reserved for oxygen service.<ref name="MB-9-78" /> Oxygen must never be used to cool a worker, ventilate a confined space or dust off clothing, because oxygen-saturated clothing can burn in a flash with fatal results.<ref name="MB-9-82">Manz and Blank (2008), p. 9-82.</ref> | The gases add their own hazards. Oxygen is a far more powerful oxidiser than air: materials that burn in air burn violently in pure oxygen and explosively in pressurised oxygen. Oxygen equipment must therefore be kept free of oil and grease, and reserved for oxygen service.<ref name="MB-9-78" /> Oxygen must never be used to cool a worker, ventilate a confined space or dust off clothing, because oxygen-saturated clothing can burn in a flash with fatal results.<ref name="MB-9-82">Manz and Blank (2008), p. 9-82.</ref> | ||
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The six welding and cutting bins at power have frequencies of 1.6 × 10⁻³, 9.7 × 10⁻³, 2.0 × 10⁻³, 4.9 × 10⁻³, 1.6 × 10⁻³ and 8.2 × 10⁻³ per reactor-year.<ref name="Nowlen-6-3" /> As a worked example, their sum is 2.8 × 10⁻² per reactor-year, or about one such fire per 36 reactor-years. Over an assumed 10 reactor-years, the expected number is 10 × 0.028 = 0.28 fires. The three bins for transient fires caused by welding and cutting make up 81 percent of the total. The generic values cover welding and cutting together and do not separate oxy-fuel gas cutting from arc processes. | The six welding and cutting bins at power have frequencies of 1.6 × 10⁻³, 9.7 × 10⁻³, 2.0 × 10⁻³, 4.9 × 10⁻³, 1.6 × 10⁻³ and 8.2 × 10⁻³ per reactor-year.<ref name="Nowlen-6-3" /> As a worked example, their sum is 2.8 × 10⁻² per reactor-year, or about one such fire per 36 reactor-years. Over an assumed 10 reactor-years, the expected number is 10 × 0.028 = 0.28 fires. The three bins for transient fires caused by welding and cutting make up 81 percent of the total. The generic values cover welding and cutting together and do not separate oxy-fuel gas cutting from arc processes. The 2005 sum leaves out bin 3, the containment of pressurised water reactors (2.0 × 10⁻³ per reactor-year), because that bin combines transient fires and hot work, with a hot-work fraction of 0.56.<ref name="Nowlen-6-3" /> | ||
[[File:fse-oxy-fuel-gas-cutting-v4.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Grouped bars of cable and transient welding-and-cutting fire frequencies for three plant locations|Generic frequencies of fires caused by welding and cutting in US nuclear plant fire PRA, by location and fire type.]] | |||
In 2010, Supplement 1 to NUREG/CR-6850 accepted revised means for best-estimate NFPA 805 fire PRAs, with sensitivity analysis using the 2005 frequencies.<ref name="Hyslop-10-3">Hyslop et al. (2010), pp. 10-2–10-4.</ref> For the same six bins, the revised means were 1.25 × 10⁻³, 2.46 × 10⁻³, 9.43 × 10⁻⁴, 3.65 × 10⁻³, 4.50 × 10⁻⁴ and 7.55 × 10⁻³ per reactor-year.<ref name="Hyslop-10-3" /> Adding them gives about 1.6 × 10⁻² per reactor-year, or one event per 61 reactor-years. | |||
== Precautions in US practice == | == Precautions in US practice == | ||
Manz and Blank (2008) organise their minimum recommended combustible control around a work area of 10.7 m (35 ft) around the point of cutting. Their paraphrase of NFPA 51B uses the same distance.<ref name="MB-9-79" /><ref name="MB-9-80" /> Combustibles should be moved at least that far away, with no openings in walls, ceilings or floors within that radius. Where combustibles lie within a sphere of that radius, cutting that could throw sparks upwards or downwards needs particular care. If the work cannot be moved to a safe location, the exposed combustibles are protected by fire-resistant guards and a trained fire watcher is provided.<ref name="MB-9-79" /> | |||
[[File:fse-oxy-fuel-gas-cutting-v2.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Section through a building with a cutting operation, a 10.7 m radius zone and sparks falling through floor openings|The 10.7 m (35 ft) zone around a cutting or welding operation, with typical routes for sparks and slag.]] | |||
Combustible floors are shielded with wet sand, listed hot work blankets or sheet metal. Duct openings are blocked, openings are filled with non-combustible or fire-stop material, and doors around the area are closed.<ref name="MB-9-80" /> For a sense of scale, a 10.7 m radius covers a floor area of about 358 m². | Combustible floors are shielded with wet sand, listed hot work blankets or sheet metal. Duct openings are blocked, openings are filled with non-combustible or fire-stop material, and doors around the area are closed.<ref name="MB-9-80" /> For a sense of scale, a 10.7 m radius covers a floor area of about 358 m². | ||
Responsibility is shared. Management must designate areas for hot work or a permit-authorising individual (PAI), who checks the site, has combustibles moved or shielded and issues a written hot work permit.<ref name="MB-9-80" /> Hot work must not take place in flammable atmospheres or on metal walls or roofs with combustible covering or combustible sandwich panel construction.<ref name="MB-9-80" /> Equipment that has contained combustible dusts, flammable liquids or gases | Responsibility is shared. Management must designate areas for hot work or a permit-authorising individual (PAI), who checks the site, has combustibles moved or shielded and issues a written hot work permit.<ref name="MB-9-80" /> Hot work must not take place in flammable atmospheres or on metal walls or roofs with combustible covering or combustible sandwich panel construction.<ref name="MB-9-80" /> Equipment that has contained combustible dusts, flammable liquids or gases should be shut down, cleaned and purged before hot work is authorised.<ref name="MB-9-80" /> Snyder (2008) describes the permit as a tool for three steps: recognition, evaluation and control of the hazard.<ref name="Snyder-12-188" /> | ||
A [[ | A [[fire watch]] is required where a significant fire could develop, where appreciable quantities of shielded combustibles lie within 10.7 m (35 ft), or where openings expose combustibles in adjacent areas.<ref name="MB-9-80" /> Where no fire watcher is posted, the work area and adjacent areas should be checked for at least half an hour after the work to find smouldering fires. The time should be extended when conditions seem more hazardous.<ref name="MB-9-81" /> Snyder (2008) applies the 30-minute check to the floors above and below as well. When oxyacetylene equipment is not in use, the gas should be turned off at the cylinder valve.<ref name="Snyder-12-188" /> McDaniel (2008) gives the same minimum of 30 minutes of fire watch after torches have been used in libraries and museums.<ref name="McDaniel-20-185">McDaniel (2008), p. 20-185.</ref> | ||
The equipment itself is part of the precautions. Cylinders | The equipment itself is part of the precautions. Cylinders should always be supported so that they cannot be knocked over, since ruptured cylinders can explode. Outfits should be leak-tested periodically, especially at hose connections, and taped hose repairs are unacceptable.<ref name="MB-9-79" /> At trade shows and exhibitions, the fire department must be notified in advance and gas cylinders must be charged to no more than one-half of their maximum permissible content.<ref name="MB-9-81" /><ref name="MB-9-82" /> Hot tapping, the welding or cutting of a pipeline that still contains flammable gas or liquid, may only be done by specially trained staff using recognised methods.<ref name="MB-9-81" /> | ||
== Limits and related issues == | == Limits and related issues == | ||
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* Dungan, K. W. (2008a). Automatic fire detectors. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), ''Fire protection handbook'' (20th ed., pp. 14-15–14-28). National Fire Protection Association. | * Dungan, K. W. (2008a). Automatic fire detectors. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), ''Fire protection handbook'' (20th ed., pp. 14-15–14-28). National Fire Protection Association. | ||
* Grill, R. A. (2008). Motion picture and television studios and soundstages. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), ''Fire protection handbook'' (20th ed., pp. 20-211–20-215). National Fire Protection Association. | * Grill, R. A. (2008). Motion picture and television studios and soundstages. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), ''Fire protection handbook'' (20th ed., pp. 20-211–20-215). National Fire Protection Association. | ||
* Hyslop, J. S., Kratchman, J., Siu, N., Afshar, C., Najafi, B., Joglar, F., Li, Y., Henneke, D., & Warner, M. (2010). ''Fire probabilistic risk assessment methods enhancements: Supplement 1 to NUREG/CR-6850 and EPRI 1011989'' (NUREG/CR-6850, Supplement 1; EPRI 1019259). Electric Power Research Institute; U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research. | |||
* Iqbal, N., & Salley, M. H. (2004). ''Fire Dynamics Tools (FDTs): Quantitative fire hazard analysis methods for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Fire Protection Inspection Program'' (NUREG-1805). U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. | * Iqbal, N., & Salley, M. H. (2004). ''Fire Dynamics Tools (FDTs): Quantitative fire hazard analysis methods for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Fire Protection Inspection Program'' (NUREG-1805). U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. | ||
* Lemoff, T. C. (2008). Gases. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), ''Fire protection handbook'' (20th ed., pp. 6-165–6-186). National Fire Protection Association. | * Lemoff, T. C. (2008). Gases. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), ''Fire protection handbook'' (20th ed., pp. 6-165–6-186). National Fire Protection Association. | ||
Latest revision as of 00:45, 16 November 2026
Oxy-fuel gas cutting (OFC) is a group of thermal cutting processes that sever metal by the reaction of high-purity oxygen with the hot metal. The torch burns a fuel gas with oxygen and also provides the jet of cutting oxygen.[1] The processes are named after the fuel gas, as in oxy-acetylene cutting (OFC-A) and oxy-natural gas cutting (OFC-N). Burning iron in oxygen produces iron oxide, which melts below the melting point of the steel and runs off as slag.[1]
For fire safety, oxy-fuel gas cutting is a common form of hot work. The Fire Protection Handbook (2008) describes the sparks from cutting, particularly oxy-fuel gas cutting, as generally more hazardous than those from welding, because they are more numerous and travel greater distances.[2] The process also brings pressurised fuel gas and oxygen into the work area.[1] Torch fires accounted for 1 percent of reported US structure fires in 1999–2002, but for 7 percent in industrial and manufacturing properties.[3] The precautions summarised here are those of US practice around 2007–2008, mainly NFPA 51B as described in the 2008 handbook.
Definition and principle
Neither the SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering nor Introduction to Fire Safety Engineering defines oxy-fuel gas cutting. The definition above is the one given by Manz and Blank (2008), whose process descriptions are adapted from publications of the American Welding Society.[4] The metal is not simply melted. It is burned in the oxygen jet at elevated temperature, and the iron oxide formed melts and runs off as slag.[1] A variant, oxy-fuel gas gouging, uses a relatively low-velocity oxygen jet to cut a smooth, well-defined groove in a metal surface.[1]
Oxy-fuel gas cutting belongs to a family of oxy-fuel gas processes that also includes welding, brazing, surfacing and heating operations such as flame descaling and bending.[1] It differs from arc cutting, in which an electric arc melts the metal. In air carbon arc cutting, the molten metal is blown away by compressed air at about 550 kPa (80 psi). Plasma arc cutting uses an extremely hot jet of ionised gas at high velocity.[5] All these processes fall under the NFPA 51B definition of hot work as "work involving burning, welding, or a similar operation that is capable of initiating fires or explosions".[3]
Equipment and fuel gases
The basic equipment consists of a fuel gas supply, an oxygen supply, a pressure regulator for each, hoses or piping, and a torch. The torch mixes and burns the gases and provides the cutting oxygen jet.[1] In its simplest form, the outfit is one compressed gas cylinder of each gas on a cylinder truck. A steel mill can instead draw fuel gas from multicylinder manifolds, liquefied fuel tanks or the public gas main, and oxygen from its own oxygen plant, through a fixed piping network.[1] A cutting torch resembles a welding torch, but it has separate passageways and valves for the cutting oxygen jet at the centre of the tip. Mechanised cutting is common, from simple portable machines to multitorch machines that trace shapes electronically.[6]
Protective devices on the piping, as described in NFPA 51, should prevent three events. These are backflow of oxygen into the fuel gas system and of fuel gas into the oxygen system, flame flashback into the fuel gas supply, and pressures above the ratings of the components. Backflow devices may also be required at station outlets.[6] Lemoff (2008) gives the reason: piping systems that deliver both oxygen and a flammable gas can develop gas-oxygen mixtures inadvertently. In an oxygen-fuel gas metal cutting system, special backflow prevention devices are installed to prevent such mixtures in containers.[7]
Acetylene is used primarily in chemical processing and as the fuel gas in oxygen-fuel gas cutting and welding.[8] It remains the preferred welding fuel because it has the highest flame temperature of the fuel gases. Other hydrocarbons such as propane, propylene, butane and natural gas are not suitable for welding ferrous metals.[5] The neutral flame temperatures that Manz and Blank (2008) list for common fuel gases burning with oxygen are given below.
| Fuel gas | °C | °F |
|---|---|---|
| Acetylene | 3,087 | 5,589 |
| Methyl acetylene-propadiene (stabilised) | 2,927 | 5,301 |
| Propylene | 2,900 | 5,250 |
| Hydrogen | 2,660 | 4,820 |
| Natural gas (methane) | 2,538 | 4,600 |
| Propane | 2,526 | 4,579 |
A neutral flame has neither excess oxygen (an oxidising flame) nor excess fuel gas (a carburising flame). Except for acetylene, neutral flame temperatures are much lower than the maximum temperatures of the gases, and at their maximum the flames are strongly oxidising.[5] A US nuclear guidance document gives about 3,500 °C for the hottest part of an oxygen-acetylene torch flame, against about 1,600 °C for a Bunsen burner, because the extra oxygen raises the flame temperature.[9] Babrauskas (2008b) notes that heat fluxes from specialised sources such as oxyacetylene torches may be much higher than those of incidental ignition sources, for example 140 kW/m².[10]
Fire and explosion hazards
Cutting produces literally thousands of ignition sources in the form of sparks and hot slag.[4] The sparks from oxy-fuel gas cutting are, in a sense, jet-propelled by the oxygen stream.[2] Sparks and molten slag can fly or roll long distances and ignite hidden combustibles such as wall insulation, dust or lint above suspended ceilings, or flammable vapours in an adjacent area. They can fall into openings that are not easily seen or be drawn into ductwork, where combustibles can smoulder undetected for hours before breaking out into fire.[4] Sparks that fall through cracks in floors and partitions can ignite combustibles if they have enough mass to retain heat for a time.[2]

The flame itself, the hot workpiece and the sections cut from it are inherent and obvious ignition sources.[2] Heat conducted along pipes or other metal can ignite combustible walls, partitions, ceilings or roofs in contact with them.[11] Each ignition source described here comes with the process itself. Manz and Blank (2008) therefore point out that two sides of the fire triangle, ignition and air, are always present, so that the combustible material is the element left to control.[4]
The gases add their own hazards. Oxygen is a far more powerful oxidiser than air: materials that burn in air burn violently in pure oxygen and explosively in pressurised oxygen. Oxygen equipment must therefore be kept free of oil and grease, and reserved for oxygen service.[6] Oxygen must never be used to cool a worker, ventilate a confined space or dust off clothing, because oxygen-saturated clothing can burn in a flash with fatal results.[12]
Fires have occurred at fuel gas cylinder-to-regulator connections that were not tightened properly. The burning gas can then trigger the cylinder safety devices, especially the fusible plugs of acetylene cylinders, which releases more gas and enlarges the fire.[2] Acetylene itself can decompose rapidly at moderate or high pressure, and it forms shock-sensitive acetylides with copper.[8]
Cutting on containers and hollow parts is a separate cause of explosions. Any container may hold or have held a combustible, so all containers are treated as hazardous until tested, cleaned or made inert. Residues can volatilise or decompose into flammable products in the heat of the torch.[13] Air trapped in an unvented hollow part expands when heated, and because hot metal loses strength quickly, the part can burst with explosive force at the point of cutting.[13]
Fire experience
In the United States, torch fires accounted for 1 percent of reported structure fires in 1999–2002, including 3 percent of non-home structure fires. Torches were involved in 7 percent of the reported structure fires in industrial and manufacturing properties. Where the type of torch was coded, cutting or welding torches caused 71 percent of the non-home torch fires but only 43 percent of the residential ones.[3] Snyder (2008) describes hot work as one of the largest causes of fires in industry. About one in three reported hot work fires occurs while outside contractors are doing the work.[14]
Construction site fire safety faces the same hazard. Data gathered by a large insurer from 1995 to 2005 attribute 46 percent of 132 construction-related fire losses to hot work, with a gross loss cost of $238 million for all 132.[15] Fires started by welding, cutting, plumbing or other torches account for one of the largest shares of construction fires.[16]
On film sets, oxyacetylene torches are commonly used during set construction.[17] In grain facilities, torches and electric arcs are among the most intense energy sources present, and they can quickly ignite dust.[18] One case described in the handbook is the fire at Düsseldorf airport on 11 April 1996. Workers using cutting torches started a fire in a combustible concealed ceiling space, where it spread rapidly and undetected.[19]
Frequency in probabilistic risk assessment
Fire probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) for US nuclear power plants treats welding and cutting as a separate ignition source. The EPRI/NRC method of NUREG/CR-6850 (2005) gives generic fire frequencies per reactor-year for "cable fires caused by welding and cutting" and "transient fires caused by welding and cutting". These are given separately for the control, auxiliary and reactor buildings, for plant-wide components and for the turbine building.[20] The expected number of such fires in a period is the sum of the bin frequencies multiplied by the length of the period:
| Symbol | Description | Unit |
|---|---|---|
| Expected number of fires caused by welding and cutting | – | |
| Generic frequency of frequency bin i | per reactor-year | |
| Period considered | reactor-years |
The six welding and cutting bins at power have frequencies of 1.6 × 10⁻³, 9.7 × 10⁻³, 2.0 × 10⁻³, 4.9 × 10⁻³, 1.6 × 10⁻³ and 8.2 × 10⁻³ per reactor-year.[20] As a worked example, their sum is 2.8 × 10⁻² per reactor-year, or about one such fire per 36 reactor-years. Over an assumed 10 reactor-years, the expected number is 10 × 0.028 = 0.28 fires. The three bins for transient fires caused by welding and cutting make up 81 percent of the total. The generic values cover welding and cutting together and do not separate oxy-fuel gas cutting from arc processes. The 2005 sum leaves out bin 3, the containment of pressurised water reactors (2.0 × 10⁻³ per reactor-year), because that bin combines transient fires and hot work, with a hot-work fraction of 0.56.[20]
In 2010, Supplement 1 to NUREG/CR-6850 accepted revised means for best-estimate NFPA 805 fire PRAs, with sensitivity analysis using the 2005 frequencies.[21] For the same six bins, the revised means were 1.25 × 10⁻³, 2.46 × 10⁻³, 9.43 × 10⁻⁴, 3.65 × 10⁻³, 4.50 × 10⁻⁴ and 7.55 × 10⁻³ per reactor-year.[21] Adding them gives about 1.6 × 10⁻² per reactor-year, or one event per 61 reactor-years.
Precautions in US practice
Manz and Blank (2008) organise their minimum recommended combustible control around a work area of 10.7 m (35 ft) around the point of cutting. Their paraphrase of NFPA 51B uses the same distance.[2][11] Combustibles should be moved at least that far away, with no openings in walls, ceilings or floors within that radius. Where combustibles lie within a sphere of that radius, cutting that could throw sparks upwards or downwards needs particular care. If the work cannot be moved to a safe location, the exposed combustibles are protected by fire-resistant guards and a trained fire watcher is provided.[2]
Combustible floors are shielded with wet sand, listed hot work blankets or sheet metal. Duct openings are blocked, openings are filled with non-combustible or fire-stop material, and doors around the area are closed.[11] For a sense of scale, a 10.7 m radius covers a floor area of about 358 m².
Responsibility is shared. Management must designate areas for hot work or a permit-authorising individual (PAI), who checks the site, has combustibles moved or shielded and issues a written hot work permit.[11] Hot work must not take place in flammable atmospheres or on metal walls or roofs with combustible covering or combustible sandwich panel construction.[11] Equipment that has contained combustible dusts, flammable liquids or gases should be shut down, cleaned and purged before hot work is authorised.[11] Snyder (2008) describes the permit as a tool for three steps: recognition, evaluation and control of the hazard.[14]
A fire watch is required where a significant fire could develop, where appreciable quantities of shielded combustibles lie within 10.7 m (35 ft), or where openings expose combustibles in adjacent areas.[11] Where no fire watcher is posted, the work area and adjacent areas should be checked for at least half an hour after the work to find smouldering fires. The time should be extended when conditions seem more hazardous.[13] Snyder (2008) applies the 30-minute check to the floors above and below as well. When oxyacetylene equipment is not in use, the gas should be turned off at the cylinder valve.[14] McDaniel (2008) gives the same minimum of 30 minutes of fire watch after torches have been used in libraries and museums.[22]
The equipment itself is part of the precautions. Cylinders should always be supported so that they cannot be knocked over, since ruptured cylinders can explode. Outfits should be leak-tested periodically, especially at hose connections, and taped hose repairs are unacceptable.[2] At trade shows and exhibitions, the fire department must be notified in advance and gas cylinders must be charged to no more than one-half of their maximum permissible content.[13][12] Hot tapping, the welding or cutting of a pipeline that still contains flammable gas or liquid, may only be done by specially trained staff using recognised methods.[13]
The rules summarised here describe US practice around 2007–2008. They come from NFPA 51B and NFPA 51 as paraphrased in the handbook, which notes that its list should not be used in place of NFPA 51B.[11] Other countries apply their own rules. The separation distance is also given with different rounding: Manz and Blank (2008) convert 35 ft to 10.6 m, Davis (2008a) to 11 m.[2][16] The exact value is 10.67 m.
The torch flame can also affect fire protection systems. Gas (oxy-acetylene) welding in the field of view of an infrared flame detector is a potential source of nuisance alarms.[23] In process risk assessment, welding and cutting sparks appear among the potential ignition sources of the variable-point type, together with maintenance operations and mechanical sparks.[24] A US nuclear guidance document defines hot work broadly as activities that involve the use of heat, sparks or open flame, such as cutting, welding and grinding.[25]
See also
- Ignition
- Critical heat flux for ignition
- Smouldering-to-flaming transition
- Oxygen-enriched atmosphere
Notes
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 Manz and Blank (2008), p. 9-77.
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 Manz and Blank (2008), p. 9-79.
- ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 Manz and Blank (2008), p. 9-73.
- ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 Manz and Blank (2008), p. 9-74.
- ↑ 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.3 Manz and Blank (2008), p. 9-76.
- ↑ 6.0 6.1 6.2 Manz and Blank (2008), p. 9-78.
- ↑ Lemoff (2008), p. 6-173.
- ↑ 8.0 8.1 Lemoff (2008), p. 6-177.
- ↑ Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. 3-9.
- ↑ Babrauskas (2008b), p. 6-118.
- ↑ 11.0 11.1 11.2 11.3 11.4 11.5 11.6 11.7 Manz and Blank (2008), p. 9-80.
- ↑ 12.0 12.1 Manz and Blank (2008), p. 9-82.
- ↑ 13.0 13.1 13.2 13.3 13.4 Manz and Blank (2008), p. 9-81.
- ↑ 14.0 14.1 14.2 Snyder (2008), pp. 12-187–12-188.
- ↑ Davis (2008a), p. 11-47.
- ↑ 16.0 16.1 Davis (2008a), p. 11-51.
- ↑ Grill (2008), p. 20-213.
- ↑ Maness and Sargent (2008), p. 9-98.
- ↑ Miller and Roether (2008), p. 20-89.
- ↑ 20.0 20.1 20.2 Nowlen et al. (2005b), pp. 6-3–6-5.
- ↑ 21.0 21.1 Hyslop et al. (2010), pp. 10-2–10-4.
- ↑ McDaniel (2008), p. 20-185.
- ↑ Dungan (2008a), p. 14-24.
- ↑ Barry (2002), p. 5-193.
- ↑ Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. F-37.
References
- Babrauskas, V. (2008b). Upholstered furniture and mattresses. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 6-103–6-128). National Fire Protection Association.
- Barry, T. F. (2002). Quantitative risk assessment in chemical process industries. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 5-176–5-213). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
- Davis, R. J. (2008a). Fire hazards of construction, alteration, and demolition of buildings. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 11-47–11-58). National Fire Protection Association.
- Dungan, K. W. (2008a). Automatic fire detectors. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 14-15–14-28). National Fire Protection Association.
- Grill, R. A. (2008). Motion picture and television studios and soundstages. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 20-211–20-215). National Fire Protection Association.
- Hyslop, J. S., Kratchman, J., Siu, N., Afshar, C., Najafi, B., Joglar, F., Li, Y., Henneke, D., & Warner, M. (2010). Fire probabilistic risk assessment methods enhancements: Supplement 1 to NUREG/CR-6850 and EPRI 1011989 (NUREG/CR-6850, Supplement 1; EPRI 1019259). Electric Power Research Institute; U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research.
- Iqbal, N., & Salley, M. H. (2004). Fire Dynamics Tools (FDTs): Quantitative fire hazard analysis methods for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Fire Protection Inspection Program (NUREG-1805). U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
- Lemoff, T. C. (2008). Gases. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 6-165–6-186). National Fire Protection Association.
- Maness, J. E., & Sargent, L. M. (2008). Storage and handling of grain mill products. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 9-85–9-103). National Fire Protection Association.
- Manz, A. F., & Blank, M. E. (2008). Welding, cutting, and other hot work. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 9-73–9-83). National Fire Protection Association.
- McDaniel, D. L. (2008). Library and museum collections. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 20-179–20-202). National Fire Protection Association.
- Miller, G., & Roether, E. (2008). Assembly occupancies. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 20-85–20-95). National Fire Protection Association.
- Nowlen, S. P., Najafi, B., Wyant, F. J., Forester, J., Kazarians, M., Kolaczkowski, A., Joglar, F., Funk, D., Hannaman, G., & Anoba, R. (2005b). EPRI/NRC-RES fire PRA methodology for nuclear power facilities: Vol. 2. Detailed methodology (NUREG/CR-6850; EPRI 1011989). Electric Power Research Institute; U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research.
- Snyder, M. (2008). Industrial fire loss prevention. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 12-177–12-198). National Fire Protection Association.