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Contents
  1. 1Network and facilities
  2. 2Differences from data processing
  3. 3Fire record
  4. 4Hazard areas and smoke damage
  5. 5The NFPA 76 protection chain
  6. 6Detection, response and suppression
  7. 7Private exchanges and newer facilities
  8. 8Fire service concerns and limits
  9. 9See also
  10. 10Notes
  11. 11References

A telecommunications facility is a building or enclosure that houses the switching, transmission and power equipment of a telecommunications network, such as a telephone exchange, also called a central office (CO). The 2008 NFPA Fire Protection Handbook describes NFPA 76 as capturing the best practices of US and Canadian network providers through prescriptive and performance-based methods.[1] A central concern is continuity of service: even a small fire can cut off emergency calls, banking and data traffic for a whole community.[2][3] The 1988 fire in the Hinsdale exchange in Illinois stayed within cable trays covering about 9 m by 12 m, yet most service took 12 days to restore.[3][4] Burning PVC insulation produces dense, corrosive smoke that can damage equipment far from the fire.[5][6] Traditional protection therefore relies on a chain of measures: fire-resistant equipment and cable, compartmentation, very early warning detection, rapid response by trained staff and, where needed, automatic suppression.[7]

Network and facilities

In the traditional US network described in 2008, buildings called central offices or telephone exchanges housed its primary control functions. Nearly 25,000 smaller structures supported them.[1] Each customer telephone connected to one central office, so a failure there or in the cables between offices could isolate customers on one side of the failure.[1] The US network design criteria aimed at universal service at a low price, not uninterrupted service, although established companies provided redundant paths on high-traffic routes.[1]

Inside a central office, cables enter through the cable vault, where they split into smaller, more fire-resistant cables.[8] They rise to the main distributing frame (MDF), where they break into individual wire pairs, and continue to the switching and transmission systems.[8] Standby generators, battery systems and power distribution equipment support the operation.[8] Major metropolitan central offices are built of reinforced concrete, and traditional equipment areas have ceilings of 4.3 to 4.9 m (14 to 16 ft) for heavy copper cable and tall equipment frames.[3][8] Newer equipment areas may have lower ceilings and raised floors, and contain less cable because of fibre optics and data compression.[8]

Section through a central office with cable vault, distributing frame, switching, transmission, power plant and standby engine areas
Simplified section through a central office. Cables enter through the cable vault, rise to the main distributing frame and continue to switching and transmission equipment.

The 2008 handbook describes telecommunications equipment arranged in parallel rows, or "lineups", 48 to 66 cm wide and 1.83 to 2.14 m high in its then-current generation.[8] It describes metal cabinets needing forced ventilation and equipment sensitive to rapid changes of a few degrees or a few percent of humidity.[8] Under NFPA 101, as illustrated in the handbook, equipment areas were treated as special-purpose industrial areas and office areas as offices.[8]

Differences from data processing

The equipment looks much like that of a data centre, but several differences change the fire protection approach.[8] A telecommunications system does not store customer data; it transfers it in real time. During a disruption all information in transit is lost and cannot be reloaded later, whereas a computer can usually repeat interrupted work from stored data.[8][7]

The power supply also differs. Data processing equipment receives alternating current, but telecommunications equipment is fed with direct current at 12, 24, 48 or 130 V from a separate power plant.[7] An emergency power off switch, common in computer rooms, would abruptly end 9-1-1 and other emergency services, so the industry avoids it.[7] NFPA 76 instead uses a decision-based approach to normal electrical disconnection.[7]

Switching usually runs on two processors in parallel, so that one can take over if the other fails.[7] The control programs can run to millions of lines of code, and restarting an electronic switch after a power loss can take many hours.[7] The thermal shock of suddenly restoring power to the whole system is another reason for the delay.[7] The handbook concludes that telecommunications facilities must be analysed on their own merits and characteristics.[8]

Fire record

Structure fires in US telephone exchanges reported to local fire departments fell from 132 in 1980 to 37 in 1998, and averaged about 40 to 50 a year in the late 1990s.[4] Only a small fraction start in the specialised equipment, and most remain very small and develop slowly.[4] The handbook attributes the low average loss per fire to the use of fire-resistive equipment, wire and cable that meet industry standards.[4] These standards were developed after large-loss fires in the 1960s and 1970s.[2]

Column chart of reported structure fires in US telephone exchanges per year from 132 in 1980 to 37 in 1998
Structure fires in US telephone exchanges or central offices reported to municipal fire departments, 1980–1998.

A study for the US Federal Communications Commission covered the years 1988 to 1992 and more than 93% of US telephone lines.[3] It found 189 fire events, an average of 38 a year, of which only 8 a year affected service.[3] The 2008 handbook stated that the US telecommunications industry had recorded no fire deaths up to that time.[3] Its list of notable North American central office fires covers 1975 to 2006.[4]

Notable central office fires in North America, 1975–2006 (selection), as listed in the handbook (2008)[4]
Incident Area of fire origin Extent of service interruption
New York City, 1975 Cable vault 170,000 customers, several weeks
Brooklyn, 1987 Main distribution frame; smoke spread to fourth floor 41,000 customers, all restored within 16 days
Hinsdale, Illinois, 1988 Cable tray with ac and dc cables 38,000 customers, most restored in 12 days
Los Angeles, 1994 Battery plant under reconfiguration 9-1-1 service for 12 hours
Portland, Oregon, 1996 Cables fire, loss of power to transmission equipment 88,900 lines, all restored in 15 hours
Toronto, 1999 ac switchgear under reconfiguration 113,000 lines for less than one day

In none of these fires did an occupant or fire fighter die.[4] Several started in cables or power equipment, and two began during reconfiguration work. The Hinsdale fire burned for over 3 hours, and the handbook calls it the most significant telecommunications fire in recent history.[3] Its consequences are discussed under Cable fire and Business continuity.

Hazard areas and smoke damage

NFPA 76, as summarised in the handbook, divides a facility into eight types of hazard area, each with its own fire scenario.[9][10] The hazard types are the same whether a prescriptive or a performance-based solution is chosen.[9] Where one compartment combines several types, it is protected as the most demanding of them.[9] NUREG-1805 compares the cable hazard of nuclear power plants with that of telephone exchanges, which also carry many power, control and instrument cables in trays.[11]

Main hazard areas in telecommunications facilities (after Table 9.13.3 of the handbook)[10]
Area Contents Fire scenario
Signal processing equipment area Electronic equipment in racks or cabinets, cables in racks or under a raised floor Slowly developing smoky fire with corrosive vapours, typically 5 to 15 kW, not over 150 kW for a fully involved cabinet or rack
Cable entrance facility Cables without fire resistance rating from outside, spliced to rated cables High or low heat release rate; corrosive products can spread
Power areas Batteries, rectifiers, switchgear, bus bars, cables Low heat release rate; some corrosive vapours or acid spill
Main distribution frame area Large amounts of low-voltage wire Low to medium heat release rate smoky fires
Standby engine area Engine generator with day tank and batteries More electrical than fuel fires in the record

The signal processing values assume that equipment and cable meet the industry fire resistance standards.[10] Technical support areas within the equipment areas, administrative areas and building service areas complete the list.[10] The IFEG (2005) lists a variable fire load density of 80 MJ/m² for telephone exchanges, from Swiss surveys of 1967–69.[12] The guidelines caution that such values can change with new technologies and materials.[12] Grouped communications cables can still carry fire through concealed spaces: at One New York Plaza, flame moved through a ceiling plenum that contained communications cables and exposed foam insulation.[13]

PVC wire insulation releases hydrogen chloride, a corrosive gas that the handbook also names as a useful fire signature for detection in telecommunications facilities.[14] PVC starts to release it at about 100 °C, and up to about 200 to 220 °C it is the main product.[15] Much telephone equipment and ductwork has zinc-coated surfaces.[16] With hydrogen chloride, zinc forms zinc chloride, which absorbs moisture from air as dry as 10% relative humidity and becomes a conductive liquid that causes serious short circuits.[16][6] In two major central office losses, zinc chloride governed both the rate of restoration and the ability to salvage equipment.[6]

Engineers judge smoke damage by the chloride deposited on equipment. In central office fires involving PVC cables, contamination of about 5 to 900 µg/cm² has been observed, whereas clean equipment carries less than 2 µg/cm².[6] For comparison, an electronic switch collects only about 5 to 9 µg/cm² from its environment over a working life of more than 20 years.[6] The levels below link deposition to the chance of restoring the equipment.[15]

Contamination levels for chloride ion deposition on electronic equipment (Tewarson, 2002)[15]
Level Chloride ion (µg/cm²) Damage, cleaning and restoration
One 2 No damage expected; no cleaning needed
Two below 30 Easily restored by cleaning, little effect on long-term reliability
Three 30 to 90 Restorable by cleaning if the environment is strictly controlled soon after the fire
Four above 90 Cleaning cost approaches replacement cost

Deposition on wet surfaces was almost four times that on dry surfaces in laboratory tests, so prompt control of humidity after a fire matters.[15] In room tests with PVC flooring, chloride on most wall surfaces reached 30 to 90 µg/cm², the third level.[15] A handbook example of performance criteria for sensitive equipment limits hydrogen chloride at the target to 5 ppm.[17]

The NFPA 76 protection chain

The traditional practice of the US industry is a chain of actions and elements, in which any missing link raises the fire risk.[7] The chain consists of excellent fire prevention, noncombustible construction, compartmentation, fire resistance-rated equipment and cable, very early warning fire detection, rigorous alarm processing and rapid response.[7] Suppression, power interruption and smoke ventilation follow when needed.[7] The prescriptive solutions in NFPA 76 assume that this chain stays unbroken for the life of the facility.[7] Where most equipment and cable is not fire resistance-rated, the chain is broken, and an alternative strategy, generally with automatic suppression, is needed.[7]

Chain of eleven linked elements from fire prevention to smoke ventilation, with one broken link replaced by automatic suppression
The chain of fire protection elements behind the prescriptive NFPA 76 solution. Where equipment and cable are not fire resistance-rated the chain is broken and automatic suppression is generally added.

The risk factors are the community served, public safety services, life safety, service continuity, the services provided, redundancy and property.[18] A switching centre serving a major medical complex, for instance, may be more critical than one serving a small town.[18] The prescriptive method approximates criticality by size: large facilities have more than 232 m² (2,500 ft²) of enclosed network equipment area and receive more protection.[9] The performance-based method, which follows the SFPE engineering guide, instead uses the community served, network redundancy, recovery time and business interruption costs.[7][9]

Performance criteria of this kind appear in a handbook example for a data centre with telecommunications equipment.[19] It limits interruption of critical telecommunications operations to 4 hours and of noncritical operations to 48 hours.[20] Power to critical equipment is maintained during a fire, so the agent must extinguish fires in energised equipment at or below 2 kW.[20] Halide acids from the agent are limited to 200 ppm, and reignition must be prevented for at least 10 minutes.[20]

Detection, response and suppression

Very early warning fire detection (VEWFD), for example with aspirating smoke detection, is central to the chain.[7][21] Laser spot detectors, up to 100 times as sensitive as ordinary units, are also intended for telecommunications hubs.[22] A US nuclear regulatory report cites the sensitivity criteria of NFPA 76 (2009 edition).[23] It gives 0.2% per foot of obscuration for an alert and 1% per foot for an alarm, measured as effective sensitivity at each sampling port.[23] These equal about 0.65% and 3.2% per metre. The same report notes that the 2009 NFPA 76 edition essentially requires such systems in main distribution frame and signal processing areas.[21]

The handbook's NFPA 76 depowering decision tree sends a technician to investigate a VEWFD alert, while an alarm also calls the fire department.[18] If a clean agent is released, staff monitor for reignition, and power is cut only if necessary.[18] The handbook says NFPA 76 recommended a means to disconnect power for every facility, but not an automatic or readily available one; it was meant for knowledgeable provider or fire service personnel.[5]

Flowchart from detection signal through alert or alarm, dispatch of technician and fire department, suppression and depowering only if necessary
Simplified depowering decision tree for telecommunications equipment areas: a very early warning alert sends a technician, an alarm also calls the fire department, and power is removed only if necessary.

The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission's 2010 interim position uses a simplified event tree for VEWFD in electrical cabinets of 250 V or less in nuclear plants.[21][24] The method takes no credit for preventing a fire before flaming and assumes the cabinet lacks fast-acting components that could bypass the detectable incipient phase.[24][25] After an initiating event, outside targets are damaged if a stationed responder fails to suppress the fire promptly, or if detection or response fails and normal suppression then also fails:[25][26]

Pdamage=(1−β)(1−γ)ε1+[β+(1−β)γ]ε2

Symbol Description Unit
Pdamage Probability of fire damage outside the cabinet, given an initiating event in an eligible cabinet –
β Probability that the detection system does not issue an alert (unavailability and unreliability) –
γ Probability that staff fail to respond to the alert and find the component in time –
ε1 Probability that staff stationed at the cabinet fail to suppress an outbreak of flame ("enhanced" nonsuppression) –
ε2 Probability of "normal" nonsuppression by other means –

The report gives β = 0.01, γ = 0.005 for a system that identifies the individual cabinet (0.01 otherwise) and ε1 = 0.001.[24][27][26] These values assume at least one hour of warning before open flaming.[27] As a conservative worked example, set ε2 = 1, so no ordinary suppression is credited. Then P = 0.99 × 0.995 × 0.001 + (0.01 + 0.99 × 0.005) × 1 ≈ 0.016. This is a model result for the stated nuclear-cabinet conditions, not a measured telecommunications protection rate.

Conditional nuclear cabinet event tree with detector, staff and suppression branches and about 0.016 outside-target damage probability under stated assumptions
Illustrative nuclear-cabinet event tree for very early warning detection; the ε1 branch follows the report's prose rather than its conflicting diagram endpoint.

The report contains an internal conflict. Its prose defines ε1 as failure to suppress soon enough to prevent outside-target damage.[25][26] Its event tree on p. 13-8 instead labels that branch as having no such damage.[26] The equation above follows the prose and counts the branch as damage; following the diagram's endpoint instead gives about 0.015. The largest term in either interpretation is detector unreliability β, which the report ties to testing, maintenance and setpoint control.[24][27]

Automatic suppression follows the chain logic. Gaseous agents are widely used for telecommunications equipment, and a gaseous extinguishing system can reach fuel inside closed cabinets.[28][29][30] Clean agent systems even protect telecommunications rooms at the top of air traffic control towers.[31] If power stays on, the fire is a Class C fire that is harder to extinguish and can rekindle.[29]

Water-based agents and powders have their own limits. In 2008, Mawhinney reported FM Global support for water mist in central offices, but slow acceptance among North American users.[32] In the tests he cites, electrical charge did not transmit through atomised mist, which could be applied in switchboard compartments for 10 minutes or more before leakage currents reached dangerous levels.[32] Dry chemical should not be used where relays and delicate contacts are present, such as in telephone exchanges, because its insulating residue can make equipment inoperative.[33]

Private exchanges and newer facilities

A private branch exchange (PBX) serves a single building or complex and resembles central office equipment.[9] It differs in three ways: it need not meet the rigorous fire resistance standards for central office equipment, replacements are easier to obtain, and it is easier to switch off.[9] The 2008 handbook recommends protecting a PBX like an important computer room, in a room with a fire barrier of at least 1 hour, limited access and strict housekeeping.[9] It calls for smoke detection that alarms at a constantly attended location and power shutdown procedures for responding fire fighters.[9] It says the code exceptions then allowing central offices to omit automatic suppression in equipment areas did not apply to PBX rooms or telephone closets.[9]

The 2008 handbook observed that Internet servers and routers were increasingly being colocated with traditional network equipment.[5] It warned that they might lack the fire resistance ratings or redundancy of traditional equipment and occupy buildings of different design.[5] It gave two examples meeting the NFPA 76 edition then in use: rating the servers and cables like telecommunications equipment, or putting unrated equipment in separate fire-resistive compartments with automatic suppression.[5]

Fire service concerns and limits

Fires in telecommunications equipment can produce very large quantities of dense, corrosive smoke, in which visibility may become nearly impossible even with hand lamps.[5] Even 10 to 12 portable smoke fans may be inadequate, so the handbook advises fire departments to ask owners for manual smoke exhaust systems.[5] Such systems have proven highly effective in at least one actual telecommunications fire.[5] Fire fighters need to know the owner's power disconnect procedures. The 2008 handbook stated that Illinois, where the Hinsdale fire occurred, required a power shutdown plan for every telecommunications facility.[5] Large batteries and electrical power are further hazards, and tours of the facilities help crews prepare.[5]

The guidance rests on US and Canadian experience and best practice.[34] Facilities without rated equipment and cable, strong prevention practices or fast response to detection signals need more than the prescriptive measures of NFPA 76, and a performance-based analysis is then required.[34] The fire statistics end in 1998 and the incident list in 2006, and the requirements described are those of the NFPA 76 edition summarised in the 2008 handbook.[4] The event-tree values were set for nuclear plant cabinets and rest on limited data on how long incipient degradation lasts.[35]

See also

Notes

  1. ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 Transue (2008), p. 9-168.
  2. ↑ 2.0 2.1 Transue (2008), p. 9-167.
  3. ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 Transue (2008), p. 9-170.
  4. ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7 Transue (2008), p. 9-169.
  5. ↑ 5.00 5.01 5.02 5.03 5.04 5.05 5.06 5.07 5.08 5.09 Transue (2008), p. 9-176.
  6. ↑ 6.0 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 Tewarson (2002), p. 3-137.
  7. ↑ 7.00 7.01 7.02 7.03 7.04 7.05 7.06 7.07 7.08 7.09 7.10 7.11 7.12 7.13 7.14 Transue (2008), p. 9-172.
  8. ↑ 8.00 8.01 8.02 8.03 8.04 8.05 8.06 8.07 8.08 8.09 8.10 Transue (2008), p. 9-171.
  9. ↑ 9.00 9.01 9.02 9.03 9.04 9.05 9.06 9.07 9.08 9.09 Transue (2008), p. 9-174.
  10. ↑ 10.0 10.1 10.2 10.3 Transue (2008), p. 9-175.
  11. ↑ Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. 1-7.
  12. ↑ 12.0 12.1 National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), pp. 3.4-2, 3.4-7.
  13. ↑ Davoodi (2008), p. 18-11.
  14. ↑ Custer and Milke (2008), p. 2-76.
  15. ↑ 15.0 15.1 15.2 15.3 15.4 Tewarson (2002), p. 3-138.
  16. ↑ 16.0 16.1 Tewarson (2002), p. 3-136.
  17. ↑ Mowrer and Rosenbaum (2008), p. 3-186.
  18. ↑ 18.0 18.1 18.2 18.3 Transue (2008), p. 9-173.
  19. ↑ Harrington (2008), p. 17-134.
  20. ↑ 20.0 20.1 20.2 Harrington (2008), p. 17-136.
  21. ↑ 21.0 21.1 21.2 Hyslop et al. (2010), p. 13-1.
  22. ↑ Dungan (2008a), p. 14-22.
  23. ↑ 23.0 23.1 Hyslop et al. (2010), p. 13-2.
  24. ↑ 24.0 24.1 24.2 24.3 Hyslop et al. (2010), p. 13-5.
  25. ↑ 25.0 25.1 25.2 Hyslop et al. (2010), p. 13-7.
  26. ↑ 26.0 26.1 26.2 26.3 Hyslop et al. (2010), p. 13-8.
  27. ↑ 27.0 27.1 27.2 Hyslop et al. (2010), p. 13-6.
  28. ↑ Harrington (2008), p. 17-124.
  29. ↑ 29.0 29.1 Harrington (2008), p. 17-125.
  30. ↑ Harrington (2008), p. 17-135.
  31. ↑ Harrington (2008), p. 17-127.
  32. ↑ 32.0 32.1 Mawhinney (2008), p. 16-139.
  33. ↑ Lake (2008), p. 17-20.
  34. ↑ 34.0 34.1 Transue (2008), p. 9-177.
  35. ↑ Hyslop et al. (2010), p. 13-3.

References

  • Custer, R. L. P., & Milke, J. A. (2008). Fundamentals of fire detection. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 2-75–2-78). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Davoodi, H. (2008). Confinement of fire in buildings. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 18-3–18-21). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Dungan, K. W. (2008a). Automatic fire detectors. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 14-15–14-28). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Harrington, J. L. (2008). Application of gaseous agents to special hazards fire protection. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 17-123–17-139). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Hyslop, J. S., Kratchman, J., Siu, N., Afshar, C., Najafi, B., Joglar, F., Li, Y., Henneke, D., & Warner, M. (2010). Fire probabilistic risk assessment methods enhancements: Supplement 1 to NUREG/CR-6850 and EPRI 1011989 (NUREG/CR-6850, Supplement 1; EPRI 1019259). Electric Power Research Institute; U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research.
  • Iqbal, N., & Salley, M. H. (2004). Fire Dynamics Tools (FDTs): Quantitative fire hazard analysis methods for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Fire Protection Inspection Program (NUREG-1805). U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
  • Lake, J. D. (2008). Chemical extinguishing agents and application systems. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 17-17–17-29). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Mawhinney, J. R. (2008). Water mist fire suppression systems. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 16-135–16-180). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Mowrer, F. W., & Rosenbaum, E. R. (2008). Overview of performance-based fire protection design. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 3-183–3-194). National Fire Protection Association.
  • National Research Council of Canada, International Code Council, Department of Building and Housing, & Australian Building Codes Board. (2005). International fire engineering guidelines (2005 ed.). Australian Building Codes Board.
  • Tewarson, A. (2002). Generation of heat and chemical compounds in fires. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 3-82–3-161). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
  • Transue, R. E. (2008). Fire protection of telecommunications facilities. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 9-167–9-177). National Fire Protection Association.