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Ethics in fire safety engineering

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Contents
  1. 1Why ethics matters in fire safety engineering
  2. 2Interests and incentives
  3. 3Competence
  4. 4Honesty about assumptions and uncertainty
  5. 5Review and independence
  6. 6Responsibilities of the engineer
  7. 7See also
  8. 8Notes
  9. 9References

Ethics in fire safety engineering concerns the right conduct of engineers who design and assess fire safety: acting with integrity, working within their competence and being open about assumptions and uncertainty. Ethics is the branch of philosophy that reflects critically on right action. It seeks criteria for judging whether an action is good or wrong and for weighing its motives and consequences.[1] In fire safety, integrity matters because a wrong decision can cost lives, while clients and employers may create incentives that tempt an engineer to act otherwise.[1]

The issue is sharper in fire safety engineering than in rule-based design. A performance-based justification can be so complex that the authority reviewing it cannot check it, and must then rely on the integrity of the engineer.[2] Guidance in several countries responds by setting requirements for competence and by providing for independent review. The Australian Fire Safety Verification Method, for example, may only be used by fire safety engineers with demonstrated competency. The need for a peer review must be considered at the design brief stage of each project.[3][4]

Why ethics matters in fire safety engineering

In a prescriptive approach, the reviewing authority checks a design against fixed rules, which is relatively easy. In a scientific approach such as fire safety engineering, the justification provided by the applicant may be so complex that the authority cannot verify it, or can do so only with difficulty.[2] Introduction to Fire Safety Engineering gives computational fluid dynamics (CFD) as an example. Understanding how CFD works requires long scientific training and frequent use, and a reviewing authority seldom employs a CFD specialist.[2] The boundary conditions and assumptions of a simulation are then often unknown to the reviewer, although checking exactly these is important.[2]

Where a design cannot be checked, the authority has to rely on the integrity of the fire safety engineer. A counter-expertise by a second engineer is possible, but it is not economically feasible for every project.[2] The book recommends one where there are good reasons, for example when results are unexpected or when the engineer is new and has no reputation yet.[2]

The same point is made by the developers of fire models. The technical guides of CFAST and the Fire Dynamics Simulator (FDS) state that users bear sole responsibility for judging whether the model suits an application and for the conclusions they draw. The models are intended only for people competent in fluid dynamics, thermodynamics, heat transfer, combustion and fire science.[5][6] A model "may or may not have predictive capability" in a particular case, and all results should be evaluated by an informed user.[5]

Interests and incentives

Almost every party in a building project has an economic interest in the outcome of a fire safety analysis. Introduction to Fire Safety Engineering lists what a client may gain: a permit, and savings on construction through cheaper building methods or materials, a lower level of fire protection installations or dropping costly measures.[7] In a tender, the contractor bidding for the work also has an interest. An engineer employed by a firm may find that the employer favours certain outcomes for the same reasons, and in a government body the pressure may be political.[7]

An engineer pushed by client, contractor, employer and politics, and supported by integrity, competence and peer review.
Interests that may push a fire safety engineer towards a desired outcome (left) and the safeguards that counter them (right). Based on Van Rossum (2027), §2.2 and §2.5.

Giving in to these interests can bring short-term advantages, such as a follow-up commission, a bribe or faster promotion. Resisting them can mean that a career stalls or, in the worst case, that the engineer is pushed out or dismissed.[7] The book therefore treats integrity as a responsibility that remains even when nobody else can see that advice has been bent.[8]

Watts and Hall describe the same tension in terms of values. Accepting a level of risk requires a value judgement, and technical experts, ordinary citizens, enforcing authorities and managers judge differently.[9] An engineer performing a fire risk analysis usually works for a client, but cannot base the analysis on the values of that client alone. The analysis must address both the client's values and the values of society.[10]

Four quadrants labelled technical, societal, enforcer and managerial value judgements, each with a short description, around a sprinkler symbol.
Four perspectives on the value of a safety measure such as residential sprinklers. An engineer cannot base an analysis on the client's values alone. Based on Watts and Hall (2002), pp. 5-1–5-2.

Enforcing authorities are often seen as the interpreters and guardians of those societal values.[10] Because they bear neither the costs nor the benefits of their decisions, they must also ask when it is acceptable to dictate safety choices to people. Examples are whether it is fair to require sprinklers in all homes, how costs should be shared and who is responsible for the reliability of the systems.[10]

Competence

Competence is the second pillar of professional ethics. Introduction to Fire Safety Engineering notes that in the Netherlands there are few mechanisms to assure the knowledge and skill of practitioners. There is no degree programme in fire safety in higher education and no established set of competences for the profession, so anyone can call themselves a fire safety adviser.[11] It is therefore the engineer's own responsibility to be competent for the work.

Clients can help by asking for a CV with reference projects, which is usual on large, complex projects.[11] According to the book, an active role in fire safety engineering needs a higher technical education. People with secondary vocational training can still build the skills needed to check such analyses.[11]

The book warns against overconfidence and names the Dunning–Kruger effect. People who are incompetent at a task tend to overestimate their performance, because their incompetence keeps them from seeing their own errors.[12] The author, in the field since 2001, writes that further study has mainly shown him how much he does not yet know. He also reports meeting practitioners who gave themselves specialist titles after a course of three to five days.[12] For CFD in particular, the book advises a university background in physics or a related field and much practical experience. It refers back to its chapter on ethics for this point.[13]

Other countries set formal requirements. In Australia, the Fire Safety Verification Method (FSVM) Standard 2022 states that the method may only be used by fire safety engineers who are suitably qualified and experienced. They must have demonstrated competency in fire safety engineering, be proficient in fire modelling methods and be familiar with fire testing and the validation of computational data.[3] In New Zealand, C/VM2 (second edition, 2025) is intended for professional fire engineers proficient in modelling methods, who are expected to apply appropriate judgement to model inputs and results.[14]

The FSVM handbook adds that some jurisdictions register fire safety engineers. National registers recognised in some jurisdictions serve as evidence of suitable qualification and experience.[15] The Australian part of the International Fire Engineering Guidelines presupposes a level of competence and experience that would enable accreditation by an appropriate body.[16]

Honesty about assumptions and uncertainty

A fire safety engineering analysis rests on many assumptions, and ethical practice means making them visible. Notarianni writes that it is important to identify where value judgements enter a performance-based calculation. Assumptions about values, and their effect on the final design, should be made explicit.[17] Decisions that would change if a value, attitude or risk perception changed must be explicit in the design, and agreement on them by all stakeholders is critical.[17] This is a core requirement of performance-based design.

Equivalence is a typical example. One person may consider non-combustible construction equivalent to a sprinkler system because both give enough time to leave the building. Another may disagree because the sprinkler system is less reliable.[17] Designs may be equivalent for life safety but not for property protection or business interruption, so the assumptions behind an equivalence must be stated.[17]

In the Netherlands, the regulations do not say how safe is safe enough. Their limits apply to measures, such as travel distances, rather than to goals. Per hour of stay, for example, the risk of dying in a fire is much higher in a residential building than in an assembly building, yet detection requirements are stricter for assembly buildings. The acceptable residual risk must therefore be agreed in advance, for example by comparison with a reference design that meets the rules.[18]

Uncertainty raises similar questions. Notarianni notes that uncertainty analysis is an uncomfortable topic for many stakeholders. One fear is that it would show that predictions of heat and toxic products are not accurate enough to judge a design with high confidence.[19] She also warns that assumptions meant to be conservative may not be, for example when the reaction time of a resident is set equal to a travel time.[19] Introduction to Fire Safety Engineering warns against false precision: an available escape time given as 187.4 s suggests an accuracy that the calculation cannot deliver. Two or at most three significant figures are realistic, and results compared with limits should be rounded to the safe side.[20]

Models must also be fit for their use. Cox and Kumar note that the test cases supplied with commercial CFD software validate the technology in general terms only. The responsibility for ensuring validity for a fire application rests with the fire community.[21] Verification and validation of models is one way to meet this responsibility. In the United States, the standard NFPA 805 for nuclear power plants requires that fire models are verified and validated and acceptable to the authority having jurisdiction.[22]

Review and independence

Independent review is the main safeguard against both error and undue influence. Introduction to Fire Safety Engineering advises engineers to have their work checked by colleagues.[8] In Australia, the FSVM Standard 2022 requires the design team to consider at the brief stage whether an independent fire safety engineer should review some or all of the proposed solutions. Where full agreement cannot be reached, dissenting views must be recorded and carried through the approval process.[4]

Independence must be protected. The FSVM handbook states that the approving authority should not take part in design decisions for matters under its jurisdiction. Doing so creates a conflict, or a perceived conflict, of interest, because the authority must be independent and act in the public interest.[23] The same applies to a peer reviewer, who should not be involved in design decisions.[24]

Flowchart from design team and fire safety engineer through the design brief and analysis to an independent peer reviewer and the approving authority.
Roles in an Australian FSVM project: the peer reviewer and the approving authority comment on the brief but stay out of design decisions. Based on Australian Building Codes Board (2022), p. 6, and Australian Building Codes Board (2020b), pp. 38–40.

The Australian part of the IFEG describes the attitude expected of a third party reviewer. The review should be constructive and help the authority approve a design, and it may help the engineer to justify expert judgement properly.[25] Professional detachment, flexibility and an open mind are essential. The reviewer must be independent of the project, keep the documents confidential and carry out check calculations where appropriate.[25] The conclusions of the review should be documented. Assertions and assumptions must be substantiated and referenced, and the remedial actions needed must be clearly identified.[25]

The investigation of the World Trade Center disaster shows why a documented basis matters. NIST found no technical basis for the choice of the sprayed fire-resistive material used on the long-span floor trusses of the towers, or for its thickness.[26] The same report notes that, from 1993, new or modified fire safety systems in the towers required third-party review by a licensed architect or engineer.[26]

Responsibilities of the engineer

Introduction to Fire Safety Engineering sums up the responsibility of the fire safety engineer as giving advice that is both competent and honest. This applies despite the incentives and despite the fact that others cannot see whether advice has been compromised.[8] Dishonest advice may bring short-term gains but disastrous consequences if it leads to casualties. In the Netherlands, an adviser can be prosecuted if an investigation after a fire shows that the advice was demonstrably wrong by the standards of knowledge that could be expected at the time.[8] There is also the risk of damage to professional reputation.[8]

The point is not limited to fire safety. Writing on structural engineering in the SFPE Handbook, Fitzgerald notes that safety is a major part of the professional responsibility.[27] Because professionals do not know everything and mistakes remain human, the book recommends five habits. Engineers should dare to question their own knowledge and skill, and have their work checked by peers. They should also join professional associations to exchange knowledge, follow regular training and keep up with publications.[8]

Professional societies such as the Society of Fire Protection Engineers (SFPE) publish engineering guidance. The Australian part of the IFEG, for example, lists the SFPE engineering guide to performance-based fire protection among its reference documents.[16] The SFPE Handbook is also one of the main sources of the calculation methods in the Fire Dynamics Tools of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission.[28]

See also

Notes

  1. ↑ 1.0 1.1 Van Rossum (2027), §2.
  2. ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 Van Rossum (2027), §2.1.
  3. ↑ 3.0 3.1 Australian Building Codes Board (2022), p. 5.
  4. ↑ 4.0 4.1 Australian Building Codes Board (2022), p. 6.
  5. ↑ 5.0 5.1 Peacock et al. (2026), p. ix.
  6. ↑ McGrattan et al. (2026), p. vii.
  7. ↑ 7.0 7.1 7.2 Van Rossum (2027), §2.2.
  8. ↑ 8.0 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.5 Van Rossum (2027), §2.5.
  9. ↑ Watts and Hall (2002), pp. 5-1–5-2.
  10. ↑ 10.0 10.1 10.2 Watts and Hall (2002), p. 5-2.
  11. ↑ 11.0 11.1 11.2 Van Rossum (2027), §2.3.
  12. ↑ 12.0 12.1 Van Rossum (2027), §2.4.
  13. ↑ Van Rossum (2027), §11.4.
  14. ↑ Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2025b), p. 7.
  15. ↑ Australian Building Codes Board (2020b), pp. 6–7.
  16. ↑ 16.0 16.1 National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), p. 0.1-3 (Part 0, Australia).
  17. ↑ 17.0 17.1 17.2 17.3 Notarianni (2002), p. 5-46.
  18. ↑ Van Rossum (2027), §1.2.
  19. ↑ 19.0 19.1 Notarianni (2002), p. 5-44.
  20. ↑ Van Rossum (2027), §1.7.
  21. ↑ Cox and Kumar (2002), p. 3-203.
  22. ↑ Najafi et al. (2007), p. xv.
  23. ↑ Australian Building Codes Board (2020b), p. 38.
  24. ↑ Australian Building Codes Board (2020b), p. 40.
  25. ↑ 25.0 25.1 25.2 National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), pp. 0.3-7–0.3-8 (Part 0, Australia).
  26. ↑ 26.0 26.1 National Institute of Standards and Technology (2005), p. 197.
  27. ↑ Fitzgerald (2002), p. 1-132.
  28. ↑ Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. iii.

References

  • Australian Building Codes Board. (2020b). Handbook: Fire Safety Verification Method (Print version 1.1).
  • Australian Building Codes Board. (2022). Fire Safety Verification Method Standard 2022.
  • Cox, G., & Kumar, S. (2002). Modeling enclosure fires using CFD. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 3-194–3-218). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
  • Fitzgerald, R. W. (2002). Structural mechanics. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 1-132–1-143). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
  • Iqbal, N., & Salley, M. H. (2004). Fire Dynamics Tools (FDTs): Quantitative fire hazard analysis methods for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Fire Protection Inspection Program (NUREG-1805). U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
  • McGrattan, K., Hostikka, S., Floyd, J., McDermott, R., Vanella, M., Mueller, E., & Paul, C. (2026). Fire Dynamics Simulator technical reference guide: Vol. 1. Mathematical model (6th ed., NIST Special Publication 1018-1). National Institute of Standards and Technology. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.1018
  • Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment. (2025b). Verification Method C/VM2: Framework for fire safety design (2nd ed.).
  • Najafi, B., Joglar, F., & Dreisbach, J. (2007). Verification and validation of selected fire models for nuclear power plant applications: Vol. 1. Main report (NUREG-1824; EPRI 1011999). U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research; Electric Power Research Institute.
  • National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2005). Final report on the collapse of the World Trade Center towers (NIST NCSTAR 1).
  • National Research Council of Canada, International Code Council, Department of Building and Housing, & Australian Building Codes Board. (2005). International fire engineering guidelines (2005 ed.). Australian Building Codes Board.
  • Notarianni, K. A. (2002). Uncertainty. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 5-40–5-64). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
  • Peacock, R. D., McGrattan, K. B., Forney, G. P., & Reneke, P. A. (2026). CFAST – Consolidated Fire and Smoke Transport: Vol. 1. Technical reference guide (Version 7, NIST Technical Note 1889v1). National Institute of Standards and Technology. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.TN.1889v1
  • Van Rossum, E. (2027). Introduction to Fire Safety Engineering. Fire Safety Academy.
  • Watts, J. M., Jr., & Hall, J. R., Jr. (2002). Introduction to fire risk analysis. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 5-1–5-7). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
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