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Contents
  1. 1Types of device
  2. 2Why containers need pressure relief
  3. 3Set pressure and relieving capacity
    1. 3.1Emergency venting of storage tanks
  4. 4Applications
  5. 5Pressure relief and the BLEVE
  6. 6Discharge hazards, installation and maintenance
  7. 7Relation to explosion protection
  8. 8See also
  9. 9Notes
  10. 10References

A pressure relief device is a device on a tank, cylinder or pressure vessel that opens under the static pressure at its inlet. It acts during an emergency or abnormal condition, so that the internal pressure cannot rise above a specified value.[1] The main types are the spring-loaded pressure-relief valve, which closes again after it has operated, and non-reclosing devices such as rupture disks and fusible plugs, which stay open until the container is empty.[2][3] In North American practice, most containers of compressed and liquefied gases carry one or both kinds of device.[4] The most demanding design case is usually a fire around the container, because fire exposure is the largest heat source that can be expected.[5]

For aboveground tanks of flammable liquids, the Fire Protection Handbook (2008) gives the emergency venting rates that NFPA 30 tied to the wetted area exposed to a ground fire.[6] A relief device limits pressure but cannot by itself prevent a BLEVE (boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion), because the container shell above the liquid can still overheat and fail while the valve works as designed.[7] Its discharge is itself a release of gas: the normal operation of an overpressure relief device can be the first step of a flammable gas combustion explosion.[8]

Types of device

The Fire Protection Handbook describes the devices used on aboveground tanks and pressure vessels in the United States.[1] Pressure-relief valves are frequently of the spring-loaded type. A spring holds a disk on its seat until the inlet pressure overcomes the spring force. The valve then closes again automatically, so that no further gas, vapour or liquid escapes.[2] Rivkin (2008b) describes pressure-relief valves as safety valves designed to relieve excessive pressure.[3] A pilot-operated pressure-relief valve is a main relief valve combined with, and controlled by, a smaller auxiliary relief valve.[2]

A rupture disk device is a non-reclosing differential pressure-relief device, actuated by inlet pressure and designed to work by bursting a disk.[2] The disk is preformed metal that fails at a particular pressure or temperature, and once it has burst it vents the entire contents of the container.[3] The handbook also calls it a frangible or bursting disc.[9] A fusible plug is also non-reclosing: a plug of low-melting metal melts at a set temperature. For compressed natural gas cylinders this is a nominal 74 °C or 100 °C (165 °F or 212 °F), depending on the alloy.[3] A fusible plug responds to temperature, not to pressure, so it protects a cylinder indirectly by opening when the cylinder is heated.[10]

Cutaways of a spring-loaded relief valve, a rupture disk before and after bursting, and a fusible plug
Three basic types of pressure relief device: a spring-loaded valve that recloses, and a rupture disk and fusible plug that stay open.

Rail tank cars show how these elements are combined. A safety vent there is a frangible rupture disk that seals the vent opening and does not reclose; a combination pressure-relief device joins a rupture disk or breaking pin with a spring-operated valve.[11] On tank containers, a rupture disk is often fitted between the valve spring and the lading, to protect the spring from the product.[12] Some nonpressure tank cars also carry a vacuum relief valve, which opens to admit air when a vacuum of more than 0.75 psi (about 5 kPa) develops, for example during unloading, and then recloses.[11] Pressure-vacuum (breather) vents on atmospheric tanks combine pressure and vacuum relief for normal operation, while emergency relief for fire exposure is provided in addition.[1][2]

Why containers need pressure relief

Gases expand when they are heated. In a closed container this raises the pressure, which can end either in a release through a relief valve or in failure of the container; containers can also lose strength in a fire.[13] For a gas that is only in the gaseous state, the combined laws of Boyle and Charles describe the effect closely enough for practical work. They state that the product of absolute pressure and volume, divided by absolute temperature, stays constant for a given mass of gas:[4]

P1V1T1=P2V2T2

Symbol Description Unit
P1,P2 Absolute pressure before and after the change (gauge pressure plus atmospheric pressure) kPa
V1,V2 Gas volume before and after the change m³
T1,T2 Absolute temperature before and after the change K

The handbook's first example takes a cylinder of fixed volume at 21 °C (70 °F) with a gauge pressure of 1000 psi, about 6.9 MPa. Heating it to about 66 °C (150 °F) raises the gauge pressure to about 1155 psi, roughly 8.0 MPa, an increase of about 15 %.[4] In the United States, the upper limit of compressed gas container pressure is restricted only by the economics of construction and is usually 1800 to 3600 psi (about 12.4 to 24.8 MPa).[13] Compressed and liquefied gas containers can hold a large amount of potential energy. A failure releases it, often extremely rapidly and violently, together with the gas and with propulsion of the container or its pieces.[4]

Liquefied gases behave in a more complicated way. On heating, the vapour is compressed as the liquid expands, and the vapour pressure of the liquid rises with its temperature.[4] If the expanding liquid fills the container completely, a small further heat input gives a very large pressure rise. Codes therefore limit the filling density so that a vapour space always remains.[4] Liquefied petroleum gas (LP-gas) vehicle containers show this hazard: a liquid-full container causes the relief valve to open and discharge LP-gas. In US practice described by Rivkin (2008b), containers manufactured after 1 January 1984 and installed in vehicles must therefore have a device that prevents overfilling.[14]

Set pressure and relieving capacity

According to the handbook, the start-to-discharge pressure is set from the strength of the container, while the relieving capacity is in most cases based on the maximum heat input from fire exposure.[5] For underground or insulated containers other causes, such as overfilling, may dominate.[5] Settings differ widely with the duty. A four-stage compressor at a natural gas fuelling station might have relief valves set at 1724, 8618, 9652 and 28,610 kPa (250, 1250, 1400 and 4150 psi), one for each compression stage.[15] On US rail tank cars, as described by C. J. Wright (2008b), pressure-relief valves are set at either 75 % of the tank's test pressure or 33 % of its burst pressure.[11]

The rated capacity assumes that vapour or gas passes the device. If a liquefied gas container exposed to fire tips over, liquid may reach the valve instead. The capacity can then drop by as much as 60 to 70 %, because liquids are more viscous and flow more slowly.[5] For this reason, relief devices on liquefied gas containers should be in direct contact with the vapour space, and portable containers are stored upright.[16] Vehicle LP-gas relief valves are placed at the uppermost point of the container; with an expansion ratio of about 1:260 for propane, any liquid discharge produces a large volume of gas.[14]

Emergency venting of storage tanks

In US practice described by Ordile (2008), most aboveground tanks for flammable and combustible liquids require emergency relief in addition to their normal vents. It protects them if a fire occurs under or around the tank.[2] The relief lets the vapours escape and burn at the vent instead of rupturing the tank. It can take the form of loose manhole covers, weak roof-to-shell seams, rupture disks, remotely actuated vapour depressuring or purpose-built relief devices; a floating roof removes the need.[2] An Atmospheric storage tank with a cone roof and a weakened roof-to-shell seam relieves itself when the roof lifts, while an unvented horizontal tank commonly fails at its ends.[2]

The required venting rate in NFPA 30, as summarised by Ordile (2008), depends on the wetted area. This is the inner tank surface in contact with liquid, assuming a full tank, that a ground fire such as a spill fire can expose.[2] It is taken as 55 % of the exposed area of a sphere or spheroid and 75 % of that of a horizontal tank. For a vertical tank it is the first 9 m (30 ft) of shell above grade.[2] Tabulated venting rates were derived from the probable maximum heat transfer rate, the exposed area, the time to boil the contents and the time to weaken unwetted steel.[2]

Sphere, horizontal tank and vertical tank with the wetted area used for emergency venting shaded
Wetted area for emergency venting as summarised from NFPA 30 (US practice, 2008 handbook): 55 % of a sphere, 75 % of a horizontal tank, the first 9 m of a vertical tank.

For tanks designed for more than 6.9 kPa (1 psig) with a wetted area above 260 m² (2800 ft²), the handbook gives the free-air venting rate as a power law of the wetted area. "Free air" means air at 101 kPa and 15.5 °C.[6] The SI form is:

V˙air=220A0.82

The formula rests on a fire heat input of Q=21,000A0.82 in Btu/h, with A in square feet.[6] For a specific stable liquid, the rate is corrected with its latent heat of vaporisation and its molecular weight:[6]

V˙liq=V˙air3107LM

Symbol Description Unit
V˙air Venting rate expressed as free air (101 kPa, 15.5 °C) m³/h
A Exposed wetted area m²
V˙liq Venting rate for the specific liquid, as free air m³/h
L Latent heat of vaporisation of the liquid kJ/kg
M Molecular weight of the liquid –

NFPA 30, as summarised in the 2008 handbook, allows the result to be multiplied by one reduction factor per tank. The factor is 0.5 for approved drainage on tanks with more than 18.6 m² (200 ft²) of wetted area. It is 0.3 for approved water spray with drainage, approved automatic water spray or approved insulation, and 0.15 for water spray with approved insulation.[6] With some restrictions these factors may be halved for liquids whose heat of combustion and burning rate do not exceed those of ethanol, but never below 0.15.[6] Vents smaller than 200 mm (8 in.) should be flow tested, because the flow characteristics of manufactured vents vary widely.[2]

Worked example. A vertical tank 12 m in diameter and at least 9 m high, designed for more than 6.9 kPa, stores acetone. Its wetted area is the first 9 m of shell: A=π×12×9=339 m², which is above the 260 m² limit.[2] The free-air rate is 220×3390.82≈26,200 m³/h, corresponding to a fire heat input of about 5.1 MW.[6]

Acetone has a molecular weight of 58.08 and a latent heat of vaporisation of 501 kJ/kg.[17] The handbook defines the liquid correction for rates taken from Table 7.2.2; applying it here to the formula result is an extension of that wording.[6] The correction factor is 3107/(50158.08)=0.814, so the tank needs about 21,300 m³/h of free-air venting capacity. With approved automatic water spray, the factor 0.3 lowers this to about 6400 m³/h. The rates are rounded up, to the safe side. The formula agrees within 0.1 % with Table 7.2.3 of the handbook, which lists 28,175 m³/h for 372 m².[6]

Log-log chart of emergency venting rate in cubic metres per hour of free air against wetted area in square metres
Emergency venting rate (free air) against wetted area for aboveground tanks, from Tables 7.2.2 and 7.2.3 and the formula 220 A^0.82 above 260 m².

Applications

Practice for gas containers depends on the gas, as described by Lemoff (2008) for the United States and Canada. A Compressed gas cylinder of hydrogen, oxygen or ethylene is usually protected by frangible (bursting) discs, sometimes combined with fusible plugs. Insulated cryogenic containers, cargo tanks and tank cars of these gases use pressure-relief valves.[9][18] Chlorine cylinders and one-ton containers have fusible plugs, but chlorine tank cars have relief valves.[19] LP-gas containers are generally protected by relief valves, some cylinders by fusible plugs, and most of these containers can suffer a BLEVE.[20] Containers of certain poisonous and highly toxic gases have no relief device at all, because a leaking or early-opening device is judged worse than overpressure; a lowered filling limit gives the safety margin instead.[5] In some countries, especially in Europe, liquefied gas containers are often installed inside buildings and are not given overpressure protection, because a release indoors through a relief device is judged the greater hazard.[5]

Acetylene is a special case. In the United States and Canada, its cylinders carry fusible metal plugs that operate at about 100 °C (212 °F).[21] Because the plugs release both the gas and its solvent, the cylinder drops fully to atmospheric pressure, and a BLEVE in the strict sense cannot occur.[10] Above about 300 °C (570 °F), however, acetylene decomposes so rapidly that the plugs cannot always prevent rupture. A small leak flame that heats a plug can release a torch-like flame up to 3.6 m (12 ft) long.[21] Most acetylene cylinders in Europe and other parts of the world have no relief devices.[21]

Relief devices on containers of a Cryogenic fluid also handle normal boil-off. Liquid hydrogen, for example, is shipped in insulated pressure vessels with reclosing relief valves, which open to relieve the pressure from boil-off caused by heat leaking into the container.[9] Containers of liquefied natural gas (LNG) are likewise protected by relief valves.[22] Most cryogenic storage tanks are pressure vessels whose design pressure is too low to hold the pressure if the liquid warms to atmospheric temperature.[16] LNG vehicle fuel tanks have a relief valve backed by a rupture disk whose burst pressure lies above the valve setting but below the design pressure of the container.[23] In fire tests cited by Rivkin (2008b), the relief valves of an uninsulated cryogenic vessel opened within 1 hour, while with intact insulation and vacuum they did not open for several days.[24]

Vehicle fuel systems follow the same principles. Under NFPA 52, as described in the 2008 handbook, compressed natural gas vehicle containers need one or more relief devices built to Compressed Gas Association pamphlet S-1.1.[25] A shutoff valve should not be installed between the device and the cylinder, and inside a vehicle the vent is piped to the exterior with tubing at least the size of the device.[3] NFPA 58, as described by Rivkin (2008b), prohibits fusible plugs on LP-gas vehicle containers, which can become hot while garaged or in use.[14] A study of a public parking garage found the operation of a container relief valve to be the worst-case release; it produced a brief flammable puff that diffused rapidly.[26]

Relief valves also protect liquid piping. Grill and Johnson (2005a) document the fuel oil rules of the Building Code of the City of New York (Local Law 76). The code required a relief valve between a fuel oil pump and the first shut-off valve. The valve was to discharge at no more than 1.5 times the maximum working pressure, return its discharge to the storage tank or supply line, and have no shut-off valve in its relief line.[27] In the emergency power fuel systems of World Trade Center 7, the pump discharge relief valves were set at 690 to 860 kPa (100 to 125 psi).[28] In US nuclear power plants, a fire probabilistic risk assessment lists the safety relief valves of a boiling water reactor among its components. A fire can make these valves close when they are needed or open when they are not.[29]

Pressure relief and the BLEVE

A relief valve that works exactly as designed cannot prevent a BLEVE of a fire-exposed liquefied gas container.[7] The valve can only lower the pressure to somewhat below its start-to-discharge pressure. The liquid therefore stays above its normal boiling point, and the shell remains stressed in tension.[7] The strength of carbon steel decreases steadily above about 204 °C (400 °F), well below temperatures that a fire can reach.[7] Where the steel is wetted by liquid, the liquid absorbs the heat: while the relief valve is discharging, the propane liquid stays at about 49 to 60 °C (120 to 140 °F). The shell above the liquid, cooled only by vapour, can overheat, tear and fail.[7]

Fire-exposed horizontal LP-gas tank with relief valve discharging, cool liquid-wetted shell and overheated vapour-space shell
A fire-exposed LP-gas tank with its relief valve discharging: the liquid keeps the wetted shell near 49 to 60 °C, while the vapour-space shell can overheat and tear.

The relief setting also raises the energy of a BLEVE when it happens. Propane at 1.9 MPa gauge (275 psig), the maximum relief valve setting, boils at about 57 °C (135 °F), compared with about −40 °C at atmospheric pressure.[5][20] When a container fails while its relief device is operating, often more than half of the liquid flashes to vapour.[7] Relief devices remain useful even so: they extend the time to failure in all cases and can prevent failure under many fire exposures.[16] In fire tests on LP-gas rail tank cars, a BLEVE occurred after 93 minutes for an insulated car and after 25 minutes for an uninsulated one.[30] For a Rail tank car or any other liquefied gas container, the relief device is therefore one safeguard among several, next to insulation, cooling water and product control with remotely closing valves.[5][30][31]

Discharge hazards, installation and maintenance

A relief device turns a container failure into a controlled release, but the release is still hazardous. The first step of a flammable gas combustion explosion can be the normal operation of an overpressure relief device.[8] Burning gas from one device can impinge on nearby containers and make their devices operate too, which adds to the heat flux of the fire.[26] Sprinklers have greatly reduced the number of cylinder relief devices that operate in a fire.[32]

In process plants, releases through relief valves, accidental or intentional, may be captured by a vent header and sent to a flare, which must then be designed for the expected flows.[33] Vent outlets on tanks designed for 17 kPa (2.5 psi) or more should be arranged so that a vent fire cannot overheat any part of the tank.[34] NFPA 55 (2005 edition), as quoted in the handbook, requires relief devices of certain gas containers to be vented directly outdoors or to an exhaust hood.[35]

The handbook stresses that inspection, maintenance and replacement of these devices were essentially unregulated in the United States.[5] A device must not be blocked by corrosion or paint, nor damaged mechanically. Portable containers should be checked whenever they enter a facility, are connected or are filled.[16] Spring-loaded relief valves on larger stationary containers should be tested at five- to ten-year intervals, more often in corrosive or reactive service.[16]

Water must not be sprayed onto the relief valve of a cryogenic container, because it can freeze and make the valve inoperative.[32][16] On US tank containers, tanks and relief devices must be retested at intervals of no more than 5 years.[36] For hazardous materials responders, a relief valve that is operating is one of the clues that a container is leaking.[37]

Relation to explosion protection

Pressure relief devices protect against pressure rises from heating, overfilling and other abnormal conditions.[1][5] Explosion venting protects an enclosure against a deflagration and uses vent panels or rupture discs that open after ignition, early in the explosion.[38] Zalosh (2002) notes that such vents cannot be used against detonations, because the peak pressure arrives instantly with the shock front.[38] Where a vessel is designed to contain a deflagration, no credit is taken for relief devices on the vessel.[39]

Runaway chemical reactions form a separate design problem. Emergency vents for reactive systems require scale-up calculations based on the reaction chemistry, heat transfer and the possible presence of two-phase vent flow.[40] Zalosh (2008) adds that on-site audits are needed after design, given the poor record of many facilities in installing and maintaining relief devices.[40] In quantitative risk assessment for the chemical process industries, relief valves count as a safety system response that mitigates an event.[41]

See also

Notes

  1. ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 Ordile (2008), p. 7-19.
  2. ↑ 2.00 2.01 2.02 2.03 2.04 2.05 2.06 2.07 2.08 2.09 2.10 2.11 2.12 Ordile (2008), p. 7-20.
  3. ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 Rivkin (2008b), p. 21-70.
  4. ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 Lemoff (2008), p. 6-169.
  5. ↑ 5.00 5.01 5.02 5.03 5.04 5.05 5.06 5.07 5.08 5.09 Lemoff (2008), p. 6-170.
  6. ↑ 6.0 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.6 6.7 6.8 Ordile (2008), p. 7-21.
  7. ↑ 7.0 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 Lemoff (2008), p. 6-171.
  8. ↑ 8.0 8.1 Lemoff (2008), p. 6-174.
  9. ↑ 9.0 9.1 9.2 Lemoff (2008), p. 6-181.
  10. ↑ 10.0 10.1 Lemoff (2008), p. 6-177.
  11. ↑ 11.0 11.1 11.2 C. J. Wright (2008b), p. 21-130.
  12. ↑ C. J. Wright (2008b), p. 21-133.
  13. ↑ 13.0 13.1 Lemoff (2008), p. 6-168.
  14. ↑ 14.0 14.1 14.2 Rivkin (2008b), p. 21-73.
  15. ↑ Rivkin (2008b), p. 21-63.
  16. ↑ 16.0 16.1 16.2 16.3 16.4 16.5 Lemoff and Rivkin (2008), p. 7-40.
  17. ↑ Babrauskas (2008a), p. 6-270.
  18. ↑ Lemoff (2008), p. 6-185.
  19. ↑ Lemoff (2008), p. 6-180.
  20. ↑ 20.0 20.1 Lemoff (2008), p. 6-183.
  21. ↑ 21.0 21.1 21.2 Lemoff (2008), p. 6-178.
  22. ↑ Lemoff (2008), p. 6-182.
  23. ↑ Rivkin (2008b), p. 21-71.
  24. ↑ Rivkin (2008b), p. 21-59.
  25. ↑ Rivkin (2008b), p. 21-69.
  26. ↑ 26.0 26.1 Rivkin (2008b), p. 21-58.
  27. ↑ Grill and Johnson (2005a), p. 6.
  28. ↑ Grill and Johnson (2005a), p. 43.
  29. ↑ Nowlen et al. (2005b), p. 2-2.
  30. ↑ 30.0 30.1 Lemoff (2008), p. 6-172.
  31. ↑ Lemoff (2008), p. 6-173.
  32. ↑ 32.0 32.1 Lemoff (2008), p. 6-176.
  33. ↑ Beyler (2002a), pp. 3-268–3-269.
  34. ↑ Ordile (2008), p. 7-22.
  35. ↑ Lemoff and Rivkin (2008), p. 7-39.
  36. ↑ C. J. Wright (2008b), p. 21-132.
  37. ↑ C. J. Wright (2008a), p. 13-127.
  38. ↑ 38.0 38.1 Zalosh (2002), p. 3-414.
  39. ↑ Ural and Garzia (2008), p. 17-154.
  40. ↑ 40.0 40.1 Zalosh (2008), p. 2-102.
  41. ↑ Barry (2002), p. 5-181.

References

  • Babrauskas, V. (2008a). Tables and charts. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 6-269–6-294). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Barry, T. F. (2002). Quantitative risk assessment in chemical process industries. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 5-176–5-213). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
  • Beyler, C. L. (2002a). Fire hazard calculations for large, open hydrocarbon fires. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 3-268–3-314). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
  • Grill, R. A., & Johnson, D. A. (2005a). Documentation of the fuel system for emergency power in World Trade Center 7 (NIST NCSTAR 1-1J). National Institute of Standards and Technology.
  • Lemoff, T. C. (2008). Gases. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 6-165–6-186). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Lemoff, T. C., & Rivkin, C. H. (2008). Storage of gases. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 7-35–7-42). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Nowlen, S. P., Najafi, B., Wyant, F. J., Forester, J., Kazarians, M., Kolaczkowski, A., Joglar, F., Funk, D., Hannaman, G., & Anoba, R. (2005b). EPRI/NRC-RES fire PRA methodology for nuclear power facilities: Vol. 2. Detailed methodology (NUREG/CR-6850; EPRI 1011989). Electric Power Research Institute; U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research.
  • Ordile, A. M. (2008). Storage of flammable and combustible liquids. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 7-15–7-33). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Rivkin, C. H. (2008b). Vehicle fueling using gaseous fuels. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 21-41–21-76). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Ural, E. A., & Garzia, H. W. (2008). Explosion prevention and protection. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 17-141–17-165). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Wright, C. J. (2008a). Managing the response to hazardous material incidents. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 13-117–13-144). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Wright, C. J. (2008b). Rail transportation systems. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 21-109–21-134). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Zalosh, R. (2002). Explosion protection. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 3-402–3-421). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
  • Zalosh, R. (2008). Explosions. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 2-93–2-106). National Fire Protection Association.