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Contents
  1. 1Bridges compared with tunnels
  2. 2Recorded bridge fires
  3. 3Fire exposure from vehicles and fuel spills
  4. 4Effect of fire on the bridge structure
  5. 5Fire protection of road bridges
  6. 6Rail bridges and trestles
  7. 7Water supply and fire department access
  8. 8See also
  9. 9Notes
  10. 10References

A bridge fire is a fire on or beneath a bridge, such as a burning vehicle, a tanker fuel spill or waste stored under the deck, that threatens its users or its structure.[1] The NFPA Fire Protection Handbook treats road bridges in the same chapter as road tunnels; like tunnels, bridges give emergency responders very limited access.[2] For the same fire size, motorists on an open bridge avoid the trapped heat and smoke of a tunnel, but the bridge supports can still be damaged. A severe fire on or under a bridge can therefore endanger people on and below it.[1]

Cargo rules are also far less strict on bridges than in tunnels, so very large fires are possible.[1] Three fires on Interstate 95 in the United States between 1996 and 2004, one caused by burning tyres and two by tanker trucks, buckled spans and damaged steel girders.[1] Protection rests on fire resistance of the structure, drainage that keeps burning fuel away from it, standpipes, emergency communications and an emergency response plan.[1][3] Railways protect their bridges and trestles mainly by fire prevention and by replacing combustible structures.[4]

Bridges compared with tunnels

The handbook's chapter on road tunnels and bridges covers bridges that carry road vehicles over another road, a railroad, a waterway or a valley.[2] The 2004 edition of NFPA 502, Standard for Road Tunnels, Bridges, and Other Limited Access Highways, gives fire protection requirements for road bridges with spans of more than 122 m (400 ft).[1] In the US NFIRS reporting system, fires in or on bridge structures can count as structure fires rather than building fires; vehicle fires are recorded separately. NFIRS has a property-use type for bridges and trestles.[5]

The comparison with a tunnel fire explains the special character of a bridge fire. In a tunnel, the motorists and the fire share one long compartment, which makes evacuation and rescue far more difficult.[2] On a bridge, the smoke and heat escape into the open air.[1] However, most bridges, like tunnels, give emergency responders only limited access. Emergency response planning is therefore recommended for longer bridges.[1]

Side view of a girder bridge with a burning tanker on the deck and a burning tyre pile beneath it, smoke rising freely into the air
Two bridge fire scenarios: a vehicle or fuel fire on the deck and a fire in stored material under the deck. Heat and smoke escape upwards, but the flames attack girders and piers.

Two further factors raise the hazard. First, cargo restrictions are far less strict on bridges than in tunnels and probably do not exist at all beneath bridges, so the potential for a large fire is greater. Second, more lightweight and double-decked bridges are being built, which is likely to make the fire resistance of the structure more important.[1] On a double-decked bridge, a fire on the lower level can attack the supports of the upper level.[3]

Recorded bridge fires

The handbook describes three fires on Interstate 95 (I-95) in the United States. In 1996, a fire under an elevated section of I-95 near Philadelphia caused three spans of the 26-span Westmoreland Viaduct, 520 m (1707 ft) long, to buckle. The fuel was a stack of discarded tyres in an illegal dump underneath the viaduct.[1] The handbook's chapter on juvenile firesetting reports a similar case: in March 1996, a group of youths set fire to an illegal tyre dump beneath an interstate highway. The damage to the overpasses was estimated at $8 million, and traffic was disrupted for months during the repair.[6]

In 1998, a tanker truck carrying about 32,900 L (8,700 gal) of gasoline swerved on I-95 in Pennsylvania, jumped the Jersey barrier into the southbound lanes and exploded after striking a pickup truck there. Both drivers died. Nine steel support girders and 20 to 24 m (65 to 80 ft) of the bridge over Chester Creek were damaged.[1] In 2004, a tanker carrying about 45,400 L (12,000 gal) of fuel oil collided with another vehicle and caught fire on I-95 near Bridgeport, Connecticut. According to the handbook, the fire was hot enough to melt the steel support beams of the bridge over Howard Avenue, and I-95 was closed in both directions.[1]

Two of these fires involved a cargo tank vehicle, the tank truck that is the most common road vehicle for moving combustible, flammable and corrosive liquids. When such a vehicle crashes, the disaster potential is substantial.[7] The hazards to fire fighters include the release of large quantities of hazardous material and a boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion (BLEVE).[8] Routhier's advice for a burning vehicle tyre says internal heat build-up makes it hard to extinguish: portable extinguishers normally only control open flames, while large quantities of water are needed for cooling.[7] Babrauskas reported in 2002 that several tyre-dump fires involved smouldering, for which he found no quantified heat release rate data.[9]

Fire exposure from vehicles and fuel spills

For road tunnels, NFPA 502 (2008 edition) lists typical peak heat release rates of vehicle fires. They are 5 to 10 MW for a passenger car, 20 to 30 MW for a bus, 70 to 200 MW for a heavy goods truck and 200 to 300 MW for a tanker. Peak values may be reached within 10 minutes, and in a tunnel the temperatures directly above the fire can reach 1000 to 1400 °C.[10] As a separate indicative value, Van Rossum lists 8.5 MW for a car's peak heat release rate.[11] Full-scale tests in the Runehamar tunnel in Norway in 2003 showed that a heavy goods vehicle carrying furniture or foam mattresses could produce 75 to 200 MW.[12] The same vehicles cross bridges, often with fewer cargo restrictions.[1]

Horizontal range bar chart of peak heat release rates: car 5 to 10 MW, several cars 10 to 20, bus 20 to 30, heavy goods truck 70 to 200, tanker 200 to 300 MW
Typical peak heat release rates of vehicle fires used as design fires in NFPA 502 (2008 edition), as summarised in the 2008 handbook.

A tanker fire can involve a pool fire, which develops when spilled liquid is ignited.[13] For the tanker design fire, NFPA 502 asks for drainage that limits the area and duration of the pool fire.[10] The pool area is the key quantity. A given amount of liquid burns for a long time over a small area, or for a short time over a large spill area.[13]

Unconfined spills are thin. Limited tests, mostly with jet fuel, water and foam, suggest that releases of 95 L or more approach about 0.3 m² per litre of spill area, a depth of 2.8 to 4 mm. For maximum fire size, Gottuk and White suggest about 155 % of the initial spill area, based on limited observations of spread after ignition.[14]

The heat release rate of a large pool is the burning rate per unit area multiplied by the heat of combustion and the pool area. For smaller pools, an empirical factor that depends on the pool diameter reduces this value.[15] The flame height follows from the heat release rate and the pool diameter.[15] The burning duration follows from the volume of fuel and the rate at which the liquid surface drops.[13] Q˙=m˙″ΔHc,effAf(1−e−kβD) Hf=0.235Q˙2/5−1.02D tb=4VπD2ν,ν=m˙″ρ

Symbol Description Unit
Q˙ Heat release rate of the pool fire kW
m˙″ Mass burning rate per unit area kg/(m²·s)
ΔHc,eff Effective heat of combustion kJ/kg
Af Horizontal burning area of the pool m²
kβ Empirical constant m⁻¹
D Pool diameter m
Hf Flame height (height reached by the flames at least 50 % of the time) m
tb Burning duration s
V Volume of liquid m³
ν Regression rate (fall of the liquid surface) m/s
ρ Liquid density kg/m³

For large gasoline pools, the SFPE Handbook gives a burning rate of 0.055 kg/(m²·s), a heat of combustion of 43.7 MJ/kg, a density of 740 kg/m³ and kβ = 2.1 m⁻¹. These values apply to fires burning in the open.[16] They are inputs for the illustrative calculation below.

As a worked example, take the lower NFPA 502 tanker design fire of 200 MW.[10] A large gasoline pool releases 0.055 × 43,700 ≈ 2,400 kW per square metre, so 200 MW needs a pool of about 83 m², or about 10 m in diameter. For a pool this size the empirical factor is practically 1. The flame height is 0.235 × 200,0000.4 − 1.02 × 10.3 ≈ 21 m. A girder directly over the pool at a lower height would fall within this flame-height estimate; the calculation does not predict its temperature or failure.

Hypothetical gasoline pool 10 m across with a calculated 21 m flame height next to an illustrative bridge pier and deck
Hypothetical pool-fire calculation: gasoline burning over about 83 m² (10 m diameter) would give about 200 MW and a mean flame height of about 21 m.

The liquid surface drops by 0.055/740 ≈ 7.4 × 10⁻⁵ m/s, or about 4.5 mm per minute. If the full 32.9 m³ load of the 1998 tanker stayed in this 83 m² pool, it would burn for about 5,330 s, or roughly 89 minutes.[16][13][1] This would be a contained pool about 0.4 m deep, not an unconfined road-surface spill. The result assumes a constant area, steady burning in still air, and no loss through drains or joints; it is not a prediction of the I-95 fire.

Effect of fire on the bridge structure

Two of the three I-95 bridges had steel girders or beams, so the behaviour of steel in fire governed the damage. Steel loses significant stiffness above about 316 °C (600 °F) and significant strength above about 538 °C (1000 °F). Its thermal expansion reaches about 0.008 of its length at 600 °C.[17] A member heated uniformly to that temperature and free to expand would therefore grow by about 80 mm per 10 m of length. The different steel grades used in buildings and bridges lose strength in a similar way at fire temperatures.[17]

Fire engineers often express failure as a critical temperature, the temperature at which a material loses so much strength that it can no longer carry its load. North American standards (ASTM E119) assume 538 °C for structural steel, a typical failure temperature for columns under full design load. For steel inside concrete, the critical temperature is 593 °C for reinforcing steel and 426 °C for prestressing steel.[18] Concrete can also spall when it is exposed to high and rapidly rising temperatures. Layers break off the surface, sometimes violently, and extensive spalling can expose the reinforcement; high-strength concrete is thought to be more susceptible than normal-strength concrete.[18]

Temperature scale marking steel stiffness loss at 316 °C, strength loss at 538 °C, prestressing steel 426 °C and the UL 1709 furnace at 1093 °C
Key temperatures for bridge steel in fire: stiffness and strength loss, critical temperatures for structural, reinforcing and prestressing steel, and the UL 1709 hydrocarbon test temperature.

Two standard test curves, in ASTM E1529 and UL 1709, are significantly more severe than the standard building fire curve of ASTM E119. They are intended for structures that must withstand a hydrocarbon fuel fire.[19] The UL 1709 rapid-rise test, which simulates exposure to a large hydrocarbon pool fire, reaches a furnace temperature of 1093 °C within 5 minutes, with a heat flux of 204 kW/m².[20] Van Rossum lists the hydrocarbon curve, which simulates an oil or gas fire, among the less common fire curves that are more severe than the standard curve. Such curves are agreed temperature–time relations and do not, in principle, describe a real fire.[21]

After a fire, the steel has to be assessed. Tests on steel from fire-exposed buildings have shown that the yield strength can drop from its original mill value to the specified minimum, but not below it. Distorted members that can be straightened need a full evaluation of their properties, and connections should be checked for cracks around fastener holes and welds. Steel heated to about 870 °C or more becomes coarse-grained "burnt" steel, and whether it can be reused is a matter of individual judgement.[17] Timber bridges and trestles bring a different problem. Timber in piers, bridges and trestles is often pressure-treated against decay, and oil-type preservatives such as creosote can increase the fire hazard compared with untreated wood.[22]

Fire protection of road bridges

As summarised in the 2008 handbook, NFPA 502 asks that seven elements be considered for long-span road bridges: emergency communications, signage, traffic control, fire suppression, drainage, control of hazardous materials and emergency response planning.[1] Where the authority having jurisdiction requires them, emergency telephone boxes, alarm stations or radio transmitters are installed. They should be conspicuous and numbered, and placed where motorists can stop clear of the traffic lanes.[1] Mile markers or other location signs help motorists report exactly where an incident is. A traffic control procedure makes vehicles stop or proceed with caution, so that they do not block fire apparatus.[1][3]

Where the distance from an acceptable water supply to any point on the bridge exceeds 122 m (400 ft), the bridge gets a Class I standpipe system to NFPA 14. The maximum flow is 1893 L/min (500 gpm) for one hour. Hose connections are placed so that no point on the roadway is more than 45.7 m (150 ft) from one, with a spacing of no more than 83.8 m (275 ft). Each independent standpipe system has two fire department connections.[3]

Plan and section of a long road bridge with a standpipe, hose connections at most 83.8 m apart, two fire department connections and deck drains
Fire protection of a long road bridge as summarised from NFPA 502 in the 2008 handbook: Class I standpipe, hose connections, fire department connections and deck drainage.

Drainage is the element most specific to bridges. Drains should channel and collect spilled hazardous or flammable liquids to areas where they cannot cause further hazards. Expansion joints should be designed so that liquid cannot spill onto the area below.[3] Hazardous materials are controlled under Chapter 13 of NFPA 502. The operator must also have written emergency response procedures under Chapter 12, and the handbook recommends a plan similar to that for road tunnels.[3]

Rail bridges and trestles

For railways, fire prevention is the key to keeping bridges and trestles in service. Maintenance should keep a clearance of 7.6 to 15 m (25 to 50 ft) between combustible structures and nearby vegetation. The fire risk can be reduced by fire-retardant treatment, water barrels, fire detection, standby pipe and hose systems and guard service.[4] Some particularly valuable bridges have fireboats or water buckets for helicopters. Others have noncombustible segments at regular intervals, which limit the damage if a fire occurs. The 2008 handbook says most railroads had been replacing combustible bridges with noncombustible construction whenever possible.[4]

A rail emergency on a bridge is dangerous for responders. On bridges and in tunnels with several tracks there is usually no working space except on the tracks. Until the railway confirms that all trains in the area have stopped, there is no safe place to work.[23] Passengers face a similar limit: tunnels, bridges and other elevated sections restrict how far they can move away from a burning train.[24] In a fire hazard analysis for passenger rail, the bridges and tunnels on the route are among the features of the operating environment to identify.[25] On a rail transit system, elevated trainways need their own means of egress and can block fire department access to buildings next to them.[26]

Water supply and fire department access

Bridges over rivers or tidal water can give access to an alternative water supply for fire fighting. Where a bridge passes over tidewater, a permanently installed deep-well pump can deliver water to a point convenient for fire department pumpers. Pumps on boats and fireboats can supply large quantities of water from river and harbour sources.[27] Stewart illustrates a bridge-mounted dry hydrant, with a fixed suction line into the water, for nonfreezing conditions.[28]

The bridge itself can limit fire fighting. In the United States, many older bridges were designed for much lighter vehicles than those in use today. In one US state with more than 15,000 bridges, half were posted below their original load limits, and a quarter of those were unsafe for a fully loaded school bus or fire apparatus.[29] Fire departments should check that every bridge and culvert in their response area can carry every responding vehicle. Where a bridge is too weak, a pumper can draw water from the river and pump it across the bridge through large hose lines.[30] In some US states, a mobile water supply vehicle may not park on a bridge to fill, because it would block traffic.[30]

See also

Notes

  1. ↑ 1.00 1.01 1.02 1.03 1.04 1.05 1.06 1.07 1.08 1.09 1.10 1.11 1.12 1.13 1.14 1.15 1.16 Bendelius (2008), p. 21-210.
  2. ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 Bendelius (2008), p. 21-187.
  3. ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 Bendelius (2008), p. 21-211.
  4. ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 C. J. Wright (2008b), p. 21-111.
  5. ↑ Ahrens et al. (2008), pp. 3-67, 3-81.
  6. ↑ Schwartzman (2008), p. 5-91.
  7. ↑ 7.0 7.1 Routhier (2008), p. 21-23.
  8. ↑ Routhier (2008), p. 21-24.
  9. ↑ Babrauskas (2002b), p. 3-27.
  10. ↑ 10.0 10.1 10.2 Bendelius (2008), p. 21-204.
  11. ↑ Van Rossum (2027), §4.5.
  12. ↑ Mawhinney (2008), p. 16-140.
  13. ↑ 13.0 13.1 13.2 13.3 Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. 3-8.
  14. ↑ Gottuk and White (2002), p. 2-298.
  15. ↑ 15.0 15.1 Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. 3-17.
  16. ↑ 16.0 16.1 Babrauskas (2002b), p. 3-26.
  17. ↑ 17.0 17.1 17.2 Pessiki (2008), p. 19-71.
  18. ↑ 18.0 18.1 Kodur and Harmathy (2002), p. 1-163.
  19. ↑ Hirschler (2008a), p. 6-39.
  20. ↑ Janssens (2008), p. 2-67.
  21. ↑ Van Rossum (2027), §8.6.
  22. ↑ Shaw (2008), p. 6-137.
  23. ↑ C. J. Wright (2008b), p. 21-114.
  24. ↑ Bukowski (2002), p. 5-229.
  25. ↑ Bukowski (2002), p. 5-232.
  26. ↑ Peacock (2008), p. 21-107.
  27. ↑ Edwards (2008), p. 15-20.
  28. ↑ Stewart (2008), p. 13-44.
  29. ↑ Stewart (2008), p. 13-51.
  30. ↑ 30.0 30.1 Stewart (2008), p. 13-50.

References

  • Ahrens, M., Frazier, P., & Kelch, G. (2008). Use of fire incident data and statistics. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 3-61–3-92). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Babrauskas, V. (2002b). Heat release rates. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 3-1–3-37). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
  • Bendelius, A. G. (2008). Road tunnels and bridges. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 21-187–21-212). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Bukowski, R. W. (2002). Fire hazard assessment for transportation vehicles. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 5-227–5-233). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
  • Edwards, B. A. (2008). Fixed water storage supplies for fire protection. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 15-3–15-21). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Gottuk, D. T., & White, D. A. (2002). Liquid fuel fires. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 2-297–2-316). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
  • Hirschler, M. M. (2008a). Concepts and protocols of fire testing. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 6-35–6-60). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Iqbal, N., & Salley, M. H. (2004). Fire Dynamics Tools (FDTs): Quantitative fire hazard analysis methods for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Fire Protection Inspection Program (NUREG-1805). U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
  • Janssens, M. L. (2008). Basics of fire containment. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 2-59–2-74). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Kodur, V. K. R., & Harmathy, T. Z. (2002). Properties of building materials. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 1-155–1-181). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
  • Mawhinney, J. R. (2008). Water mist fire suppression systems. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 16-135–16-180). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Peacock, T. (2008). Fixed guideway transit and light rail systems. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 21-101–21-107). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Pessiki, S. (2008). Analyzing structural fire damage. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 19-65–19-76). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Routhier, B. (2008). Fire safety in commercial vehicles. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 21-15–21-27). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Schwartzman, P. (2008). Juvenile firesetting. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 5-87–5-102). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Shaw, J. R. (2008). Fire-Retardant and flame-resistant treatment of cellulosic materials. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 6-129–6-139). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Stewart, L. J. (2008). Alternate water supplies. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 13-37–13-52). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Van Rossum, E. (2027). Introduction to Fire Safety Engineering. Fire Safety Academy.
  • Wright, C. J. (2008b). Rail transportation systems. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 21-109–21-134). National Fire Protection Association.