Contents
- 1Terminology and purpose
- 2Origin in United States regulation and standards
- 3The initial stage: two in, two out
- 4Dedicated crews as the incident grows
- 5Role in incident command and risk management
- 6Activation, communication and locating a missing member
- 7Limitations and wider use
- 8See also
- 9Notes
- 10References
A rapid intervention crew (RIC) is a crew assigned to be available for firefighter rescue at an emergency incident. As the incident grows, the handbook calls for a dedicated crew with rescue equipment. The NFPA Fire Protection Handbook (2008) also uses the terms rapid intervention team (RIT) and rapid intervention company.[1][2] The concept is part of United States fire service practice. The handbook describes it in connection with NFPA 1500, Standard on Fire Department Occupational Safety and Health Program, and NFPA 1561 on incident management. It also relates it to the "two in/two out" requirement of the federal respiratory protection rule 29 CFR 1910.134.[3]
In the initial stage of a structure fire, at least four members are needed: two working as a crew inside the hazard area and two outside who are available for their rescue.[1] Once a second crew is assigned to or begins working in the hazard area, at least one rapid intervention crew should be provided; as an incident grows it should be dedicated to that task.[1] The incident safety officer should ensure that such a crew is available and ready for deployment.[4] Planning guidance in the handbook includes a rapid intervention team in each of four hazard or area categories in its table of typical initial attack responses.[5] Such a crew does not guarantee safety: in a 2002 training fire in Florida with a designated rapid intervention team, two firefighters died after a flashover.[6]
Terminology and purpose
The sources use several names for the same function. Loflin (2008) writes of the "rapid intervention crew/company (RIC)", while Granito (2008), Denlinger (2008) and Duggan (2008) speak of rapid intervention teams.[1][7][8][9] A training prop for this work is described as the "Rapid Intervention Team (RIT) prop, also known as FAST prop or RIC prop".[2] Granito (2008) lists "standby rapid intervention/fire fighter rescue" among the tasks that structural fire suppression in an urban setting involves. Many of these tasks must be done almost simultaneously to ensure effective and safe operations.[10]
Its aim is to reduce Firefighter injuries and fatalities. Denlinger (2008) notes that rescue companies may be assigned as rapid intervention teams, with a focus on reducing injury and death to firefighters operating at fires.[8] Teele (2008) describes the situations involved. Firefighters can become trapped or disoriented and can lose contact with others in their crews, and disoriented behaviour during escape is particularly associated with deaths from smoke inhalation.[11] Even firefighters wearing breathing apparatus face similar dangers if they operate beyond the time limits of their air supply.[11]
The rapid intervention crew is one of several safety provisions in firefighting that were introduced after continuing line-of-duty deaths. Granito (2008) describes protocols from OSHA, NFPA, the National Fallen Fire Fighters Foundation Initiative, state agencies, fire departments and labour organisations. They call for on-scene safety officers, incident command teams, rapid intervention teams for firefighter rescue and personnel accountability systems.[7] All of these imply additional personnel at an incident beyond those needed for typical operations.[7]
Origin in United States regulation and standards
NFPA's incident management standard, NFPA 1561, expanded the use of rapid intervention crews for the rescue of members in its 1995 edition. Its 2002 edition again addressed rapid intervention crews, together with the roles of the incident safety officer and defined command structures.[3] During the 1997 revision cycle, recommendations for firefighting during the incipient stages of an incident, "for the initial rapid intervention crew", were added to NFPA 1500.[12] This crew required sufficient personnel to conduct an "initial operation" in an atmosphere that was potentially or actually immediately dangerous to life and health (IDLH).[3] OSHA defines an IDLH atmosphere as one that poses an immediate hazard to life or produces immediate irreversible debilitating effects on health.[3]
The NFPA debate coincided with OSHA's public review of 29 CFR 1910.134, Respiratory Protection, which contained the "two in/two out" requirements.[3] Loflin (2008) records that the citing of fire departments under this rule caused a great deal of confusion and resistance among fire service leaders and their governing bodies. The inconsistency was resolved only when the revised NFPA 1500 was passed in May 1997 and OSHA issued its rules in January 1998. The 1997 edition of NFPA 1500 included a comparison of its requirements with those of the OSHA rule.[3]
Granito (2008) separately dates a four-person stipulation to 1995. He describes "an important stipulation put into effect in 1995, and continuing": a minimum of four trained personnel must be at the scene of a structure fire before an interior attack is launched. The only exception is the most extenuating circumstances.[13] Both OSHA and NFPA had issued documents on this. Granito adds that governmental agencies in the United States and in certain other countries had issued regulations and advisories requiring trained incident commanders and standby safety or rescue crews for certain emergency operations.[13] Granito does not name the other countries.
The initial stage: two in, two out
Kreckie (2008) quotes the OSHA requirement in 29 CFR 1910.134(g)(4) for interior structural firefighting. At least two employees enter the IDLH atmosphere and remain in visual or voice contact with one another at all times, and at least two employees are located outside it.[14] All employees engaged in interior structural firefighting use Self-contained breathing apparatus.[14] Kreckie notes that the rule is known in the industry as the "two-in/two-out" rule.[14]
Loflin (2008) describes the same arrangement for the initial stage of a working structure fire, when only one crew is operating in the hazardous area. A minimum of four individuals is then required: two working as a crew in the hazard area and two outside it, available for assistance or rescue.[1] The initial stage covers the tasks of the first arriving company while only one crew is assigned to or operating in the hazardous area. As an illustration, only half of this minimum team of four works inside.[1]
The two standby members have their own tasks. They should maintain constant awareness of the number and identity of the members in the hazardous area, their location and function, and their time of entry. They should also remain in radio, visual, voice or signal line communication with the crew.[1] For the incident as a whole, the Personnel accountability system serves a similar purpose: the incident commander should maintain awareness of the location and function of all companies.[15]
NFPA 1500, as described by Loflin (2008), gives three examples of how a team of four could be deployed. In the first, the team leader and one firefighter advance a hose line into the IDLH atmosphere, while the other firefighter and the pump operator are the standby members. In the second, the team leader designates the pump operator as incident commander and then enters with one firefighter, leaving the other firefighter and the pump operator outside. In the third, the two firefighters advance the hose line while the team leader and the pump operator remain outside.[1]
The four-person minimum is also the threshold for interior attack by volunteers. NFPA 1720, as summarised by Denlinger (2008), states that volunteer fire companies should not conduct interior firefighting operations unless at least four trained members are on the scene. To guarantee an effective working crew, many volunteer departments require the first apparatus to respond with at least three members.[16] The second national needs assessment of the US fire service, made in 2005 by the US Fire Administration and NFPA, found a shortfall here. Many fire departments failed to deliver a first-arriving complement of at least four firefighters. That number is the minimum needed to initiate an interior attack safely.[17][18]
Dedicated crews as the incident grows
Once a second crew is assigned to or operating in the hazardous area, the incident should no longer be considered to be in its initial stage. At least one rapid intervention crew or company should then be provided.[1] Loflin (2008) lists both on-scene members designated and dedicated as the rapid intervention crew, and on-scene members performing other functions but ready to redeploy to rapid intervention duties. Responders should not be assigned to the crew if abandoning their critical tasks to perform a rescue would clearly jeopardise the safety and health of any member.[1]
As the incident expands in size or complexity, Loflin (2008) calls for a dedicated crew. Expansion includes the point at which the incident commander requests resources beyond the department's initial attack assignment.[1] When those additional resources arrive, the dedicated crew should take one of two forms. It should consist either of on-scene members designated and dedicated as the rapid intervention crew, or of crews or companies located for rapid deployment and dedicated to that role.[1]
Several rules govern rescue operations themselves. During firefighter rescue operations, each company should remain intact. At least one dedicated rapid intervention company should be in standby mode with rescue equipment. It covers members performing special operations and members in positions where equipment failure or collapse would present an immediate danger of injury.[1] When more than one crew is deployed, the appointment of a rescue group supervisor should be considered, to manage the companies and coordinate rescue attempts. Whenever a rapid intervention crew is deployed, the incident commander should designate another one in standby mode.[1]
The planning chapter of the handbook shows the resulting staffing. In Granito's table of typical initial attack responses, a rapid intervention team is listed in addition to the stated minimum numbers of firefighters in each of four hazard or area categories. For low-hazard occupancies such as one- to three-family dwellings the table gives at least 14 firefighters and 1 chief officer, plus a safety officer and a rapid intervention team.[5] For high-hazard occupancies it gives at least 24 firefighters and 2 chief officers, and states that one or more safety officers and rapid intervention teams are also necessary.[5] The table does not state how many members a rapid intervention team should have.[5]
Role in incident command and risk management
Discussing NFPA 1500, Loflin (2008) lists rapid intervention crews among the components needed for effective operational risk management in the incident command system. The same list includes standard operating procedures, full protective equipment, an incident safety officer, adequate resources and a pessimistic evaluation of changing conditions.[4] The Incident safety officer should ensure that a rapid intervention crew meeting the criteria of Chapter 8 of NFPA 1500 is available and ready for deployment.[4] At hazardous materials incidents the safety officer meets the incident commander to determine rapid intervention needs. After special operations incidents, the officer's report for the post-incident analysis covers issues relating to rapid intervention crews.[4]
Klaene and Sanders (2008) list rapid intervention crews among the subjects on which every department should have standard operating procedures. Such procedures are especially important at large incidents that need more resources than one department can provide. Where mutual aid is likely, all responding departments should use the same procedures and train together to ensure safe and predictable operations.[19] Their size-up checklist also lists "accountability and rapid intervention" among the life safety factors that the incident commander evaluates.[20]
Granito (2008) presents rapid intervention team protocols, together with incident command systems and qualified safety officers, as part of the reasonable and prudent action that officials must be able to demonstrate.[21] The federal needs assessment described by Jenaway (2008) also counted rapid intervention teams as a separate category of fire department resources.[17] Granito also counts the necessity for safety officers and rapid intervention teams among the technical questions that arise in planning public fire protection.[22]
Activation, communication and locating a missing member
The radio procedures in the handbook provide for reporting a member in trouble. Its emergency traffic procedure includes the clear-text messages "fire fighter down", "fire fighter missing" and "fire fighter trapped".[15] Emergency traffic can be declared by the incident commander, a division or group supervisor, or the member in trouble, and it clears the radio channel for the emergency message.[15] Loflin's table of communication issues states that "Mayday" signals a life-or-death situation. Ideally, every firefighter in an IDLH atmosphere would carry a portable radio with an emergency distress feature.[23]
Distress calls are not always heard. NIST records that a firefighter trapped during the 1993 World Trade Center bombing called a mayday, but the incident commander could not communicate well because of the volume of radio traffic.[24] On 19 March 2001 an FDNY firefighter trapped during firefighting called Mayday several times on a new digital radio without being heard. He was rescued, and the radios were recalled two days later.[25] The same table notes that a culture of bravery can make firefighters reluctant to call for help quickly enough.[23]
A personal alert safety system (PASS) provides an automatic call for help when a firefighter is suddenly incapacitated and cannot activate the alarm.[11] Duggan (2008) describes automated location systems that give a directional pointer to a firefighter in distress and can assist a rapid intervention team. Other systems could direct rescue crews towards a lost or injured firefighter.[9] Duggan expected such systems to be improved to give more detailed information.[9]
Rescue skills are trained on dedicated props. Acomb and LeBoeuf (2008) describe the rapid intervention team prop as a small wood-framed structure that simulates conditions in which firefighters could become trapped and need rescue.[2] Loflin (2008) adds that effective training, rest and rehabilitation, continuous evaluation of changing conditions and past experience are also important in reducing risks to members.[1]
Limitations and wider use
The presence of a rapid intervention team does not by itself prevent deaths. Laughlin (2008) describes a 2002 live fire training exercise in a vacant dwelling in Florida that had designated safety officers and a rapid intervention team. The trainees had no ready water supply and too few escape paths, and the fuel load contributed to a flashover only 3 minutes later.[6] Four instructors posted inside as interior safety officers escaped, but a lieutenant and a firefighter died of smoke inhalation and thermal injuries.[6]
The crew also requires personnel and equipment. Granito (2008) notes that the new protocols imply additional people at an incident.[7] The 2005 needs assessment reported by Jenaway (2008) found that an estimated 65 % of US fire departments lacked enough portable radios to equip all responders on a shift. An estimated 60 % lacked enough breathing apparatus and 48 % lacked enough PASS devices.[17][18] Loflin (2008) also warns that responders should not be taken from critical tasks for the crew if that would clearly endanger other members.[1]
The two-in/two-out principle reaches beyond structural firefighting. Kreckie (2008) states that an interior fire on an aircraft is certainly IDLH, and that airport rescue and firefighting personnel should perform interior aircraft firefighting in accordance with the OSHA rule.[14] For United States nuclear power plants, the EPRI/NRC fire probabilistic risk assessment method notes that the critical factor in crediting the plant fire brigade is the time needed to start effective firefighting. That time is not simply the response time of the first brigade member, so the analysis should consider plant practices such as a "two-in, two-out" response procedure.[26]
See also
Notes
- ↑ 1.00 1.01 1.02 1.03 1.04 1.05 1.06 1.07 1.08 1.09 1.10 1.11 1.12 1.13 1.14 1.15 Loflin (2008), p. 12-114.
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 Acomb and LeBoeuf (2008), p. 12-251.
- ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 Loflin (2008), p. 12-110.
- ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 Loflin (2008), p. 12-112.
- ↑ 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.3 Granito (2008), p. 12-12.
- ↑ 6.0 6.1 6.2 Laughlin (2008), p. 12-173.
- ↑ 7.0 7.1 7.2 7.3 Granito (2008), p. 12-11.
- ↑ 8.0 8.1 Denlinger (2008), p. 12-64.
- ↑ 9.0 9.1 9.2 Duggan (2008), p. 12-87.
- ↑ Granito (2008), p. 12-10.
- ↑ 11.0 11.1 11.2 Teele (2008), p. 12-154.
- ↑ Loflin (2008), p. 12-109.
- ↑ 13.0 13.1 Granito (2008), p. 12-8.
- ↑ 14.0 14.1 14.2 14.3 Kreckie (2008), p. 13-111.
- ↑ 15.0 15.1 15.2 Loflin (2008), p. 12-113.
- ↑ Denlinger (2008), pp. 12-74–12-75.
- ↑ 17.0 17.1 17.2 Jenaway (2008), p. 12-42.
- ↑ 18.0 18.1 Jenaway (2008), p. 12-43.
- ↑ Klaene and Sanders (2008), p. 13-4.
- ↑ Klaene and Sanders (2008), p. 13-6.
- ↑ Granito (2008), p. 12-13.
- ↑ Granito (2008), p. 12-4.
- ↑ 23.0 23.1 Loflin (2008), p. 12-123.
- ↑ Lawson and Vettori (2005), p. 19.
- ↑ Lawson and Vettori (2005), p. 128.
- ↑ Nowlen et al. (2005b), p. 11-17.
References
- Acomb, D. J., & LeBoeuf, R. M. (2008). Fire rescue stations and fire service training centers. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 12-233–12-251). National Fire Protection Association.
- Denlinger, R. F. (2008). Managing fire-rescue departments. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 12-51–12-78). National Fire Protection Association.
- Duggan, B. P. (2008). Information management and computer technology. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 12-79–12-97). National Fire Protection Association.
- Granito, J. A. (2008). Planning for public fire-rescue protection. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 12-3–12-22). National Fire Protection Association.
- Jenaway, W. F. (2008). Needs assessment and hazard analysis. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 12-41–12-50). National Fire Protection Association.
- Klaene, B. J., & Sanders, R. (2008). Fireground operations. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 13-3–13-11). National Fire Protection Association.
- Kreckie, J. (2008). Aircraft rescue and fire fighting (ARFF). In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 13-99–13-115). National Fire Protection Association.
- Laughlin, J. W. (2008). Training programs for fire and emergency service personnel. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 12-161–12-175). National Fire Protection Association.
- Lawson, J. R., & Vettori, R. L. (2005). The emergency response operations (NIST NCSTAR 1-8). National Institute of Standards and Technology.
- Loflin, M. E. (2008). Safety, medical, and health issues and programs. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 12-107–12-125). National Fire Protection Association.
- Nowlen, S. P., Najafi, B., Wyant, F. J., Forester, J., Kazarians, M., Kolaczkowski, A., Joglar, F., Funk, D., Hannaman, G., & Anoba, R. (2005b). EPRI/NRC-RES fire PRA methodology for nuclear power facilities: Vol. 2. Detailed methodology (NUREG/CR-6850; EPRI 1011989). Electric Power Research Institute; U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research.
- Teele, B. W. (2008). Fire and emergency services protective clothing and protective equipment. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 12-143–12-160). National Fire Protection Association.