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Contents
  1. 1Definition and purpose
  2. 2Relation to size-up and standard operating procedures
  3. 3Planning process
  4. 4Contents of a plan
  5. 5Fire protection systems and water supply
  6. 6Storing, distributing and maintaining plans
  7. 7Experience, limits and design practice
  8. 8See also
  9. 9Notes
  10. 10References

Pre-incident planning is the gathering, analysis and recording of information about a specific building or site before an emergency occurs, so that the fire service can decide in advance how it will respond there.[1] The resulting pre-incident plan, also called a prefire plan or preplan, records features such as construction, occupancy, fire protection systems, water supply and hazards.[2][3] It also records the strategy that the department intends to use.[4]

In the United States, NFPA 1620, Recommended Practice for Pre-Incident Planning, was adopted in 1998 and updated in 2003.[5] The information feeds the incident commander's evaluation of the scene and reduces the information that must be processed in the first minutes of an operation.[6] Pre-incident planning is not a code inspection: it takes the property as it is and assumes that an incident will occur.[7] This article follows mainly the 2008 edition of the NFPA Fire Protection Handbook, with lessons from the 2005 World Trade Center investigation.

Definition and purpose

Serapiglia (2008) defines pre-incident planning as a written document based on general and detailed information about a specific facility. Public emergency response agencies and private industry use it to determine the response to reasonably anticipated emergency incidents at that facility. In simpler terms, responders should know as much as they can about the facility's construction, occupancy and fire protection systems before an incident occurs. The department can then compare a potential incident with its resources and plan its response, including conditions at the site beyond the building.[1]

Denlinger (2008) calls pre-incident planning a necessary adjunct to tactical operations that should aid efficiency and reduce fire loss.[8] For Corbett (2008), a foremost purpose is to identify situations that are or can become hazardous to fire fighters. Some hazards are serious enough to call for defensive tactics, meaning an exterior attack with no entry into the building. His examples are abandoned buildings, post-tensioned concrete in buildings under construction and unprotected load-bearing steel.[9]

Norman (2008) stresses that the great advantage of pre-incident planning is that it is done before the incident. Three o'clock in the morning, in wind and rain with fire spreading, is not the best time for gathering critical information.[5] In his view, failing to gather available information about a hazard that could kill a responder comes close to reckless behaviour.[10] He also notes that NFPA began issuing consensus standards on pre-incident planning in 1993, and that NFPA 1620 contains several example forms.[5]

Serapiglia (2008) separates planning sharply from code enforcement. The planner takes the facility "as is" and builds a response strategy around the existing conditions, without trying to identify code violations. His example is a facility whose sprinkler deficiencies will be corrected within 90 days: a fire could still occur the day after tomorrow, so a plan is needed anyway. An authoritative inspection approach would also cost the department the cooperation that planning needs.[7] Klaene and Sanders (2008) add that dangerous structural conditions found during surveys should be reported and corrected.[11] The US Insurance Services Office grading of fire departments, as described by Granito (2008), also considers the level of documented prefire planning.[12]

Relation to size-up and standard operating procedures

Klaene and Sanders (2008) define Size-up as the evaluation of factors as they exist at the time of an incident. Many of these factors can be known in advance through pre-incident planning, but some only when the incident occurs.[11] Norman (2008) adds that size-up begins when the alarm is received and continues until the emergency is under control. A plan can supply the size and construction of a building, but weather, the location and extent of the fire and the time of day become known only during the emergency. Planning should therefore focus on items that are hard to obtain at the scene, such as interconnections between buildings that are not visible from the street.[2]

Most planning deals with aspects that remain static until an event, such as construction or occupancy loads. It should also cover temporary situations, such as a disrupted water supply or a one-time flammable process.[2] Klaene and Sanders (2008) explain the benefit in terms of workload: advance knowledge reduces the information processing needs of the incident commander in the first moments of an operation. Standard operating procedures (SOPs) meanwhile provide a predictable course of action.[6]

Plans and SOPs are meant to work together. Denlinger (2008) considers plans desirable for target hazards, special risks and large complexes, while SOPs usually suffice for single-family dwellings and smaller occupancies. Plans should build on the SOP framework, because plans that are too rigid or complex may handicap an operation more than they help it.[8] Norman (2008) goes further. Departments that plan only target hazards rely on each fire fitting a "standard" incident, and nonstandard situations develop too often, so he argues for plans for all locations.[2]

Serapiglia (2008) presents the process as a cycle in three phases. Before an incident, the department consults others, surveys the site, evaluates the data, develops the plan, tests it and maintains it. During an incident, the size-up leads to a strategy and tactics, whose results are evaluated and adjusted. Afterwards, the department critiques the incident and evaluates the plan against what actually happened.[13][14]

Three-column flowchart of pre-incident planning before, during and after an incident
The pre-incident planning cycle: the plan is developed before an incident, supports size-up, strategy and tactics during it, and is evaluated afterwards.

Planning process

Norman (2008) summarises the process in ten steps. A department first sets its priorities, namely life hazards, firefighter traps and critical infrastructure, and decides what data it needs. It then develops a standard way of capturing the information, such as a preplan form, and trains the people who collect it. After the site visits, it develops strategic and tactical plans and distributes them to all potential users. Finally, it trains the users, reviews each plan at least annually, and revises and redistributes it as needed.[4]

Few departments can plan every building. Klaene and Sanders (2008) call planning labour-intensive and put first the buildings that present an extraordinary hazard to fire fighters or a potential for a large loss of life or property. Large commercial and industrial facilities, confusing floor plans and built-in fire protection systems usually also call for a plan.[15] Serapiglia (2008) warns against choosing only the largest facilities. His examples include commercial storage of swimming pool supplies and golf courses, which may have battery charging areas, fuel storage and large quantities of pesticides.[13]

At the site visit, Norman (2008) advises fire fighters to approach a site as if they were to return for a serious fire 15 minutes after leaving, and to look for what could kill them. Because not everyone remembers everything seen years before, conditions are documented, and digital photographs have proved very useful.[16] Serapiglia (2008) adds that surveyors must ask the right questions about construction, storage, water supply and sprinkler design.[7]

Fire officers with a clipboard and camera inspecting a sprinkler riser and control valve during a site visit
Fire officers record a sprinkler riser and its control valve during a pre-incident site visit; photographs help crews recall conditions later.

Planning depends on partners. Serapiglia (2008) calls for open three-way communication between facility management, the fire service and the property insurer, with police, utilities and environmental agencies contributing where useful.[7] Schmidt (2008) adds that the facility compiles information on its site, hazards and protection systems, which public responders use to develop tactical plans. NFPA 1620 describes the information to be compiled.[17] Company fire inspections also feed planning, because they familiarise crews with buildings in their first-due area.[3]

The data are then analysed and a solution is planned for each problem.[16] Norman's examples range from a strictly defensive posture for a fire exposing lightweight construction to an extra ladder company for a school with handicapped pupils. He insists that the officers responsible for fireground command make the strategic decisions, and that the commanders of all shifts agree on them.[4] Planning is not limited to fire. Under the US confined space standard of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (29 CFR 1910.146), the rescue service must be given yearly access to representative spaces to practise rescues.[16][10]

Contents of a plan

New York City fire officers use a 13-point outline, "COAL WAS WEALTH", for both size-up and planning, often arranged in order of priority. The letters stand for construction, occupancy, apparatus and staffing, life hazard, water supply, auxiliary appliances, street conditions, weather, exposures, area and height, location and extent of fire, time, and hazardous materials.[4][18] Life hazard, for example, results from the combination of the time of day, the occupancy and the location and extent of the fire.[18]

Thirteen size-up factors of COAL WAS WEALTH grouped into factors known in advance and factors known only at the incident
The 13 factors of the New York City "COAL WAS WEALTH" outline. Factors such as construction and area can be recorded in a pre-incident plan; weather, location and extent of fire and time of day become known only at the incident.

For construction, the first concern is the building's ability to resist collapse. Norman (2008) advises against relying only on labels such as a two-hour rated floor, since fire load, earlier damage and weathering all affect how long an element survives. He recalls that one of the "three-hour rated" World Trade Center towers collapsed in under one hour of fire exposure. According to him, hidden voids such as cocklofts and pipe chases have caused the destruction of more buildings than any other construction-related factor.[19] He recommends a list of all lightweight buildings and a policy that a fire past flashover in such a building is fought only from defensive positions until knocked down.[19] In New Jersey, the Uniform Fire Code required symbols on structures with trusses: "F" for floors, "R" for roofs and "F/R" for both.[20]

Occupancy determines the life hazard and the fire load. The life hazard in a school varies with the time of day, whereas hospitals and apartment houses have a high life hazard around the clock. Where the occupancy poses great threats to fire fighters and the civilian life hazard is minimal, Norman (2008) advises that the plan set out a defensive strategy.[18] In New York City, commercial buildings with hidden residential use were identified, marked with a sign and later flagged in the dispatch computer.[18] Serapiglia (2008) adds salvage needs, because in industrial and commercial occupancies smoke damage outside the fire area is often the largest part of a loss.[20]

Area and height indicate the maximum potential fire area. A building on a sloping grade may look one storey high from one side and two from the other, and a similar situation contributed to the deaths of four fire fighters in Seattle in 1995.[19] Openings between apparently separate buildings combine them into one fire area.[19] Any structure closer to the planned building than that building's height may be in immediate danger from collapsing walls. Exposures should be examined on all six sides of the fire area, including top and bottom.[21]

Access routes and street conditions also belong in the plan. Serapiglia (2008) recommends recording the best route and alternatives in case weight-limited bridges, road works, flooding or snow block it. Assigning tasks by probable order of arrival, including companies that respond under automatic mutual aid, can make the operation more effective.[22] Such information complements the Fire service access provided by the building itself.

Hazardous materials are among the most important items. Poisons or explosives could lead the department to take a strictly defensive posture and conduct no firefighting at all. The plan should record the materials, their properties, quantities and locations and the recommended emergency procedures.[23] Serapiglia (2008) also lists utility shut-offs, emergency generators, ventilation controls and the drainage points for contaminated firefighting water.[22][24]

Fire protection systems and water supply

Norman (2008) gives fixed fire protection systems, which he calls auxiliary appliances, high priority in any plan. Systems out of service must be shown prominently and may require the building to be vacated or a fire guard to be posted.[21] Serapiglia (2008) adds that the plan must establish whether a sprinkler system is adequate for the current occupancy, because an inadequate system makes the building essentially "unsprinklered". He groups sprinkler failures into design deficiencies, impairments before a fire and impairments during a fire, such as a control valve closed too early. Checking that control valves are open is one of the first actions on arrival, so their locations must be known in advance.[25]

Standpipe systems need similar attention. The plan should note whether a standpipe is of the wet or dry type (see Dry and wet risers) and record outlet sizes and any pressure-reducing valves.[22] Each Fire department connection should be identified by the systems it feeds, and its threads checked against the department's hose.[25]

The needed fire flow is the water flow rate that a fire in the building is likely to require. Norman (2008) writes that a variation of the Iowa State University formula is usually sufficient for planning in most structures, and that the Insurance Services Office may already have analysed larger facilities. The estimate multiplies the area of the structure by a factor that depends on fire loading and construction:[21]

Q=f⋅A100

Symbol Description Unit
Q Needed fire flow gpm (US gallons per minute)
f Flow factor per 100 ft² of floor area, from 14 (light fire load) to 30 or more (heavy fire load) gpm per 100 ft²
A Floor area of the structure or fire area ft²

The factor is 14 gpm per 100 ft² (53.2 L/min per 9 m²) for lightly loaded areas, such as residential rooms and spaces in non-combustible buildings. It rises to 30 gpm per 100 ft² (114 L/min per 9 m²) or more for heavy fire loads such as paint storage. More water is needed for frame construction or where exposures must be protected.[21] Norman's example is a one-storey furniture showroom of ordinary construction, 100 ft by 100 ft (about 30 m by 30 m), which should have at least 3,000 gpm (11,400 L/min) available. Norman does not state the factor; for A = 10,000 ft², this corresponds to f = 30.[21] As an illustration, the lightest factor of 14 would give 1,400 gpm (about 5,300 L/min) for the same floor, which shows how strongly the result depends on the assumed fire load.

Line chart of needed fire flow against floor area for light and heavy fire load factors, with the 100 ft by 100 ft showroom marked at 3,000 gpm
Needed fire flow Q = f·A/100 for the light (14) and heavy (30) fire load factors. The marked point is the 100 ft by 100 ft furniture showroom, which needs at least 3,000 gpm (11,400 L/min).

As a further illustration, Granito (2008) gives a rule of thumb of one fire company for each 250 gpm (946.25 L/min) needed in an interior attack, plus rescue personnel.[26] The showroom would then call for about 12 companies plus rescue personnel. Granito's table of typical initial attack responses lists at least three pumpers and one ladder truck for medium-hazard occupancies, which include mercantile ones.[27] Klaene and Sanders (2008) recommend calculating the flow for large undivided areas, beyond the reach of two standard preconnected hose lines, as part of the plan. Such calculations are simple but very difficult at the scene, where interior dimensions may be unknown and the commander is busy.[11]

These formulas have known limits. Frank (2008) describes the Iowa, National Fire Academy and Insurance Services Office methods as useful for fire service preplanning but not readily adapted to performance-based design. He also reports Kimball's observation that two to four times the flow rate suggested by the Iowa State study tends to be used.[28]

Storing, distributing and maintaining plans

Plans range from formal documents to a simple note. Klaene and Sanders (2008) describe formal plans as an outline narrative with drawings, which for an industrial complex show the site and each building.[29] Norman (2008) names three-ring binders on the apparatus as the simplest system. Their drawbacks are bulk and a "crying wolf" syndrome, because every address must be checked by hand.[23]

Site sketch of a fictitious warehouse with access road, hydrants, fire department connection, control valve, hazard area and exposure distances
Example site sketch for a pre-incident plan of a fictitious one-storey warehouse, showing access, water supply, fire protection connections, hazards and exposures.

Norman (2008) considers a properly used computer-aided dispatch system by far the most effective tool for recalling planning information. It should recall the information automatically when an alarm comes from an address on file, and those occupancies should be inspected at least annually.[30] On 11 September 2001, the New York City Fire Department (FDNY) dispatch centre sent a Critical Information Dispatch System message on known hazards at the World Trade Center site, based on earlier inspections.[31]

Serapiglia (2008) advises basing the presentation of a plan on the department's incident management system.[13] The Incident command system starts with the arrival of the first company.[32] Klaene and Sanders (2008) recommend limiting the plan to information of value to the commander, who should know it before arriving at the scene.[15]

A plan is useful only if people know it and if it is current. Norman (2008) states that the job is not complete until all members who may play a role have been trained and have had the chance to show their proficiency. This may require site visits for drills, or tabletop exercises, and the visits should take place at least annually on all affected shifts.[4] Serapiglia (2008) calls planning continuous, because many major fires can be traced back to a change at a facility, such as packaging changed from cardboard to plastic. Updating once a year may be fine at some locations but woefully inadequate at others.[7][13] For warehouses, J. Moore (2008) advises basing the plan on the worst case, such as a store warehouse full of holiday stock in autumn.[33]

Experience, limits and design practice

The US National Institute of Standards and Technology investigation of the World Trade Center disaster discusses preplanning in detail. Building owners, fire departments, emergency medical services and police need well-developed pre-plans for high-rise buildings, and these must link into one unified plan.[34] On 11 September 2001, the first companies were familiar with the towers and their emergency plans, and the Port Authority's emergency manual of 1988 had been updated annually.[34][35] FDNY pre-planning for high-rise buildings covered construction, standpipes, communications, elevators, radio coverage and ventilation.[36]

The same report records gaps that preplanning had not closed. Many difficulties of the 1993 bombing recurred in 2001, including poor radio communication inside the buildings and inadequate building markings. Units that did not normally work in lower Manhattan were unaware of the buildings' design and lacked information on their operating systems.[37]

The handbook authors also name general limits. Very few, if any, fire departments have the resources to plan all types of industrial and commercial facilities on their own.[24] Computer-generated information is only as good as the information entered.[30] Norman (2008) also notes that the security of planning information must be considered because of terrorist threats, but that this should not stop its use.[10]

Design documents outside the United States address the building side of the same problem. In Australia, the handbook to the Fire Safety Verification Method (2020) treats a plan for fire brigade intervention as a key part of any Fire safety strategy. Under such a plan, the brigade is notified, gains access and receives documentation on the strategy and the form of attack.[38] The International Fire Engineering Guidelines (2005) advise discussing fire service procedures with the fire service during the fire engineering brief.[39] In New Zealand, clause C5.7, as set out in C/VM2 (second edition, 2025), requires buildings to give firefighters clear information on the location of the fire, the fire safety systems and any hazardous substances.[40] In the Netherlands, the sub-goals of the building regulations include preserving the attack routes of the fire service.[41]

See also

Notes

  1. ↑ 1.0 1.1 Serapiglia (2008), p. 12-289.
  2. ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 Norman (2008), p. 12-300.
  3. ↑ 3.0 3.1 Farr and Sawyer (2008), p. 1-85.
  4. ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 Norman (2008), p. 12-302.
  5. ↑ 5.0 5.1 5.2 Norman (2008), p. 12-299.
  6. ↑ 6.0 6.1 Klaene and Sanders (2008), p. 13-11.
  7. ↑ 7.0 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 Serapiglia (2008), p. 12-290.
  8. ↑ 8.0 8.1 Denlinger (2008), p. 12-57.
  9. ↑ Corbett (2008), p. 12-128.
  10. ↑ 10.0 10.1 10.2 Norman (2008), p. 12-308.
  11. ↑ 11.0 11.1 11.2 Klaene and Sanders (2008), p. 13-5.
  12. ↑ Granito (2008), p. 12-17.
  13. ↑ 13.0 13.1 13.2 13.3 Serapiglia (2008), p. 12-291.
  14. ↑ Serapiglia (2008), p. 12-294.
  15. ↑ 15.0 15.1 Klaene and Sanders (2008), p. 13-4.
  16. ↑ 16.0 16.1 16.2 Norman (2008), p. 12-301.
  17. ↑ Schmidt (2008), p. 1-144.
  18. ↑ 18.0 18.1 18.2 18.3 Norman (2008), p. 12-303.
  19. ↑ 19.0 19.1 19.2 19.3 Norman (2008), p. 12-304.
  20. ↑ 20.0 20.1 Serapiglia (2008), p. 12-295.
  21. ↑ 21.0 21.1 21.2 21.3 21.4 Norman (2008), p. 12-305.
  22. ↑ 22.0 22.1 22.2 Serapiglia (2008), p. 12-297.
  23. ↑ 23.0 23.1 Norman (2008), p. 12-306.
  24. ↑ 24.0 24.1 Serapiglia (2008), p. 12-298.
  25. ↑ 25.0 25.1 Serapiglia (2008), p. 12-296.
  26. ↑ Granito (2008), p. 12-13.
  27. ↑ Granito (2008), p. 12-12.
  28. ↑ Frank (2008), p. 17-34.
  29. ↑ Klaene and Sanders (2008), pp. 13-4–13-5.
  30. ↑ 30.0 30.1 Norman (2008), p. 12-307.
  31. ↑ Lawson and Vettori (2005), p. 70.
  32. ↑ Loflin (2008), p. 12-112.
  33. ↑ J. Moore (2008), p. 20-172.
  34. ↑ 34.0 34.1 Lawson and Vettori (2005), p. 119.
  35. ↑ Lawson and Vettori (2005), p. 122.
  36. ↑ Lawson and Vettori (2005), p. 120.
  37. ↑ Lawson and Vettori (2005), pp. xlix–l.
  38. ↑ Australian Building Codes Board (2020b), p. 29.
  39. ↑ National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), p. 1.9-5.
  40. ↑ Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2025b), p. 53.
  41. ↑ Van Rossum (2027), §1.2.

References

  • Australian Building Codes Board. (2020b). Handbook: Fire Safety Verification Method (Print version 1.1).
  • Corbett, G. P. (2008). Effect of building construction and fire protection systems on fire fighter safety. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 12-127–12-141). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Denlinger, R. F. (2008). Managing fire-rescue departments. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 12-51–12-78). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Farr, R. R., & Sawyer, S. F. (2008). Fire prevention and code enforcement. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 1-81–1-93). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Frank, J. A. (2008). Characteristics and hazards of water and water additives for fire suppression. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 17-31–17-43). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Granito, J. A. (2008). Planning for public fire-rescue protection. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 12-3–12-22). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Klaene, B. J., & Sanders, R. (2008). Fireground operations. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 13-3–13-11). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Lawson, J. R., & Vettori, R. L. (2005). The emergency response operations (NIST NCSTAR 1-8). National Institute of Standards and Technology.
  • Loflin, M. E. (2008). Safety, medical, and health issues and programs. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 12-107–12-125). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment. (2025b). Verification Method C/VM2: Framework for fire safety design (2nd ed.).
  • Moore, J. (2008). Storage occupancies. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 20-157–20-178). National Fire Protection Association.
  • National Research Council of Canada, International Code Council, Department of Building and Housing, & Australian Building Codes Board. (2005). International fire engineering guidelines (2005 ed.). Australian Building Codes Board.
  • Norman, J. (2008). Pre-Incident planning for emergency response. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 12-299–12-308). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Schmidt, D. L. (2008). Emergency management and business continuity. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 1-137–1-156). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Serapiglia, M. J. (2008). Pre-Incident planning for industrial and municipal emergency response. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 12-289–12-298). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Van Rossum, E. (2027). Introduction to Fire Safety Engineering. Fire Safety Academy.