Skip to content
Upcoming courses

Fire safety strategy

Tools
From Fire Safety Academy Wiki
(Redirected from Fire strategy)
Contents
  1. 1Definition and scope
  2. 2Objectives as the starting point
  3. 3Building blocks of a strategy
  4. 4Main parts of the strategy
  5. 5Development during design
  6. 6Documentation and the building life cycle
  7. 7Redundancy and limits of protection
  8. 8See also
  9. 9Notes
  10. 10References

A fire safety strategy is the overall plan that describes how a building will achieve its fire safety objectives, setting out the philosophy and approach adopted to reach the required level of performance.[1] It brings together the measures that warn people, allow safe evacuation, restrict the spread of fire and control or extinguish a fire, both active and passive.[2] The strategy also covers the protection of neighbouring property, the plan for firefighting, and the management needed to keep the measures working.[3][4]

The strategy sits between the objectives and the detailed analysis. The Australian handbook for the Fire Safety Verification Method (FSVM) describes a logical sequence for fire safety engineering. It runs from objectives and performance requirements, through the building concept and the fire safety strategy, to hazard identification, scenario development, analysis and compliance.[5] Development is iterative: a trial strategy is analysed, and it is revised until it meets the agreed criteria.[6] At the end of design the strategy is documented, preferably in a fire safety handbook that guides construction, commissioning, management and maintenance for the life of the building.[7]

Flowchart from fire safety objectives through the fire safety strategy, scenarios and analysis to compliance, with a loop back to the strategy.
The fire safety strategy in the sequence of fire safety engineering; if the analysis does not show compliance, the strategy is modified and analysed again. Based on Australian Building Codes Board (2020b), p. 20 and National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), p. 1.1-3.

Definition and scope

In Australia, the Fire Safety Verification Method Standard 2022 requires the performance-based design brief (PBDB) to cover the fire safety strategy for the building. That strategy must outline the philosophy and approach used to achieve the required level of performance.[1] The same clause requires the strategy to pay particular attention to the evacuation strategy and to the management regimes that are necessary.[1] A fire safety strategy is therefore more than a list of installations: it is the reasoning that explains why a particular combination of measures will work in a particular building.

The International Fire Engineering Guidelines (IFEG, 2005) use the related term fire safety system. A fire safety system is one or any combination of the methods used in a building to warn people and provide for safe evacuation. The same definition adds the methods used to restrict the spread of fire and to control or extinguish it.[2] It includes both active systems, such as alarms and sprinklers, and passive systems, such as fire-resisting construction.[2] A fire safety system that is proposed for assessment with fire engineering techniques is called a trial design.[8] In practice, the strategy is the explanation, the system is the set of measures, and a trial design is one candidate version of that system.

The strategy is a product of fire safety engineering. Introduction to Fire Safety Engineering defines that discipline as the application of all fire-related fields of knowledge to achieve the relevant fire safety goals, while taking the specific features of the project into account.[9] The phrase "project-specific" is important. The IFEG point out that fire engineering is specific to the building, its occupants and its site.[10] Buildings that look similar often differ in details that affect fire safety, so a strategy accepted for one building is not normally a precedent for another.[10]

Objectives as the starting point

A strategy can only be judged against what it is meant to achieve, so design starts with the fire safety objectives. The Australian handbook states that the design process normally begins by defining the relevant objectives, both regulatory and other, and then develops the strategy.[5] In the National Construction Code (NCC) of Australia, the broad fire safety objectives are life safety of occupants, protection of other property, facilities for firefighting and fire safety during construction.[11] Protection of the subject building itself and its contents is addressed only to a limited extent for some building classes.[11]

Clients and other stakeholders often have further objectives. The IFEG list examples such as limiting damage to the structure and contents, maintaining business continuity, protecting corporate image and heritage, and limiting the release of hazardous materials.[12] Non-fire objectives also shape the strategy, for example extensive natural lighting, an open-plan layout, new materials, sustainability, future flexibility and low life-cycle costs.[13] The IFEG recommend that all these objectives, together with the mandatory requirements, are taken into account in one integrated and cost-effective fire safety system.[13]

The Dutch context shows how objectives can differ between regulations. Introduction to Fire Safety Engineering lists possible goals such as preserving the building and its contents, business continuity, limiting reputational damage, limiting casualties and societal impact, and protecting the environment.[14] In the Netherlands, the explanatory notes to the building regulations (Besluit bouwwerken leefomgeving, Bbl) name only two goals: preventing casualties and preventing spread of fire to another plot.[15] Preserving the building is explicitly not a goal of the Bbl.[15] A strategy that must also protect the building or its operations therefore has to go beyond the regulatory minimum.

Building blocks of a strategy

Engineers use several frameworks to make sure a strategy covers every route by which a fire can cause harm. The fire safety concepts tree of the US National Fire Protection Association (NFPA 550) divides fire safety into two main branches: prevent fire ignition, and manage fire impact.[16] The idea is that one or the other must succeed for the objectives to be met.[16] Managing fire impact divides further into managing the fire and managing the exposed people or property.[16] Watts describes how a list of strategies can be taken from a cut set of the tree. His examples are ignition prevention, limitation of combustibles, compartmentation, detection and alarm, suppression, and protection of exposed people or things.[17]

Logic tree: fire safety objectives met by preventing fire ignition or managing fire impact; managing impact splits into managing the fire and the exposed.
Top branches of the fire safety concepts tree: either ignition is prevented or the impact of the fire is managed. Based on Meacham (2002), p. 5-158.

The IFEG divide a building's fire safety system into six sub-systems for analysis.[18] Sub-system A covers fire initiation and development, B smoke development and spread, and C fire spread and its impact on the structure.[18] Sub-system D covers detection, warning and suppression, E occupant evacuation, and F intervention by the fire services.[18] For each sub-system the guidelines list typical measures. Examples include limiting ignition sources and following procedures for hot work, smoke barriers and mechanical smoke management, fire-resisting barriers and dampers, detectors and sprinklers, evacuation plans and signage, and fire service access and water supplies.[19]

Section of a three-storey building with six tags A to F marking ignition control, smoke venting, fire-resisting floor, sprinkler, exit stair and fire engine.
The six sub-systems of a fire safety system, each with one typical measure. Based on National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), pp. 1.1-2 and 1.2-10.

Two of these building blocks appear in many strategies. Fire compartmentation is a fire protection strategy in which a building is subdivided into compartments separated from one another by fire-resistant barriers.[20] Smoke control limits the development and spread of smoke, using measures such as smoke barriers, natural smoke venting and mechanical smoke management.[18][19] The chosen combination depends on the building. Watts and Hall stress that the relative value of a measure is not constant, because it changes with the other features of the building.[21]

Main parts of the strategy

The Australian handbook divides the strategy for NCC compliance into three parts. The strategy for life safety must pay close attention to the evacuation strategy and to the management regimes needed to achieve the outcome.[3] Documenting both in the design brief is meant to reduce inadvertent non-compliance and to secure the expected reliability of fire protection systems.[3] It also ensures that the evacuation strategy for all occupants, including people with disabilities, becomes part of the fire safety management of the building.[3]

The strategy for protecting other property limits the risk of fire spread between buildings. The handbook lists five common means: separation distances, material controls that limit combustibility, protection of openings, fire-resistant construction, and limits on the number, size and arrangement of openings.[3] In Australia, two verification methods, CV1 and CV2, set a maximum radiant heat flux for spread between buildings on adjoining allotments and on the same allotment.[4]

The third part is the firefighting strategy. It describes how the fire brigade will be notified of a fire and its location, gain access to the site, and receive communication facilities on arrival.[4] The brigade should also receive documentation of the strategy and an appropriate set-up area for firefighting, search and rescue.[4] In Australia, this strategy is developed with the fire authority, using the Fire Brigade Intervention Model where appropriate.[4]

The handbook adds individual and societal risk as a cross-cutting consideration. Individual risk is the frequency at which a person may be expected to suffer a given level of harm from a fire in the building.[22] Societal risk relates frequency to the number of people who suffer a specified level of harm. Both must be considered, so that the proposed design is at least as safe as a reference building that complies with the deemed-to-satisfy (DTS) provisions.[22]

Development during design

Design is iterative. A typical project moves from a feasibility study through schematic design and design development to design documentation.[5] The Australian handbook notes significant advantages when a fire safety engineer is involved throughout these stages, because synergies can be used and practical, cost-effective strategies developed.[5] The IFEG make the same point: the benefits of fire engineering are greatest when it is involved early in the design process.[23]

During design, the team proposes one or more trial designs. A fire safety system should be developed with other factors in mind, such as aesthetics, cost, ease of everyday use, speed of construction and maintenance.[24] Trial designs may include measures not required by the prescriptive provisions to compensate for features that do not comply.[24] They should also include redundancies to compensate for possible failure of components.[24] If analysis shows that a trial design is unsatisfactory, the analysis is repeated on a different trial design until an acceptable one is found.[6]

New Zealand's Verification Method C/VM2 (second edition, 2025) illustrates this loop in four steps.[25] A concept design first sets out occupant characteristics and the preferred active and passive systems. A fire engineering brief (FEB) then records the inputs and stakeholder considerations.[25] In the third step, the trial design is evaluated against ten design scenarios and revised until all ten are satisfied, before the design is documented in step four.[25] The IFEG warn that the evaluation of the fire safety strategy should be finished before the design or the cost estimate of the project is complete.[6]

Four boxes: concept design, fire engineering brief, trial design tested against ten scenarios with a revise loop, design documents.
Example design process of C/VM2 (New Zealand, 2025): the trial design is revised until all ten design scenarios are satisfied. Based on Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2025b), p. 9.

The strategy is shaped by the way it will be analysed.[5] In the Netherlands, rules can be met in a rule-based way or in a risk-based way. A risk-based alternative to the Bbl is usually called equivalence and must reach at least the same level of fire safety as the original prescribed measure.[14] In Australia, the FSVM uses the DTS provisions to define tolerable risk levels, because the performance requirements are generally not quantified.[3]

Documentation and the building life cycle

At the end of the design stage, the Australian handbook expects the strategy to be documented in enough detail to start the assessment.[7] The document should contain a summary of the objectives and an overview of the philosophy and approach. It should also include drawings with the fire safety requirements highlighted, the occupant and building characteristics, and the evacuation strategy.[7] It further lists the physical fire safety measures with their operation and expected efficacy and reliability, the management measures, and an implementation plan stating who is responsible.[7] Finally, it states the actions needed to keep the strategy effective through the life of the building.[7]

The handbook calls it good practice to consolidate the strategy into a draft fire safety handbook for the building.[7] That handbook gives special attention to fire safety management, such as maintenance of fire protection measures and the evacuation strategy.[7] The final performance-based design report in Australia includes such a handbook, with the procedures needed to achieve the required reliability of fire protection systems.[26]

A strategy only works if it survives construction and decades of use. The IFEG note that real-life fire safety depends heavily on construction, commissioning, management and use, and maintenance, not only on the approved design.[27] Evacuation procedures and training must be consistent with the design, for example the method of warning and whether evacuation is staged or horizontal.[28] Limits on fuel loads and on the use of escape routes also need to be recorded.[28] Alterations and changes of use can compromise the original design and may require a new evaluation.[10]

For each fire safety feature, the Australian handbook raises a set of life-cycle questions.[29] These ask how the feature achieves its objectives, and how it will be built safely, commissioned and verified. They also ask whether it creates a hazard during occupation, how it will be maintained or replaced, and how hazards are avoided during renovation or demolition.[29]

Redundancy and limits of protection

No strategy removes fire risk completely. The IFEG state that absolute or 100% safety is not attainable, and that a fire safety system may not cope with all possible scenarios.[30] The Australian handbook adds that, as zero risk is approached, the strategy starts to conflict with the function and use of the building.[3]

Because the performance requirements of the Australian building code are not quantified, the IFEG recommend building redundancies into the fire safety system.[31] Such redundancies compensate for uncertainty in the methods and data, and they should be examined in sensitivity studies.[31] The Fire Safety Evaluation System, a US method for showing equivalence to the NFPA 101 Life Safety Code in certain institutional occupancies, uses the same idea.[32] It relies on the simultaneous use of three strategies, containment, extinguishment and people movement, so that the failure of one device does not cause a major loss.[33]

C/VM2 in New Zealand turns redundancy into an explicit test. Its design scenario RC assumes that each key fire safety system fails in turn and requires the design to still allow people to escape.[34] The scenario applies where such a failure could expose more than 150 people to untenable conditions, with lower thresholds for sleeping and care occupancies.[34] Sprinkler systems and automatic fire alarms installed to a recognised standard are considered reliable enough to be exempt.[34]

The Dutch situation shows a further limit. Introduction to Fire Safety Engineering explains that Dutch regulations set measurable limits on means, such as travel distance in metres or compartment area in square metres. These limits do not correspond directly to quantified goals.[15] How many casualties are acceptable, or how large the risk of spread to the neighbouring plot may be, is not laid down.[15] A strategy that departs from the rules must therefore agree in advance which performance or residual risk is acceptable, often by comparison with a reference situation that complies with the regulations.[15]

See also

Notes

  1. ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 Australian Building Codes Board (2022), p. 7.
  2. ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), p. 0.5-3 (Part 0, Australia).
  3. ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 Australian Building Codes Board (2020b), p. 28.
  4. ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 Australian Building Codes Board (2020b), p. 29.
  5. ↑ 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 Australian Building Codes Board (2020b), p. 20.
  6. ↑ 6.0 6.1 6.2 National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), p. 1.1-3.
  7. ↑ 7.0 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.6 Australian Building Codes Board (2020b), p. 31.
  8. ↑ National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), p. 0.5-5 (Part 0, Australia).
  9. ↑ Van Rossum (2027), §1.1.
  10. ↑ 10.0 10.1 10.2 National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), p. 0.3-7 (Part 0, Australia).
  11. ↑ 11.0 11.1 Australian Building Codes Board (2020b), p. 27.
  12. ↑ National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), p. 0.3-2 (Part 0, Australia).
  13. ↑ 13.0 13.1 National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), p. 0.3-3 (Part 0, Australia).
  14. ↑ 14.0 14.1 Van Rossum (2027), §1.
  15. ↑ 15.0 15.1 15.2 15.3 15.4 Van Rossum (2027), §1.2.
  16. ↑ 16.0 16.1 16.2 Meacham (2002), p. 5-158.
  17. ↑ Watts (2002), p. 5-137.
  18. ↑ 18.0 18.1 18.2 18.3 National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), p. 1.1-2.
  19. ↑ 19.0 19.1 National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), p. 1.2-10.
  20. ↑ Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. F-16.
  21. ↑ Watts and Hall (2002), p. 5-5.
  22. ↑ 22.0 22.1 Australian Building Codes Board (2020b), p. 22.
  23. ↑ National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), p. 0.3-5 (Part 0, Australia).
  24. ↑ 24.0 24.1 24.2 National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), p. 1.2-11.
  25. ↑ 25.0 25.1 25.2 Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2025b), p. 9.
  26. ↑ Australian Building Codes Board (2020b), p. 125.
  27. ↑ National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), p. 1.2-32.
  28. ↑ 28.0 28.1 National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), p. 0.3-6 (Part 0, Australia).
  29. ↑ 29.0 29.1 Australian Building Codes Board (2020b), p. 23.
  30. ↑ National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), p. 0.1-4 (Part 0, Australia).
  31. ↑ 31.0 31.1 National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), p. 0.2-4 (Part 0, Australia).
  32. ↑ Watts (2002), p. 5-129.
  33. ↑ Watts (2002), pp. 5-132–5-133.
  34. ↑ 34.0 34.1 34.2 Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2025b), p. 58.

References

  • Australian Building Codes Board. (2020b). Handbook: Fire Safety Verification Method (Print version 1.1).
  • Australian Building Codes Board. (2022). Fire Safety Verification Method Standard 2022.
  • Iqbal, N., & Salley, M. H. (2004). Fire Dynamics Tools (FDTs): Quantitative fire hazard analysis methods for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Fire Protection Inspection Program (NUREG-1805). U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
  • Meacham, B. J. (2002). Building fire risk analysis. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 5-153–5-175). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
  • Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment. (2025b). Verification Method C/VM2: Framework for fire safety design (2nd ed.).
  • National Research Council of Canada, International Code Council, Department of Building and Housing, & Australian Building Codes Board. (2005). International fire engineering guidelines (2005 ed.). Australian Building Codes Board.
  • Van Rossum, E. (2027). Introduction to Fire Safety Engineering. Fire Safety Academy.
  • Watts, J. M., Jr. (2002). Fire risk indexing. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 5-125–5-142). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
  • Watts, J. M., Jr., & Hall, J. R., Jr. (2002). Introduction to fire risk analysis. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 5-1–5-7). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
Retrieved from "https://fire-safety.academy/w/index.php?title=Fire_safety_strategy&oldid=2861"