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Contents
  1. 1Forms of secondary containment
  2. 2Why it matters
  3. 3Diked enclosures for aboveground tanks
  4. 4Impounding basins and drainage
  5. 5Containment tanks, double walls and vaults
  6. 6Buildings, chemicals and fire-fighting water
  7. 7Sizing and worked examples
    1. 7.1Dike capacity
    2. 7.2Effect of containment on pool fire size
  8. 8Limits and special cases
  9. 9See also
  10. 10Notes
  11. 11References

Secondary containment is a second barrier around a tank, container, pipe or storage area that holds liquid escaping from the primary container. It keeps a leak or spill from spreading to other tanks, buildings, drains or waterways. Typical forms are a dike (also called a bund), an impounding basin, curbing, a liquid-tight vault, or the outer wall of a double-walled tank or pipe.[1][2][3] The term is used for flammable and combustible liquids, for toxic chemicals such as pesticides and for contaminated fire-fighting water.[4]

Secondary containment matters for fire safety because a released liquid that is not held back can flow to ignition sources and form a large burning pool around tanks and their supports. It also protects soil, groundwater and surface water from leaking fuel and from runoff.[2][5] The size of the contained area fixes the size of a possible pool fire. A small, contained pool burns with a lower heat release rate, for longer, than the same liquid spread thinly over a floor.[6] Most of the rules described here are US practice around 2007–2008, as summarised in the Fire Protection Handbook (2008).

Forms of secondary containment

The primary container is the tank, drum, pipe or vessel that normally holds the liquid. Secondary containment is whatever catches the liquid when the primary container leaks, is overfilled or fails. For storage tanks, the main forms are dikes around the tanks and drainage to an impounding basin, a separate collection area into which sloping ground or ditches lead the liquid.[2]

Five small sketches of a primary container with its secondary barrier: dike, impounding basin, double-walled tank, vault and cabinet sill
Common forms of secondary containment around a primary container.

Factory-built secondary containment tanks are a second family. They combine a primary steel tank with an outer steel or fibreglass tank, or with a geomembrane shell, so that any leakage from the inner tank stays in the outer tank or shell.[1] Underground tanks are also made in single-wall and double-wall versions, and service station piping can be double-walled, with containment sumps under the dispensers.[7][8]

Smaller forms are found in buildings and at container storage. A flammable liquid storage cabinet has a door sill raised at least 2 in. (51 mm) above the bottom of the cabinet to retain spilled liquid. Prefabricated hazardous materials storage lockers are equipped with spill containment features, and outdoor container storage areas can be graded or curbed to keep spills away from buildings.[9]

Why it matters

Ordile (2008) states that storage tank fires may start with an internal explosion or with a spill fire that exposes the tanks.[7] A common type of installation has tanks on unprotected steel supports, filled from tank vehicles close by. A fire that starts at the vehicle can make the supports fail, so that the tanks fall, break their piping or rupture and release their entire contents.[2] Failed piping and valves have added their contents to the ground fire, and fire barriers at intervals are recommended in open pipe trenches.[2] Slye (2008) records the boilover at Tacoa, Venezuela, on 19 December 1982, which followed 6 hours of intense burning. It killed 160 people, 50 of them fire fighters, and a photograph taken minutes before the boilover shows fire fighters standing on top of the dike.[10]

Containment is equally an environmental measure. Leaks from underground tanks can reach groundwater, contaminate soil and air, and produce vapours that collect in sewers and basements, where they can ignite.[5] Ordile (2008) notes that leaking liquid can travel substantial distances underground and can penetrate 24 in. (610 mm) of waterproofed concrete before appearing in a building.[11] Water used in fire fighting can dissolve stored chemicals and become contaminated runoff, which is why some codes and guidelines treat runoff capture as a design objective.[4][12]

Diked enclosures for aboveground tanks

The handbook chapter on liquid storage describes the US practice for an atmospheric storage tank installation. Where important facilities, waterways or adjoining properties would be endangered by a release, a means of controlling spillage is necessary. The preferred method is to place the tanks on sloping ground, so that dikes or ditches divert spilled liquid into an impounding basin where it can burn without exposing other tanks, property or waterways.[2] Where an impounding basin cannot be used, dikes around the tanks prevent the spread of liquid.[2]

Dikes may be built of earth, concrete, solid masonry or steel, and must withstand the lateral pressure of a full liquid head. When several large tanks share one diked enclosure, drainage channels or intermediate dikes may be placed between them. Intermediate dikes at least 18 in. (457 mm) high keep small spills, typically from a leaking valve or connection or from overfilling, away from the other tanks.[2] A diked enclosure should hold the greatest amount of liquid that can be released from the largest tank inside it, assuming that tank is full. In calculating the capacity, the volume of the other tanks within the enclosure, up to the height of the dike, is not available for retaining liquid.[2]

Cross-section of a diked enclosure with a large and a small tank, the liquid level after the large tank empties, and the dike height
Diked enclosure: capacity for the full contents of the largest tank, with the volume of the other tanks below the dike top not counted.

Rainwater and fire-fighting water collect inside a dike, so diked areas are given trapped drains where needed. Best practice is to keep the drain valves closed and to open them at intervals, because a permanently open drain would discharge leaking liquid. The valves should be located outside the dike so that they can be reached during a fire. Oil separators skim oil from water but do not control the discharge when the whole flow through the drain is oil.[2]

Dikes higher than 6 ft (1.8 m) are not desirable without additional safety measures. Where high, close dike walls are needed, access to tanks and valves and safe egress from the enclosure should be provided. For Class I liquids (Flammable and combustible liquid classification), special provisions apply where the average dike height exceeds 12 ft (3.6 m) or the tank stands closer to the wall than the wall is high. Valves and tank roofs should then be operable without entering below the top of the dike. The concern is that Class I vapours can accumulate to harmful levels in the narrow space between a high wall and the tank.[2]

Impounding basins and drainage

Schwab (2008a) lists six steps for plants that handle hazardous liquids. They are to minimise the possibility, size and spread of spills, plan alarms and evacuation for toxic releases, control ignition sources and protect exposed property.[13] Diking or curbing restricts the spread of a liquid spill; foam can cover the spill to reduce evaporation, provided the foam is compatible with the liquid.[13]

Diking has a weakness that Schwab (2008a) points out. It holds the liquid where it was released, so a fire can still burn around the source and damage the equipment further. A better approach is drainage to an impounding basin, located where a burning liquid can burn out harmlessly or where a toxic liquid can be neutralised.[14] Drainage has its own hazards. A spill can ignite during drainage, underground sewers without liquid seals at all entrances can explode, and fire in open ditches can damage piping and utilities that run alongside or across them. Drainage must accommodate the expected water or foam discharge together with the spill.[14]

Containment tanks, double walls and vaults

Aboveground secondary containment tanks became popular in the United States partly because of federal regulations on underground tanks. Many are encased in 6 in. (152 mm) of reinforced concrete, which protects them against exposure fires and vandalism and gives fire resistance. NFPA 30 covers their size limits, pipe connections and overfill protection.[1] A manufacturer's example in the handbook, a UL 2085 steel tank with UL 142 inner and outer tanks and leak detection, is marked as having passed 2 hour fire, hose stream, impact and ballistic tests.[15] According to the 2008 handbook, such tanks meeting the requirements of NFPA 30 need not meet the drainage or diking provisions, as long as their capacity does not exceed that allowed by NFPA 30.[2]

Cutaway of a double-walled underground tank, double-walled pipe and dispenser sump with leak monitoring points
Secondary containment at a fuel dispensing installation: double-walled tank and piping, dispenser sump and leak monitoring.

An underground storage tank is generally considered the safest form of storage from the fire point of view, but concern about groundwater contamination has increased concern about its use.[7] Environmental regulations or a hazard analysis might require a double-walled tank, groundwater monitoring for leaks, or both.[11] Severson (2008) describes the US rules under Subtitle I of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). There, an underground storage tank is a tank system, including its piping, with at least 10 percent of its volume underground. Tanks installed after 1988 had to meet specifications and have overfill protection and leak detection.[5] One of the permitted leak monitoring methods is interstitial monitoring between the inner and outer walls of a double-walled tank.[16]

At a motor fuel dispensing facility, the handbook illustrates double-walled, cathodically protected steel tanks, double-walled pipes, containment and monitoring wells. Below each dispenser, a piping sump provides secondary containment for the primary and secondary containment pipes.[8] Aboveground tanks at service stations must be provided with spill protection, and NFPA 30 offers options for this spill control.[17] Inside service station buildings, spill control must stop fuel flowing through the floor or into other parts of the building. A drainage system connected to public sewers or waterways must have an oil trap or separator.[18]

Vaults are another form. NFPA 30, as summarised by Ordile (2008), permits aboveground tanks in vaults with walls and floor of reinforced concrete at least 6 in. (150 mm) thick. The vault must be liquid-tight, and each tank should have its own vault.[19]

Buildings, chemicals and fire-fighting water

Containment inside buildings is closely tied to drainage and sprinklers. Ordile (2008) states that any room or building where liquid containers are stored should protect them from exposure fires and contain or drain any spilled liquid. Fire tests have shown that sprinklers may not prevent containers in high-piled storage from failing, and the ability to drain away spilled liquid is then critical, especially with water-only sprinklers.[20] From its 1996 edition, NFPA 30 included protection criteria under which the type of sprinkler system and the liquids protected determine whether an inside storage area needs drainage.[9] Storage tank buildings need drainage to limit fire exposure to other tanks and to keep liquids out of public waterways, sewers and neighbouring properties.[19]

Pesticide storage shows how containment is sized for chemicals and runoff. Whitford (2008) recommends that a facility be able to hold any spill and water runoff within its boundary by a secondary containment system. The containment volume should at least cover a credible worst-case release from a single tank or vessel, plus potentially contaminated water from fire fighting or sprinklers.[4] The volume of fire-fighting runoff to be held should be set by the authority having jurisdiction, and overflow must not threaten people, property or the environment. In the United States in 2008, secondary containment for pesticides was required by state or federal law only when specific stored quantities triggered it.[4]

Internal containment and external containment each have drawbacks. Internal containment gives control over spilled material, security and protection from rain. It can, however, expose workers to residues, create a flash fire or vapour explosion hazard and hinder emergency responders.[4] External containment areas should be secured, kept away from important valves, building exits, incompatible materials and sensitive areas, and sized for extra rain if they have no roof. Separation of incompatible products is treated in chemical incompatibility.[4]

The same idea applies to waste and foam. In a release of hazardous waste, Severson (2008) lists diking the area around a liquid spill, to limit its spread to sewers and drains and to reduce the vapour release rate.[21] Scheffey (2002) notes that foam discharges are easier to handle where an in-place collection system exists, as at some warehouses, tank farms and training grounds. Otherwise, temporary diking is an alternative where time and resources permit.[22]

Performance-based design can set a numerical target. A handbook table taken from the SFPE Engineering Guide to Performance-Based Fire Protection (2007) gives the example criterion "impoundment capacity at least 1.20 times the design discharge". It serves the objective of no groundwater contamination by fire water runoff.[23] The International Fire Engineering Guidelines (2005) list "impoundment of water" among the parameters for the objective of limiting environmental effects.[12]

The US oil pollution rules described by Hildebrand and Noll (2008) work in the same direction. The EPA regulation 40 CFR 112 requires a Spill Prevention, Control, and Countermeasure (SPCC) plan with containment or drainage control that keeps discharged oil out of navigable water. Facilities with less than 1320 gal (4996 L) of aboveground oil storage, and no single container over 660 gal (2498 L), were excluded.[24]

Sizing and worked examples

Dike capacity

The capacity rule of Ordile (2008) can be written as a minimum dike height. The free volume inside the dike, up to its top, must at least equal the full volume of the largest tank. The ground area taken up by the other tanks does not count, because their shells occupy that space up to the dike height.[2] For a flat enclosure with vertical walls this gives

hmin=VmaxAd−∑At

Symbol Description Unit
hmin minimum dike height (liquid level when the largest tank has emptied) m
Vmax volume of the largest tank in the enclosure, assumed full m³
Ad floor area inside the dike walls m²
∑At footprint of all other tanks in the enclosure m²

As a worked example, take the cone roof tank used in an SFPE foam design example: 120 ft (36.6 m) in diameter and 48 ft (14.6 m) high, storing gasoline.[25] Its full volume is about 15,400 m³. Assume it shares a dike with one smaller tank of 20 m diameter, whose footprint is 314 m². In a rectangular enclosure of 120 m by 80 m (9,600 m²), the net area is 9,286 m² and the minimum dike height is 1.66 m, rounded up to 1.7 m. This stays below the 6 ft (1.8 m) above which the handbook advises additional safety measures.[2] A 100 m by 70 m enclosure would need 2.30 m, above that limit. Ignoring the smaller tank in the first case would give 1.60 m and leave about 500 m³ of liquid with nowhere to go.

Effect of containment on pool fire size

The contained area also sets the size of the fire if the liquid ignites. For a confined pool the area is fixed by the boundaries, and the depth follows from the volume divided by the area.[26] An unconfined spill spreads much thinner. Gottuk and White (2002) report that for releases of 95 L or more on smooth surfaces, the spill area approaches about 0.3 m² per litre. This corresponds to depths of about 2.8 to 4 mm, and ignition can enlarge the burning area to about 155 percent of the initial spill.[26]

The heat release rate of a pool fire is estimated from the burning rate per unit area, the heat of combustion and the pool area. The NRC Fire Dynamics Tools use the following form, with an empirical factor that lowers the burning rate of small pools:[27]

Q˙=m˙″ΔHc,effAf(1−e−kβD)

A rectangular dike is treated as a circle of equal area. The burning duration follows from the volume and the regression rate, the speed at which the liquid surface falls:[28][29]

D=4Afπtb=4VπD2νν=m˙″ρ

Symbol Description Unit
Q˙ heat release rate kW
m˙″ mass burning rate per unit area kg/(m²·s)
ΔHc,eff effective heat of combustion kJ/kg
Af horizontal burning area (contained area) m²
kβ empirical constant m⁻¹
D pool diameter or equivalent diameter m
tb burning duration s
V volume of liquid m³
ν regression rate m/s
ρ liquid density kg/m³

The equations assume a fire burning in the open, a pool that is circular or nearly so, instantaneous involvement of the whole surface and no growth period.[28] For gasoline, Babrauskas (2002b) gives a density of 740 kg/m³, a heat of combustion of 43.7 MJ/kg, a mass burning rate of 0.055 kg/(m²·s) and kβ = 2.1 m⁻¹.[30]

Gottuk and White (2002) work through the rupture of a 208 L (55 gal) drum of gasoline on a warehouse floor with no containment. They estimate a spill of 75 m² and a burning area of 116 m² (12.2 m diameter). With a spill burning rate of one fifth of the pool rate, 0.011 kg/(m²·s), the fire reaches 56 MW and lasts about 121 s.[31] If the same drum stood in a curbed area of 2 m by 2 m (4 m²), the liquid would form a pool about 52 mm deep with an equivalent diameter of 2.26 m. With the pool data above, the fire would release about 9.5 MW and, at a regression rate of about 4.5 mm/min, burn for about 700 s, or 11.7 minutes. In this case containment cuts the peak heat release rate by a factor of about six but makes the fire last about six times longer. Iqbal and Salley (2004) state the same trade-off in general terms.[6]

Chart of heat release rate against time for an unconfined gasoline spill and the same volume in a 4 square metre curbed area
Heat release rate and burning time of 208 L of gasoline, unconfined and in a 2 m by 2 m curbed area, idealised as constant burning.

Limits and special cases

Secondary containment works for liquids that stay liquid. Total confinement of a large flammable gas or vapour release is not possible; water spray curtains and hose streams are used instead to dilute and steer the cloud.[14] For the same reason, the 2008 handbook states that secondary containment is not provided at liquefied petroleum gas vehicle fuelling stations, because released non-refrigerated liquid propane turns to vapour immediately.[32] Impounding or diked areas have not been required for liquid hydrogen, whose vapour has a low density.[33]

Refrigerated liquids are a different case. For liquefied natural gas (LNG) fuelling stations, Rivkin (2008b) describes an impounding area with means to remove rainwater. It must hold the greatest volume that could be discharged during a 10 minute release from any single leakage source. Containment design and insulation can cut the rate of vapour production by as much as 30 percent. Compressed natural gas equipment should not stand inside the LNG secondary containment.[34]

Containment does not stop ignition, and it can concentrate a hazard. A diked spill can still burn around its source, high dike walls can trap heavy vapours, and internal containment keeps released chemicals inside a building where responders must work.[14][2][4] Strong winds can push fuel out of contained areas.[35] Rain, fire-fighting water and foam all take up part of the volume, and drains left open defeat the containment.[2]

In quantitative risk assessment, dikes appear as a mitigating factor after a loss of containment.[36] Barry (2002) lists overfilling of tanks, drainage and sampling valves, gaskets, flanges, piping failures and tank rupture among the major causes of containment failure.[36] Release calculations should document the effects of diking and curbing and the reliability of the drainage design.[37] The bund wall of an atmospheric tank is treated as part of the tank component, and containment systems must first be checked for whether their design suits the application.[3][38]

See also

Notes

  1. ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 Ordile (2008), p. 7-16.
  2. ↑ 2.00 2.01 2.02 2.03 2.04 2.05 2.06 2.07 2.08 2.09 2.10 2.11 2.12 2.13 2.14 2.15 Ordile (2008), p. 7-22.
  3. ↑ 3.0 3.1 Barry (2002), p. 5-185.
  4. ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 Whitford (2008), p. 6-240.
  5. ↑ 5.0 5.1 5.2 Severson (2008), p. 7-67.
  6. ↑ 6.0 6.1 Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. 3-5.
  7. ↑ 7.0 7.1 7.2 Ordile (2008), p. 7-23.
  8. ↑ 8.0 8.1 Rivkin (2008a), pp. 21-30–21-31.
  9. ↑ 9.0 9.1 Ordile (2008), p. 7-28.
  10. ↑ Slye (2008), p. 6-206.
  11. ↑ 11.0 11.1 Ordile (2008), p. 7-24.
  12. ↑ 12.0 12.1 National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), p. 1.2-25.
  13. ↑ 13.0 13.1 Schwab (2008a), p. 8-21.
  14. ↑ 14.0 14.1 14.2 14.3 Schwab (2008a), p. 8-22.
  15. ↑ Ordile (2008), p. 7-18.
  16. ↑ Severson (2008), p. 7-68.
  17. ↑ Rivkin (2008a), p. 21-34.
  18. ↑ Rivkin (2008a), p. 21-32.
  19. ↑ 19.0 19.1 Ordile (2008), p. 7-25.
  20. ↑ Ordile (2008), p. 7-27.
  21. ↑ Severson (2008), p. 7-65.
  22. ↑ Scheffey (2002), p. 4-119.
  23. ↑ Mowrer and Rosenbaum (2008), p. 3-186.
  24. ↑ Hildebrand and Noll (2008), p. 13-87.
  25. ↑ Scheffey and Hickey (2002), p. 4-130.
  26. ↑ 26.0 26.1 Gottuk and White (2002), p. 2-298.
  27. ↑ Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. 3-3.
  28. ↑ 28.0 28.1 Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. 3-18.
  29. ↑ Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. 3-8.
  30. ↑ Babrauskas (2002b), p. 3-26.
  31. ↑ Gottuk and White (2002), p. 2-314.
  32. ↑ Rivkin (2008b), p. 21-68.
  33. ↑ Lemoff (2008), p. 6-182.
  34. ↑ Rivkin (2008b), p. 21-66.
  35. ↑ Gottuk and White (2002), p. 2-313.
  36. ↑ 36.0 36.1 Barry (2002), p. 5-181.
  37. ↑ Barry (2002), p. 5-182.
  38. ↑ Barry (2002), p. 5-198.

References

  • Babrauskas, V. (2002b). Heat release rates. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 3-1–3-37). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
  • Barry, T. F. (2002). Quantitative risk assessment in chemical process industries. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 5-176–5-213). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
  • Gottuk, D. T., & White, D. A. (2002). Liquid fuel fires. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 2-297–2-316). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
  • Hildebrand, M. S., & Noll, G. G. (2008). Public fire protection and hazmat management. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 13-81–13-98). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Iqbal, N., & Salley, M. H. (2004). Fire Dynamics Tools (FDTs): Quantitative fire hazard analysis methods for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Fire Protection Inspection Program (NUREG-1805). U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
  • Lemoff, T. C. (2008). Gases. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 6-165–6-186). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Mowrer, F. W., & Rosenbaum, E. R. (2008). Overview of performance-based fire protection design. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 3-183–3-194). National Fire Protection Association.
  • National Research Council of Canada, International Code Council, Department of Building and Housing, & Australian Building Codes Board. (2005). International fire engineering guidelines (2005 ed.). Australian Building Codes Board.
  • Ordile, A. M. (2008). Storage of flammable and combustible liquids. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 7-15–7-33). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Rivkin, C. H. (2008a). Automotive and marine service station operations. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 21-29–21-40). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Rivkin, C. H. (2008b). Vehicle fueling using gaseous fuels. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 21-41–21-76). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Scheffey, J. L. (2002). Foam agents and AFFF system design considerations. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 4-88–4-122). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
  • Scheffey, J. L., & Hickey, H. E. (2002). Foam system calculations. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 4-123–4-148). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
  • Schwab, R. F. (2008a). Chemical processing equipment. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 8-17–8-29). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Severson, P. R. (2008). Hazardous waste control. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 7-57–7-69). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Slye, O. M., Jr. (2008). Flammable and combustible liquids. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 6-197–6-208). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Whitford, F. (2008). Pesticides in the workplace. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 6-233–6-245). National Fire Protection Association.