Contents
The MGM Grand Hotel fire was a fatal hotel fire in the Las Vegas area of Nevada on 21 November 1980. The NFPA handbook describes a fire beginning in a deli-restaurant on the casino level and smoke spreading through the building to guest floors. The incident caused 85 deaths and became an important case in the study of hotel protection and occupant response. [1]
The event demonstrated that severe exposure could occur far from the principal burning area. Bryan's SFPE Handbook chapter examines guests' reported actions, including attempts to leave, warnings to others and movement into rooms offering temporary refuge. These observations connect the physical spread of smoke with the decisions available to occupants. The case is therefore relevant to both building protection and the interpretation of human behaviour, while its particular layout, warning arrangements and fire conditions limit direct comparisons with other hotels. [2][3]
Fire development and remote exposure
The fire was discovered in the unoccupied deli area during the morning. The handbook describes subsequent spread through the casino and a rapid deterioration in conditions around the telephone operators. Their position became untenable shortly after a public-address announcement concerning the casino. The interruption of that function affected communication with guests elsewhere in the building. [1]
Smoke movement extended the incident beyond the area of flame involvement. The handbook identifies seismic joints, lift shafts and stairs among the pathways to upper floors. The principal fire remained at casino level, with only limited extension into guest accommodation. This distinction explains why the location of burning and the location of life-threatening exposure cannot be treated as the same thing. [1][4]
The high-rise building configuration connected many occupied floors with shared vertical features. Guests who received early information faced different conditions from those alerted after smoke had spread. The handbook records that some later-alerted occupants stayed in rooms or moved to other rooms. Those actions occurred in response to the conditions they encountered, rather than within a single uniform evacuation sequence. [1][4]
The fire therefore raised a system question about containment, warning and movement. A protected room, corridor or stair has a particular function within that system. Smoke reaching one of those spaces can alter the choices available elsewhere. The case connects the integrity of building pathways with the practical timing of occupant decisions. [5][2]
What the occupant study recorded
Human behaviour in fire was examined through a questionnaire sent to registered guests. Bryan describes the questionnaire, the returned responses and follow-up interview requests. The study recorded a sequence of actions rather than assuming that awareness immediately produced evacuation. This method captured information about dressing, checking conditions, communicating and seeking a route or refuge. [6]
Early actions often concerned interpreting the situation and preparing to act. Later reported actions included attempts to leave and responses to obstructed or smoky routes. The sequence matters because the fire environment was changing while these actions occurred. A movement model beginning with everyone at an exit would omit the preceding decisions and delays. [7][8]
The study also described people gathering in rooms with others. Bryan calls these groupings convergence clusters and discusses the characteristics of rooms selected by guests. The observations include cooperation and shared refuge, as well as attempts to evacuate. They show why response cannot be reduced to a single assumption about competitive escape. [9]
Re-entry behaviour and returns to rooms form part of the wider sequence of protective actions. A person might attempt a route, encounter conditions that changed the decision, and return or relocate. The records document what people did under those circumstances. They do not establish that every action was effective or that the same action would be appropriate in a different fire. [7]
Interpretation and comparisons
The case is relevant to hotel and dormitory occupancy because sleeping accommodation, unfamiliar surroundings and shared routes can occur together. The handbook's hotel chapter places the event among fires that prompted renewed attention to the complete protective package. That history connects warning and suppression with construction and escape arrangements. It does not attribute the entire safety outcome to one isolated measure. [10]
The World Trade Center collapse provides another body of high-rise evacuation evidence, but under very different conditions. NIST's account includes aircraft damage, unavailable routes and disruption of communications. The useful comparison is the need to connect physical conditions with the information available to occupants. Direct transfer of timings or survival outcomes between the incidents would disregard their different circumstances. [11][2]
The MGM study's evidence also has a defined population. Returned questionnaires describe respondents and their recollections, rather than a complete recording of every occupant. Bryan explicitly documents the response process. Keeping that basis visible prevents detailed observations from becoming unsupported claims about everyone in the hotel or every hotel fire. [6]
Occupant response and escape
Escape involves more than movement through a doorway. An occupant must first receive or notice information, interpret it and decide what to do. These activities can take place before travel begins. Proulx distinguishes the delay before movement from the time spent moving towards safety. A calculation that represents only walking or flow therefore describes part of the evacuation process. Whether that part is sufficient for the question being studied depends on the stated scope of the analysis. [12]
The availability of an exit and its actual use are also different. Proulx reports that people may investigate ambiguous cues and favour familiar routes. The assumption that everyone immediately follows the nearest available escape route can therefore misrepresent response. Route familiarity, information and the actions of others affect how the physical escape system is used. The NFPA handbook makes a related distinction between egress adequacy and reliability. Capacity provides one part of the system; warning, marking, illumination and protection support its effective use. [13][14]
Occupant characteristics determine whether an assumed response is plausible. The IFEG identifies state of alertness, mobility, hearing, vision and ability to understand instructions among the relevant characteristics. It separately identifies the help required and the help actually available. Staff numbers and shift patterns can therefore matter alongside the layout. Describing a population only by its total number omits information that can control evacuation performance. The relevant characteristics depend on the particular design question. [15]
Smoke changes both the environment and the movement problem. It can obscure routes and lighting, reduce movement speed and expose occupants to harmful combustion products. Proulx describes occupants moving into smoke in real incidents, including situations where conditions changed after movement began. Such observations do not establish that travel through smoke is safe. They show why an escape assessment has to consider changing conditions along the route, rather than treating the destination alone as the point of concern. [16]
Different times also describe different parts of the process. Flow time concerns how long a population takes to pass a particular element. Movement time concerns travel between locations. Total evacuation time includes delays and interactions beyond either of those measures. Treating these quantities as interchangeable can conceal a bottleneck or omit a period of exposure. Proulx's timing framework connects the response sequence to the period during which the escape environment remains tenable, meaning tolerable for the people involved. [8]
Protection of occupants can include controlling the fire, limiting smoke spread and supporting movement. The NFPA handbook presents prevention, management of fire and management of exposed occupants as related strategies. Their combination depends on the population and building. Where assistance is necessary, the assumed staff response becomes part of the safety system. Where an escape route is credited, its continuing usability matters. A description of the strategy therefore includes both physical features and the actions on which their effectiveness depends. [17][15]
What the assessment has to establish
An assessment starts by identifying what could be harmed and how a fire could produce that harm. Life, property, continuity of operations, heritage and the environment can all be relevant. These objectives overlap, but they do not describe the same outcome. A building that allows everyone to escape can still suffer a loss that stops its activities. Equally, preserving the structure does not necessarily preserve its contents or services. Meacham's account of building fire risk analysis makes these distinctions part of defining the problem. [18]
A hazard assessment then identifies possible ignition sources, combustible materials and the conditions through which fire could spread. The arrangement matters as well as the quantity of material. The description includes the building, its compartments and the protection systems that may affect the event. A hazard assessment asks what could happen under specified conditions. A risk assessment adds consideration of how likely those conditions and consequences are. A calculated consequence therefore does not, by itself, establish a probability of loss. [18]
The people affected need to be described with similar care. An occupancy name provides a useful starting point, but does not fully describe an individual's ability to respond. The NFPA handbook treats occupancy classification as a substitute description for a collection of life safety characteristics. Detailed assessment needs more information when those characteristics determine the result. Age, mobility, awareness, familiarity and available assistance can change the protection that an occupant needs. A category suitable for organising code requirements is therefore not a complete prediction of an evacuation. [19]
Different forms of evidence answer different questions. Inspection can identify an obstruction or an unprotected opening. A calculation can explore a fire scenario under stated assumptions. Historical records can indicate recurring causes or consequences. None of these sources removes the need to check whether the evidence applies to the particular building and activity. Meacham identifies changing materials, uncertain data and future changes in use as limitations when past experience informs a new assessment. [20]
Assessment also includes the behaviour of safeguards when conditions are unfavourable. A review can examine a failed component, an unavailable protection system or an action that does not occur as intended. Fault trees work backwards from an unwanted event towards possible causes. Event trees work forwards from an initiating event through possible outcomes. Their structure can clarify dependencies before reliable numerical probabilities are available. Assigning a number to each branch is a separate evidential step. [21]
The resulting judgement depends on the purpose of the assessment and the acceptance criteria. A result that answers a narrow equipment question may leave wider building risks unresolved. Stakeholders can also value consequences differently, especially where life safety, economic loss and irreplaceable heritage are involved. Recording the scope makes the meaning of an acceptable result visible. It also identifies which changes in use, population or protection would require the assessment to be reconsidered. [18][15]
Evidence, review and the limits of a decision
A fire safety decision needs a defined question before calculations or inspections can resolve it. The International Fire Engineering Guidelines describe a fire engineering brief as the agreed basis for an analysis. It records the scope, relevant stakeholders, building and occupant characteristics, objectives and methods. Acceptance criteria and proposed designs are considered as part of that process. The brief is a technical basis for the assessment, rather than simply the commercial agreement for the work. Its detail varies with the complexity of the problem. [22]
The distinction between an objective and a test of that objective is significant. Protecting occupants states an aim. A criterion identifies a condition against which the design can be evaluated. The calculation method then estimates the quantities needed for that comparison. These steps cannot be replaced by selecting software and accepting its output. The NFPA handbook states that verification methods help evaluate a solution; the design and approval decisions remain with the responsible people. [23]
An analysis depends on its assumptions even when the output appears precise. Input data may be incomplete, the model may simplify a physical process, and actual conditions may vary. The handbook distinguishes uncertainty caused by limited knowledge from variation inherent in the conditions being represented. Additional information can reduce some uncertainties, but cannot remove all variation. Identifying the source of uncertainty makes it possible to judge which further evidence would change the decision. [24]
Sensitivity analysis explores how changing an input changes the result. It can reveal that an apparently minor assumption controls a conclusion. A separate assessment can examine the point at which a result changes from acceptable to unacceptable. These methods help explain the margin between a prediction and the acceptance criterion. They do not create evidence for an input that has no defensible basis. The scale of the uncertainty and the significance of the outcome remain relevant to interpreting the margin. [25]
Review also has an organisational dimension. A reviewer needs enough information to understand the proposed arrangement and the reasons offered for accepting it. The handbook places the authority having jurisdiction within the performance design process from an early stage. The IFEG similarly describes consultation and revision of the brief as the work develops. Early agreement on scope can identify disagreements before they become hidden within a finished calculation. It also makes departures from the original assumptions visible. [25][26]
Professional competence and independence affect the quality of this evidence. Van Rossum explains that complex analyses can be difficult for a reviewing body to check fully. Commercial or organisational interests may also favour a particular result. A technically convincing report therefore depends on competent work and an honest account of assumptions and limitations. These issues concern the integrity of the assessment, alongside the correctness of individual calculations. They cannot be resolved merely by making a report longer or its numerical output more detailed. [27]
See also
Notes
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 Cote et al. (2008), §4.1, p. 4-20.
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 Bryan (2002), pp. 3-326–3-328.
- ↑ Cote et al. (2008), §4.1, pp. 4-20–4-24.
- ↑ 4.0 4.1 Bryan (2002), p. 3-326.
- ↑ Cote et al. (2008), §4.1, pp. 4-20–4-21.
- ↑ 6.0 6.1 Bryan (2002), p. 3-327.
- ↑ 7.0 7.1 Bryan (2002), pp. 3-327–3-328.
- ↑ 8.0 8.1 Proulx (2002), p. 3-347.
- ↑ Bryan (2002), p. 3-328.
- ↑ Cote et al. (2008), §20.3, pp. 20-24–20-25.
- ↑ Averill et al. (2005), pp. xxxi–xxxiv.
- ↑ Proulx (2002), pp. 3-342, 3-347.
- ↑ Proulx (2002), p. 3-342.
- ↑ Cote et al. (2008), §20.1, pp. 20-11–20-12.
- ↑ 15.0 15.1 15.2 Australian Building Codes Board (2005), §1.2.4, pp. 1.2-6–1.2-7.
- ↑ Proulx (2002), p. 3-362.
- ↑ Cote et al. (2008), §20.1, pp. 20-9–20-12.
- ↑ 18.0 18.1 18.2 Meacham (2002), pp. 5-153–5-155.
- ↑ Cote et al. (2008), §20.1, p. 20-9.
- ↑ Meacham (2002), pp. 5-154–5-156.
- ↑ Meacham (2002), p. 5-156.
- ↑ Australian Building Codes Board (2005), §1.2, pp. 1.2-2–1.2-3.
- ↑ Cote et al. (2008), §3.10, pp. 3-167, 3-173–3-174.
- ↑ Cote et al. (2008), §3.10, p. 3-173.
- ↑ 25.0 25.1 Cote et al. (2008), §3.10, p. 3-174.
- ↑ Australian Building Codes Board (2005), §1.2, p. 1.2-2.
- ↑ Van Rossum (2027), §§2.1–2.3.
References
- Australian Building Codes Board. (2005). International fire engineering guidelines.
- Averill, J. D., Mileti, D. S., Peacock, R. D., Kuligowski, E. D., Groner, N., Proulx, G., Reneke, P. A., & Nelson, H. E. (2005). Occupant behavior, egress, and emergency communications (NIST NCSTAR 1-7). National Institute of Standards and Technology.
- Bryan, J. L. (2002). Behavioral response to fire and smoke. In P. J. DiNenno (Ed.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., Section 3, Chapter 12, pp. 3-315–3-341). National Fire Protection Association.
- Cote, A. E., Grant, C. C., Hall, J. R., Jr., & Solomon, R. E. (Eds.). (2008). Fire protection handbook (20th ed.). National Fire Protection Association.
- Meacham, B. J. (2002). Building fire risk analysis. In P. J. DiNenno (Ed.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., Section 5, Chapter 12, pp. 5-153–5-175). National Fire Protection Association.
- Proulx, G. (2002). Movement of people: The evacuation timing. In P. J. DiNenno (Ed.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., Section 3, Chapter 13, pp. 3-342–3-366). National Fire Protection Association.
- Van Rossum, E. (2027). Introduction to Fire Safety Engineering. Fire Safety Academy.