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Contents
  1. 1Definition and scope
  2. 2From alarm to control
  3. 3Factors considered
  4. 4Fire conditions, structure and collapse
  5. 5From size-up to decision
  6. 6Information sources
  7. 7Limits and lessons
  8. 8See also
  9. 9Notes
  10. 10References

Size-up is the evaluation of the problems and conditions that affect the likely outcome of a fire or other emergency, carried out by the officer in command as the basis for the strategy.[1][2][3] It begins when the alarm is received and continues until the emergency is under control.[4] Some factors, such as the construction of a building, can be known in advance through pre-incident planning. Others, such as the weather and the extent of the fire, become known only at the incident.[2][4]

The size-up leads to an incident action plan, and in structural firefighting the most critical decision in it is often whether to attack the fire offensively, with crews inside, or defensively, usually from outside.[5] Fire officers use checklists and memory aids, such as the New York City outline "COAL WAS WEALTH", to cover the main factors.[6] The same evaluation step is used at hazardous materials incidents, aircraft accidents and technical rescues.[7][8][9] This article describes size-up mainly as presented in the 2008 edition of the NFPA Fire Protection Handbook, with examples from the investigation of the emergency response at the World Trade Center in 2001.

Definition and scope

Norman (2008) describes size-up as "an evaluation of problems and conditions that affect the likely outcome of a fire". He calls it an information-gathering process, comparable to gathering intelligence in a military campaign.[1] Klaene and Sanders (2008) define it as the evaluation of factors as they exist at the time of an incident. The procedures of the New York City Fire Department (FDNY) of 1997 define it as an estimate of the conditions and problems of a fire or emergency situation by the officer in command.[2][3]

Size-up is a task of command. The FDNY incident command system manual of 1997 states that at all incidents, command conducts a size-up, develops a strategy and is responsible for its outcome.[10] Klaene and Sanders (2008) describe how the incident commander uses the standard operating procedures, the pre-incident plan and the size-up to develop a safe and effective incident action plan. The result should be a straightforward, easy-to-understand strategy that emphasises the commander's major tactical objectives.[2]

The term is not limited to building fires. C. J. Wright (2008a) calls the analysis of a hazardous materials problem the "sizeup", a way of determining the specific hazards and the potential magnitude of the problem.[7] At airports, every vehicle approaching an aircraft accident should immediately perform a quick size-up and report smoke, fire, damage and fuel spills.[8] Awareness training for rope rescue includes basic size-up; confined-space rescue training includes size-up of existing and potential conditions.[9] For fires in combustible metals, Christman (2008) calls putting the fire in perspective a key element of the size-up, because water can make such fires react violently.[11]

From alarm to control

Information for the initial size-up begins to arrive when the incident is reported, by a call to the 9-1-1 emergency dispatch centre or by an alarm from a pull box at the scene. This information forms the basis of what responders are told when they are dispatched.[12] Where the address has a pre-incident plan on file, a computer-aided dispatch system can send its warnings to the responding units. Norman (2008) recommends repeating such a message by radio about one minute after the initial alarm, once crews are on the road.[13] Geographic information systems can also give first responders the incident location, quickest route, hydrant locations, preplans, photographs and floor plans.[14]

Timeline from alarm to control showing when size-up information arrives and when the size-up is re-evaluated
Size-up as a continuous process: information arrives with the call and dispatch, is refined on arrival and is re-evaluated until the emergency is under control.

On arrival, the first officer must evaluate the situation before resources are committed. Johnson and Price (2008) summarise the sequence: first responders must get to the emergency, size it up and then deploy.[14] Granito (2008) links this step to response time. He describes a planning target of first-arriving apparatus reaching the scene within 5 minutes of the alarm at the station. Additional minutes are then needed to size up the situation, deploy hose lines and start search and rescue.[15]

Fire officer in a command vest observing smoke from a two-storey building while holding a radio and a tablet
An officer in command observes smoke conditions and the building from outside during the initial size-up.

The International Fire Engineering Guidelines (2005) treat this step as one of the time periods in a fire engineering analysis of fire service intervention. The "time to complete investigations" covers locating the fire with information from installed fire safety equipment, occupants and observations of smoke and flames. Fire fighters may put on their equipment and enter the building before these investigations are complete.[16] The analysis then asks when sufficient information has been gathered to start set-up, search and rescue, and fire attack.[17] The guidelines describe a common tactic in which some firefighters locate the fire and assess its severity while others check for trapped occupants near the fire.[18]

Size-up does not end with the first decision. Klaene and Sanders (2008) state that it continues throughout the incident as the commander evaluates and re-evaluates each critical factor. There is a direct link between the size-up and the quantity and quality of the information available: the more accurate the size-up, the better the odds of a safe and efficient operation.[2] Loflin (2008) lists regular re-evaluation and a pessimistic evaluation of changing conditions among the components of operational risk management under NFPA 1500. He also describes reports of elapsed time on scene at 15-minute intervals from the communication centre.[19][20]

Factors considered

Klaene and Sanders (2008) give a size-up checklist in seven groups. Life safety covers, among others, structural stability, the collapse zone, smoke and fire conditions, the estimated number of people, their proximity to the fire, their mobility and the rescue options. Extinguishment covers the choice between offensive and defensive operations, fixed suppression systems, water supply, rate of flow, fuel load and the number of hose lines needed.[5] Property conservation covers salvageable property and the likely smoke and water damage. Structure covers signs of collapse, construction type, previous damage, age, height and area, and large undivided areas. Resources compare the staffing, apparatus and water supply needed with what is available, and the last two groups are weather and time.[5]

Seven groups of the size-up checklist around a central box labelled size-up, each with three to five example factors
The seven groups of the size-up checklist with examples of the factors in each group.

New York City fire officers use a 13-point outline for size-up and pre-incident planning, summarised as "COAL WAS WEALTH". The letters stand for construction, occupancy, apparatus and staffing, life hazard, water supply, auxiliary appliances, street conditions, weather, exposures, area and height, location and extent of fire, time, and hazardous materials.[6][21] According to Norman (2008), this outline covers the majority of fireground considerations.[6]

The weight of each factor changes with the situation. Klaene and Sanders (2008) note that weather can be critically important at the extremes but unimportant under mild conditions. When occupants are known to be inside a burning building, life safety factors are pre-eminent. Time of day can be critical because a high-rise office building may hold thousands of people during business hours but only a few at other times. In their words, "quite often structural conditions are the single most important factor in the size-up".[2]

The significance of each factor is directly related to the operational priorities of life safety, extinguishment and property conservation, in that order. Klaene and Sanders (2008) name environmental impact, heritage protection and business or mission continuity as additional considerations.[2] Other fields use similar orders. At aircraft accidents, the priorities are rescue, fire control, loss control and environmental consideration.[8][22] At hazardous materials incidents, C. J. Wright (2008a) lists seven tasks, from detecting the material and surveying the incident to predicting its behaviour and estimating the potential outcomes.[7]

Fire conditions, structure and collapse

The fire's stage of development is central to the size-up. As described by Van Rossum (2027), the development phase of a room fire lasts from flaming combustion until flashover and is still local and fuel-controlled. After flashover the fire is fully developed and usually ventilation-controlled, until it enters the decay phase.[23] Flashover itself is the sudden transition in which the whole room becomes involved.[24] The stages are described in more detail under Fire development stages. For fire service operations, Van Rossum (2027) notes that it matters whether a fire is still local or already a compartment fire, and whether crews can work with sight of the fire.[25]

Schematic heat release curve of a room fire with development phase, flashover, fully developed phase and decay phase, and a bar for elapsed time since flashover
Phases of a room fire. Before flashover the fire is local and fuel-controlled; after flashover the whole room is involved and the elapsed time since flashover becomes a primary indicator of possible collapse.

Fire events that threaten crews are a specific concern. A Backdraft is the explosive ignition of accumulated pyrolysis gases when oxygen is suddenly admitted, for example by opening a door, and is a dangerous phenomenon for the fire service.[26] Klaene and Sanders (2008) list a backdraft among the possible effects of improper ventilation.[27] As described by Loflin (2008), the functions of the incident safety officer include evaluating visible smoke and fire conditions. The officer advises the commander on the potential for flashover, backdraft, blowup or other fire events that could threaten crews.[19]

Elapsed burning time is one of the main clues to collapse. Norman (2008) writes that structural collapse is very difficult to predict, because it depends on construction, fire load, burning time before the alarm, alterations and deterioration. The time frame that matters starts when the fire reaches flashover and begins to attack the structure, and the elapsed time from flashover is one of the primary indicators of impending collapse. The class of construction indicates how long the building will resist failure.[21]

The location of the fire also shapes the evaluation. The lower the fire is in a building, the more of the building is exposed to rapid vertical fire spread. Shafts and open stairs need hose-line protection or examination, and the void above the top floor of most ordinary and frame buildings can allow rapid spread over the whole top floor.[28] Area and height indicate the maximum potential fire area, but a building may look different from different sides. A building on a sloping grade appears one storey high from one side and two from another, and a similar situation contributed to the deaths of four fire fighters in Seattle in 1995.[28]

Some buildings make the size-up harder. In limited-access and underground structures, visibility from outside is poor, and the size-up is often delayed until an initial interior observation can be made.[29] In sprinklered warehouses, Moore (2008) recommends supporting the sprinkler system first; once that support is established, the commander has time to size up the situation carefully.[30] In the Netherlands, the basic principles of firefighting published by the Netherlands Institute for Safety (IFV) in 2018 begin with taking more time to "stop and think" and with an exterior reconnaissance. Its aim is to locate the fire from outside, for example with a thermal imaging camera.[31]

From size-up to decision

The size-up feeds the incident action plan, which the commander revises as the size-up reflects changing conditions. In developing the plan, the commander compares the fire fighters' exposure to risk with the potential outcomes. Klaene and Sanders (2008) describe the offensive-defensive decision as often the most critical factor in this risk-benefit analysis and as the foundation of the plan.[5] That decision, and the strategies that follow from it, are described under Fire attack strategy. Because the decision depends on the ongoing size-up, it can change during the incident.[5]

The Dutch guidance makes this link explicit. After the reconnaissance, three questions are answered: is it known where the fire is, can it be reached from outside, and is sufficient cooling capacity available. The answers determine the type of attack, and taking more time makes it possible to see more and to interpret it correctly.[31][32]

Size-up also decides whether the first response is enough. In the FDNY procedure for high-rise office buildings, as summarised by Lawson and Vettori (2005), the first battalion chief makes an initial size-up to determine the adequacy of the response. Any visible fire or smoke coming through the outer skin of the building warrants a second alarm. The chief also asks the building's fire safety director whether the fire floor has been confirmed, how far evacuation has progressed and whether there are reports of severe life hazards. Further questions concern the status of elevators and ventilation, access stairs near the fire floor, and communications with the fire floor and the occupants.[33]

At hazardous materials incidents, the FDNY plan of 1994 warned against committing companies prematurely to unknown, potentially hazardous locations. It called for a cautious, methodical and deliberate size-up combined with immediate site security, to limit needless exposure of responders.[10] C. J. Wright (2008a) adds that pre-emergency planning that follows the same analysis steps shortens the time needed for a safe response.[7] At aircraft accidents, the commander, who at a small airport may be the only person responding, must gather the assessment information and develop an action plan from the initial size-up.[8]

Information sources

Pre-incident planning supplies the part of the size-up that can be known in advance. Norman (2008) calls the information gathered during a pre-incident planning visit a key component of the fire officer's size-up.[1] Such planning concentrates on factors that remain static until an event, such as building construction or occupancy loads. It also concentrates on items that would be hard to see on arrival, such as interconnections between buildings.[4] Klaene and Sanders (2008) add that both pre-incident plans and standard operating procedures contain information critically important to the commander's size-up, so commanders and crews should know them and train with them.[2]

Building design can also support the size-up. In New Zealand, the commentary to Verification Method C/VM2 (2013) states that information must be available to crews on arrival so that they can size up the situation rapidly. This allows the officer in charge to make a risk-informed judgement about firefighting and rescue.[34] Clause C5.7, as set out in C/VM2 (second edition, 2025), requires means to give firefighters clear information on the location of the fire, the fire safety systems and any hazardous substances.[35] In Australia, the handbook to the Fire Safety Verification Method (2020) expects the brigade to be given the correct fire location and communication facilities on arrival.[36] The International Fire Engineering Guidelines (2005) note that the size, layout and signage of a building affect investigation, search, rescue and firefighting.[37]

Limits and lessons

A size-up is only as good as its information. Klaene and Sanders (2008) note that the choice between offensive and defensive operations is not always clear-cut, because the commander often has inadequate information or conflicting reports. The commander's training and experience are then key factors in selecting the proper mode.[38] Van Rossum (2027) adds a caution for engineers: a favourable fire safety engineering result does not mean that the fire service will attack from inside. That decision is always made by the crew at the scene.[25]

The World Trade Center response on 11 September 2001 shows these limits at a very large scale. The first FDNY battalion chief had seen the aircraft strike WTC 1 and set up a command post at the lobby fire command desk. There he was told that no elevators were operating and that fires were burning above the 78th floor.[12][39] The initial size-up indicated that the sprinkler systems were not controlling the fires and that the standpipes were inoperable at the impact zones.[40] Firefighters were ordered to go no higher than the 70th floor, leaving eight floors as a buffer, and to report what they observed.[39]

The NIST report concludes that information available during the initial size-up defined the building conditions, but that details needed for refining operations were limited. Some information never reached the command post inside WTC 1. Chief officers later stated that people watching television knew more about conditions on the upper floors than the commanders in the lobby.[39] The case illustrates the direct link that Klaene and Sanders (2008) draw between the quality of information and the quality of the size-up.[2]

See also

Notes

  1. ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 Norman (2008), p. 12-299.
  2. ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 Klaene and Sanders (2008), p. 13-5.
  3. ↑ 3.0 3.1 Lawson and Vettori (2005), Appendix I.
  4. ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 Norman (2008), p. 12-300.
  5. ↑ 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 Klaene and Sanders (2008), p. 13-6.
  6. ↑ 6.0 6.1 6.2 Norman (2008), p. 12-302.
  7. ↑ 7.0 7.1 7.2 7.3 C. J. Wright (2008a), p. 13-121.
  8. ↑ 8.0 8.1 8.2 8.3 Kreckie (2008), p. 13-109.
  9. ↑ 9.0 9.1 R. Wright (2008), p. 13-20.
  10. ↑ 10.0 10.1 Lawson and Vettori (2005), Appendix A.
  11. ↑ Christman (2008), p. 6-155.
  12. ↑ 12.0 12.1 Lawson and Vettori (2005), p. 70.
  13. ↑ Norman (2008), p. 12-307.
  14. ↑ 14.0 14.1 Johnson and Price (2008), p. 12-229.
  15. ↑ Granito (2008), p. 12-13.
  16. ↑ National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), p. 1.9-4.
  17. ↑ National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), p. 1.9-6.
  18. ↑ National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), p. 2.9-3.
  19. ↑ 19.0 19.1 Loflin (2008), p. 12-112.
  20. ↑ Loflin (2008), p. 12-114.
  21. ↑ 21.0 21.1 Norman (2008), p. 12-303.
  22. ↑ Kreckie (2008), p. 13-110.
  23. ↑ Van Rossum (2027), §4.11.
  24. ↑ Van Rossum (2027), §4.7.
  25. ↑ 25.0 25.1 Van Rossum (2027), §9.3 (Results from zone models).
  26. ↑ Van Rossum (2027), §4.9.
  27. ↑ Klaene and Sanders (2008), p. 13-10.
  28. ↑ 28.0 28.1 Norman (2008), p. 12-304.
  29. ↑ Holmes (2008b), p. 20-218.
  30. ↑ J. Moore (2008), p. 20-173.
  31. ↑ 31.0 31.1 Netherlands Institute for Safety (2018a), as cited in Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 44.
  32. ↑ Netherlands Institute for Safety (2018a), as cited in Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 63.
  33. ↑ Lawson and Vettori (2005), p. 121.
  34. ↑ Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2013), p. 151.
  35. ↑ Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2025b), p. 53.
  36. ↑ Australian Building Codes Board (2020b), p. 29.
  37. ↑ National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), p. 1.9-5.
  38. ↑ Klaene and Sanders (2008), p. 13-9.
  39. ↑ 39.0 39.1 39.2 Lawson and Vettori (2005), p. 71.
  40. ↑ Lawson and Vettori (2005), p. 77.

References

  • Australian Building Codes Board. (2020b). Handbook: Fire Safety Verification Method (Print version 1.1).
  • Christman, T. (2008). Metals. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 6-153–6-164). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Granito, J. A. (2008). Planning for public fire-rescue protection. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 12-3–12-22). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Holmes, W. D. (2008b). Occupancies in special structures. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 20-217–20-226). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Johnson, R., & Price, M. (2008). GIS for fire station locations and response protocols. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 12-215–12-231). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Klaene, B. J., & Sanders, R. (2008). Fireground operations. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 13-3–13-11). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Kreckie, J. (2008). Aircraft rescue and fire fighting (ARFF). In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 13-99–13-115). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Lawson, J. R., & Vettori, R. L. (2005). The emergency response operations (NIST NCSTAR 1-8). National Institute of Standards and Technology.
  • Loflin, M. E. (2008). Safety, medical, and health issues and programs. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 12-107–12-125). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment. (2013). Commentary for Building Code clauses C1–C6 and Verification Method C/VM2.
  • Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment. (2025b). Verification Method C/VM2: Framework for fire safety design (2nd ed.).
  • Moore, J. (2008). Storage occupancies. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 20-157–20-178). National Fire Protection Association.
  • National Research Council of Canada, International Code Council, Department of Building and Housing, & Australian Building Codes Board. (2005). International fire engineering guidelines (2005 ed.). Australian Building Codes Board.
  • Norman, J. (2008). Pre-Incident planning for emergency response. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 12-299–12-308). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Van der Graaf, J., Hessels, T., & Rosmuller, N. (2023). Fire safety of indoor car parks accommodating electrically powered vehicles. Nederlands Instituut Publieke Veiligheid. (Original work published 2021)
  • Van Rossum, E. (2027). Introduction to Fire Safety Engineering. Fire Safety Academy.
  • Wright, C. J. (2008a). Managing the response to hazardous material incidents. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 13-117–13-144). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Wright, R. (2008). Organizing rescue operations. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 13-13–13-21). National Fire Protection Association.