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Contents
  1. 1Ships as a fire problem
  2. 2Causes and locations of ship fires
  3. 3Regulation: SOLAS and national rules
  4. 4Structural fire protection and compartmentation
  5. 5Fixed fire-extinguishing systems
  6. 6Inerting of cargo tanks
  7. 7Evacuation and emergency response
  8. 8See also
  9. 9Notes
  10. 10References

A ship fire is a fire on board a ship or other marine vessel, from a small pleasure boat to a cargo ship, tanker or cruise ship.[1] Fires and explosions remain a cause of death and injury in marine casualties.[1] A ship at sea is on its own: it cannot rely on a local fire department, so it must carry its own equipment and trained fire fighters.[2]

The 2008 handbook reports that about 60 % of shipboard fires in US Coast Guard data start in the engine room. Most are linked to fuel or lubricating oil spraying onto a hot surface.[3][4] Ship fire safety rests on noncombustible steel construction divided into fire-rated zones, fixed gas or water mist systems in machinery spaces, inert gas in tanker cargo tanks and evacuation to assembly stations on board.[5] Ships on international voyages follow the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), maintained by the International Maritime Organization (IMO).[6]

Ships as a fire problem

A ship differs from a building in several ways that matter for fire. Its hull is closed on the bottom and on all sides so that it can float. Leaking fuel and heavier-than-air vapours therefore stay inside the hull, whereas trains, aircraft and road vehicles can let them drain away.[1] Gasoline vapour is about four times as heavy as air and sinks to the bilge, the lowest part of the hull.[7]

Adding deck levels raises the centre of gravity, so ships are built long and low rather than tall.[8] Fire protection equipment is exposed to salt water, humidity, shock and vibration, and the water for fire fighting is usually seawater or river water that may contain sediment. Fire fighters cannot vent a compartment by cutting a hole in the deck above. Water used on the upper decks must be limited, and bilge pumps must remove it, because accumulated water can threaten the ship's stability.[2]

The handbook analyses fire hazards in three main areas of ships: the engine room, the cargo holds or tanks, and the accommodation and service areas where crew and passengers live.[3] Using the US Coast Guard casualty database, in use since 1985, the 2008 handbook attributes roughly 60 % of shipboard fires to the engine room. It divides the rest evenly between cargo and accommodation areas, but does not state the full data period.[3] For small craft, US Coast Guard statistics for 2001–2005 cover nearly 13 million pleasure and small commercial boats. They show about 225 fire and explosion accidents per year, causing on average about 5 deaths and 93 injuries per year, and almost $54 million of property damage over the five years.[1]

Horizontal bar chart of shipboard fire locations: engine room about 60 percent, cargo area about 20 percent, accommodation about 20 percent
Approximate share of shipboard fires by location in US Coast Guard data, as reported in 2008; the full data period is unstated. Based on Eberly (2008), p. 21-165.

Causes and locations of ship fires

The engine room of a modern ship usually holds one or more large diesel engines with generators and hydraulic, ventilation and lubricating oil systems. The fuel is marine diesel or heavy fuel oil, which must be heated before it can be transferred.[4] Casualty data show that most engine room fires start when broken fuel or lube oil lines spray onto hot exhaust manifolds, turbochargers or engine casings. Electrical faults come next. Less often, crankcase, clutch and turbocharger explosions occur, and poorly controlled cutting and welding also contributes.[4] Since 2002, SOLAS has required new ships to have double-jacketed high-pressure fuel piping and shielding of fuel lines that could spray onto hot surfaces.[4]

Machinery space fires are spray and pool fires of diesel, lubricating or hydraulic oil, ignited by hot engine parts, overheated bearings or electrical arcing. They can develop fast, burn very hot and cripple or destroy a ship.[9] In cargo areas, electrical shorts and sparking are the most frequent cause, followed by cutting and welding, hot surfaces and discarded cigarettes. In accommodation areas, electrical faults lead, followed by galley and cooking fires.[4]

Cargo determines much of the hazard. In general cargo holds the goods are stowed tightly up to the deckhead, often 3 to 6 m (10 to 20 ft) high, with no aisles. This limits the air supply, so a hold fire is usually a deep-seated, slowly developing fire.[10]

In roll-on/roll-off (ro-ro) holds carrying vehicles with gasoline and charged batteries, the expected fires include flammable liquid fires rather than only deep-seated cargo fires.[11] On tank ships, the greatest risk is flammable cargo vapour meeting an ignition source. Typical petroleum products carried on tankships are flammable between 1 and 10 % by volume in air.[11]

Regulation: SOLAS and national rules

SOLAS sets fire protection rules for ships on international voyages, and all signatory countries accept each other's SOLAS safety certificates. The flag state, where the ship is registered, approves the design; port states may inspect visiting ships to check compliance.[6][12][3] The convention in force at the time of the 2008 handbook was SOLAS 1974, as amended, effective for ships built after 25 May 1980. Its 2000 amendments reorganised the fire chapter and moved system design rules into the International Code for Fire Safety Systems (FSS Code).[12] Since 1 July 1998, the fire test methods of the International Code for the Application of Fire Test Procedures (FTP Code) have been a mandatory part of SOLAS.[13]

In the United States, the Coast Guard writes and enforces the rules for US flag ships in Title 46 of the Code of Federal Regulations. It has separate parts for tank, passenger and cargo vessels.[6] The domestic rules follow a principle of passive fire safety: noncombustible fire boundaries and limited combustible materials are meant to confine a fire to its space of origin.[12] The Coast Guard also enforces IMO requirements for foreign flag ships in US waters. NFPA 301, Code for Safety to Life from Fire on Merchant Vessels, includes requirements for vessels carrying more than 12 passengers.[14]

The 2000 SOLAS amendments added a performance-based option. Under it, a designer may use fire safety engineering to show that an alternative design offers the same level of safety as the prescriptive rules.[12][15] Unlike an approved building, such a ship may later visit a port state that took no part in the review, so IMO guidelines suggest documentation to be carried on board.[15] The International Fire Engineering Guidelines, written for buildings, note that their concepts may also help in evaluating ships and tunnels.[16]

Structural fire protection and compartmentation

The passenger ship Morro Castle burned off the coast of New Jersey in 1934. Combustible wooden construction and open stairways were found to have caused the rapid fire spread. In 1936, full-scale fire tests on the surplus ship SS Nantasket showed the superior performance of insulated steel bulkheads and noncombustible panels, and the resulting report recommended noncombustible materials only.[2] Noncombustible construction is still the cornerstone of shipboard structural fire protection, and most ships are built of steel.[2]

Fire compartmentation on a ship works differently from that in a building. In a building, the floors form the main fire subdivisions. On a ship, the decks stop vertical fire spread, but extra barriers are needed to stop horizontal spread along decks that can be more than 200 m long. Passenger ships are therefore divided into main vertical zones by fire barriers with a 1-hour rating at intervals of 40 m along the ship.[8] Each main vertical zone needs two means of escape, which in effect limits the travel distance.[17]

Side section of a passenger ship divided by vertical fire barriers every 40 m into main vertical zones, with engine room, stair towers and lifeboats marked
Fire compartmentation of a passenger ship: decks limit vertical spread, and 1-hour fire barriers at most 40 m apart form main vertical zones. Based on Eberly (2008), pp. 21-163, 21-171, 21-179–21-180.

Ship fire barriers are classed by fire tests. An A-class division keeps its structural integrity for 60 minutes and a B-class division for 30 minutes. The number after the letter gives the time, in minutes, for which the barrier limits the average temperature rise on its unexposed side to 140 °C above ambient. An A-0 division, such as bare steel, has no insulation rating; A-60 is the highest rating and is used for main vertical zones, stair towers and the boundaries of engine rooms.[18] In the US structural insulation test, a 5 mm steel plate with insulation faces the standard time–temperature curve of ASTM E119 for 60 minutes. About 75 % of the insulation thickness that gives A-60 provides A-30, and 50 % provides A-15.[19]

Diagram of ship fire divisions A-0, A-15, A-30, A-60, B-0 and B-15 with integrity and insulation times and relative insulation thickness
Ship fire division classes: A-class keeps integrity for 60 minutes and B-class for 30 minutes; the number is the time the average temperature rise on the cold side stays within 140 °C. Based on Eberly (2008), pp. 21-171–21-172.

The materials themselves must pass strict tests. In the US noncombustibility test, a small sample is lowered into a furnace at 750 °C. It fails if the furnace or sample temperature rises by more than 50 °C, if it flames for more than 10 seconds in total, or if it loses more than 50 % of its mass.[19] Approved interior finishes must have a flame spread rating of 20 or less and a smoke developed rating of 10 or less in the ASTM E84 or NFPA 255 test. Combustible veneers may be at most about 2 mm thick.[13] On small US passenger vessels used for dinner cruises or gaming, the combustible load in public spaces is limited to 36.6 kg/m² (7.5 lb/ft²).[20]

Fixed fire-extinguishing systems

Because of the hazards in engine rooms, US Coast Guard rules require them to have a total flooding carbon dioxide extinguishing system or a clean agent system, with a manual release. An accidental discharge would stop the engines and leave a moving ship without propulsion or steering.[4] Both are forms of gaseous extinguishing system, which fill the protected space with an agent at a set concentration.[21] Shipboard carbon dioxide (CO2) systems are designed for a minimum concentration of 34 % by volume. This extinguishing concentration can cause serious injury or death, so the protected space must be evacuated before the gas is released.[22]

The volume of inert gas needed to reach a design concentration can be estimated with the free-efflux relation. It assumes that the displaced atmosphere vents freely from the space during discharge, and the same expression is used in CO2 system design.[23] For a space at about 21 °C the relation simplifies to the form below, where the ratio of specific volumes equals 1.

CO2 concentration scale marking the 34 percent shipboard design value and levels for propane, ethyl ether and ethylene, with an evacuation warning
CO2 concentrations in a protected space: shipboard design concentration and the minimum levels that prevent burning of three vapours at 25 °C. Evacuate before discharge. Based on Eberly (2008), p. 21-178, and Yu and Newman (2008), p. 2-87.

XV=2.303log10(100100−C)

Symbol Description Unit
X Volume of inert gas (CO2) required, at 21 °C m³
V Net volume of the protected space m³
C Design concentration % by volume

As a worked example, take an engine room of 500 m³. The 2000 SOLAS amendments described by the handbook required an extra local application system for engine rooms larger than this.[24] At C = 34 %, X/V = 2.303 × log10(100/66) ≈ 0.42, so about 210 m³ of CO2 is needed. Air contains 21 % oxygen, so the oxygen concentration in the space falls to about 21 × 0.66 ≈ 13.9 %.[25]

The ratio of CO2 to air is then 34/66 ≈ 0.52. At 25 °C, this exceeds the minimum ratios that prevent burning of propane vapour (0.41) and ethyl ether vapour (0.51), but not that for ethylene (0.68).[26] This idealised comparison does not size a shipboard system. Where a hazard needs more than 34 %, NFPA 12 increases the basic quantity by a conversion factor.[21]

NFPA 12 uses flooding factors that include an allowance for distributed leakage. For a space of 4,501 to 50,000 ft³, which includes 500 m³ (17,657 ft³), the factor is 0.050 lb of CO2 per ft³, or about 0.80 kg/m³. This gives about 401 kg (883 lb) of CO2 for the example, before any additional allowance for openings that cannot be closed.[21] The 2005 edition of NFPA 12 requires manually operated systems in normally occupied engine rooms to have a lockout valve, a pneumatic time delay with predischarge sirens and two independent manual releases.[22]

Shipboard CO2 systems are self-contained. The handbook describes machinery space systems as having a single application with no backup quantity. After a machinery space fire, the space must stay sealed for several hours, until hot metal has cooled below the autoignition temperature of the fuel.[22][27]

Cargo hold systems have a different aim. Deep-seated fires in tightly stowed solid cargo are very hard to extinguish with CO2, so the system is meant to control the fire until the ship reaches port. The handbook describes an initial discharge followed by periodic release from cylinders to maintain the concentration.[27][22] Baled cotton in a ship's hold is an example of a cargo that can smoulder for a very long time even at a high CO2 concentration.[28] Hold fires are detected by an air-sampling system that draws air from each hold through the CO2 piping to a smoke detector outside the cargo area.[10]

Halon 1301 systems became common in machinery spaces in the 1970s, partly because of concern about accidental CO2 discharges in occupied areas. After the Montreal Protocol of 1987 its use in total flooding systems was effectively banned, and SOLAS prohibits it. Agents such as FM-200, FE-241, Novec 1230 and Inergen are used instead in Coast Guard approved systems.[22] In marine comparisons, all clean agent alternatives need at least 50 % more agent by weight than halon.[29]

A water mist system uses very fine water droplets. Marine water mist was first developed to replace Halon 1301 in engine rooms, and it then proved to be an alternative to sprinklers in accommodation and service areas. Its low flow rates allow smaller pipes, saving cost and weight, and the smaller amount of water helps the ship's stability.[24]

To pass the IMO machinery space test protocol, a system must extinguish all 13 test fires, from a 6 MW spray fire to a 500 kW pool fire, within 15 minutes. Large fires in a space with limited ventilation are relatively easy to put out, because they consume the oxygen; small fires are harder.[9] As of 2006, almost all cruise ships were protected by marine water mist systems tested to IMO protocols.[30] Consensus test protocols for these marine applications have been developed through IMO.[31]

On tankers, manually operated deck foam systems with fixed monitors protect the cargo deck.[11] Marine foam systems must be type approved as complete systems, because hot steel structures and seawater can make ordinary foams less effective.[24][27] The NFPA 11 (1998) design method described by Scheffey compares the required foam solution flows for a deck spill, the largest tank and the largest monitor, and uses the greatest of the three. Each flow has a different design area or minimum flow, so the application rates cannot be compared without those conditions.[32]

Inerting of cargo tanks

Inerting means displacing the air in a space with an inert gas, so that the atmosphere is too poor in oxygen to burn.[18] Inert gases extinguish a fire mainly by dilution, and CO2 is the most commonly used inert gas. The handbook describes a reduction in oxygen from 21 % to 10 % as sufficient for many fires, but notes that gases such as hydrogen, acetylene and carbon disulfide need greater dilution.[33]

Tankships inert the vapour space of their cargo tanks and piping, using inert gas generators or treated flue gas.[11] Flue gas, a mixture of CO2 and nitrogen with little oxygen, is commonly used to inert tanks when oil is offloaded from ships.[34] Empty tanks are inerted before loading, so that cargo can be loaded without fear of an explosion. During the voyage, the system keeps the oxygen in the tank vapour spaces below 8 % by volume, at a positive pressure.[18]

Schematic of a tanker with an inert gas source feeding cargo tank vapour spaces kept below 8 percent oxygen, and a chart of tank atmosphere during gas-freeing
Inerting of tanker cargo tanks: inert gas keeps the oxygen in the vapour spaces below 8 %; gas-freeing takes the atmosphere through the flammable range. Based on Eberly (2008), pp. 21-168, 21-171.

The dangerous moment comes when a tank is cleaned and gas-freed for work inside it. In the fuel-rich case described by Eberly, air replaces the inert gas, and the atmosphere passes from too rich to burn, through the flammable range, to a state that will not support combustion. An ignition source or static discharge during this phase could have serious results. In port or in a shipyard, a certificated marine chemist must declare a tank safe for workers or for hot work, as described in NFPA 306.[18] Inerting also endangers people, because the atmosphere cannot sustain life.[34]

Evacuation and emergency response

A ship is considered its own best lifeboat. It is evacuated only if sinking appears imminent, because, depending on the weather and location, the sea may be far more dangerous than the ship.[3] In a fire, passengers are first moved to protected assembly stations while the crew fights the fire. These stations may be near the survival craft or in large public rooms.[35][17]

In port, the gangways can serve as exits; at sea, only the survival craft remain. Passengers may have to climb stairs to reach them, which differs from leaving a building.[3] In the first instance, evacuation on a ship therefore moves people to a refuge on board rather than off the vessel.

The means of escape reflect the ship's motion. All occupied areas need two means of escape, and one of them must not depend on watertight doors, which cannot always be opened quickly. The SOLAS rules described by the 2008 handbook require stairs used by more than 90 people to run fore and aft, so that their slope does not change when the ship lists. Fire doors must close against a 3.5 degree opposing angle.[35]

Low-location lighting no more than 0.3 m above the deck helps people find the exits when corridors fill with smoke.[17] Fire detection systems on passenger ships often have a presignal feature so that the crew can investigate before the general alarm sounds. Immediate local evacuation of the affected area may also be advantageous.[35]

When a ship is in port, shore fire fighters may be called. Many of them have little experience of ship fires: steel decks and bulkheads retain heat and make the fire hard to locate, access is restricted, and water accumulating on decks can make matters worse. The command structure is also not always understood.[15] SOLAS ships must carry a fire control plan, with a duplicate in a weathertight enclosure outside the deckhouse for shore fire fighters.[15] Because hose threads differ from port to port, SOLAS ships also carry an international shore connection, a standard flange for supplying water to the ship's fire main.[36]

Ship fires in harbour overlap with pier and wharf fire protection. Fireboats protect vessels in a harbour as well as piers, pier sheds and cargo on the waterfront, with pumping capacities from 1893 L/min (500 gpm) to 37,854 L/min (10,000 gpm) or more.[37] Tank ships and barges load and unload at wharves, where the hazards resemble those of tank vehicles and tank cars but involve larger quantities of liquid.[38] Petroleum piers are protected by fixed foam systems, with tower-mounted monitors of 3800 L/min (1000 gpm) or more covering both the pier and the tanker deck. Foam spray below the deck keeps the pier tenable if a spill fire floats on the water underneath.[39]

See also

Notes

  1. ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 Eberly (2008), p. 21-151.
  2. ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 Eberly (2008), p. 21-164.
  3. ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 Eberly (2008), p. 21-165.
  4. ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 Eberly (2008), p. 21-166.
  5. ↑ Eberly (2008), pp. 21-163–21-179.
  6. ↑ 6.0 6.1 6.2 Eberly (2008), p. 21-160.
  7. ↑ Eberly (2008), p. 21-152.
  8. ↑ 8.0 8.1 Eberly (2008), p. 21-163.
  9. ↑ 9.0 9.1 Mawhinney (2008), p. 16-136.
  10. ↑ 10.0 10.1 Eberly (2008), p. 21-167.
  11. ↑ 11.0 11.1 11.2 11.3 Eberly (2008), p. 21-168.
  12. ↑ 12.0 12.1 12.2 12.3 Eberly (2008), p. 21-161.
  13. ↑ 13.0 13.1 Eberly (2008), p. 21-173.
  14. ↑ Bukowski (2002), pp. 5-228–5-229.
  15. ↑ 15.0 15.1 15.2 15.3 Eberly (2008), p. 21-181.
  16. ↑ National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), Part 0 (United States), p. 0.1-3.
  17. ↑ 17.0 17.1 17.2 Eberly (2008), p. 21-180.
  18. ↑ 18.0 18.1 18.2 18.3 Eberly (2008), p. 21-171.
  19. ↑ 19.0 19.1 Eberly (2008), p. 21-172.
  20. ↑ Eberly (2008), p. 21-170.
  21. ↑ 21.0 21.1 21.2 Wysocki (2008), p. 17-12.
  22. ↑ 22.0 22.1 22.2 22.3 22.4 Eberly (2008), p. 21-178.
  23. ↑ DiNenno and Taylor (2008), pp. 17-113–17-114.
  24. ↑ 24.0 24.1 24.2 Eberly (2008), p. 21-176.
  25. ↑ Yu and Newman (2008), p. 2-80.
  26. ↑ Yu and Newman (2008), p. 2-87.
  27. ↑ 27.0 27.1 27.2 Eberly (2008), p. 21-177.
  28. ↑ Wysocki (2008), p. 17-13.
  29. ↑ DiNenno and Taylor (2008), p. 17-97.
  30. ↑ Mawhinney (2008), p. 16-138.
  31. ↑ Mawhinney and Back (2002), p. 4-325.
  32. ↑ Scheffey (2002), p. 4-112.
  33. ↑ Yu and Newman (2008), pp. 2-86–2-88.
  34. ↑ 34.0 34.1 Ural and Garzia (2008), p. 17-149.
  35. ↑ 35.0 35.1 35.2 Eberly (2008), p. 21-179.
  36. ↑ Eberly (2008), p. 21-175.
  37. ↑ Tutterow (2008), p. 12-280.
  38. ↑ Ordile (2008), p. 7-30.
  39. ↑ Scheffey (2008), p. 17-63.

References

  • Bukowski, R. W. (2002). Fire hazard assessment for transportation vehicles. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 5-227–5-233). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
  • DiNenno, P. J., & Taylor, G. M. (2008). Halon and halon replacement agents and systems. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 17-93–17-121). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Eberly, R. (2008). Marine vessels. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 21-151–21-185). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Mawhinney, J. R., & Back, G. G., III. (2002). Water mist fire suppression systems. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 4-311–4-337). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
  • Mawhinney, J. R. (2008). Water mist fire suppression systems. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 16-135–16-180). National Fire Protection Association.
  • National Research Council of Canada, International Code Council, Department of Building and Housing, & Australian Building Codes Board. (2005). International fire engineering guidelines (2005 ed.). Australian Building Codes Board.
  • Ordile, A. M. (2008). Storage of flammable and combustible liquids. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 7-15–7-33). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Scheffey, J. L. (2002). Foam agents and AFFF system design considerations. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 4-88–4-122). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
  • Scheffey, J. L. (2008). Foam extinguishing agents and systems. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 17-45–17-70). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Tutterow, R. (2008). Fire department apparatus and equipment. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 12-267–12-287). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Ural, E. A., & Garzia, H. W. (2008). Explosion prevention and protection. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 17-141–17-165). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Wysocki, T. J. (2008). Carbon dioxide and application systems. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 17-3–17-15). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Yu, H.-Z., & Newman, J. S. (2008). Theory of fire extinguishment. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 2-79–2-92). National Fire Protection Association.