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Contents
  1. 1Definition and scope
  2. 2Scale of the problem in the United States
  3. 3Legal framework and responder levels in the United States
  4. 4The response process
  5. 5Scene control and protective actions
  6. 6Protective equipment
  7. 7Organisation of hazardous materials teams
  8. 8Limits and common misconceptions
  9. 9See also
  10. 10Notes
  11. 11References

Hazardous materials response is the organised emergency response to the release, or potential release, of a hazardous material, with or without fire, with the aim of limiting harm to people, property and the environment.[1] The Fire Protection Handbook (20th edition, 2008), quoting Benner, describes its purpose as changing "the sequence of events constituting the emergency before it has run its course naturally".[2] In the model described by C. J. Wright, responders analyse the problem, plan the response, implement the plan, and then evaluate progress and adjust.[3] Analysis draws on clues such as placards and on reference works such as the Emergency Response Guidebook; implementation includes command, protective actions and control zones.[4][5][6]

In 2004, hazardous materials calls made up about 2 percent of all US fire department calls, but they can involve a lot of resources per incident.[7] In 2005, 80 percent of US local fire departments provided some form of hazardous materials response.[8] The framework in the handbook is American: the federal Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response (HAZWOPER) rule sets competency levels, and documents of the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) describe practice.[9]

Definition and scope

For response purposes, Wright defines a hazardous material as a substance that on release can cause harm to people, property or the environment, including weapons of mass destruction.[1] A hazardous material incident is an emergency involving the release or potential release of such materials, with or without fire.[1] The US Department of Transportation (DOT) uses a legal definition: a material that the Secretary of Transportation has found capable of posing an unreasonable risk to health, safety and property in transport.[1] Hildebrand and Noll point out that US federal law contained no fewer than six legal definitions of a hazardous material, spread over six major laws and seven agency regulations.[10]

For transport, hazardous materials fall into nine internationally accepted hazard classes, from Class 1 (explosives) to Class 9 (miscellaneous hazardous materials), several of them split into divisions.[11] The class or division appears on the diamond-shaped placards and labels used in transport.[12] Wright warns that these summary definitions should not be used to judge regulatory compliance, because they leave out the exceptions found in the regulations.[1]

Response is one of four activities in managing hazardous materials in a community, together with prevention, preparedness and recovery.[3][13] The people and organisations that may become involved form the response community: fire, police, rescue and medical personnel, private carriers, manufacturers and contractors, and government agencies.[1] Wright separates direct outcomes, such as death, injury and damage, from indirect outcomes such as system disruption and residual fear of hazardous materials.[1]

Scale of the problem in the United States

Wright cites a review of the Chemical Abstract Service (CAS) list: of 1.5 million chemicals and formulations found outside the laboratory, more than 63,000 are considered hazardous.[14] DOT regulated the transport of some 4000 hazardous materials, and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) regulated about 600 substances on the basis of occupational exposure.[14] A national study for the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), based on a 1985 database, found vehicle fuel to be the most commonly released chemical.[14][15] The study also found that 74.8 percent of releases occurred at facilities and 25.2 percent in transport.[14]

The same study shows that the most frequently released chemicals are not necessarily the most harmful. Polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) accounted for 23.0 percent of releases but 2.8 percent of the associated deaths and injuries.[14] Chlorine accounted for 3.5 percent of releases and 9.6 percent of deaths and injuries, and anhydrous ammonia for 3.7 and 6.8 percent.[14] As an illustration, the share of harm for chlorine was thus about 2.7 times its share of releases, against about 0.12 times for PCBs.

In 2004, hazardous materials calls formed about 2 percent of US fire department calls, against 62 percent for medical aid and 7 percent for fires.[7] According to the 2005 needs assessment, an estimated 36 percent of departments were involved in hazardous materials response without having formally trained all the fire fighters involved.[16] Some 70 percent of departments lacked written agreements on non-local resources for hazardous materials and medical response at a defined chemical or biological agent incident.[17]

In 2005, US and Canadian railroads originated 1,587,469 hazardous material shipments, and 886 releases occurred during rail transport in the United States, 27 of them accidental.[18] Most rail shipments of hazardous materials, 85 percent in 2005, moved in tank cars.[19] The US National Fire Incident Reporting System (NFIRS) has a hazardous materials module that state or local authorities may require.[20]

Legal framework and responder levels in the United States

The Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA) had the greatest impact on hazardous materials planning and response, according to Hildebrand and Noll.[21] Title I of the act led to the HAZWOPER rule of OSHA, published in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) as 29 CFR 1910.120.[21] Title III, the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, created state emergency response commissions and local emergency planning committees (LEPCs), which prepare community emergency response plans.[21] Facilities holding chemicals above certain quantities had to report them to the local fire department, and Denlinger advises using these reports for pre-incident plans and equipment budgets.[22]

As described in the 2008 handbook, OSHA enforced HAZWOPER in 23 states and two territories with approved occupational safety and health plans. The EPA's parallel rule, 40 CFR 311, covered state and local government employees and volunteers across all 50 states.[9][23] On the direction of Congress, the EPA issued this rule on 23 June 1989.[23] The rules thus applied to every US fire department that responded to hazardous materials incidents, whether career, combination or volunteer.[23] HAZWOPER requires an emergency response plan, an incident management system, a buddy system with backup personnel, a safety officer, initial and refresher training, medical surveillance and termination procedures.[9]

The rule defines the competency levels summarised below. NFPA 472 defines parallel levels for public and private responders, but drops the OSHA specialist level and expands the private-sector specialist employee.[24] NFPA 473 adds two levels for emergency medical personnel: Level I gives care in the cold zone, Level II in the warm zone.[25] NFPA 471, a recommended practice, covered planning, incident levels, protective equipment, decontamination, safety and communications.[24]

Responder levels under OSHA 29 CFR 1910.120(q)(6), as described by Hildebrand and Noll (2008)[9][26][27]
Level Role at an incident Minimum training
First responder, awareness level Likely to witness or discover a release; secures the site, recognises the materials, notifies; takes no further action No minimum hours; competencies must be demonstrated
First responder, operations level Protects nearby persons, property and environment; acts defensively, containing the release from a safe distance At least 8 hours, or sufficient experience to demonstrate competency
Hazardous materials technician Approaches the point of release to plug, patch or otherwise stop it At least 24 hours of training equal to the operations level
Hazardous materials specialist Supports technicians with more specific knowledge of the substances; liaison with authorities At least 24 hours of training equal to the technician level
On-scene incident commander Assumes control of the incident scene At least 24 hours of training equal to the operations level, plus certified competencies

Most fire department suppression personnel fell into the operations level.[9] NFPA had over 60 standards related to hazardous materials, but these have no force of law unless a government agency adopts them.[28] State regulations adopting NFPA standards often used editions 5 to 10 years behind the current ones.[28]

The response process

Wright's four duties each consist of tasks and steps, intended to minimise harm and reduce the risk to responders.[3] Pre-emergency planning follows the same tasks and steps, which shortens the time needed at the scene and increases the available response options.[14] Analysis, also called size-up, has seven tasks: detect hazardous materials, initiate command, survey the incident, collect hazard information, assess container damage, predict behaviour and estimate outcomes.[14]

Detection starts with the first call and uses the occupancy, container shapes, markings, placards, shipping papers and the senses, such as odours, dead animals or a vapour cloud.[4][29] Any emergency should be approached from a protected direction, upwind, uphill and upstream where possible.[4] The survey is made from a safe distance with aided vision.[29]

Command and control start as soon as hazardous materials are detected: implementing an incident command system, stopping personnel at a safe distance, notifying and controlling access.[29] Information is then collected in six groups: identification, physical properties, chemical properties, physical hazards, health hazards and response information.[30] No single printed source provides all of it, so responders consult several, including material safety data sheets (MSDSs) and the CHEMTREC emergency centre, which held more than 500,000 MSDSs.[30] The data sheet that Wright proposes for recording this information has a field for toxic products of combustion, a question of fire toxicity.[31]

Prediction is a "mental movie" of what each container and its contents will do, based on the worst possible case and revised as information comes in.[32] It follows an event sequence adapted from Benner: stress, breach, release, engulfment, contact and harm.[33] Releases range from detonation and violent rupture to a gradual spill or leak.[32] Contact is short term (minutes and hours), medium term (days to months) or long term (years and generations).[5]

The last analysis task estimates outcomes in the engulfed area, the actual or potential area of exposure. Its size can be taken from the table of initial isolation and protective action distances in the Emergency Response Guidebook, from planning documents or from dispersion models.[5] Monitoring instruments, from colorimetric tubes to photoionisation detectors, measure concentrations; odour gives some insight, but not without risk.[5] Wright lists both the concentration of the released material and the duration of contact among the factors that determine harm.[5] For smoke, Introduction to Fire Safety Engineering expresses the same idea as a dose: the concentration multiplied by the exposure time.[34]

Planning turns the estimated outcomes into response objectives (strategy) and response options (tactics).[35] Two principles apply: events that have already happened cannot be influenced, and the earlier the sequence is interrupted, the more acceptable the loss.[35] Options are defensive, offensive or nonintervention; corrective actions resolve the immediate problem, and preventive actions stop it from escalating.[35] For each option, responders identify the protective equipment and a decontamination process, then select options the available resources can carry out.[35][36]

The result is a plan of action describing objectives, options, personnel, equipment and safety procedures; it can guide the safety briefing that all personnel receive.[36] Implementation then sets up the incident management system, carries out protective actions, enforces scene control and performs the planned control actions.[36][6] In this system one individual is in charge and all communications pass through the command post.[6] Evaluation compares the actual behaviour of the incident with the prediction; negative feedback triggers a new analysis and a modified plan.[37] Termination consists of debriefing the responders about possible exposures, a post-incident analysis and a critique.[37]

Scene control and protective actions

Wright lists three protective actions for responders and the public: isolate the hazard area and deny entry, evacuate the threatened area, and protect in place those who cannot be evacuated.[6] Evacuation needs time for warning, preparation and departure, and evacuees should be sent upwind to a definite place by a specific route.[6] In-place protection directs people to go inside a building and stay there until the danger passes; it is used when evacuation would cause greater risk or cannot be carried out.[6]

The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) reproduced the 1994 hazardous materials plan of the Fire Department of the City of New York (FDNY) in its World Trade Center report. The plan considers evacuation clearly safer with respect to the hazards, but warns that evacuation takes time and that moving people through a toxic atmosphere may do more harm than good.[38] Sheltering in place was the alternative when evacuation could not be managed, or when the material showed characteristics such as low to moderate toxicity or a release that could be rapidly controlled at the source.[38]

Scene control relies on control zones based on safety and the degree of hazard.[6] The hot zone surrounds the incident and extends far enough to prevent adverse effects on people outside it.[6] The warm zone is where personnel and equipment decontamination takes place, and the cold zone holds the command post and other support functions.[6] People move between zones only through access control points.[6] The hot line separates the hot zone from the warm zone, and the contamination control line separates the warm zone from the cold zone.[37][39]

The FDNY plan called the same areas the exclusion area, the contamination reduction area and the support area.[39] Its exclusion boundary was first set from the type of material, initial instrument readings and a safe distance, and could later be adjusted on the basis of measurements.[39] The plan based the three-zone system on a worst case, allowing less stringent control once monitoring gave better information.[39] A hazardous materials incident safety officer, who should meet the requirements of NFPA 472, ensures that hot, warm, decontamination and other zone designations are clearly marked and communicated to all members.[40]

Protective equipment

Personal protective equipment (PPE) is the protective clothing and respiratory protection that shield a person from chemical, biological, physical or thermal hazards.[41] Wright stresses that no single combination of PPE protects against all hazards, and that both overprotection and underprotection can be hazardous.[41] Clothing types include liquid splash-protective and vapour-protective chemical protective clothing, high-temperature suits and structural fire-fighting clothing.[41] In the United States, 29 CFR 1910.120 sets positive-pressure self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) as the minimum respiratory protection until concentrations have been determined.[41]

Clothing can fail by penetration through zippers, seams or pinholes, by permeation of the chemical through the material at molecular level, or by degradation of the material.[41] The breakthrough time is the time a chemical takes to pass through the material.[41] Wright advises looking for breakthrough times of at least 2 hours, which represent the normal physical limit of a responder's capacity for effective work in protective equipment.[42] In the NFPA product standards described by Teele, vapour-protective ensembles (NFPA 1991) and liquid splash-protective ensembles (NFPA 1992) must each resist the test chemicals for at least 1 hour.[43]

The EPA identifies four levels of protection. Level A is the highest, for situations that need respiratory, skin, eye and mucous membrane protection.[41] Level B gives less skin and eye protection and is the minimum recommended for initial entries until the hazards are known.[42] Level C may be worn only when the airborne substance is known and measured, air-purifying respirators are suitable and skin and eye exposure are unlikely; Level D is primarily a work uniform.[42] Teele cautions that the EPA defined these levels mainly for hazardous waste sites, where emergency conditions do not usually exist, and that responders commonly, and often inappropriately, use them.[44]

Two responders in fully encapsulating gastight chemical suits with breathing apparatus inside, assessing a drum during an exercise
Hazardous materials technicians in fully encapsulating vapour-protective suits during an exercise.

Structural fire-fighting clothing, even when certified to the NFPA standard, provides little or no protection against hazardous materials and should not be used at such incidents, according to Teele.[44] The FDNY plan classed turnout gear as Level D at most, and limited chemical protective clothing to members of its Hazardous Materials Unit.[45] Protective equipment itself creates hazards, including heat stress, physical and psychological stress, and impaired vision, mobility and communication.[42]

Organisation of hazardous materials teams

In the United States, the fire department was in many cases the lead agency for hazardous materials incidents.[22] Many departments had neither the trained personnel nor the funds for a full response team, so regional teams were organised within counties and parishes, and sometimes across larger areas.[22][46] In the 1980s, many jurisdictions hastily set up hazardous materials teams, then found that the demands on time, money and commitment forced a re-evaluation.[47] Later, the emphasis on domestic preparedness led more departments to develop such teams.[48]

Fire departments equip special vehicles for spills and releases, sized to the role the department sees for itself.[49] These vehicles typically carry a reference library, tools for shutting valves and stopping leaks, materials for diking or absorbing spills, recovery drums and protective clothing.[49] Team members working inside encapsulating suits need special radio systems, for example with bone, ear or throat microphones.[50]

A facility that makes, treats or stores large quantities of highly hazardous materials warrants, or may legally require, a hazardous materials response team.[51] An industrial fire brigade that takes on this role must meet the OSHA requirements for a hazmat team, including training, medical surveillance, procedures and personnel decontamination.[52] Because of the training time and equipment cost, Snyder notes, a facility may be financially prohibited from letting its brigade act as a hazmat team.[52] Some railroads keep response teams that can repair leaks and transfer the contents of damaged tank cars.[53]

The FDNY plan of 1994 defined three incident levels. Level 1 incidents could be handled by up to the first alarm of three engines, two ladders and two battalion chiefs.[54] Level 2 involved a greater hazard and possibly a limited evacuation, and brought in the Hazardous Materials Unit and other special units.[54] Level 3 posed an extreme threat, probably required large-scale evacuation, and activated the full city emergency plan.[54] The highest level reached by any single condition, such as product, container size or leak severity, set the incident level.[54]

The FDNY plan assigned hazard assessment to the first-arriving ladder company and site access control to the second; both used the DOT guidebook to find isolation and evacuation recommendations.[55] The plan directed the first engine to stretch a hose line but wait for an order before using it, because premature, unnecessary or incompatible use of water can compound the hazard.[55] The plan specified entry, backup and decontamination teams of at least two members each for the hazardous materials group.[56] After the 2001 attacks, NIST reported that FDNY had concentrated on, among other things, increasing its capabilities for hazardous materials operations.[57]

Limits and common misconceptions

Placards and markings do not always reveal what is present. In the United States, transport vehicles and freight containers could carry up to 1000 lb (454 kg) of certain hazardous materials without a placard.[12] Most pesticides were neither required to be placarded nor listed in the guidebook, according to Whitford.[58] Information can also be wrong: if the shipping paper describes a gas while a solid is escaping, some of the information may be incorrect.[30]

Time is a second limit. Wright calls the full analysis time consuming, but warns that protective and control decisions taken before it is complete raise the risk to responders.[5] The FDNY plan likewise warned against premature commitment of first-arriving companies.[55] It advised against a rescue attempt when the victim is probably dead or cannot be saved and the attempt would put the rescuer at unnecessary risk.[59] Norman adds that poisons or explosives may lead a fire department to take a strictly defensive posture and not fight the fire at all.[60]

The practice described here is US law, standards and practice as presented in the 2008 handbook and in a New York City plan of 1994. Later editions of the standards and arrangements in other countries may differ. The International Fire Engineering Guidelines (2005) state that they do not specifically address hazardous materials, and refer such situations to the applicable regulations and to special experts.[61]

See also

Notes

  1. ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 C. J. Wright (2008a), p. 13-118.
  2. ↑ Benner (1975), as cited in C. J. Wright (2008a), p. 13-117.
  3. ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 C. J. Wright (2008a), p. 13-117.
  4. ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 C. J. Wright (2008a), p. 13-122.
  5. ↑ 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 C. J. Wright (2008a), p. 13-134.
  6. ↑ 6.00 6.01 6.02 6.03 6.04 6.05 6.06 6.07 6.08 6.09 C. J. Wright (2008a), p. 13-142.
  7. ↑ 7.0 7.1 Hall and Cote (2008), p. 3-28.
  8. ↑ Hall and Cote (2008), p. 3-27.
  9. ↑ 9.0 9.1 9.2 9.3 9.4 Hildebrand and Noll (2008), p. 13-88.
  10. ↑ Hildebrand and Noll (2008), p. 13-81.
  11. ↑ C. J. Wright (2008a), pp. 13-118–13-119.
  12. ↑ 12.0 12.1 C. J. Wright (2008a), p. 13-124.
  13. ↑ Hildebrand and Noll (2008), p. 13-82.
  14. ↑ 14.0 14.1 14.2 14.3 14.4 14.5 14.6 14.7 C. J. Wright (2008a), p. 13-121.
  15. ↑ C. J. Wright (2008a), p. 13-144.
  16. ↑ Jenaway (2008), p. 12-42.
  17. ↑ Jenaway (2008), p. 12-43.
  18. ↑ C. J. Wright (2008b), p. 21-111.
  19. ↑ C. J. Wright (2008b), p. 21-112.
  20. ↑ Ahrens and Stewart (2008), p. 3-52.
  21. ↑ 21.0 21.1 21.2 Hildebrand and Noll (2008), p. 13-85.
  22. ↑ 22.0 22.1 22.2 Denlinger (2008), p. 12-59.
  23. ↑ 23.0 23.1 23.2 Teele (2008), pp. 12-144–12-145.
  24. ↑ 24.0 24.1 Hildebrand and Noll (2008), p. 13-95.
  25. ↑ Hildebrand and Noll (2008), p. 13-96.
  26. ↑ Hildebrand and Noll (2008), p. 13-89.
  27. ↑ Hildebrand and Noll (2008), p. 13-90.
  28. ↑ 28.0 28.1 Hildebrand and Noll (2008), p. 13-94.
  29. ↑ 29.0 29.1 29.2 C. J. Wright (2008a), p. 13-126.
  30. ↑ 30.0 30.1 30.2 C. J. Wright (2008a), p. 13-127.
  31. ↑ C. J. Wright (2008a), p. 13-129.
  32. ↑ 32.0 32.1 C. J. Wright (2008a), p. 13-132.
  33. ↑ C. J. Wright (2008a), p. 13-135.
  34. ↑ Van Rossum (2027), §6.1.
  35. ↑ 35.0 35.1 35.2 35.3 C. J. Wright (2008a), p. 13-137.
  36. ↑ 36.0 36.1 36.2 C. J. Wright (2008a), p. 13-141.
  37. ↑ 37.0 37.1 37.2 C. J. Wright (2008a), p. 13-143.
  38. ↑ 38.0 38.1 Lawson and Vettori (2005), Appendix A, FDNY hazardous materials plan, §3.7.
  39. ↑ 39.0 39.1 39.2 39.3 Lawson and Vettori (2005), Appendix A, FDNY hazardous materials plan, §5.2.
  40. ↑ Loflin (2008), p. 12-112.
  41. ↑ 41.0 41.1 41.2 41.3 41.4 41.5 41.6 C. J. Wright (2008a), p. 13-139.
  42. ↑ 42.0 42.1 42.2 42.3 C. J. Wright (2008a), p. 13-140.
  43. ↑ Teele (2008), p. 12-157.
  44. ↑ 44.0 44.1 Teele (2008), p. 12-156.
  45. ↑ Lawson and Vettori (2005), Appendix A, FDNY hazardous materials plan, §3.5.
  46. ↑ Granito (2008), p. 12-13.
  47. ↑ R. Wright (2008), p. 13-19.
  48. ↑ Denlinger (2008), p. 12-71.
  49. ↑ 49.0 49.1 Tutterow (2008), p. 12-278.
  50. ↑ Merklinger (2008), p. 12-259.
  51. ↑ Schmidt (2008), p. 1-145.
  52. ↑ 52.0 52.1 Snyder (2008), p. 12-197.
  53. ↑ C. J. Wright (2008b), p. 21-113.
  54. ↑ 54.0 54.1 54.2 54.3 Lawson and Vettori (2005), Appendix A, FDNY hazardous materials plan, §2.2.
  55. ↑ 55.0 55.1 55.2 Lawson and Vettori (2005), Appendix A, FDNY hazardous materials plan, §4.2.
  56. ↑ Lawson and Vettori (2005), Appendix A, FDNY hazardous materials plan, §4.3.
  57. ↑ Lawson and Vettori (2005), p. 177.
  58. ↑ Whitford (2008), p. 6-240.
  59. ↑ Lawson and Vettori (2005), Appendix A, FDNY hazardous materials plan, §3.6.
  60. ↑ Norman (2008), p. 12-306.
  61. ↑ National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), p. 0.1-4 (Part 0, United States).

References

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  • Denlinger, R. F. (2008). Managing fire-rescue departments. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 12-51–12-78). National Fire Protection Association.
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