Skip to content
From Fire Safety Academy Wiki
Revision as of 09:34, 8 November 2026 by Linda (talk | contribs) (Add watermarked Fire Safety Academy illustration at the location specified in the visual plan)
Contents
  1. 1Offensive and defensive strategies
  2. 2Choosing the strategy
  3. 3The Dutch quadrant model
  4. 4Water flow for an offensive attack
  5. 5Offensive tactics and ventilation
  6. 6Defensive tactics
  7. 7Changing strategy
  8. 8Fire safety engineering criteria
  9. 9See also
  10. 10Notes
  11. 11References

Fire attack strategy is the overall approach that the incident commander chooses for fighting a fire. Its core is the choice between an offensive attack, in which firefighters enter the building to extinguish the fire, and a defensive attack, usually from outside, that aims to stop the fire from spreading.[1][2] The choice follows from the size-up and from a comparison of the risk to firefighters with what can be saved. In structural firefighting it is often the most critical factor in the risk-benefit analysis on which the incident action plan is built.[3]

Dutch fire service guidance, as described in a 2021 report, uses a "quadrant model" that also distinguishes attacks from inside and from outside. That guidance prefers to fight fires from outside.[4] This article follows mainly the 2008 handbook, with Dutch, Australian and New Zealand material where those sources treat the topic.

Offensive and defensive strategies

Klaene and Sanders (2008) distinguish two general types of operations at a structure fire. During offensive operations, firefighters enter the burning building and conduct interior life safety, extinguishment and property conservation duties. Offensive operations are preferred whenever they can be conducted safely and effectively. Even though extinguishment is the second incident priority, offensive extinguishment is often the most important life safety tactic.[1]

A defensive or "nonattack" strategy is used whenever the risk-benefit analysis shows that the risk to firefighters outweighs any possible benefit of an offensive attack. Defensive attacks are almost always exterior operations.[2] Corbett (2008) describes defensive tactics in the same way, as an exterior attack with no entry into the building.[5] The International Fire Engineering Guidelines (2005) use a similar distinction. Applying water to a fire is an offensive strategy, operating hose streams to protect adjoining property is a defensive strategy, and an attack may combine both.[6]

Granito (2008) describes a related contrast in terms of timing. An "initial attack" aims to stop the fire as close to its point of origin as possible, while a "sustained attack" tries to reduce the loss to exposed or nearby property. Because of longer response times, rural departments may find themselves in this sustained, or defensive, mode on arrival.[7][8]

Klaene and Sanders (2008) warn incident commanders that combining offensive and defensive attacks can be dangerous.[1] The IFEG nevertheless recognises both actions in one intervention.[6] Klaene and Sanders also warn that master streams, if improperly placed, can push the main body of fire towards areas not yet exposed, including nearby buildings.[2]

Choosing the strategy

The choice rests on the Size-up, the evaluation of conditions at the scene. The incident commander uses it to develop the incident action plan and compares the firefighters' exposure to risk with the potential outcomes.[3] Klaene and Sanders (2008) describe the offensive-defensive decision as often the most critical factor in this risk-benefit analysis and as the foundation of the plan. The decision can change with the ongoing size-up. Occupants or firefighters exposed to extreme risk may warrant placing more firefighters at risk, but once savable occupants and firefighters are out of the building, the acceptable level of risk falls.[3]

In the United States, NFPA 1500, Standard on Fire Department Occupational Safety and Health Program, provides the basis of this analysis, as described by Klaene and Sanders (2008). Activities that present a significant risk shall be limited to situations with a potential to save endangered lives. Routine property protection is recognised as an inherent risk that must be reduced or avoided. No risk is acceptable when there is no possibility of saving lives or property, and when the risk is excessive, activities shall be limited to defensive operations.[3][1]

Klaene and Sanders (2008) list three situations in which defensive attacks are generally conducted. The risk is too great in terms of what can be saved, the building's structural integrity or the fire conditions prohibit entry, or the resources needed for an offensive attack exceed those available. Fighting a fire in an unstable building with no lives to save is a clear example. The decision is not always that clear-cut, however, because the commander often has inadequate information or conflicting reports, and training and experience become key factors.[2]

Several handbook chapters give typical triggers for a defensive strategy. Norman (2008) recommends that a fire which has reached flashover in a lightweight building be fought only from defensive positions until it has been knocked down. He adds that poisons or explosives could prompt a strictly defensive posture without any firefighting.[9][10] As hazards serious enough for defensive tactics, Corbett (2008) names dilapidated or abandoned buildings, post-tensioned concrete in buildings under construction and unprotected load-bearing steel. In 2000, a fire department in Key Biscayne, Florida, adopted a defensive, no-entry mode at a post-tensioned high-rise under construction for this reason.[5][11]

Resources also limit the options. In 2008 Granito reported that a US stipulation in effect since 1995 called for at least four trained personnel on scene before interior attack, except in the most extenuating circumstances. He noted related OSHA and NFPA documents.[12] Loflin (2008) describes the arrangement as two members working as a crew in the hazard area and two outside, ready for assistance or rescue.[13] A national needs assessment of the US fire service published in 2006, as described by Jenaway (2008), found that many departments failed to deliver such a first-arriving complement of four.[14]

Outside the United States, design documents leave the decision with the fire service. In New Zealand, the commentary to Verification Method C/VM2 (2013) notes that the officer in charge makes the final decision on whether to commit crews to a burning building.[15] Van Rossum (2027) states that a positive fire safety engineering result does not mean that a fire service will attack from inside. That is always for the crew at the scene to judge.[16]

The Dutch quadrant model

Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023) summarise the basic principles of firefighting of the Netherlands Institute for Safety (2018). The goal of firefighting can be to prevent fire growth or to extinguish the seat of the fire, and either can be done inside the building or from outside. These combinations form the "quadrant model". Under these principles, firefighters preferably fight the fire from outside and carry out an interior attack only in a small room or structure, if an exterior attack fails and if it can be done safely. A smoke-filled space is entered only if the benefits outweigh the risks, and reducing material damage is not a reason to take any risks.[4]

The principles begin with taking more time to "stop and think" and with an exterior reconnaissance to locate the fire. Three questions then follow: is it known where the fire is, can it be reached from outside, and is sufficient cooling capacity available. If all three answers are yes, an offensive exterior attack can extinguish the fire from outside. If one answer is no, an offensive exterior attack is in principle not possible. The attack then becomes a defensive exterior attack and the building is basically considered beyond saving, which applies anyway to large structures such as indoor car parks.[17]

For small structures, the principles nevertheless allow an offensive interior attack if certain conditions are met. The structure must be relatively small, door control must be possible, the depth of attack must not be too great and sufficient cooling capacity must be available.[18] In a small structure, the principles advise controlling doors, keeping the structure closed where possible and applying water as quickly as possible. Where the fire is fully ablaze, a "transitional attack" is advised where possible.[19]

The report draws a consequence for designers. Developers, architects and consultants should be told that the fire service will not automatically enter a structure on fire, and that a car park may therefore burn out.[20] In the flowchart of the basic principles, a defensive deployment means preventing fire spread and should be prepared in any case.[19]

Water flow for an offensive attack

The objective of an offensive attack is to apply a sufficient quantity of water directly on the burning fuel. Once the fire has been located, the essential question is how much water per minute is needed.[1][21] Klaene and Sanders (2008) point out a problem with trial and error: crews tend to keep adding standard preconnected lines when larger-diameter hose is needed. They give three methods: the Royer/Nelson formula based on volume, the US National Fire Academy (NFA) formula based on area, and sprinkler calculations based on fire load.[21]

The Royer/Nelson method is a form of the Iowa State University formula. According to Wenzel (2008b), it is based on the water needed to deplete the oxygen in an enclosure when the water turns to steam. Tests showed best control when this water was applied within 30 seconds.[22] The NFA formula was developed from the experience of fireground commanders and can be applied to partly involved structures.[23] In SI units, as printed by Klaene and Sanders (2008):[21]

FIowa=V0.748FNFA=A0.074

Frank (2008) compares a fire's heat release rate with the estimated extinguishing capacity of applied water. His table of international models gives an Australian entry with a nominal capacity of 10.5 MW per L/s and efficiency factors of 15 % for interior streams and 5 % for exterior streams. The table notes that 10.5 includes steam and extinction credits beyond literal heat absorption.[24] The following illustrative estimate rearranges those factors. Frank cautions that unknowns, including how much water reaches the fuel, limit their practical use.[23] As an illustrative relation:

V˙w=Q˙ηceff

Symbol Description Unit
FIowa, FNFA Required rate of flow (Royer/Nelson and NFA methods) L/min
V Volume of the enclosure m³
A Floor area of the fire area m²
V˙w Estimated water flow rate L/s
Q˙ Heat release rate of the fire MW
η Efficiency factor for the selected model entry (0.15 interior, 0.05 exterior) –
ceff Nominal extinguishing capacity per unit flow in the selected model entry (10.5) MW per L/s

As a worked example, consider a room of 5 m by 4 m with a 2.5 m ceiling, an illustrative room containing a burning sofa. Van Rossum (2027) gives about 2.5 MW for an average living room sofa.[25] The NFA formula gives 20 m² / 0.074 = 271 L/min, and the Royer/Nelson formula gives 50 m³ / 0.748 = 67 L/min, each rounded up to a whole litre per minute. The table-based capacity estimate gives 2.5 MW / (0.15 × 10.5) = 1.59 L/s, or 96 L/min, for an interior stream. For an exterior stream it gives 2.5 MW / (0.05 × 10.5) = 4.76 L/s, or 286 L/min, three times as much.

The spread of these results illustrates the warnings in the sources. Klaene and Sanders (2008) note that practitioners disagree about which formula is best and that the formulas only give a rough approximation for offensive attacks within enclosed areas.[2] Frank (2008) reports Kimball's observation that two to four times the Iowa flow tends to be used, and warns against mixing efficiency factors from one model with heat absorption values from another.[23] A Dutch report on indoor car-park fires gives context: 125 L/min at high pressure is generally sufficient for up to 2.5 MW. Its low-pressure rule is 450 L/min for up to 10 MW.[18] Van Rossum (2027) explains the purpose of such values: matching the cooling capacity of the available lines to the heat release rate shows whether a fire can still be fought.[26]

Because these calculations are hard to make at the scene, Klaene and Sanders (2008) advise determining the required flow during pre-incident planning. All members should also know the flow rates of their department's nozzles and hose combinations.[2] This applies especially to large undivided areas beyond the reach of two standard preconnected hose lines.[27]

Offensive tactics and ventilation

How water is applied matters as much as how much. Klaene and Sanders (2008) describe the indirect method, once popular, in which a finely divided spray is directed into an unventilated enclosure to absorb heat by turning to steam. It endangers occupants who have not escaped, because it disrupts the heat balance, makes the floor level much hotter and fills the enclosure with steam.[28] Modern tactics, in their words, call for a direct attack on the burning fuel, coordinated with natural or mechanical ventilation by a second crew.[28] One form of mechanical ventilation is covered under Positive pressure ventilation.

Two firefighters with breathing apparatus advancing a charged hose line through a doorway into a smoke-filled room during a training fire
An interior attack crew advances a charged handline into a fire compartment during live fire training.

Ventilation can help or harm all three operational priorities. Proper ventilation pulls fire away from trapped occupants and lets crews attack safely, whereas improper ventilation can draw fire towards victims, spread it into undamaged areas, or cause a Backdraft.[28] A backdraft is the explosive ignition of accumulated pyrolysis gases when oxygen is suddenly admitted.[29] For small structures, the Dutch principles recommend door control and, where possible, keeping the structure closed.[19]

The type of stream is part of the tactic. Frank (2008) notes that the literature reports successful extinguishment with techniques that emphasise general cooling, such as a fog stream, with direct cooling of the fuel by a solid stream, and with combinations. A Fire stream must balance the high heat absorption of fine droplets against the penetration needed to reach the fuel. According to Frank (2008), fog attack, or gas phase cooling, had gained wide acceptance in Europe and was gaining acceptance in Australia and the United States.[30] Hose size follows the strategy as well: in the United States around 2008, handlines of 38 to 51 mm were common for interior attack, and 65 mm lines for larger exterior flows or exposures.[31]

The development of the fire limits what an offensive attack can achieve. Before Flashover, a room fire is local and fuel-controlled; afterwards, the whole room is involved and the fire is usually ventilation-controlled.[32] The International Fire Engineering Guidelines (2005) distinguish three outcomes of an attack: no effect, control at a steady heat release rate, and extinguishment. The "no effect" outcome reflects that a fire service may arrive after the growth stage, when a fire beyond flashover in the room of origin is difficult to extinguish.[33]

Buildings with fixed protection change the offensive attack. In a building with a properly operating sprinkler system, manual firefighting is most likely limited to supporting the system and providing backup hose lines, and improper tactics could reduce the system's effectiveness. In high-rise buildings, an effective interior attack on upper floors may be impossible without a standpipe system.[2] For warehouses, Moore (2008) adds that supporting the sprinklers also protects firefighters, because they need not be exposed to the hazards of an interior attack.[34]

Defensive tactics

In a defensive attack, firefighters and apparatus are kept out of the collapse zone when the fire threatens the building's structure. Because of the uncertainty about how a building will collapse, Klaene and Sanders (2008) set this zone equal to the height of the building plus an allowance for scattering debris. If water cannot be applied from that distance, a tall building in danger of collapse may lead to a nonattack decision.[2]

The building of origin is sometimes written off in favour of saving nearby property, and the commander must recognise a total loss when faced with one.[2] If a large volume of fire cannot be contained and other buildings are close, it is best to apply water to the outside of the exposed buildings. Directing a stream between the buildings is less effective, because radiant heat travels through transparent substances such as water.[2] Frank (2008) explains that water protects an exposure mainly by the cooling of a water film evaporating from its surface.[24] Corbett (2008) adds that most of the water in a defensive attack is directed through windows rather than onto walls.[35]

Master streams are the streams of choice for most defensive operations, but they must be placed with care.[2] Some buildings leave no other option. Quiter (2008) notes that in a high-rise building the area of fire origin, if it has no automatic suppression or compartmentation, may not be approachable at all. The result is a defensive approach that depends on fuel consumption for control and typically leads to a large or unacceptable loss.[36] In New Zealand, fire service intervention is not normally used in design decisions, but the commentary to C/VM2 (2013) notes that its positive influence on warehouse fires cannot be ignored. It expects the Fire Service to have time to size up the fire, secure personnel and water, and mount a defensive attack to reduce spread to the adjacent property.[37]

Changing strategy

A strategy is not fixed. The incident action plan is revised as the size-up reflects changing conditions, and the offensive-defensive decision may change with it.[3] The International Fire Engineering Guidelines (2005) note that if the water supply or the number of firefighters is insufficient for interior firefighting, the strategy may change from offensive to defensive.[38] Loflin (2008) gives "change from offensive to defensive" as an example of an emergency traffic radio message.[39]

The switch itself is a hazardous moment. When an unsuccessful offensive operation is replaced by a defensive one, there are usually more firefighters on scene than needed. Klaene and Sanders (2008) therefore call for strict control and accountability, a minimum number of personnel in the fire zone, and disconnection of attack lines that are no longer needed. These measures reduce the temptation for firefighters to freelance and attempt unsafe tactics.[2][28]

Fire safety engineering criteria

Engineering documents describe the conditions that an attack requires. In New Zealand, clause C3.8, as set out in C/VM2 (second edition, 2025), covers unsprinklered firecells within 15 m of a boundary. It applies where the fire load exceeds 20 TJ or the floor area exceeds 5,000 m². At the time firefighters first apply water, the radiation at 1.5 m above the floor must not exceed 4.5 kW/m² and the smoke layer must be at least 2 m above the floor.[40] That time may be taken as 1200 s, or 1000 s with an automatic alarm connected to a remote receiving centre.[41]

In Australia, the Fire Safety Verification Method Standard (2022) requires a demonstration that the brigade can intervene until search and rescue is complete, for buildings within 50 km road travel of a fire station. Its table of required facilities includes tenable conditions that allow identification of, and access to, the seat of the fire.[42] In the Netherlands, NEN 6093 sets limits for fire service operations in a space with smoke and heat exhaust, as described by Van Rossum (2027). These include a visibility of at least 100 m to light-emitting objects up to 1.8 m and a radiant flux from the smoke layer of no more than 3.5 kW/m² at 1.8 m.[16] Such criteria describe conditions that make an attack possible, but the strategy itself remains a decision at the scene.[16][15]

See also

Notes

  1. ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 Klaene and Sanders (2008), p. 13-7.
  2. ↑ 2.00 2.01 2.02 2.03 2.04 2.05 2.06 2.07 2.08 2.09 2.10 2.11 Klaene and Sanders (2008), p. 13-9.
  3. ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 Klaene and Sanders (2008), p. 13-6.
  4. ↑ 4.0 4.1 Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 43.
  5. ↑ 5.0 5.1 Corbett (2008), p. 12-128.
  6. ↑ 6.0 6.1 National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), p. 1.9-4.
  7. ↑ Granito (2008), p. 12-9.
  8. ↑ Granito (2008), p. 12-10.
  9. ↑ Norman (2008), p. 12-304.
  10. ↑ Norman (2008), p. 12-306.
  11. ↑ Corbett (2008), p. 12-137.
  12. ↑ Granito (2008), p. 12-8.
  13. ↑ Loflin (2008), p. 12-114.
  14. ↑ Jenaway (2008), p. 12-42.
  15. ↑ 15.0 15.1 Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2013), p. 151.
  16. ↑ 16.0 16.1 16.2 Van Rossum (2027), §9.3 (Results from zone models).
  17. ↑ Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 44.
  18. ↑ 18.0 18.1 Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 45.
  19. ↑ 19.0 19.1 19.2 Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 63.
  20. ↑ Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 47.
  21. ↑ 21.0 21.1 21.2 Klaene and Sanders (2008), p. 13-8.
  22. ↑ Wenzel (2008b), p. 15-25.
  23. ↑ 23.0 23.1 23.2 Frank (2008), p. 17-34.
  24. ↑ 24.0 24.1 Frank (2008), Table 17.3.1, p. 17-35.
  25. ↑ Van Rossum (2027), §4.5.
  26. ↑ Van Rossum (2027), §8.6.
  27. ↑ Klaene and Sanders (2008), p. 13-5.
  28. ↑ 28.0 28.1 28.2 28.3 Klaene and Sanders (2008), p. 13-10.
  29. ↑ Van Rossum (2027), §4.9.
  30. ↑ Frank (2008), p. 17-33.
  31. ↑ Tutterow (2008), p. 12-280.
  32. ↑ Van Rossum (2027), §4.7.
  33. ↑ National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), p. 1.9-7.
  34. ↑ J. Moore (2008), p. 20-171.
  35. ↑ Corbett (2008), p. 12-135.
  36. ↑ Quiter (2008), p. 20-80.
  37. ↑ Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2013), p. 73.
  38. ↑ National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), p. 2.9-4.
  39. ↑ Loflin (2008), p. 12-113.
  40. ↑ Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2025b), p. 53.
  41. ↑ Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2025b), p. 54.
  42. ↑ Australian Building Codes Board (2022), pp. 15–16.

References

  • Australian Building Codes Board. (2022). Fire Safety Verification Method Standard 2022.
  • Corbett, G. P. (2008). Effect of building construction and fire protection systems on fire fighter safety. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 12-127–12-141). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Frank, J. A. (2008). Characteristics and hazards of water and water additives for fire suppression. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 17-31–17-43). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Granito, J. A. (2008). Planning for public fire-rescue protection. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 12-3–12-22). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Jenaway, W. F. (2008). Needs assessment and hazard analysis. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 12-41–12-50). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Klaene, B. J., & Sanders, R. (2008). Fireground operations. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 13-3–13-11). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Loflin, M. E. (2008). Safety, medical, and health issues and programs. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 12-107–12-125). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment. (2013). Commentary for Building Code clauses C1–C6 and Verification Method C/VM2.
  • Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment. (2025b). Verification Method C/VM2: Framework for fire safety design (2nd ed.).
  • Moore, J. (2008). Storage occupancies. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 20-157–20-178). National Fire Protection Association.
  • National Research Council of Canada, International Code Council, Department of Building and Housing, & Australian Building Codes Board. (2005). International fire engineering guidelines (2005 ed.). Australian Building Codes Board.
  • Norman, J. (2008). Pre-Incident planning for emergency response. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 12-299–12-308). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Quiter, J. R. (2008). High-Rise buildings. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 20-73–20-84). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Tutterow, R. (2008). Fire department apparatus and equipment. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 12-267–12-287). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Van der Graaf, J., Hessels, T., & Rosmuller, N. (2023). Fire safety of indoor car parks accommodating electrically powered vehicles. Nederlands Instituut Publieke Veiligheid. (Original work published 2021)
  • Van Rossum, E. (2027). Introduction to Fire Safety Engineering. Fire Safety Academy.
  • Wenzel, L. J. (2008b). Water supply requirements for public supply systems. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 15-23–15-33). National Fire Protection Association.