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Contents
  1. 1Definitions
  2. 2How explosives release energy
  3. 3Types of explosive materials
  4. 4Classification
  5. 5Explosive energy and blast effects
  6. 6Storage, transport and security
  7. 7Fire protection and fire fighting
  8. 8Limits and common misconceptions
  9. 9See also
  10. 10Notes
  11. 11References

An explosive material is any explosive, blasting agent, water gel (slurry) or detonator.[1] An explosive, in turn, is a chemical compound, mixture or device whose primary or common purpose is to function by explosion.[2] The term covers products such as dynamite, black powder, detonators, safety fuses and detonating cord.[1] Some explosive materials combine fuel and oxidiser in a mixture or a molecule and can react without oxygen supplied by the air.[3][4]

High explosives tend to react as a detonation, with a front faster than sound and peak pressures of 700 to 70,000 bar. Low explosives tend to burn as a deflagration, with a slower front and much lower peak pressures.[5][6] Santis (2008) reports that industry used more than 7 billion pounds (about 3.2 million metric tonnes) of explosives and blasting agents in 2005, about 90 % of it in mining.[2] Fire is a principal cause of accidents with explosive materials.[7] The United States Explosive Materials Code, NFPA 495, as described by Santis (2008), sets a simple rule: fires involving explosive materials are not fought, and the area is evacuated.[2]

Definitions

An explosion is a chemical reaction involving an extremely rapid expansion of gases, usually with the release of heat.[1] Zalosh (2008) gives a wider definition: a sudden energy release that produces potentially damaging pressures.[5] In the United States definition quoted by Santis (2008), an explosive also includes material within Title 18, Chapter 40 of the United States Code or classified as explosive by the Department of Transportation (DOT).[1]

Explosive material is the wider group. In Santis's 2008 account, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) published a list of such materials every year in the Federal Register.[1] A detonator contains an initiating explosive used to start detonation. It may contain no more than 10 g (154 grains) of explosive per unit, excluding ignition or delay charges.[1] A propellant is an explosive that normally deflagrates and is used for propulsion.[1]

The DOT definition, as described by C. J. Wright (2008a), also covers substances that are not designed to explode. An explosive is any substance or article, including a device, that is designed to function by explosion, meaning an extremely rapid release of gas and heat. It also covers a substance that, by chemical reaction within itself, is able to function in a similar manner.[8]

How explosives release energy

Ordinary combustion is a set of reactions between a fuel and an oxidiser, which is normally oxygen from the air.[9] In several explosive formulations, both reactants are brought together in one mixture or compound. Drysdale (2008) gives gunpowder as an example of a physical mixture of carbon and sulfur as the fuel with sodium nitrate as the oxidiser.[3] In materials such as trinitrotoluene (TNT) and cellulose nitrate, nitrate groups are built chemically into the fuel molecule. The resulting species can be highly unstable and decompose violently under the right conditions.[3] Grant (2002) notes that fuels containing their own oxidising agent, such as gunpowder, rocket propellants and cellulose nitrate, burn freely even in the presence of halon.[4]

The speed of the reaction front separates the two main classes. High explosives tend to detonate: their reaction propagates faster than the speed of sound in the reacting material, and they can generate peak pressures of 104 to 106 psi (700 to 70,000 bar).[5] Low explosives tend to deflagrate, with a reaction front slower than sound. Their speeds range from hundreds of metres per second down to millimetres per hour, and their peak pressures are orders of magnitude lower.[6]

Log-scale chart: low explosives range from millimetres per hour to hundreds of metres per second; high explosives detonate at 2,000 to 8,200 m/s.
Reported reaction-front speed ranges of low and high explosives. Detonation is faster than sound in the reacting material, not defined by a fixed air-sound-speed marker.

The SFPE Handbook describes a detonation as an explosion in which the combustion wave travels at supersonic speed through the unburned material. The pressure rise is then highly nonuniform and virtually instantaneous.[10] The glossary of NUREG-1805 gives the same criterion: a combustion zone moving faster than the speed of sound in the unreacted medium.[11]

The detonation speeds of high explosives lie in the range of 2,000 to 8,200 m/s.[6] The time over which a high explosive releases its energy depends on this speed and on the size of the charge. Zalosh (2008) expresses it as the length of the explosive divided by the detonation speed:[6]

t=LD

Dynamite detonates at about 4,900 m/s (16,000 ft/s). A stick 0.3 m long therefore releases its energy in 0.3/4,900 = 6.1 × 10−5 s, about 1/16 of a millisecond.[6] Gas and dust deflagrations in buildings, by comparison, often produce pressures of the order of 1 psig (about 7 kPa), because most building structures fail at about that pressure.[6]

Types of explosive materials

Black powder was the first known explosive. Roger Bacon described it in the thirteenth century, and its first use in mining dates from the late seventeenth century.[2] Nitroglycerin was first prepared in 1846, but its sensitivity prevented wide use until 1867. In that year Alfred Nobel found that nitroglycerin absorbed in an inert material such as diatomaceous earth was relatively safe to handle. The best-known form of this mixture is dynamite.[2] Dynamite remained the main commercial explosive until modern blasting agents arrived in the mid-1950s.[2]

Santis (2008) groups explosive materials into several types by their properties. Primary or initiating high explosives, such as mercury fulminate, lead styphnate and lead azide, nearly always detonate when exposed to a spark, flame, impact or friction of sufficient magnitude. They are used almost only in detonators, to start detonation in less sensitive explosives.[12] Secondary high explosives, such as TNT, RDX, dynamite, nitroglycerin and pentaerythritol tetranitrate (PETN), are relatively insensitive to shock and heat. A primary explosive readily detonates them, and this detonator sensitivity distinguishes them from blasting agents.[12]

Tree diagram: explosive materials split into high and low explosives, blasting agents and detonators, with UN divisions.
Types of explosive materials with typical examples and the UN/DOT divisions given in the 2008 Fire Protection Handbook.

Low explosives or propellants include black powder, smokeless powder and solid rocket fuels. They normally deflagrate, although some can detonate when confined, and fire is the greatest hazard in their handling.[12] Blasting agents are fuel and oxidiser systems based mainly on ammonium nitrate, such as ANFO. Water gels, slurries and emulsions are related products that usually contain 10 to 25 % water.[12] Two-component or binary explosives consist of two or more prepackaged chemicals that are not individually classified as explosives. Once mixed, they must be stored, transported and handled as explosives.[13]

Permissible explosives are a special group for underground coal mines. Santis (2008) describes their United States testing and approval by the Mine Safety and Health Administration and their reduced tendency to ignite gas-air and gas-air-coal dust mixtures.[13] Moore (2008) states that coal-mine explosives must be permissible and used under special blasting regulations.[14] Commercial explosives are designed for a wide range of needs, including water resistance, fume production, sensitivity, energy, shelf life and ruggedness.[1]

Classification

In 1991, the United States DOT adopted transport rules based on the United Nations Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods. The older Class A, B and C system was no longer permitted for transport.[12] Under the UN system, explosives form Class 1, which has six divisions that are further divided into compatibility groups.[12] The divisions depend on the propensity of a material to detonate in its entirety, its susceptibility to accidental initiation and whether it presents projectile, blast or fire hazards.[6] The ATF uses a separate system with three classes: high explosives, low explosives and blasting agents. It serves the enforcement of the federal rules on the secure and safe storage of explosive materials.[12]

UN Class 1 divisions, as described in the 2008 Fire Protection Handbook[13]
Division Hazard Class name before 1 January 1991 (United States)
1.1 Mass explosion hazard: an explosion that affects almost the entire load instantaneously Class A explosives
1.2 Projection hazard but no mass explosion hazard Class A or B explosives
1.3 Fire hazard with a minor blast or projection hazard, or both, but no mass explosion hazard Class B explosives
1.4 Minor explosion hazard; effects largely confined to the package Class C explosives
1.5 Very insensitive explosives with a mass explosion hazard Blasting agents
1.6 Extremely insensitive articles without a mass explosion hazard No applicable hazard class

For Division 1.4, an external fire must not cause a virtually instantaneous explosion of almost the entire package content.[13] C. J. Wright (2008a) adds that no device in Division 1.4 may contain more than 25 g (0.9 oz) of detonating material.[8] The DOT package label for Class 1 shows the division number and the compatibility group letter.[13] Primary explosives are classed as Division 1.1A and secondary high explosives as Division 1.1D.[12] For road transport, Routhier (2008) lists placarding, driver qualifications, vehicle design, fire-fighting equipment and vehicle operation among the subjects covered by NFPA 495.[15]

Explosive energy and blast effects

The energy of condensed explosives is often quoted as a TNT equivalent weight. One kilogram of TNT releases 4.2 × 106 J.[6] The conversion table of the SFPE Handbook lists the ton (nuclear equivalent of TNT) as 4.20 × 109 J.[16] The TNT equivalence of another explosive is the ratio of its explosive energy to that of TNT:[6]

WTNT=mExETNT

Most condensed high explosives release a similar energy per unit mass. Pentolite (50/50) releases 5.1 × 106 J/kg, so 1 kg corresponds to 5.1/4.2 = 1.2 kg of TNT. RDX releases 5.4 × 106 J/kg and corresponds to 1.3 kg of TNT per kilogram.[6]

An explosion sends a blast wave into the surroundings. Its leading edge is a shock wave, a sudden jump in pressure, and behind it the pressure decays. Far from the source the wave takes the shape of a letter N.[17] Damage depends on the peak side-on overpressure and on the specific impulse, the area under the positive part of the pressure curve. At large distances, structural damage depends mainly on the overpressure.[17] For ideal blast waves from an instantaneous point source, the overpressure correlates with a scaled distance:[17]

Z=zWTNT1/3

A charge eight times larger therefore produces the same overpressure at twice the distance.[17] Explosions at ground level produce hemispherical blast waves. When the scaled distances of Zalosh (2008) are applied to them, the blast energy is doubled, which means using 2WTNT in the equation.[18] The SFPE Handbook uses a dimensionless form, R¯=R(P0/E)1/3, with the blast energy E in joules and the ambient pressure P0 in pascals. It also doubles the energy for ground reflection.[19]

Symbol Description Unit
t time over which a high explosive releases its energy s
L length of the explosive charge m
D detonation speed m/s
WTNT TNT equivalent mass kg
m mass of the explosive kg
Ex explosive energy per unit mass of the explosive J/kg
ETNT explosive energy per unit mass of TNT, 4.2 × 106 J/kg
Z scaled distance m/kg1/3
z distance from the explosion site m
R¯, R dimensionless scaled distance (SFPE form) and distance –, m
E, P0 blast wave energy and ambient pressure (SFPE form) J, Pa

Zalosh (2008) reproduces a table of overpressure consequences for high explosives, based on Kinney and Graham. Typical window glass breaks at 0.69 to 1.4 kPa (0.1 to 0.2 psi), at scaled distances of 128 to 61.0 m/kg1/3. Personnel are knocked down at 6.9 to 10 kPa (1.0 to 1.5 psi), at 13.4 to 9.75 m/kg1/3.[18]

Range-bar chart of blast effects against scaled distance from 0.8 to 900 m per cube-root kilogram, from lethality to minimum glass damage.
Consequences of high-explosive blast overpressure as a function of TNT scaled distance.

Most buildings are probably totally destroyed at 70 to 80 kPa (10.2 to 11.6 psi), at 3.35 to 3.05 m/kg1/3. The lethality band lies at 0.70 to 1.5 MPa (102 to 218 psi), at scaled distances of 1.16 to 0.823 m/kg1/3.[18] These correlations hold for free-field blast waves. Reflection from a surface facing the explosion roughly doubles the pressure when the incident overpressure is below about 14 kPa (2 psi).[18]

A worked example shows the method. Consider 100 kg of RDX that detonates at ground level in the open. The TNT equivalent mass is 100 × 5.4/4.2 = 129 kg. Because the charge is at ground level, the doubled mass of 257 kg is used, with a cube root of 6.36 kg1/3.[6][18]

The incident-pressure estimate for personnel knockdown follows from 44 ft/kg1/3, or 13.41 m/kg1/3: 13.41 × 6.36 = 85.3 m, rounded up to about 86 m. Reflected pressure can cause the same effect farther away.[20] Typical window breakage, at 61.0 to 128 m/kg1/3, extends from about 390 m to about 815 m.[18] For comparison, Santis (2008) gives a minimum evacuation distance of 610 m for fires involving explosives. It is a fire-response rule, not a blast-effect radius derived from this example.[7]

Concentric rings around a 100 kg RDX charge: incident-pressure knockdown estimate about 86 m and typical window breakage about 390 to 815 m.
Worked example: idealised incident-pressure effects of 100 kg of RDX at ground level; reflected pressure can extend effects farther.

Real explosions are more complex. Casualties are often caused by fragments of the container or casing, called primary fragments, and by debris from damaged structures, called secondary fragments.[20] In the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, a charge of 1,800 kg (4,000 lb) of ammonium nitrate and fuel oil had an estimated TNT equivalence of 1,540 kg (3,400 lb). Oswald et al., as cited in Zalosh (2008), used data from that and other incidents to correlate the share of building occupants with life-threatening injuries from glass, roof and wall damage.[20]

In building security design, an effective defence against vehicle-borne explosives is a standoff distance between the building and the closest point a vehicle can reach. The design must assume an explosive size, expressed as a TNT equivalent, and the standoff is valid only for that assumption.[21] Meacham and Galioto (2008) call keeping the threat away the only defence that will succeed against a large vehicle bomb. Even modest amounts of high explosives cause extensive damage and injury if detonated at close range. With adequate standoff, the other measures of blast-resistant design, such as hardening the structure, become realistically achievable.[22]

The investigation of World Trade Center Building 7 shows the same methods in forensic use. NIST simulated hypothetical blasts with SHAMRC, a code with a proven record of accuracy for charges from less than 500 g to more than 4 × 106 kg. Its focused scenario used preliminary cutting of a critical column and 4 kg (9 lb) of RDX in linear shaped charges; NIST also calculated a smaller 1 kg charge to assess window fragility.[23] NIST estimated 130 to 140 dB at least half a mile away for the smallest column-failing charge, assuming surrounding buildings did not obstruct the sound. It concluded that no blast event had occurred.[24][25]

Storage, transport and security

For most industrial materials, storage protects the material from its surroundings. For explosives the reverse applies: storage must protect workers and the public from the material.[26] Commercial explosives have shelf lives from a few weeks to indefinite and can become unstable or even inert. The manufacturer or the local bomb squad is consulted if there is any doubt about their condition.[26] Santis (2008) describes five types of United States storage magazine recognised in the then-current ATF regulations, with specifications also given in NFPA 495.[26]

To protect the public, the Institute of Makers of Explosives publishes the American Table of Distances. It gives the separation between stores of explosive materials and inhabited buildings, public highways, passenger railways and other magazines, as a function of the stored quantity.[26] For 408 to 454 kg (900 to 1,000 lb), for example, the distance to an inhabited building is 122 m (400 ft) with a barricade and 244 m (800 ft) without.[27] An artificial barricade is a mound or revetted wall of earth at least 0.914 m (3 ft) thick.[28] A straight line from the top of any sidewall of the building with explosives to a point 3.66 m (12 ft) above the centre of a railway or highway must pass through the barricade.[28]

Cross-section: magazine, earth barricade at least 0.914 m thick and a sight line to 3.66 m above a highway that passes through it.
Barricade rule of the American Table of Distances: a straight line from the top of the magazine sidewall to a point 3.66 m above the centre of the railway or highway must pass through the barricade.

The table applies only to the manufacture and permanent storage of commercial explosive materials. It does not cover transport, bombs, projectiles or other heavily encased explosives.[28] It is not adjusted for blast effect, density or detonation velocity, and it is not intended for blasting work or open detonation of waste explosives.[7] Process plants use it as well: where a true explosive could be present, intentionally or by accident, spacing should follow the American Table of Distances.[29]

In the 2008 United States account, the DOT regulates the transport of explosive materials and must approve and classify an explosive before it can be shipped. Most commercial explosives travel by truck, and fire is the greatest concern on public highways.[26] A study of DOT data found ten truck fires with Class 1 materials from 1993 to 1998, none of which ended in a mass detonation.[26][7] The DOT Emergency Response Guidebook covered emergency procedures for transport incidents. NFPA 498 covered safe havens and interchange lots for vehicles carrying explosives in the 2008 handbook.[26]

Fire protection and fire fighting

Fire is a principal cause of accidents involving explosive materials. Explosives vary in their sensitivity to fire, but they always have the potential to produce a disastrous explosion when exposed to it.[7] Santis (2008) calls eliminating sources of fire the effective method of protection in the explosive-material settings he describes. This requires meticulous housekeeping, because a small fire in oily rags or wastepaper is often what triggers a major catastrophe.[7] Smoking should not be permitted where explosive materials are produced, handled, stored or used. In manufacture, flame-producing equipment is confined to designated areas and strict safety procedures.[26][7]

If explosives become involved in a fire, all fire fighting stops and people are removed to at least 610 m (2,000 ft).[30] NFPA 495 states this as a rule that must always be obeyed. Santis (2008) recalls in this context the Kansas City fire of 1988, in which six fire fighters were killed fighting a fire in a blasting agent store.[2] Truck fires carry a special threat, because many occupants of other vehicles may be within the radius of a blast. Santis calls for immediate evacuation if a truck fire occurs and for ignition sources to be controlled until the cargo can be transported away.[7]

Fixed protection is used mainly in manufacturing. Gagnon (2008) quotes the NFPA 15 definition: water discharge begins within 100 milliseconds after energy reaches the detector. He says 10-millisecond responses are achievable.[31] Neither these systems nor explosion suppression systems are effective where a detonation can occur.[32]

Gagnon (2008) describes Class 1, Division 1 materials as too energetic for such systems and Division 2 materials as possibly too energetic. Most systems protect Division 3 materials, and Division 4 fires can be extinguished by them.[32] The SFPE Handbook gives the reason: the sudden, spatially nonuniform pressure rise of a detonation precludes explosion venting and explosion suppression.[33]

Limits and common misconceptions

Insensitive products are not safe in a fire. Although blasting agents and secondary explosives should simply burn in a fire, confinement may allow the burning to change into a detonation.[12] Santis (2008) warns that the relative insensitivity of Division 1.5 materials can make personnel careless around them.[7] Once they detonate, their damage is comparable to that of Division 1.1 materials.[26]

TNT equivalence and scaled distance are simplifications. The correlations assume an ideal blast wave from an instantaneous point source. Multiple and oblique reflections from buildings, nearby structures and uneven terrain require more detailed blast codes.[17][20] The overpressure table gives ranges rather than sharp limits, and the result depends on whether ground reflection is included.[18]

The classifications, codes and distances in this article describe United States practice as presented in the 2008 edition of the Fire Protection Handbook. These include NFPA 495, NFPA 498, the ATF rules and the American Table of Distances, which the Institute of Makers of Explosives periodically revises. Later editions and the rules of other countries may differ.[26][30]

See also

Notes

  1. ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 Santis (2008), p. 6-248.
  2. ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 Santis (2008), p. 6-247.
  3. ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 Drysdale (2008), p. 2-17.
  4. ↑ 4.0 4.1 Grant (2002), p. 4-152.
  5. ↑ 5.0 5.1 5.2 Zalosh (2008), p. 2-93.
  6. ↑ 6.00 6.01 6.02 6.03 6.04 6.05 6.06 6.07 6.08 6.09 6.10 Zalosh (2008), p. 2-94.
  7. ↑ 7.0 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.6 7.7 7.8 Santis (2008), p. 6-254.
  8. ↑ 8.0 8.1 C. J. Wright (2008a), p. 13-118.
  9. ↑ Van Rossum (2027), §4.1.
  10. ↑ Zalosh (2002), p. 3-410.
  11. ↑ Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. F-21.
  12. ↑ 12.0 12.1 12.2 12.3 12.4 12.5 12.6 12.7 12.8 Santis (2008), p. 6-249.
  13. ↑ 13.0 13.1 13.2 13.3 13.4 Santis (2008), p. 6-250.
  14. ↑ L. J. Moore (2008), p. 9-217.
  15. ↑ Routhier (2008), p. 21-19.
  16. ↑ DiNenno et al. (2002), p. A-9.
  17. ↑ 17.0 17.1 17.2 17.3 17.4 Zalosh (2008), p. 2-95.
  18. ↑ 18.0 18.1 18.2 18.3 18.4 18.5 18.6 Zalosh (2008), p. 2-96.
  19. ↑ Zalosh (2002), p. 3-419.
  20. ↑ 20.0 20.1 20.2 20.3 Zalosh (2008), p. 2-97.
  21. ↑ Freidenfelds (2008), p. 1-101.
  22. ↑ Meacham and Galioto (2008), p. 1-123.
  23. ↑ National Institute of Standards and Technology (2008), p. 26.
  24. ↑ National Institute of Standards and Technology (2008), p. xxxvi.
  25. ↑ National Institute of Standards and Technology (2008), p. 49.
  26. ↑ 26.00 26.01 26.02 26.03 26.04 26.05 26.06 26.07 26.08 26.09 Santis (2008), p. 6-251.
  27. ↑ Santis (2008), p. 6-252.
  28. ↑ 28.0 28.1 28.2 Santis (2008), p. 6-253.
  29. ↑ Schwab (2008a), p. 8-19.
  30. ↑ 30.0 30.1 Santis (2008), p. 6-256.
  31. ↑ Gagnon (2008), p. 16-109.
  32. ↑ 32.0 32.1 Gagnon (2008), p. 16-110.
  33. ↑ Zalosh (2002), p. 3-411.

References

  • DiNenno, P. J., Drysdale, D., Beyler, C. L., Walton, W. D., Custer, R. L. P., Hall, J. R., Jr., & Watts, J. M., Jr. (Eds.). (2002). SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed.). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
  • Drysdale, D. (2008). Physics and chemistry of fire. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 2-3–2-20). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Freidenfelds, L. V. (2008). Premises security. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 1-95–1-107). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Gagnon, R. M. (2008). Ultra-High-Speed water spray systems. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 16-109–16-133). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Grant, C. C. (2002). Halon design calculations. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 4-149–4-172). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
  • Iqbal, N., & Salley, M. H. (2004). Fire Dynamics Tools (FDTs): Quantitative fire hazard analysis methods for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Fire Protection Inspection Program (NUREG-1805). U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
  • Meacham, B. J., & Galioto, C. (2008). Protecting against extreme events. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 1-109–1-136). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Moore, L. J. (2008). Mining and mineral processing. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 9-203–9-223). National Fire Protection Association.
  • National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2008). Final report on the collapse of World Trade Center Building 7 (NIST NCSTAR 1A).
  • Routhier, B. (2008). Fire safety in commercial vehicles. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 21-15–21-27). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Santis, L. D. (2008). Explosives and blasting agents. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 6-247–6-256). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Schwab, R. F. (2008a). Chemical processing equipment. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 8-17–8-29). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Van Rossum, E. (2027). Introduction to Fire Safety Engineering. Fire Safety Academy.
  • Wright, C. J. (2008a). Managing the response to hazardous material incidents. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 13-117–13-144). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Zalosh, R. (2002). Explosion protection. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 3-402–3-421). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
  • Zalosh, R. (2008). Explosions. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 2-93–2-106). National Fire Protection Association.