Contents
A blasting agent is an explosive material made of a fuel and an oxidiser that is intended for blasting but is so insensitive that it cannot be detonated by a standard blasting cap.[1][2] In the United Nations transport classification it belongs to Division 1.5, the very insensitive explosives, and in the United States it was called a blasting agent as a separate hazard class before 1991.[3] The best-known blasting agent is ANFO, a mixture of ammonium nitrate with about 6 % fuel oil.[4]
Blasting agents based on ammonium nitrate took over about 99 % of the commercial explosives market in the fifty years before 2008, and over 90 % are delivered to the work site in bulk.[1] Their low sensitivity makes accidental initiation very unlikely. It does not make them harmless: once a blasting agent detonates, the damage is comparable to that of Division 1.1 explosives, which have a mass explosion hazard.[5] Their relative insensitivity can make personnel careless around them, as a fire and explosion at a mixing house near Norton, Virginia, illustrated. A fire and explosion at a blasting agent store in Kansas City, Missouri, killed six fire fighters in 1988.[6]
Definition and classification
The 2008 Fire Protection Handbook gives the United States definition used in the explosives industry. Blasting agents are Division 1.5 materials that have been classified according to tests specified in Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Parts 170 to 189.[1] They are found to be so insensitive that there is very little probability of accidental initiation to explosion or of transition from deflagration to detonation. They cannot be detonated in the standard blasting cap sensitivity test.[1]
The explanatory notes to the American Table of Distances give a more detailed wording. A blasting agent is any material or mixture consisting of fuel and oxidiser, intended for blasting and not otherwise defined as an explosive. The finished product, as mixed for use or shipment, must not be detonable by a No. 8 test blasting cap when unconfined.[2] The glossary of NUREG-1805 defines it as a material or mixture intended for blasting that meets the requirements of the DOT Hazardous Materials Regulations in 49 CFR 173.56 to 173.58 as Explosive 1.5D.[7]
Under the UN recommendations, Division 1.5 consists of very insensitive explosives. These substances have a mass explosion hazard, but they are so insensitive that initiation, or transition from burning to detonation, is very unlikely under normal conditions of transport.[3][8] A mass explosion is one that affects almost the entire load instantaneously.[3] The example given for Division 1.5 in the international hazard class table is an ammonium nitrate and fuel oil mix.[9] Before 1 January 1991, the same materials formed the United States hazard class "blasting agents".[3]
The test of sensitivity is what separates a blasting agent from a high explosive. Secondary high explosives such as TNT, dynamite and RDX are detonator-sensitive, and this property distinguishes them from blasting agents.[4] The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) also keeps blasting agents as one of its three classes of explosive materials, next to high explosives and low explosives.[4]
Composition and types
Blasting agents combine a fuel and an oxidiser in one product, the same two reactants that take part in any combustion.[10] Powerful oxidising agents form highly reactive mixtures when they are intimately mixed with a solid or liquid fuel.[11] According to Santis (2008), the most commonly used explosive is a fuel and oxidiser system that consists mainly of ammonium nitrate and a fuel such as No. 2 diesel fuel. This formulation is called ANFO and is sold under a variety of trade names.[4]
ANFO is made by adding about 6 % fuel oil to specially prepared ammonium nitrate particles known as prills. The combination offers low cost, high energy, satisfactory fume characteristics and much greater safety than nitroglycerin dynamites.[4] It also has limits. Its use in wet conditions is restricted, and its shattering power is not particularly strong.[4]
Many variations have therefore been developed. Powdered aluminium or other fuels can be added to raise the energy and blasting efficiency. Ammonium nitrate solutions can be emulsified or slurried with other ingredients into a semisolid blasting agent and then mixed with ammonium nitrate or ANFO.[4]
Water gels, slurries and emulsions were developed for work that needs a very water-resistant product and a higher shock energy than ANFO can give.[4] Ammonium nitrate is usually their basic oxidiser. They can be sensitised with paint-grade aluminium, monomethylamine nitrate, TNT and various gelling agents and emulsifiers, and they usually contain 10 to 25 % water.[4] Depending on formulation and sensitivity, they are classed either as Division 1.5 blasting agents or as Division 1.1 explosives.[4] Davenport (2008) adds, on the basis of Bureau of Mines tests, that ammonium nitrate intimately mixed with fuel oil, ground polyethylene or ground paper is properly classified as a blasting agent.[12]
Modern blasting agents were introduced in the mid-1950s and ended the long dominance of dynamite.[13] Santis (2008) attributes the shift to economic considerations and to the greatly improved safety of water-based explosive materials. By 2008, over 90 % of blasting agents were delivered to the work site in bulk.[1] Some ingredients are hazardous in their own right, among them nitric acid, aluminium powder, ammonium nitrate, ammonium perchlorate, sodium nitrate and fuel oil.[6]
Sensitivity and fire behaviour
A blasting agent is insensitive, not inert. Blasting agents and secondary explosives should simply burn in a fire, but confinement may allow the burning to change into a detonation.[4] The Bureau of Mines tests on ammonium nitrate mixed with fuel oil, ground polyethylene or ground paper found such a transition possible, though quite unlikely, in pile sizes typical of storage and transport.[12] Even the UN definition of Division 1.5 describes the transition as very unlikely under normal conditions of transport, not as impossible.[3]
Santis (2008) stresses the human side of this hazard. Because of the relative insensitivity of Division 1.5 materials, there is always a danger that personnel become careless around them.[6] A fire and explosion in a blasting agent mixing house near Norton, Virginia, illustrated the hazard of the careless use of heat-producing equipment (Van Dolah and Malesky, 1962, as cited in Santis, 2008).[6][14] Another fire and explosion, in a blasting agent storage facility in Kansas City, Missouri, killed six fire fighters who were fighting the fire. The store held a blasting agent based on ammonium nitrate, and the event took place in 1988.[13][6]
The consequences of a detonation do not scale with the sensitivity. Division 1.5 materials are appreciably less sensitive than Division 1.1 materials, but once initiated to detonation, they produce comparable damage.[5] Fire is therefore treated in the same way as for other explosive materials. Sources of fire are eliminated by meticulous housekeeping, and smoking or fire-producing equipment is not permitted where blasting agents are produced, handled, stored or used.[6]
Blast performance
The energy of a blasting agent is often expressed as a TNT equivalence: the mass of TNT that releases the same explosive energy. One kilogram of TNT releases 4.2 × 106 J.[15] In the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, about 1,800 kg (4,000 lb) of ammonium nitrate and fuel oil had an estimated TNT equivalence of 1,540 kg (3,400 lb).[16] The ratio is 3,400/4,000 = 0.85, so in that event one kilogram of the mixture acted like about 0.85 kg of TNT. For comparison, the same handbook gives TNT equivalents of 1.2 for pentolite and 1.3 for RDX.[15]
Zalosh (2008) cites one study for the detonation speeds of high explosives, 2,000 to 8,200 m/s, and for TNT equivalents. It deals with the airblast TNT equivalence of a range of commercial blasting explosives (Wharton et al., 2000, as cited in Zalosh, 2008).[15][17] The handbook does not give a separate detonation speed for ANFO. It does note that ANFO has no particularly strong shattering power and that additives such as aluminium increase its energy.[4] Blast effects at a distance follow the same scaling laws as for other condensed explosives, with the TNT equivalent mass as the measure of charge size.[18]
Use in mining and construction
Mining is the main user. Of the more than 3.2 million tonnes of explosives and blasting agents used by industry in the United States in 2005, about 90 % went to mining and most of the rest to construction.[13] Bulk explosives dominate large mining, quarrying and construction blasting. They are Division 1.5 materials and can consist of ANFO, water gels, slurries or emulsions, or blends of these.[5] They are mixed at a plant and delivered by bulk truck, or mixed at the blast site in the bulk truck itself. From the truck they are moved by auger or pumped directly into the blastholes.[5]
Fire is a safety concern in every type of bulk truck. The driver or operator must be thoroughly trained in the mixing, pumping and augering equipment and in the emergency procedures for the materials carried.[5] Pumping operations should follow industry standards, and in the United States the operator needs a commercial driver's licence with a hazardous materials endorsement.[5]
The NUREG-1805 glossary defines the blast site as the area where explosive material is handled during loading of the blastholes. It extends 15.3 m (50 ft) in all directions from the perimeter formed by the loaded holes. A minimum of 9.15 m (30 ft) may replace this if the perimeter is marked and separated from other areas by a barrier.[7] Underground, at least 4.6 m (15 ft) of solid rib, pillar or broken rock may be substituted.[7]
Large quarry blasts are fired in sequence rather than all at once. The NIST investigation of World Trade Center Building 7 had to separate seismic signals from local quarry blasts around New York City. These blasts involved about 100 holes in the bedrock and about 36,000 kg of ammonium nitrate and fuel oil.[19] Their ground vibration is much reduced by firing the blasting caps in sequence with delays of 25 ms. The peak amplitude of the seismic signal is roughly proportional to the largest charge per delay, not to the total charge (Kim et al., 1994, as cited in McAllister et al., 2008).[19]
Blasting also affects the risk of a mine fire or explosion underground. In metal mines, sulfide dust can be ignited during a blast: the blast may create a combustible dust that the flame of the explosive or blasting agent then ignites.[20] Where sulfide dust explosions are possible, special anti-incendive blasting agents are available. In coal mines, explosives must be permissible and used under special blasting regulations.[21] Explosives magazines are among the areas with a high combustible load that can be designed to minimise ignition sources. In noncoal mines, oil, grease and diesel fuel are stored at safe distances from them.[21][22]
Storage and separation
In the United States, protection requirements for explosives and blasting agents are set out in NFPA 495, Explosive Materials Code, as described in the 2008 edition of the Fire Protection Handbook.[22] Blasting agents are stored in magazines like other explosive materials. Because their damage after detonation is comparable to that of Division 1.1 materials, the American Table of Distances is also used for their separation from inhabited buildings, public highways and passenger railways.[5] Their lower sensitivity is recognised in the distances between stores. Stores of Division 1.1 and Division 1.5 materials, or two stores of Division 1.5 materials, need not be as far apart as two stores of Division 1.1 materials.[5][6]
These shorter distances come from a separate table of recommended separation distances. It is reproduced in the 2008 handbook for ammonium nitrate and blasting agents placed near explosives or blasting agents, called the donor.[23] For a blasting agent store, the barricaded distance is 3.35 m (11 ft) for a donor of up to 45.4 kg (100 lb). It rises to 70.1 m (230 ft) for donors of 125,000 to 136,000 kg (275,000 to 300,000 lb).[23] Without a barricade the distances are multiplied by 6. The distances apply only to blasting agents that pass the insensitivity test in the regulations of the DOT and the ATF.[23]
A worked example shows how the two tables combine. A quarry plans a barricaded magazine for 9,070 kg (20,000 lb) of blasting agent. The American Table of Distances row "over 18,000 lb, not over 20,000 lb" applies.[24] It requires 297 m (975 ft) to an inhabited building, 88.4 m (290 ft) to a public highway of Class A to D and 248 m (813 ft) to a passenger railway. Without a barricade, these become 594 m, 177 m and 496 m.[24]
A second store of blasting agent is planned on the same site. If the first store is the donor, the separation table gives 17.7 m (58 ft) behind an earth or sand barricade at least 0.635 m (25 in.) thick, or 106 m (348 ft) unbarricaded.[23] Under the American Table of Distances, two magazines of Division 1.1 materials of the same size would need 29.9 m (98 ft) with a barricade.[24] The barricaded distance between the blasting agent stores is thus about 40 % shorter, while the distances to the public stay the same. Without barricades the comparison reverses: the factor of 6 gives 106 m, against 59.7 m (196 ft) in the American Table. A note to the separation table states that distances beyond those of the American Table are not required where storage is in bullet-resistant magazines or behind a bullet-resistant wall.[23]
Transport and emergency response
In the United States, the DOT regulates the transport of all explosive materials and must approve and classify each product before it can be shipped.[5] Detonators may travel in limited quantities on the same vehicle as explosives and blasting agents, provided that the DOT rules on quantity and container type are met.[5] NFPA 495 sets fire and explosion prevention rules for vehicles carrying explosive materials, covering driver qualifications, vehicle design, placarding, fire-fighting equipment and operation.[25] The United States OSHA rule 29 CFR 1910.119 names blasting agents in its title, "Process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous Chemicals, Explosives, and Blasting Agents".[26]
Emergency response follows the rule for all explosive materials. No attempt should be made to fight a fire involving them, and the area is evacuated to at least 610 m (2,000 ft).[6] A truck fire is especially dangerous because occupants of other vehicles may be within the radius of a blast. Ignition sources are controlled until the cargo can be moved away, and immediate evacuation is imperative in the event of a fire.[6] Santis (2008) places the Kansas City deaths of 1988 directly after this rule: the six fire fighters died while fighting a fire in a blasting agent store.[13]
Limits and common misconceptions
Insensitivity to a blasting cap does not make a material safe in a fire. Confinement can turn burning into detonation, and the damage of a detonating blasting agent is comparable to that of Division 1.1 explosives.[4][5] The name "blasting agent" describes a test result for the finished product as mixed for use or shipment. A change in formulation can move a water gel or emulsion into Division 1.1.[4][2]
Fertiliser-grade ammonium nitrate and a blasting agent are also different things. The handbook warns against confusing the two: the first is an oxidiser, while the second is a mixture of ammonium nitrate with combustible material.[27] The Oklahoma City value is an estimate for one event and not a property of ANFO in general.[16]
The definitions, tables and rules in this article describe United States practice as presented in the 2008 edition of the Fire Protection Handbook and in NUREG-1805 (2004). Later editions of NFPA 495 and of the American Table of Distances, which the Institute of Makers of Explosives revises periodically, and the rules of other countries may differ.[5]
See also
Notes
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 Santis (2008), p. 6-248.
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 Santis (2008), p. 6-253.
- ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 Santis (2008), p. 6-250.
- ↑ 4.00 4.01 4.02 4.03 4.04 4.05 4.06 4.07 4.08 4.09 4.10 4.11 4.12 4.13 Santis (2008), p. 6-249.
- ↑ 5.00 5.01 5.02 5.03 5.04 5.05 5.06 5.07 5.08 5.09 5.10 5.11 Santis (2008), p. 6-251.
- ↑ 6.0 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.6 6.7 6.8 Santis (2008), p. 6-254.
- ↑ 7.0 7.1 7.2 Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. F-8.
- ↑ C. J. Wright (2008a), p. 13-118.
- ↑ C. J. Wright (2008a), p. 13-119.
- ↑ Van Rossum (2027), §4.1.
- ↑ Drysdale (2008), p. 2-17.
- ↑ 12.0 12.1 Davenport (2008), p. 7-46.
- ↑ 13.0 13.1 13.2 13.3 Santis (2008), p. 6-247.
- ↑ Santis (2008), p. 6-256.
- ↑ 15.0 15.1 15.2 Zalosh (2008), p. 2-94.
- ↑ 16.0 16.1 Zalosh (2008), p. 2-97.
- ↑ Zalosh (2008), p. 2-105.
- ↑ Zalosh (2008), p. 2-95.
- ↑ 19.0 19.1 McAllister et al. (2008), p. 672.
- ↑ L. J. Moore (2008), p. 9-214.
- ↑ 21.0 21.1 L. J. Moore (2008), p. 9-217.
- ↑ 22.0 22.1 L. J. Moore (2008), p. 9-220.
- ↑ 23.0 23.1 23.2 23.3 23.4 Santis (2008), p. 6-255.
- ↑ 24.0 24.1 24.2 Santis (2008), p. 6-252.
- ↑ Routhier (2008), p. 21-19.
- ↑ Hildebrand and Noll (2008), p. 13-84.
- ↑ Davenport (2008), p. 7-45.
References
- Davenport, J. A. (2008). Storage and handling of chemicals. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 7-43–7-55). National Fire Protection Association.
- Drysdale, D. (2008). Physics and chemistry of fire. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 2-3–2-20). National Fire Protection Association.
- Hildebrand, M. S., & Noll, G. G. (2008). Public fire protection and hazmat management. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 13-81–13-98). National Fire Protection Association.
- Iqbal, N., & Salley, M. H. (2004). Fire Dynamics Tools (FDTs): Quantitative fire hazard analysis methods for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Fire Protection Inspection Program (NUREG-1805). U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
- McAllister, T. P., Gann, R. G., Averill, J. D., Gross, J. L., Grosshandler, W. L., Lawson, J. R., McGrattan, K. B., Pitts, W. M., Prasad, K. R., Sadek, F. H., & Nelson, H. E. (2008). Structural fire response and probable collapse sequence of World Trade Center Building 7 (NIST NCSTAR 1-9, Vols. 1–2). National Institute of Standards and Technology.
- Moore, L. J. (2008). Mining and mineral processing. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 9-203–9-223). National Fire Protection Association.
- Routhier, B. (2008). Fire safety in commercial vehicles. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 21-15–21-27). National Fire Protection Association.
- Santis, L. D. (2008). Explosives and blasting agents. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 6-247–6-256). National Fire Protection Association.
- Van Rossum, E. (2027). Introduction to Fire Safety Engineering. Fire Safety Academy.
- Wright, C. J. (2008a). Managing the response to hazardous material incidents. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 13-117–13-144). National Fire Protection Association.
- Zalosh, R. (2008). Explosions. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 2-93–2-106). National Fire Protection Association.