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Contents
  1. 1Construction
  2. 2Types of tank cars
  3. 3Markings and specification
  4. 4Fittings and pressure relief
  5. 5Safety features and fire exposure
  6. 6BLEVE and fireball hazard
  7. 7Emergency response
  8. 8See also
  9. 9Notes
  10. 10References

A rail tank car (also railroad tank car or simply tank car) is a railroad freight car built around a closed tank for carrying liquids, liquefied or compressed gases and some solids in bulk.[1] Tank cars carry both hazardous and nonhazardous commodities, and the materials a car may carry depend on its size, construction, fittings and linings.[1] On US railroads, the majority of hazardous materials shipments move in tank cars: 85 % in 2005.[2]

Tank cars range from about 15 m³ (4000 gal) to about 170 m³ (45,000 gal) in capacity.[3] They are grouped into nonpressure, pressure and cryogenic classes, each identified by a specification marking on the tank.[4] The main fire hazard arises when a car is damaged in an accident or exposed to fire. A car of liquefied petroleum gas (LP-gas) that is heated by flames can fail in a BLEVE with a large fireball, as several US derailments have shown.[5][6] This article describes tank cars as presented in the 2008 Fire Protection Handbook, which reflects US and Canadian rules of that time.

Construction

A tank car is typically an enclosed longitudinal cylinder, with or without internal compartments, closed by rounded ends called heads.[7] The shell consists of two to seven rings formed from metal plates. The heads are pressed into a flanged-and-dished or an ellipsoidal shape, of which the 2 to 1 ellipsoidal head is the strongest.[7] Rings and heads are fusion-welded, although some older nonpressure cars are riveted. The finished tank is heated to 593 °C (1100 °F) for 1 hour to relieve welding stresses; representative samples are X-rayed and the tank is hydrostatically tested.[7]

Carbon steel is used in over 90 % of tank car tanks, and aluminium makes up most of the remainder. Stainless steel, called alloy steel in the regulations, is used in a smaller number of cars, and nickel or nickel alloy in some tanks for acid or food service.[7] The regulations set minimum plate thicknesses, which the handbook summarises as follows.

Minimum tank and jacket plate thickness after forming (US regulations as summarised in the 2008 handbook)[7]
Material Thickness Typical use
Steel 11 gauge, about 3.2 mm (1/8 in.), also aluminium Jacket of insulated or thermally protected cars
Steel 11.1 mm (7/16 in.) Tank of nonpressure cars
Steel 12.7 mm (1/2 in.) Head shield for puncture resistance
Steel 14.3 mm (9/16 in.) Pressure cars with tank test pressure of 200 psi (1379 kPa) and below
Steel 17.5 mm (11/16 in.) Pressure cars with tank test pressure of 300 psi (2068 kPa) and greater
Steel 19.0 mm (3/4 in.) Pressure cars in chlorine service
Aluminium 12.7 mm (1/2 in.) Nonpressure aluminium cars
Aluminium 15.9 mm (5/8 in.) Aluminium pressure cars

In the United States, tank cars must meet the mechanical standards for all freight cars and the DOT Hazardous Materials Regulations (49 CFR Part 179). They must also meet the tank car specifications of the Association of American Railroads (AAR).[7] They also meet or exceed the ASME standards for pressure vessels. Builders need design approval from the AAR Tank Car Committee, and repairs involving welding or alterations may only be made at AAR-certified facilities.[7] In Canada, the tank car requirements are set by Transport Canada.[7]

The tank rests on a car structure of two body bolsters and either a continuous underframe or stub sills, which carries the tank on two trucks.[3] A tank may be divided into up to six compartments, each of which counts as a separate tank and may carry a different commodity.[3] Since 1970, new DOT specification cars for regulated hazardous materials have been limited to 130 m³ (34,500 gal), or a gross weight on rail of 286,000 lb (about 130,000 kg).[3] Optional features include insulation, a steel jacket that also acts as a heat-radiation shield, linings, claddings and heater coils for products that must be warmed before unloading.[3]

Types of tank cars

The specification of a tank decides which products it may carry.[8] The handbook distinguishes three main groups, listed with their classes in its table of tank car classes.[4] Nonpressure tank cars, also called general-service or acid-service cars, carry flammable and combustible liquids, flammable solids, oxidisers, organic peroxides, poisons, corrosives and molten solids, as well as products such as corn syrup.[8] Their tank test pressures range from 60 to 100 psi (414 to 689 kPa).[8] Their classes include DOT-103, DOT-104, DOT-111 and DOT-115.[4] Variants include the insulated tank-within-a-tank car for temperature-sensitive products and the Tank Train, a string of cars connected by hoses and loaded from one end.[8][9]

Pressure tank cars carry flammable, nonflammable or poisonous gases at higher pressures, and also products such as ethylene oxide, pyrophoric liquids and bromine.[10] Their test pressures range from 100 to 600 psi (689 to 4137 kPa). They are noncompartmented and top-loading, with the fittings for loading, unloading, pressure relief and gauging inside a protective housing on a single manway.[10] Their classes are DOT-105, DOT-109, DOT-112, DOT-114 and DOT-120.[4] On pressure cars without insulation or jacketed thermal protection, the top two-thirds of the tank are painted white or another reflective colour.[10]

Cryogenic liquid tank cars (DOT-113 and AAR-204) carry liquids refrigerated to –104 °C (–155 °F) and below at low pressure, usually 172 kPa (25 psi) or lower.[11][4] Typical contents are argon, ethylene, hydrogen, nitrogen and oxygen. The inner tank of alloy steel sits inside an outer tank, and the space between them is insulated and evacuated. This combination protects the contents for only 30 days, so these shipments are time-sensitive.[11]

Markings and specification

Every tank car carries reporting marks, a set of initials and a number, on both sides and both ends. An "X" as the last initial means that the car is privately owned, and most tank cars are owned by companies other than railroads.[4] With the initials and number, shippers, carriers and responders can find the contents of the car from the railroad's computer or the shipping papers.[4] The hazard class and identification number of the contents are shown separately by Hazardous materials placarding on both sides and both ends of the car.[2]

The specification marking is stamped into the head and stencilled on the sides of the car. It does not identify the contents, but it shows how the car was built.[4] The marking DOT-111A60ALW1, explained in the handbook, reads as follows: DOT is the authorising agency, 111 the class, A a separator letter and 60 the tank test pressure in psi. AL stands for the material of construction (the group is absent for steel), W for the construction, and the final 1 for fittings, materials or linings.[4] On most nonpressure cars the separator letter A has no meaning, but on pressure cars, cryogenic cars and some nonpressure cars the letter indicates how the car is equipped.[4][8]

As a worked example, consider the specification DOT-112J340W, which the handbook gives as an example within class DOT-112.[4] Class DOT-112 is a pressure tank car class, and 340 is the tank test pressure, 340 psi or about 2344 kPa. Pressure-relief valves on tank cars are typically set at 75 % of the tank test pressure.[12] The relief valve of such a car would therefore start to open at about 0.75 × 340 = 255 psi, or about 1760 kPa. The minimum plate thickness for a steel pressure car with a test pressure of 300 psi or more is 17.5 mm (11/16 in.). With high-tensile-strength steels it may be reduced, but never below 12.7 mm (1/2 in.).[7]

Other markings support identification and maintenance. The volume of the tank is stencilled on both ends and the load limit on both sides, under the reporting marks.[8] Retest dates of the tank and of any pressure-relief devices are stencilled on the tank or a dataplate. New cars carry two stainless steel identification plates that give the manufacturer, serial number, specification, materials and date of manufacture.[8]

Fittings and pressure relief

Fittings allow loading, unloading and safe transport, but not every car has every fitting.[11] A manway gives access to the interior. On pressure cars, usually two liquid valves connected to an eduction pipe to the bottom of the tank are used for liquids, and one or two vapour valves remove vapour or pressurise the tank. Excess flow valves under various fittings close when the flow exceeds a set amount.[11] Other fittings include bottom outlet valves, gauging devices, sample lines, thermometer wells and sumps. A bottom washout is opened only for cleaning, and once its closure is removed there is no way to control the flow of lading.[12]

Each pressure relief device limits the build-up of internal pressure caused by vaporisation and expansion of the contents. Relief devices on tank cars are set at either 75 % of the tank test pressure or 33 % of the burst pressure.[12] A pressure-relief valve is held closed by springs and recloses after operating. A safety vent uses a rupture disc that does not reclose; cars fitted with such vents are stencilled "Not for poisonous or flammable liquids".[12] Combination devices join a rupture disc or breaking pin to a spring-loaded valve. Some nonpressure tanks also have a vacuum relief valve against negative pressures greater than 0.75 psi (about 5 kPa).[12]

A relief valve cannot by itself prevent failure in a fire. Lemoff (2008) explains that a spring-loaded valve only reduces the pressure to somewhat below its start-to-discharge pressure, so the liquid stays above its normal boiling point and the shell remains stressed.[5] Where flames heat the shell above the liquid level, the metal can lose enough strength to fail even though the valve works as designed.[5]

Safety features and fire exposure

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, a series of serious derailments occurred in the United States. Lemoff and Rivkin (2008) give the 1973 LP-gas fire at Kingman, Arizona, as an example of incidents with both impact-caused and fire-caused BLEVEs of tank cars carrying liquefied flammable gases.[13] As a result, the DOT revised its regulations in 1977.

Under the revised rules, tank cars for these gases had to be thermally protected and fitted with couplers that prevent vertical disengagement. Unless the insulation is held in a steel jacket, they also need steel head shields against punctures.[13] Existing cars had to be retrofitted by the end of 1980. In the few derailments of cars so equipped, a BLEVE either did not occur or was delayed by several hours.[13]

The handbook describes four of these safety features. Head shields cover the lower part or the whole of each head. Top and bottom shelf couplers have a vertical restraint that reduces the chance of couplers separating in an accident.[4] Thermal protection, which is different from insulation, is designed to keep the tank metal below 427 °C (800 °F) for 100 minutes in pool fire impingement or 30 minutes in torch fire impingement.[4] It is used mainly on cars for liquefied flammable gases and on some nonpressure cars, such as the DOT-111J100W4 car for ethylene oxide. Skid protection shields bottom outlets, washouts and sumps in a derailment.[4]

Test results show how much this protection gains. In fire tests on LP-gas railroad tank cars, a BLEVE occurred after 93 minutes in the insulated case and after 25 minutes without insulation.[14] In one real incident, an insulated LP-gas tank car did not fail until after 20½ hours of fire exposure, which Lemoff (2008) calls an extreme example.[14] Damage from impact alone can also lead to delayed failure. A 113.5 m³ (30,000 gal) LP-gas tank car weakened in a derailment failed more than 40 hours later, while its internal pressure was rising with the ambient temperature.[5]

BLEVE and fireball hazard

In a BLEVE, the tank fails into two or more pieces while the liquid inside is above its boiling point at atmospheric pressure.[15] Lemoff (2008) stresses that a BLEVE is what happens after the container fails, not how it fails. In failures caused by overheating, the tear typically starts in the metal over the vapour space, which the liquid does not cool.[5] Most liquefied gas BLEVEs occur when containers are from slightly less than one-half to about three-fourths full.[14] Pieces can be thrown up to about 0.8 km (½ mile), and deaths from such missiles have occurred up to 244 m (800 ft) from larger containers.[14] Fatal burns can occur up to 76 m (250 ft) away.[14]

Two US derailments described in the SFPE handbook show the fireball hazard. At Oneonta, New York, a derailment involved 27 cars, 7 of which contained 120 m³ (33,000 gal) of liquid propane. Seconds later a fireball rose from the pile of tank cars and heated other tanks, which then failed in several BLEVEs.[6] At Crescent City, Illinois, 10 of 15 derailed cars carried 130 m³ (34,000 gal) of LP-gas each. One car rode over the pile and tore a hole in another, and explosions continued for hours, destroying 24 living quarters and 18 businesses.[6] Beyler (2002a) puts the size of such fireballs at about 100 m in diameter and their duration at a few seconds.[6]

The radiation from a fireball can be estimated with the empirical method of NUREG-1805. For a target relatively distant from the fireball, the heat flux falls with the square of its distance from the centre of the fireball and rises with the mass of fuel.[15] The centre is taken at the fireball flame height, which depends on the volume of the fuel vapour.[16]

q˙′'r=828mF0.771R2 R=Zp2+L2,Zp=12.73VF1/3,VF=mFρF

Symbols in the fireball equations[15][16]
Symbol Description Unit
q˙′'r Thermal radiation from the fireball at the target kW/m²
mF Mass of fuel vapour kg
R Distance from the centre of the fireball to the target m
Zp Fireball flame height m
L Distance at ground level from the origin m
VF Volume of fuel vapour m³
ρF Fuel vapour density kg/m³

The method is a point-source model. NUREG-1805 notes that such models overestimate the radiation close to the fire. They can be used where a conservative estimate of the hazard is generally acceptable.[17]

As a worked example, take the 113.5 m³ (30,000 gal) LP-gas tank car mentioned above, half full of commercial propane.[5] Commercial propane has a liquid density of 504 kg/m³ and gives 0.534 m³ of vapour per kg at 15.5 °C. The propane mass is then 113.5 × 0.5 × 504 ≈ 28,600 kg, and the vapour density is 1/0.534 ≈ 1.87 kg/m³.[18] Taking all of the propane as fuel vapour, which is a conservative assumption, the vapour volume is about 15,300 m³ and the fireball flame height is 12.73 × 15,3001/3 ≈ 316 m.

For a target on the ground 76 m from the car, R = √(316² + 76²) ≈ 325 m and the heat flux is 828 × 28,6000.771 / 325² ≈ 21 kW/m². At 244 m the result is about 14 kW/m², and at 800 m about 3 kW/m². For a three-quarters full car, the flux at 76 m rises to about 23 kW/m².[15][16] Because the fireball centre lies high above the ground, the flux in this model changes little within the first hundred metres.

Emergency response

The fire hazards of tank cars are minimal unless a car is damaged in an accident.[19] If a fire occurs, the contents must be known before fire fighting starts. A car exposed to radiant heat, and especially to direct flame impingement, should be approached cautiously, because rising vapour pressure can operate the relief device or rupture the tank.[19] Lemoff (2008) describes protection of an uninsulated liquefied gas container by applying water so that a film of water coats the parts of the shell not wetted by liquid inside.[14] These data apply only to unreactive liquefied flammable gases; with reactive gases, internal heat of reaction can make external cooling ineffective.[14]

Identification relies on placards, identification numbers, stencilled names, reporting marks and the train consist, the shipping paper that lists the position and contents of every car.[2][4] The handbook notes that placards may not be visible because of the orientation of the cars, and that it may not be prudent to approach close enough to read them.[2] The shipping papers are held by the conductor, who in a hazardous materials emergency is likely to move with the crew at least half a mile (0.8 km) upwind, uphill or upstream.[2] Responders should not work on or near the track until flaggers have been placed at least 2.4 km (1½ miles) in each direction or the railroad confirms that trains have stopped.[20]

Describing the car accurately to tank car specialists who are not on the scene may be the most useful contribution a responder can make.[1] For damaged pressure tank cars, this includes the radius of curvature of dents and the depth of scores and gouges, which C. J. Wright (2008a) lists among the damage information to collect.[21] Carriers and the AAR Bureau of Explosives can send response teams, some with equipment to repair leaks and to transfer the contents of damaged tank cars.[22] LP-gas and other products also travel by road in cargo tank vehicles. Their tanks are basically ASME code tanks, whereas tanks for railcars are covered by specific DOT and Transport Canada specifications.[13][18]

See also

Notes

  1. ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 C. J. Wright (2008b), pp. 21-122–21-123.
  2. ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 C. J. Wright (2008b), pp. 21-111–21-112.
  3. ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 C. J. Wright (2008b), p. 21-124.
  4. ↑ 4.00 4.01 4.02 4.03 4.04 4.05 4.06 4.07 4.08 4.09 4.10 4.11 4.12 4.13 4.14 C. J. Wright (2008b), p. 21-125.
  5. ↑ 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 Lemoff (2008), pp. 6-171–6-172.
  6. ↑ 6.0 6.1 6.2 6.3 Beyler (2002a), pp. 3-302–3-303.
  7. ↑ 7.0 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.6 7.7 7.8 C. J. Wright (2008b), p. 21-123.
  8. ↑ 8.0 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.5 8.6 C. J. Wright (2008b), p. 21-126.
  9. ↑ C. J. Wright (2008b), p. 21-127.
  10. ↑ 10.0 10.1 10.2 C. J. Wright (2008b), pp. 21-128–21-129.
  11. ↑ 11.0 11.1 11.2 11.3 C. J. Wright (2008b), p. 21-129.
  12. ↑ 12.0 12.1 12.2 12.3 12.4 C. J. Wright (2008b), p. 21-130.
  13. ↑ 13.0 13.1 13.2 13.3 Lemoff and Rivkin (2008), p. 7-37.
  14. ↑ 14.0 14.1 14.2 14.3 14.4 14.5 14.6 Lemoff (2008), p. 6-172.
  15. ↑ 15.0 15.1 15.2 15.3 Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. 5-15.
  16. ↑ 16.0 16.1 16.2 Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. 5-16.
  17. ↑ Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. 5-17.
  18. ↑ 18.0 18.1 Lemoff (2008), p. 6-183.
  19. ↑ 19.0 19.1 C. J. Wright (2008b), p. 21-110.
  20. ↑ C. J. Wright (2008b), p. 21-114.
  21. ↑ C. J. Wright (2008a), p. 13-132.
  22. ↑ C. J. Wright (2008b), p. 21-113.

References

  • Beyler, C. L. (2002a). Fire hazard calculations for large, open hydrocarbon fires. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 3-268–3-314). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
  • Iqbal, N., & Salley, M. H. (2004). Fire Dynamics Tools (FDTs): Quantitative fire hazard analysis methods for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Fire Protection Inspection Program (NUREG-1805). U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
  • Lemoff, T. C. (2008). Gases. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 6-165–6-186). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Lemoff, T. C., & Rivkin, C. H. (2008). Storage of gases. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 7-35–7-42). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Wright, C. J. (2008a). Managing the response to hazardous material incidents. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 13-117–13-144). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Wright, C. J. (2008b). Rail transportation systems. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 21-109–21-134). National Fire Protection Association.