Contents
A transformer fire is a fire in or at an electrical transformer, caused by an oil leak or spill or by an electrical fault.[1] In an oil-filled transformer the main fuel is the combustible cooling and insulating oil.[2] A large transformer at an electric generating plant can hold 75,000 to 94,750 L of oil. An internal high-energy fault can rupture its tank, release the oil and possibly fragments, and ignite the oil.[3]
The burning oil forms a pool fire or a spray fire that threatens nearby transformers, buildings and cables. Protection combines spatial separation or fire walls, drainage and automatic water spray for exposure protection.[3] Some units use a less flammable insulating fluid or a dry-type design instead of mineral oil.[4] The guidance described here is mainly American: NFPA 850 and NFPA 15 as summarised in the 20th edition of the Fire Protection Handbook (2008), and US nuclear fire risk methods.[5]
Transformer types and combustible content
Electric generating plants use both indoor and outdoor transformers. The indoor units are usually relatively small, air insulated and used for individual plant service. The larger oil-cooled transformers, which step up the main generator voltage or supply station service, stand outdoors. They are grouped close to the generator to keep the isolated-phase bus duct to the main power transformer short. Each can contain 75,000 to 94,750 L (20,000 to 25,000 gal) of cooling oil.[3]
The transformers of industrial furnaces, for example, may be dry types, askarel-insulated, oil-insulated, or insulated with a less flammable fluid such as dimethyl silicone. Askarel is a material that contains polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs). New transformers are no longer made with askarel, but in 2008 many such units were still in use.[4] In the United States, PCBs served as a dielectric fluid in capacitors and transformers from the early 1930s until their regulation in 1976. Improper combustion of PCB-containing material can produce highly toxic and carcinogenic products.[6]
The amount of oil largely decides how severe a fire can become. NUREG/CR-6850 is the fire risk method of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Electric Power Research Institute. Its 2010 supplement excludes dry-type transformers of 45 kVA or less from the count of fire sources. Their combustible content, mainly the varnish on the windings, is expected to be too small for a significant fire to escape the housing. Every indoor oil-filled transformer is counted regardless of rating, because the oil alone is enough for a potentially challenging fire.[7]
Causes and development
Internal high-energy faults can be violent. They release a large amount of power and can rupture the casing, release the oil and possibly missiles, after which the oil ignites.[3] A breakdown of insulation inside a transformer can also impose dangerous voltages on other parts of the electrical system. Grounding gives the fault current a low-resistance path, so that a fuse or circuit breaker operates and removes the danger.[8]
Clearing such faults is one task of overcurrent protection, which also limits the effects of a fault inside equipment by reducing arcing and the ejection of hot metal. On high-voltage systems it relies on overcurrent and undervoltage relays.[9] Against lightning, most US utilities outside the Pacific Coast fit lightning arresters on the primaries of important transformers on systems of 44,000 V or less.[10]
The 1989 fire at the Shearon Harris nuclear power plant in the United States shows how one fault can lead to several fires. Aluminium debris, apparently carried into a bus duct by its cooling air, caused ground faults and arcing over about 15 m (50 ft) of bus. The fault reached the bushing box of main transformer B and cracked the low-voltage bushings, and the spilled oil ignited. Further arcing at the generator neutral burned holes in generator piping, and fires eventually broke out at three locations, involving the transformer and the main generator and including a hydrogen fire.[11]
US fire risk analysis for nuclear plants distinguishes two outcomes for the large yard transformers. A catastrophic failure is an energetic failure with a rupture of the tank, an oil spill and burning oil splattered some distance from the transformer. In a non-catastrophic failure the oil stays in the tank, and the fire does not necessarily spread beyond the transformer.[5] For high-energy arcing faults in large outdoor transformers, the method assumes damage to all equipment within 15 m (50 ft) that is not shielded by a structural wall.[12] Transformer fires have also spread to the generator, and generator fires to the transformer, so that two fires had to be fought at once.[3]
Burning behaviour and heat release
Released oil can burn as a pool on the ground or in a curbed area, and a ruptured tank can also spray oil over nearby surfaces.[13][14] Flames spread over a combustible liquid at roughly 10 cm/s to 2 m/s.[15] Lubricating oil burns in much the same way, so the NRC fire dynamics tools use the transformer oil data for both.[16] The simplest estimate multiplies the heat release rate per unit area of the burning liquid by the area of the pool. For a liquid pool it reads:[13]
For transformer oil the handbook gives 1790 kW/m² for an optically thick confined pool, such as oil in a curbed area, and 360 kW/m² for an unconfined spill. The lower value reflects heat losses from a thin liquid layer into the floor. Unconfined spills on concrete are about 2.8 mm deep or less, and pools deeper than this may be treated as confined.[13] The NRC tools list a similar 1,795 kW/m².[16] The confined value is about seven times the 250 kW/m² that Van Rossum gives for a developed fire in an ordinary building.[17]
A more detailed correlation, used in the SFPE Handbook and the NRC tools, also accounts for pool size. Small pools burn less intensely per square metre because their flames are not yet optically thick. For a pool that is not circular, an effective diameter is calculated from its area:[18][19]
For hydrocarbon transformer oil the density is 760 kg/m³ and the heat of combustion 46.4 MJ/kg. The large-pool burning rate is 0.039 kg/(m²·s) and the empirical constant kβ is 0.7 m⁻¹.[20] For a very large pool these values give about 1,810 kW/m², close to the handbook value. The burning time of a fixed quantity of oil is its total energy content divided by the heat release rate:[13]
Equivalently, the pool depth falls at the burning rate per unit area divided by the liquid density.[21] For transformer oil this is about 3.1 mm per minute, whatever the pool area. Outdoors, nearby equipment is threatened by flame radiation and the fire plume.[1] The simplest estimate treats the flame as a point at the centre of the fire that radiates a fraction χr of the heat release rate equally in all directions:[22]
The radiative fraction ranges from about 0.15 for low-sooting fuels such as alcohol to 0.60 for high-sooting hydrocarbons. Cold soot around large flames can reduce it considerably.[22] The NRC tools use 0.30 in their transformer oil example.[23]
| Symbol | Description | Unit |
|---|---|---|
| heat release rate of the pool fire | kW | |
| heat release rate per unit area of the burning liquid | kW/m² | |
| surface area of the burning pool | m² | |
| effective pool diameter | m | |
| , | heat of combustion of the liquid | kJ/kg |
| burning rate per unit area of a large pool | kg/(m²·s) | |
| empirical constant of the pool fire correlation | m⁻¹ | |
| mass of liquid available for burning | kg | |
| fire duration | s | |
| radiant heat flux received by the target | kW/m² | |
| fraction of the heat release rate emitted as radiation | – | |
| distance from the centre of the flame to the target | m |
The burning rate data apply to roughly circular pools that burn in the open without external heating.[18][20] Less flammable fluids change the numbers sharply. The NRC tools list a silicone transformer fluid with a burning rate of 0.005 kg/(m²·s) and a heat of combustion of 28,100 kJ/kg.[24] A large pool of this fluid would release about 140 kW/m², roughly one thirteenth of the mineral oil value. In one test, a silicone transformer fluid burning in a 2.44 m pool produced a flame only 0.14 times as high as the pool diameter.[25]
Power plants apply the same idea to turbine controls. Units built after the early 1970s use a separate electrohydraulic control system with a less flammable synthetic fluid such as phosphate ester, a type of fire-resistant hydraulic fluid.[26] This has nearly eliminated the spray fire hazard of control oil at pressures up to 11,032 kPa (1600 psi).[27]
Separation, containment and fire barriers
NFPA 850 is the US recommended practice for fire protection of electric generating plants.[28] As summarised in the 2008 handbook, it covers transformers holding 1,895 to 18,950 L (500 to 5000 gal) of oil. These should be separated from other transformers and from buildings by a fire wall or by at least 7.6 m (25 ft). It also gives criteria for the fire resistance and height of such walls. Best practice adds lightning protection, a drainage system, fire barriers and automatic water spray designed to NFPA 15.[3]
Containment keeps the burning oil where the protection works. Around groups of oil-filled transformers protected by water spray, a thick layer of crushed stone with subsurface drainage is laid at the base. It prevents burning oil from flowing beyond the ground area that the spray covers.[29] The form of the spill matters as well. A deep, curbed pool burns about five times more intensely per square metre than a thin spill, while an unconfined spill covers a larger area.[30]
A different approach was being considered for acceptance testing in 2008. The system relieves the pressure build-up of a transformer fault and leads the escaping oil to a holding tank. The transformer shell is protected against overpressure and the oil does not meet oxygen, so there is no spill or fire to extinguish. Nitrogen bubbled up through the core helps cooling.[31]
Indoor oil-insulated transformers are normally enclosed. In its discussion of industrial furnaces, the handbook notes that the US National Electrical Code (NEC) requires oil-insulated transformers above 75 kVA to be located in a fire-resistant vault. Smaller furnace transformers may stand in a room of fire-resistant construction, if an oil fire cannot spread to other combustibles. Circuit breakers above 600 V that control oil-filled transformers must be outside the vaults.[4]
Worked example
The handbook describes a transformer that leaks 50 kg of oil into a curbed area of 5 m², where it forms a deep pool.[13] With 1790 kW/m², the heat release rate is 1790 × 5 = 8950 kW, about 9.0 MW. That is close to the 8.5 MW peak of a burning car.[17] With the heat of combustion of 40,000 kJ/kg used in the handbook, the oil burns for 50 × 40,000 / 8950 ≈ 223 s. On an unconfined concrete floor, the same 5 m² would release only 1800 kW and burn for about 1110 s.[30] The diameter-dependent correlation gives an effective diameter of 2.52 m and about 7.5 MW, so the handbook value is on the safe side.
The radiation can be checked at the 7.6 m separation distance of NFPA 850. With the target 7.6 m from the pool edge, the distance from the flame centre is R = 7.6 + 2.52/2 = 8.86 m. With χr = 0.30 the flux is 0.30 × 8950 / (4π × 8.86²), or about 2.8 kW/m² after rounding up. With the upper value of 0.60 it doubles to about 5.5 kW/m². Both lie below 6 kW/m², the NUREG/CR-6850 screening damage criterion for thermoplastic cables; thermoset cables have 11 kW/m².[32] The 6 kW/m² level is reached about 4.8 m from the pool edge with χr = 0.30, and about 7.2 m from it with 0.60.
The result depends strongly on the radiative fraction, which the sources give only as a range. The point source model overestimates radiation close to a fire. It is within about 5 % of the correct flux when the distance exceeds 2.5 pool diameters.[33] Here the ratio is 7.6/2.52 ≈ 3.0, just inside that range. A catastrophic failure that throws burning oil beyond the curb is not covered by such a calculation.
Fixed suppression and fire fighting
A fixed water spray system is a pipe network with spray nozzles. It is connected to a reliable water supply through a deluge valve that opens automatically on a detection signal or by hand.[34] On transformers its purpose is exposure protection. Its benefit in a catastrophic failure has been debated, and some contend that the violence of such a failure makes water spray useless. In many cases, however, the systems survived explosions and were credited with controlling the fire and limiting damage and downtime.[31]
Because transformer oil has a relatively high flash point and boiling point, a properly designed water spray system can extinguish it quickly. The metal case and its supports must still be protected from radiant heat while the oil burns. Nozzles and piping must keep prescribed distances from live parts, and direct spray onto energised terminals or bushings should be avoided. Electricity to the transformer should be shut off automatically before the water is applied.[29] For exposure protection of equipment such as cable trays and transformers, the handbook gives 4.1 to 12.2 L/(min·m²) (0.1 to 0.3 gpm/ft²) of exposed surface.[29] At mineral processing sites, automatic sprinklers are commonly installed over important, high-value transformers that use combustible insulating oil.[35]
NFPA 15 tabulates minimum clearances between water spray equipment and live, uninsulated parts. In the 2007 edition reproduced in the handbook, the clearance is 178 mm (7 in.) up to 13.8 kV. It rises to 1270 mm (50 in.) at 138 kV and 4242 mm (167 in.) at 765 kV.[36] For manual fire fighting, rules adopted by the Edison Electric Institute in 1967 keep leakage currents below 1 mA. They set minimum approach distances of 3 m (10 ft) for handheld spray nozzles and 6 m (20 ft) for 38 mm (1½ in.) straight streams.[36]
Other agents are used as well. An oil-filled transformer contains mostly Class B (flammable liquid) material, whereas a power panel contains more Class A insulating material.[37] Dry chemical is electrically non-conductive and can be used on oil-filled transformers.[38] Gaseous agents are used for electrical transformers and transformer vaults.[39] A water mist system is a further option: outdoor transformers have been the subject of ad hoc water mist fire tests. NFPA 750 requires every water mist design to be linked to formal fire tests.[40]
At Shearon Harris in 1989, the deluge system on the main transformer operated as designed. About an hour after the start, the fire was believed to be under control. A small residual oil fire was put out with a portable dry chemical extinguisher, and the fires lasted about 1 hour and 45 minutes in total.[11] At North Anna in 1981, described below, the deluge systems were overwhelmed.
Statistics, incidents and risk analysis
In the United States in 1994–1998, transformers were involved in an average of 750 of the 81,670 yearly structure fires caused by electrical failure, under 1 %. A second table, based on an NFPA report on home products, attributes about 2 % of fires starting in electrical distribution equipment to transformers: 1,100 of 49,700 per year. Both cover fires reported to municipal fire departments only.[41] In US industrial and manufacturing properties in 1999–2002, about 200 structure fires per year started in a switchgear area or transformer vault. They caused 1 civilian death, 13 injuries and $18 million in direct damage per year.[42]
For US nuclear power plants, NUREG/CR-6850 gives generic fire frequencies per reactor-year. A catastrophic yard transformer fire has a frequency of 6.0 × 10⁻³, one fire in about 167 reactor-years. A non-catastrophic one has 1.2 × 10⁻², and indoor transformers together 9.9 × 10⁻³.[43] For catastrophic fires the method assumes damage to equipment near the transformer, with a severity factor of 1.0. Historical non-catastrophic yard fires mainly caused a plant trip without damage to safety-related equipment.[44] The fire risk evaluation that NFPA 850 recommends for power station fire protection is meant to identify such hazards whenever a plant is designed or changed.[28]
On 3 July 1981, North Anna Unit 2 in the United States was at 17.9 % power when an internal fault in main transformer B led to a catastrophic failure. The side of the transformer ruptured, and oil sprayed over the transformer and the outside wall of the turbine building. The deluge systems on two transformers operated, but the fire was too severe for them. The fire brigades needed about an hour to bring it under control, and only non-safety components were affected. The event showed that a fixed system can be overwhelmed by a fire in the very equipment it protects.[14]
Fire risk analysis also estimates the probability that manual fire fighting has not yet suppressed a fire after a given time. The estimate rests on reported suppression times of fire events in US nuclear plants since 1981.[45] NUREG/CR-6850 models the suppression time with an exponential distribution and a constant suppression rate λ:[46] Here is the probability that the fire still burns at time (min), and is the suppression rate (per min). For outdoor transformers, 14 events with a total duration of 373 minutes gave a mean λ of 0.04 per minute.[47] A 2010 reanalysis of the same 14 events revised the total to 390 minutes and λ to 0.036 per minute.[48] With this value, the probability that an outdoor transformer fire still burns after 30 minutes is e−0.036 × 30 ≈ 0.34. This matches the tabulated 0.341; after 60 minutes the value is 0.116.[49] The mean time to suppression, 1/λ, is about 28 minutes.
Limits and uncertainty
Data on real transformer fires are scarce. NUREG/CR-6850 notes that no experimental heat release rates exist for outdoor transformers, so its standard severity method may not apply to them.[44] The pool fire values in the handbook are for optically thick pools, typically above about 0.2 to 1.0 m in diameter. Maximising the heat release rate is usually conservative, but not when the question is whether a detector or sprinkler will operate.[13] The point source model is intended for cases where a conservative estimate of the hazard is acceptable.[33]
Whether water spray survives a violent failure remains uncertain, as the North Anna and Shearon Harris events show.[31] The guidance summarised here reflects US practice up to 2008: the editions of NFPA 850, NFPA 15 and the NEC described in the handbook, US fire statistics from 1994–2002 and US nuclear plant experience. Other countries and later editions of these documents may set different requirements.
See also
- Cable fire
- Nuclear facility fire protection
- Battery energy storage system
- Data centre fire protection
Notes
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 Najafi et al. (2007), p. 2-13.
- ↑ L. J. Moore (2008), p. 9-215.
- ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 Sheridan (2008), p. 9-187.
- ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 Milatovich (2008), pp. 8-158–8-159.
- ↑ 5.0 5.1 Nowlen et al. (2005b), pp. 6-18–6-19.
- ↑ Severson (2008), p. 7-66.
- ↑ Hyslop et al. (2010), pp. 6-3–6-4.
- ↑ Milatovich (2008), p. 8-142.
- ↑ Milatovich (2008), p. 8-145.
- ↑ Caloggero (2008), p. 11-80.
- ↑ 11.0 11.1 Iqbal and Salley (2004), pp. H-18–H-19.
- ↑ Nowlen et al. (2005b), p. M-2.
- ↑ 13.0 13.1 13.2 13.3 13.4 13.5 Budnick et al. (2008), p. 3-149.
- ↑ 14.0 14.1 Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. H-11.
- ↑ Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. 3-6.
- ↑ 16.0 16.1 Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. 2-21.
- ↑ 17.0 17.1 Van Rossum (2027), §4.5.
- ↑ 18.0 18.1 Babrauskas (2002b), p. 3-25.
- ↑ Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. 5-4.
- ↑ 20.0 20.1 Babrauskas (2002b), p. 3-26.
- ↑ Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. 3-8.
- ↑ 22.0 22.1 Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. 5-3.
- ↑ Iqbal and Salley (2004), pp. 5-21–5-23.
- ↑ Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. 3-4.
- ↑ Heskestad (2002), p. 2-7.
- ↑ Schacht (2008), pp. 8-114–8-115.
- ↑ Sheridan (2008), p. 9-185.
- ↑ 28.0 28.1 Sheridan (2008), p. 9-180.
- ↑ 29.0 29.1 29.2 Bell (2008), p. 16-183.
- ↑ 30.0 30.1 Budnick et al. (2008), pp. 3-149–3-150.
- ↑ 31.0 31.1 31.2 Sheridan (2008), p. 9-188.
- ↑ Nowlen et al. (2005b), p. H-1.
- ↑ 33.0 33.1 Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. 5-17.
- ↑ Bell (2008), p. 16-182.
- ↑ L. J. Moore (2008), p. 9-219.
- ↑ 36.0 36.1 Frank (2008), p. 17-40.
- ↑ Conroy (2008), p. 17-72.
- ↑ Lake (2008), p. 17-20.
- ↑ Harrington (2008), p. 17-124.
- ↑ Mawhinney (2008), p. 16-154.
- ↑ Milatovich (2008), p. 8-136.
- ↑ Demers (2008a), p. 20-207.
- ↑ Nowlen et al. (2005b), pp. 6-4–6-5.
- ↑ 44.0 44.1 Nowlen et al. (2005b), p. E-12.
- ↑ Nowlen et al. (2005b), p. P-7.
- ↑ Nowlen et al. (2005b), p. P-8.
- ↑ Nowlen et al. (2005b), p. P-9.
- ↑ Hyslop et al. (2010), p. 14-11.
- ↑ Hyslop et al. (2010), p. 14-10.
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