Skip to content
Upcoming courses

Firefighting lift

Tools
From Fire Safety Academy Wiki
Revision as of 23:28, 1 November 2026 by Daan (talk | contribs) (New FSE wiki article: Firefighting lift (written by Claude Opus 5.5))
(diff) ← Older revision | Latest revision (diff) | Newer revision → (diff)
Contents
  1. 1Why tall buildings need a firefighting lift
  2. 2How a firefighting lift works
  3. 3Access time without a lift
  4. 4Operating procedures
  5. 5Lessons from the World Trade Center
  6. 6Regulation and design practice
  7. 7Limitations and common misconceptions
  8. 8See also
  9. 9Notes
  10. 10References

A firefighting lift is a lift in a protected shaft that the fire service can control during a fire, to carry firefighters and equipment to the upper floors of a building. American reports speak of firefighter elevators or fire-protected elevators for emergency responders.[1][2][3] Fire service personnel use a special key to operate such a lift for rescue and for moving personnel and equipment to fight the fire.[4]

The lift matters most in tall buildings. Without a working lift, firefighters with their gear climbed the stairs of the World Trade Center at about 1.4 to 2.0 minutes per floor. They had to rest after the first 10 to 12 floors.[5][6] At such rates a fire 60 floors up can take an hour or more to reach, while a fully furnished floor may burn out in about an hour.[7] The United Kingdom and several countries that use British standards have required firefighter lifts in protected shafts for many years. After the World Trade Center disaster of 2001, the United States investigation recommended fire-protected and structurally hardened lifts for the exclusive use of emergency responders in tall buildings.[1][3]

Why tall buildings need a firefighting lift

Firefighting in tall buildings differs from firefighting in buildings below about 30 m (100 ft). A former New York fire chief defined a high-rise building as one that lacks viable exterior access to the upper floors and lies beyond the reach of the standard aerial ladder. Firefighters then have to attack the fire from inside and rely almost completely on the systems of the building.[8] Building height becomes an immediate problem when safe and working lifts are not available, because access for emergency responders becomes more limited as height increases.[9]

The main problem is time and fatigue. Climbing stairs in protective clothing while carrying equipment has a significant physiological effect on firefighters. Fatigue sets in after about 12 floors and reduces what the crew can do once it reaches the fire floor.[7] In the North Tower of the World Trade Center, firefighters climbed the first 10 to 12 storeys in 2 to 5 minutes and then had to stop. After a rest of several minutes they usually managed only 5 to 6 more floors, and some only 3 to 4, before the next rest.[5] The NIST investigation concluded that climbing 20 or more storeys makes effective and timely firefighting and rescue difficult without working lifts.[10]

A second problem is counterflow. When a building is being evacuated, firefighters climbing the stairs move against the stream of occupants coming down. The investigation found that the presence and movement of evacuees hampered the climbing rate of firefighters.[11] Lifts used by first responders would reduce such counterflow problems in the stairs.[1] Even where protected lifts are provided, NIST recommended enough stair capacity for responders to enter while occupants leave.[12]

The fire itself does not wait for the crews. A fuel load of about 48.8 kg/m² with normal finishes and furnishings takes about one hour to burn out, depending on ventilation. In that time the fire may also spread to other floors and other parts of the building.[7] A firefighting lift therefore supports fire service access to the upper floors. NIST recommended such lifts precisely to give responders timely access in tall buildings.[3]

How a firefighting lift works

Ordinary passenger lifts are not meant for use in a fire. The American lift code ASME A17.1 requires signs at all passenger lifts stating that they may not be used during a fire.[13] Fire detectors in every lift lobby and machine room initiate a recall. The cars return to the ground floor, where the doors open and the lift is taken out of service.[13] A more recent option is recall to an alternative floor when the fire is on the ground floor itself.[4]

After recall, the fire service can take over. Fire service personnel use a special key to operate any individual car in a manual mode, as long as they judge it safe to do so.[13] In the American codes this manual use is called Phase II emergency operation. It covers both fire service access and the rescue of people with disabilities.[13] The fire service keys allow two tasks: operating lifts for rescue, and transporting personnel and equipment to fight the fire.[4] In the World Trade Center towers, all lifts had been upgraded for firefighter emergency operation under ASME A17.1 and a New York City law of 1973.[14]

A firefighting lift adds protection to this basic control function, because it runs in a protected shaft.[1] The American codes require at least one lift serving every floor to be connected to emergency power.[13] Accessible lifts that the fire service may use to evacuate people with disabilities must also operate in a smoke-protected hoistway. They must be reachable from an area of refuge or a horizontal exit, unless the building is fully sprinklered.[13] In New Zealand, C/VM2 (second edition, 2025) defines a protected shaft as a space enclosed by fire separations or external walls that houses services, lifts or conveyors passing from one firecell to another.[15]

Smoke protection of the shaft is a design task of its own. A lift shaft runs through every floor and can carry smoke far from the fire. In the MGM Grand Hotel fire the fire started on the ground floor, but smoke reached the upper floors, where most victims died. The lift shafts had no special smoke protection and were one of the main smoke paths.[16]

One method is lift shaft pressurisation: outdoor air is supplied to the shaft so that the pressure in it stays above that of the floors.[17] The analysis is the same as for stair pressurisation, with the stair replaced by the lift shaft.[4] A moving car pushes and pulls air, the so-called piston effect, which can draw smoke into a pressurised shaft or lobby. In a worked example the critical pressure difference for a car moving at 2.54 m/s was 6.9 Pa, so a shaft pressurised to 12.4 Pa kept the smoke out.[16][4]

The machinery needs protection as well. A fire that affects the lift machinery can carry passengers or firefighters to the fire floor or trap them between floors. Smoke detectors in lift lobbies and machine rooms therefore recall the lifts to a safe level. Heat detectors can switch off the equipment before sprinkler water reaches energised controllers, motors and brakes.[18]

Access time without a lift

The value of a firefighting lift is easiest to see by estimating the time needed to climb the stairs without one. If a crew climbs at a roughly constant rate, the time to reach a floor is the number of floors to be climbed multiplied by the time per floor. The NIST investigation of the World Trade Center gives the time per floor:[6]

t=N⋅tf

Symbol Description Unit
t time to climb to the target floor by stairs min
N number of floors to be climbed none
tf average climbing time per floor, including rests min

NIST estimated climbing times of about 1.4 minutes per floor for personnel without extra equipment. Firefighters in protective clothing who carried extra equipment needed about 2.0 minutes per floor. Both estimates have an error of about ±0.5 minutes per floor and were derived for climbs to floors in the 30s and 40s of the North Tower.[6] The relation is therefore a rough estimate for fire floors about 30 or more storeys up. A rate of about one floor per minute is often quoted, but it is difficult to keep up beyond the first 20 storeys.[7][1]

As a worked example, consider a fire service crew in full gear that must reach a staging floor 60 floors above the entrance level. With N=60 and tf=2.0 min, the climb takes 60 × 2.0 = 120 minutes, or two hours. With the error of ±0.5 minutes per floor, the time lies between 90 and 150 minutes. A police officer without extra equipment, at 1.4 minutes per floor, would need about 84 minutes.[6]

The NIST final report gives between one and a half and two hours to reach the 60th floor, depending on the gear and equipment carried.[3] On 11 September 2001 the lowest impact floors were the 93rd in the North Tower and the 77th in the South Tower. NIST judged that firefighters would need two hours or more to reach them on foot.[19]

The time from the equation is only the climb. Firefighters also needed about three to five minutes after arrival to reach the lobby command post and receive an assignment.[6] After the climb, water supply has to be prepared and hoselines stretched before an attack can begin.[7] In a tall building that water comes from standpipe systems: vertical pipe risers with fire hose connections on each floor, comparable to dry and wet risers.[20]

Operating procedures

Many fire services do not fully trust lifts for critical tasks in tall buildings. Lift components are vulnerable to fire, smoke, water and earthquakes, and responders will not use systems with small safety margins when lives are at stake.[21] The Fire Department of New York (FDNY) therefore laid down rules for lift use in a training bulletin of 15 March 1997.[22] The bulletin first requires crews to account for all lifts serving the fire floor and to check them for victims.[22]

The FDNY rules aim to keep the car well away from the fire. When the fire is confirmed on the 7th floor or below, crews avoid the lifts and use the stairs. Crews should not use a lift bank that serves the fire floor if a lower bank reaches within five floors of it. If a bank serving the fire floor must be used, a car with the fire service feature is preferred, because it gives the fire service exclusive control.[22] The crew then selects a floor at least two floors below the fire floor and continues on foot.[22]

Further rules limit the consequences of a failure. Each car must carry a member with a portable radio and forcible entry tools, and no more than six members may ride in one car to prevent overloading. The car is stopped every five floors to confirm that it still responds to the selected floor.[22] A service lift may only be used after the officer in command has declared it safe.[22] NIST added that the use of lifts by emergency responders requires further operating procedures and protocols, including the release of lift door restrictors by response personnel.[10]

Lessons from the World Trade Center

The World Trade Center towers show what happens when lifts are not protected for fire service use. Each tower had 99 passenger lifts and 7 freight lifts, arranged in three zones with sky lobbies on the 44th and 78th floors.[14] The lifts had fire service recall, but they could not be used for fire service access because they were not fire-protected and did not run in protected shafts.[1] Most were damaged by the aircraft impacts.[1]

After the impacts, building staff found no working lifts in either tower, and the fire department did not direct anyone to use lifts in the North Tower.[23] FDNY personnel found one working lift in each tower. In the North Tower an elevator starter took a small group of firefighters to the 16th floor, but this lift was never reported to the command post.[23] The large utility car that served all floors of the North Tower, normally the fire service's means of reaching the upper floors, fell down its shaft. Its loss seriously hindered FDNY operations.[23][24]

In the South Tower a firefighter found one lift running from the lobby to the 40th floor. It was used to shuttle personnel and equipment to the 40th floor and to bring injured occupants down. With its help some firefighters reached the 78th floor.[25] The firefighter operating it became trapped in the shaft shortly before the tower collapsed.[24] Before the second aircraft struck, lifts had also helped occupants of the South Tower to leave quickly. Together with early self-evacuation, this is estimated to have saved roughly 3,000 lives.[26]

The 1993 bombing of the same towers had already shown the problem. The lifts were not working, and it took firefighters more than two hours to climb to the 100th floor. It took about five hours to locate and free a group of kindergarten children and adults trapped in a lift.[27] Smoke from the basement also travelled upwards mainly through the lift shafts and stairs.[28]

Regulation and design practice

Requirements for firefighting lifts differ between countries, and the folder of sources covers them only partly. According to the NIST investigation of 2005, the United Kingdom and several countries that use British standards had required firefighter lifts in protected shafts for years. United States codes did not require fire-protected lifts for routine responder access, although research on specially protected lifts had been carried out in the late 1970s.[1] NFPA 101, the American Life Safety Code, permitted lifts with fire fighter service from areas of refuge in its 1991 edition. The 1997 edition permitted a fire fighter service lift with special features as a second means of egress from towers.[29]

The NIST final report of 2005 made two related recommendations for the United States. Recommendation 20 asked for an evaluation of protected or hardened lifts as an evacuation technology. Recommendation 21 asked for fire-protected and structurally hardened lifts for emergency responders in tall buildings. These lifts would give responders timely access and allow mobility-impaired occupants to be evacuated.[3] Such lifts should be reserved for emergency responders during emergencies. Sufficient stair capacity should still be provided in case a protected lift becomes unusable.[3][12]

In Australia, the ABCB Handbook for the Fire Safety Verification Method (2020, written for NCC 2019) states that there are no deemed-to-satisfy provisions for the use of lifts during a fire emergency. A performance requirement for lifts used in evacuation is included in the National Construction Code.[30] For tall or innovative buildings, the handbook lists dedicated lifts for firefighters among the enhancements a design team may propose.[31] The accompanying data sheets give a typical reliability of 70% for a lift shaft pressurisation system, with a range of 60% to 75%.[32]

A firefighting lift is related to, but not the same as, an evacuation lift. A firefighting lift is operated by the fire service for access and rescue. An evacuation lift is intended to help occupants leave the building in addition to the required exits.[13][33] Evacuation software increasingly offers lifts as an escape option.[34]

Limitations and common misconceptions

A common misconception is that any lift with a fire service key switch is a firefighting lift. The World Trade Center lifts all had firefighter emergency operation, yet by code they could not be used for fire service access, because they were neither fire-protected nor in protected shafts.[14][1] The key switch only gives control. The protected shaft, the emergency power supply and the smoke protection are what set a firefighting lift apart.[13][4]

A firefighting lift does not remove the need for stairs. NIST noted that protected lifts may become unusable through a malfunction or a threat larger than the one considered in design. Stair capacity should then still allow responders to enter while occupants leave.[12] The investigation also found that criteria for structurally hardened lifts had not yet been developed.[12] The climbing rates in the equation above come from a single event, with uncertain start and end times, and should be read as rough estimates.[6]

The protection of the shaft is also not absolute. In the Australian data sheets, the typical reliability of a lift shaft pressurisation system is 70%, so about three systems in ten are assumed not to perform as intended.[32] The FDNY bulletin addressed the vulnerability of lift components with rules such as stopping at least two floors below the fire and checking the car every five floors.[21]

See also

Notes

  1. ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 Lew et al. (2005), p. 191.
  2. ↑ Lew et al. (2005), p. 187.
  3. ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 National Institute of Standards and Technology (2005), p. 218.
  4. ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 Klote (2002), p. 4-289.
  5. ↑ 5.0 5.1 Lawson and Vettori (2005), p. 89.
  6. ↑ 6.0 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 Lawson and Vettori (2005), p. 91.
  7. ↑ 7.0 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 Lawson and Vettori (2005), p. 73.
  8. ↑ Lawson and Vettori (2005), pp. 72–73.
  9. ↑ Lawson and Vettori (2005), p. 40.
  10. ↑ 10.0 10.1 National Institute of Standards and Technology (2005), p. 219.
  11. ↑ National Institute of Standards and Technology (2005), p. 199.
  12. ↑ 12.0 12.1 12.2 12.3 National Institute of Standards and Technology (2005), p. 216.
  13. ↑ 13.0 13.1 13.2 13.3 13.4 13.5 13.6 13.7 Lew et al. (2005), p. 161.
  14. ↑ 14.0 14.1 14.2 Lew et al. (2005), p. 169.
  15. ↑ Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2025b), p. 68.
  16. ↑ 16.0 16.1 Klote (2002), p. 4-288.
  17. ↑ Australian Building Codes Board (2020a), p. 127.
  18. ↑ Schifiliti et al. (2002), p. 4-21.
  19. ↑ Lawson and Vettori (2005), p. 41.
  20. ↑ Evans et al. (2005), p. 11.
  21. ↑ 21.0 21.1 Lawson and Vettori (2005), pp. 77–78.
  22. ↑ 22.0 22.1 22.2 22.3 22.4 22.5 Lawson and Vettori (2005), p. 78.
  23. ↑ 23.0 23.1 23.2 Lawson and Vettori (2005), p. 79.
  24. ↑ 24.0 24.1 Lawson and Vettori (2005), p. 80.
  25. ↑ Lawson and Vettori (2005), p. 31.
  26. ↑ Averill et al. (2005), p. 152.
  27. ↑ Averill et al. (2005), p. 6.
  28. ↑ Lawson and Vettori (2005), p. 42.
  29. ↑ Bryan (2002), p. 3-339.
  30. ↑ Australian Building Codes Board (2020b), p. 58.
  31. ↑ Australian Building Codes Board (2020b), p. 49.
  32. ↑ 32.0 32.1 Australian Building Codes Board (2020a), p. 134.
  33. ↑ Australian Building Codes Board (2020b), p. 106.
  34. ↑ Van Rossum (2027), §8.3.

References

  • Australian Building Codes Board. (2020a). Data sheets: Fire Safety Verification Method (Handbook annex, Print version 1.1).
  • Australian Building Codes Board. (2020b). Handbook: Fire Safety Verification Method (Print version 1.1).
  • Averill, J. D., Mileti, D. S., Peacock, R. D., Kuligowski, E. D., Groner, N., Proulx, G., Reneke, P. A., & Nelson, H. E. (2005). Occupant behavior, egress, and emergency communications (NIST NCSTAR 1-7). National Institute of Standards and Technology.
  • Bryan, J. L. (2002). Behavioral response to fire and smoke. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 3-315–3-341). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
  • Evans, D. D., Peacock, R. D., Kuligowski, E. D., Dols, W. S., & Grosshandler, W. L. (2005). Active fire protection systems (NIST NCSTAR 1-4). National Institute of Standards and Technology.
  • Klote, J. H. (2002). Smoke control. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 4-274–4-291). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
  • Lawson, J. R., & Vettori, R. L. (2005). The emergency response operations (NIST NCSTAR 1-8). National Institute of Standards and Technology.
  • Lew, H. S., Bukowski, R. W., & Carino, N. J. (2005). Design, construction, and maintenance of structural and life safety systems (NIST NCSTAR 1-1). National Institute of Standards and Technology.
  • Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment. (2025b). Verification Method C/VM2: Framework for fire safety design (2nd ed.).
  • National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2005). Final report on the collapse of the World Trade Center towers (NIST NCSTAR 1).
  • Schifiliti, R. P., Meacham, B. J., & Custer, R. L. P. (2002). Design of detection systems. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 4-1–4-43). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
  • Van Rossum, E. (2027). Introduction to Fire Safety Engineering. Fire Safety Academy.
Retrieved from "https://fire-safety.academy/w/index.php?title=Firefighting_lift&oldid=210"