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Contents
  1. 1Definition and scope
  2. 2Regulation in the United States
  3. 3Requirements and team
  4. 4Methods
  5. 5Relative ranking: the Dow Fire and Explosion Index
  6. 6Place in risk assessment
  7. 7Limitations
  8. 8See also
  9. 9Notes
  10. 10References

A process hazard analysis (PHA) is a systematic, team-based examination of an industrial process to identify, evaluate and control the hazards that could lead to fires, explosions or releases of hazardous materials.[1][2][3] According to Barry (2002), the term is the synonym for hazard evaluation in wide use, as it is the term used in the US process safety management rule, 29 CFR 1910.119.[4] That rule of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) was issued in 1992 for facilities that handle highly hazardous chemicals above threshold quantities.[5]

A PHA uses one or more established techniques, from checklists and "what if" analysis to hazard and operability studies (HAZOP) and failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA).[4] Under the OSHA rule, a team with engineering and operations expertise performs the analysis, documents its findings and reviews it at least every five years.[4] The results lead to recommended changes or further reviews, and such a hazard evaluation is the hazard identification step of a quantitative risk assessment.[1][6] The 2008 NFPA Fire Protection Handbook recommends a PHA in fields as different as woodworking and explosion protection.[7][8]

Definition and scope

Snyder (2008) describes the task of the hazard evaluation team as studying the process operation thoroughly and identifying all the potential fire and explosion hazards. The team then recommends changes or further reviews to eliminate or control the hazards it has identified.[1] The work can be done by trained plant personnel, working with outside specialists when required.[1] Hildebrand and Noll (2008) summarise the OSHA requirement as an initial process analysis, appropriate for the complexity of the process, that must identify, evaluate and control the hazards involved.[2]

Cholin (2008d) gives the same idea a stepwise form for woodworking and wood-processing facilities. The entire process and facility are analysed stage by stage, and the hazards of each stage are identified and documented. The metrics needed to manage each hazard are then identified and quantified, and a method is chosen to manage the fire or explosion hazard down to an acceptable level.[7] He notes that this stepwise analytical process is generally referred to as a process hazards analysis, and that the facility operator should perform one to find the areas with a demonstrable fire or explosion hazard.[7]

The scope of a "process" is broad. In the OSHA definition it includes the storage, handling, processing and transportation of hazardous chemicals and of flammable and explosive materials.[4] A fire hazard analysis, as described by Hurley and Bukowski (2008), determines the expected outcome of a specific set of conditions called a fire scenario.[9] The OSHA analysis must address the process hazards, the engineering and administrative controls, and the consequences of failure of those controls.[4] The abbreviation needs care: in Barry's comparison of techniques, "PHA" stands for preliminary hazard analysis, a broad screening method, not for the process hazard analysis as a whole.[4]

Regulation in the United States

The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 addressed emergency response and planning at facilities with processes using highly hazardous chemicals. The amendments included the establishment of a national Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, the EPA rule on risk management programs (40 CFR Part 68) and the OSHA rule on process safety management.[10] Issued in 1992, the OSHA rule applies mainly to hazardous materials manufacturing facilities such as refineries and chemical plants. It also covers sectors such as natural gas liquids, farm product warehousing, and electric, gas and sanitary services.[5] It applies to companies dealing with any of more than 130 toxic and reactive chemicals in listed quantities, and to flammable liquids and gases in quantities above 10,000 lb (4,540 kg).[2]

Snyder (2008) notes that the rule focuses on performance-based management programs rather than specific engineering guidelines for preventing toxic releases, fires and explosions. Many of its requirements reflected practices used by leading manufacturing companies for many years.[3] Its program segments include employee participation, process safety information, process hazard analysis, operating procedures, training, contractors, pre-start-up safety reviews and mechanical integrity.[3] They also include hot work permits, management of change, incident investigations, emergency planning and response, and compliance audits.[3]

The other elements connect closely to the PHA. Mechanical integrity covers pressure vessels and storage tanks, piping, relief and vent systems and devices, emergency shutdown systems, controls, alarms and pumps.[2] Snyder includes in such a program the scheduled testing of critical protective devices, such as pressure-relief valves, detection and alarm interlocks and fire protection systems.[1] A pre-start-up safety review of a new or modified facility should confirm that the recommendations of insurance reviews and of any process hazard analysis have been adequately resolved.[1] A compliance audit with mandatory reviews every three years verifies that the procedures are adequate and followed.[2]

Flowchart: process safety information feeds the process hazard analysis, whose recommendations feed procedures, pre-start-up review and mechanical integrity
The process hazard analysis among other elements of the US process safety management rule (29 CFR 1910.119), as described up to 2008.

The EPA risk management program rule, promulgated in the mid-1990s, focuses on the exposure of the public to toxic releases, fires and explosions. It adopts the OSHA process safety management rule as its prevention program.[3] As described by Rivkin (2008b) for LNG and LP-gas fuelling stations, the prevention program requires a PHA by qualitative or quantitative methods such as what-if, fault tree analysis or HAZOP.[11] That analysis should address the process hazards, previous incidents with off-site impact, engineering and administrative controls, the consequences of control or human failures, and the siting of the stationary source. It should also qualitatively evaluate the possible safety and health effects if the controls fail.[11]

Requirements and team

Barry (2002) summarises the OSHA requirements for the analysis in five points.[4] The first is the use of one or more methods: checklists, a "what if" checklist, a hazard and operability study, a failure mode and effects analysis, or an appropriate equivalent methodology. The second is the content, which must cover the process hazards, the engineering and administrative controls, the consequences of failure of controls, and the effects on employees.[4] The third requires a team with engineering and operations expertise, including at least one person with knowledge specific to the process.[4] The fourth requires a system for documenting the findings and actions taken and communicating them to employees. The fifth requires the analysis to be reviewed and updated at least once every five years.[4]

Snyder (2008) adds that the written report of a hazard evaluation should list the participants, the methods applied and the documents used, such as piping and instrumentation diagrams. It should also give the findings and the recommendations.[1] All hazard evaluation reports, recommendation status reports and follow-up documents should become part of the process documentation file.[1] In the example grading scheme for loss prevention programs in the same chapter, process hazard analysis is one of 17 programs. In that example, each is scored on planning, accountability, implementation and monitoring, with up to 40 points for each element.[12]

Barry (2002) lists the information the analyst needs, among them material safety data sheets, process flow diagrams, and piping and instrument diagrams that include utilities and pressure relief systems. Protection system diagrams, operating instructions, maintenance records, past HAZOPs and the documentation of process safety management are also on the list.[13] The data must describe the plant as it actually operates, which may differ from the original design.[13] Much of the published material data applies at atmospheric temperature and pressure, so experimental data for process conditions are sometimes needed.[3]

Ural and Garzia (2008) call a thorough and competent PHA perhaps the most important task of any explosion prevention or protection project. It should consider the entire process chain, all buildings, enclosures and interconnections, and the documents from process description to process and instrumentation diagrams.[8] It should cover startup, normal operation, normal shutdown, temporary operations and emergency shutdowns, and the hazards that the protection systems themselves can create. The authors consider periodic updates, and updates whenever the process or its protection systems change, essential.[8]

Methods

Snyder (2008) and Barry (2002) list the same set of hazard evaluation techniques. They are safety review, checklist analysis, relative ranking indexes, preliminary hazard analysis, what-if analysis, what-if/checklist analysis, HAZOP analysis and FMEA.[1][14] The list continues with fault tree analysis, event tree analysis, cause-consequence analysis and human reliability analysis.[14] Each technique has its own benefits, limitations, resource needs and documentation requirements. Both authors refer to the guidelines of the Center for Chemical Process Safety for a detailed treatment.[1][14]

Barry recommends a broad evaluation with safety reviews, checklists, preliminary hazard analysis and relative ranking indexes. For a detailed analysis of the wide range of hazards during design and operation, he names three fundamental methods: the what-if checklist, HAZOP and FMEA.[4] The techniques differ in what they deliver, as his comparison shows.[4]

Matrix of ten hazard evaluation techniques showing whether each gives scenario information and what ranking it allows
Scenario and ranking capabilities of ten hazard evaluation techniques.
Capabilities of some hazard evaluation techniques, after Barry (2002), Table 5-13.2[4]
Technique Provides loss event scenario information? Loss event ranking possible?
Checklists and safety reviews No; specific scenarios usually not identified No
Dow and Mond indexes Yes, on a unit or major system basis Consequence ranking
Preliminary hazard analysis No; specific scenarios usually not identified Yes
What-if and what-if/checklist analysis No; specific scenarios usually not identified Consequence ranking
HAZOP analysis Yes Consequence ranking
FMEA Yes Consequence ranking
Fault tree analysis Yes Frequency ranking
Event tree analysis Yes Yes
Cause-consequence analysis Yes Yes
Human reliability analysis Yes Frequency ranking

Meacham (2002) explains the simpler tools. Checklists are a quick way to verify compliance with codes and give inexperienced people a focus. A user who leans too heavily on the checklist may, however, overlook other hazards or misjudge the relative importance of its items.[15] A "what if" analysis is a mostly informal mental process of asking questions of the type "what if the pump fails", used as a basis for more detailed analyses.[15]

A HAZOP study combines checklists and "what if" questions. It takes a document about a process, such as a flow chart, and systematically asks questions to determine the outcomes of specific actions. A valve labelled "flow" on a drawing, for example, prompts the question of what happens with "no flow".[15] Where the answer is unknown or unsatisfactory, further analysis follows.[15] NUREG-1805 quotes a definition of HAZOP as a study in which the hazards and operability of a system are identified and analysed systematically to determine whether adequate safeguards are in place.[16]

Simple reactor with feed valve and coolant line, with callouts asking what happens with no flow, wrong order, no mixing, wrong temperature or power failure
Questions of a HAZOP-style review applied to a simple reactor: each callout asks what happens if the process deviates.

Schwab (2008a) gives an example of the deviations a HAZOP should cover for exothermic reactions. The reaction data are needed for reactants supplied in grossly wrong proportions or the wrong order, without mixing or with a late start of mixing, and at the wrong temperatures. Power failure, a broken coolant line or any other imaginable upset must also be considered, and these matters need to be reviewed and documented in a HAZOP.[17]

FMEA, and its extension with criticality analysis (FMECA), tabulate equipment, components and systems with their failure modes, effects and, in FMECA, criticality. They typically focus on single-mode failures and usually do not include human failure.[18] Where a failure mode needs more detail, fault tree analysis works backwards from one event to its possible causes. Event tree analysis works forwards from an initiating event, asking for each mitigating system whether it succeeds or fails.[18] Cause-consequence analysis combines the two. These tools are mainly qualitative in hazard assessment but become quantitative risk tools when probabilities are assigned.[18]

Relative ranking: the Dow Fire and Explosion Index

Relative ranking indexes are among the broad screening techniques.[4] One example is the Fire and Explosion Index (FEI) of the Dow Chemical Company, first issued in 1964 and in its seventh edition when Watts (2002) described it. In that account, it was a screening tool that quantified the expected damage from fire, explosion and reactivity incidents and identified equipment that could start or escalate an incident.[19] One important use is to decide when a more detailed quantitative risk analysis is warranted, and how deep it should go.[19]

The method divides a plant into process units, such as reactors, blenders, furnaces and storage tanks. For the dominant combustible material of each unit, a material factor between 1 and 40 is set from its flammability and reactivity.[20] General process hazards can increase an incident's severity, while special process hazards can increase its probability. Each factor starts at 1.00, with applicable penalties added; their product is the process unit hazards factor, with a range of 1 to 8.[20][21] The index is then:

Flowchart from process unit and material factor through process hazard factors to the Fire and Explosion Index, exposure radius and property damage
Calculation path of the Dow Fire and Explosion Index, with illustrative values (MF 16, F1 2.0, F2 2.5).

F3=F1×F2,FEI=MF×F3

Symbol Description Unit
MF material factor of the dominant combustible material (1 to 40) –
F1 general process hazards factor (1.00 plus applicable penalties) –
F2 special process hazards factor (1.00 plus applicable penalties) –
F3 process unit hazards factor (1 to 8) –
FEI Fire and Explosion Index –
R radius of exposure, 0.84 × FEI ft

As an illustration with assumed values, take a unit with a material factor of 16, a general process hazards factor of 2.0 and a special process hazards factor of 2.5. Its process unit hazards factor is 5.0. Its index is 16 × 5.0 = 80. Watts gives the radius of exposure in feet as 84 percent of the index, so this unit would have a radius of about 67 ft, or about 20 m.[20] The replacement value of the equipment inside that circle, multiplied by a damage factor, gives the base maximum probable property damage.[20]

Loss control credits for process control, material isolation and fire protection then reduce this base value.[20] One of the process control credits is for "other process hazard analysis", with a credit factor of 0.91 to 0.98; the three credit groups are multiplied together.[22] Watts (2002) reported that Dow required an FEI analysis for its existing plants and that the requirement to use the FEI had been adopted into law in the Netherlands.[20] The index does not claim the completeness of a detailed hazard and reliability study.[19]

Place in risk assessment

In a quantitative risk assessment, the risk of a fire or explosion is the product of the frequency of the undesired event and its expected consequences.[23] Barry's seven steps start with defining the objectives and identifying the hazards. They continue with loss event scenarios, consequence assessment, probability assessment, risk presentation and risk reduction analysis.[6] He calls hazard identification the foundation of credible risk assessment, because hazards that are not properly identified cannot be addressed within the framework. Documenting the hazard evaluation with a method such as a PHA, HAZOP, FMEA or event tree analysis is one of its tasks.[13] For the scenarios themselves, event tree logic is the most widely used technique, supplemented by fault trees where detail is needed.[4]

The motivation for loss prevention programs is partly statistical. Snyder (2008) cites statistical studies of loss incidents in a variety of industries. They attribute 70 to 85 percent to human factors, 10 to 20 percent to equipment failures and 10 to 20 percent to external factors. He warns that it is a mistake to treat human error and equipment performance as mutually exclusive.[24] Ouellette (2008) names major disasters, including the 1984 incident in Bhopal and the 1989 explosion at Phillips Petroleum in Pasadena, Texas, as having shown that safety is a critical issue in the polymerisation step. He refers to the OSHA rule for further information.[25]

The same techniques appear outside the process industries. In fire risk analysis of buildings, what-if analyses are classed as a qualitative method in NFPA 551, as reproduced by Hall and Watts (2008).[26] In Australia, the 2020 handbook to the Fire Safety Verification Method lists checklists, what-if analysis, hazard identification (HAZID), HAZOP, FMEA and the review of historic records for developing design scenarios.[27] It recommends a mix of structured and informal processes, involving at least the key stakeholders and any peer reviewers, to identify significant low-probability, high-consequence events.[27]

Limitations

No single technique covers everything. A checklist user may overlook hazards that the list does not cover, and "what if" and HAZOP studies tend to be more informal than formal.[15] FMEA usually leaves out human failure, while the loss statistics cited by Snyder attribute most incidents to human factors.[18][24] Barry's comparison shows that checklists, safety reviews and what-if analyses usually do not identify specific scenarios.[4]

Historical data have limits as well. Barry (2002) notes that historical databases are rarely complete, because minor incidents that could have escalated are sometimes not reported. Frequency data derived from incident reports may not apply to the specific assessment, so the analyst must examine every data source carefully.[14] Plant-specific accident records, if available, are usually the best source, since they reflect the operating and maintenance practice of the facility itself.[14]

A PHA is also only as current as the process it describes. Ural and Garzia (2008) call updates essential whenever the process or its protection systems change; the OSHA rule requires a review at least every five years.[8][4] The OSHA and EPA requirements summarised above are those reported in sources from 2002 to 2008.[2][4]

See also

Notes

  1. ↑ 1.00 1.01 1.02 1.03 1.04 1.05 1.06 1.07 1.08 1.09 Snyder (2008), p. 12-185.
  2. ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 Hildebrand and Noll (2008), p. 13-93.
  3. ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 Snyder (2008), p. 12-184.
  4. ↑ 4.00 4.01 4.02 4.03 4.04 4.05 4.06 4.07 4.08 4.09 4.10 4.11 4.12 4.13 4.14 4.15 4.16 4.17 Barry (2002), p. 5-180.
  5. ↑ 5.0 5.1 Hildebrand and Noll (2008), pp. 13-92–13-93.
  6. ↑ 6.0 6.1 Barry (2002), p. 5-177.
  7. ↑ 7.0 7.1 7.2 Cholin (2008d), p. 9-4.
  8. ↑ 8.0 8.1 8.2 8.3 Ural and Garzia (2008), p. 17-143.
  9. ↑ Hurley and Bukowski (2008), p. 3-121.
  10. ↑ Hildebrand and Noll (2008), p. 13-84.
  11. ↑ 11.0 11.1 Rivkin (2008b), p. 21-54.
  12. ↑ Snyder (2008), pp. 12-191–12-192.
  13. ↑ 13.0 13.1 13.2 Barry (2002), p. 5-178.
  14. ↑ 14.0 14.1 14.2 14.3 14.4 Barry (2002), pp. 5-179–5-180.
  15. ↑ 15.0 15.1 15.2 15.3 15.4 Meacham (2002), p. 5-155.
  16. ↑ Nolan (2000), as cited in Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. F-35.
  17. ↑ Schwab (2008a), p. 8-24.
  18. ↑ 18.0 18.1 18.2 18.3 Meacham (2002), p. 5-156.
  19. ↑ 19.0 19.1 19.2 Watts (2002), p. 5-128.
  20. ↑ 20.0 20.1 20.2 20.3 20.4 20.5 Watts (2002), p. 5-129.
  21. ↑ Watts (2002), p. 5-130, Figure 5-10.3.
  22. ↑ Watts (2002), p. 5-131.
  23. ↑ Barry (2002), p. 5-176.
  24. ↑ 24.0 24.1 Snyder (2008), p. 12-183.
  25. ↑ Ouellette (2008), p. 9-55.
  26. ↑ Hall and Watts (2008), p. 3-140.
  27. ↑ 27.0 27.1 Australian Building Codes Board (2020b), p. 59.

References

  • Australian Building Codes Board. (2020b). Handbook: Fire Safety Verification Method (Print version 1.1).
  • Barry, T. F. (2002). Quantitative risk assessment in chemical process industries. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 5-176–5-213). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
  • Cholin, J. M. (2008d). Woodworking facilities and processes. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 9-3–9-25). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Hall, J. R., Jr., & Watts, J. M., Jr. (2008). Fire risk analysis. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 3-135–3-143). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Hildebrand, M. S., & Noll, G. G. (2008). Public fire protection and hazmat management. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 13-81–13-98). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Hurley, M. J., & Bukowski, R. W. (2008). Fire hazard analysis techniques. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 3-121–3-134). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Iqbal, N., & Salley, M. H. (2004). Fire Dynamics Tools (FDTs): Quantitative fire hazard analysis methods for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Fire Protection Inspection Program (NUREG-1805). U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
  • Meacham, B. J. (2002). Building fire risk analysis. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 5-153–5-175). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
  • Ouellette, G. (2008). Plastics industry and related process hazards. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 9-53–9-65). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Rivkin, C. H. (2008b). Vehicle fueling using gaseous fuels. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 21-41–21-76). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Schwab, R. F. (2008a). Chemical processing equipment. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 8-17–8-29). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Snyder, M. (2008). Industrial fire loss prevention. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 12-177–12-198). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Ural, E. A., & Garzia, H. W. (2008). Explosion prevention and protection. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 17-141–17-165). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Watts, J. M., Jr. (2002). Fire risk indexing. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 5-125–5-142). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.