Contents
Fire following earthquake is fire that breaks out as a result of an earthquake, or that burns in its aftermath while the damage caused by the earthquake hampers detection, suppression and fire fighting.[1][2] Earthquakes can produce major post-event disasters such as fire, tsunamis, flooding and landslides, so they are often treated as multiperil incidents.[3] Some of the worst fires in history followed earthquakes. Fires after the earthquake of 1 September 1923 in the Tokyo to Yokohama region caused most of its 142,807 deaths. The 1906 San Francisco earthquake also led to one of the costliest US fires listed in the 2008 handbook.[4][5]
The danger lies in the combination of effects. An earthquake can start more than one fire at a time. In urban and industrial settings, fires often involve damaged pipes or tanks containing flammable gases or liquids. At the same time an earthquake can break water mains, disable sprinkler systems and overtax the fire service.[2][6] Protection therefore combines earthquake-resistant water supplies and bracing of sprinkler piping with emergency planning for a period in which outside help may not arrive.[7][8]
Earthquakes as a fire hazard
An earthquake is the vibration of the Earth's surface caused by a rapid release of energy, usually by slippage along a geological fault. Each unit on the Richter scale corresponds to roughly a 32-fold increase in released energy.[3] The 2008 handbook's table estimated about 266 magnitude 6.0–6.9 shocks a year, described as destructive in populous regions, and about 1.4 great earthquakes of magnitude 8.0 and above.[9] Tectonic plates move by tens of millimetres a year and accumulate strain energy until the rock breaks.[10]
Besides fault rupture and strong shaking, earthquakes often trigger secondary events: landslides, liquefaction, tsunamis, fires and dam failures. They typically cause less annual economic loss than floods, but they can devastate a region within minutes, because there is no proven method of short-term prediction. They affect all kinds of structures and infrastructure, including the water, gas and sewer lines on which fire protection depends.[10]
Building codes accept part of this risk. Ordinary buildings are designed to crack and yield under design-level shaking without collapsing, because the aim is life safety rather than protection of property.[11] Codes and standards also work within stated limits, such as the assumption of a single ignition point and of the maximum considered earthquake.[12] Several fires started at the same time by an earthquake fall outside the first of these assumptions.[13]
The largest fires after earthquakes have been conflagrations, which grow by fire spread between buildings. NFPA uses the term for a fire with major building-to-building flame spread over some distance, and a fire spreading within a complex or among adjacent buildings is called a group fire. In Japan, where many large post-earthquake fires have occurred, the term "city fire" is often used for a conflagration.[14][4]
Historical fires following earthquakes
The two deadliest fires or explosions in the handbook's 2008 list, excluding bombings and wartime attacks, were Japanese earthquake fires. In the earthquake of 1 September 1923 in the Tokyo to Yokohama region, fires caused most of the 142,807 deaths. In an earlier Tokyo earthquake, listed by NFPA as occurring on 21 March 1857, fires also caused most of about 107,000 deaths.[4] The death tolls of these two events dwarf every other fire or explosion on the list.[15] A table of the world's deadliest earthquakes lists the 1923 Kanto earthquake in Japan, of magnitude 8.3, with 143,000 deaths and the comment that fire caused extensive destruction.[16]
On 18 April 1906, an earthquake in San Francisco started a conflagration that killed 452 people and destroyed some 28,000 buildings. The loss of US$350 million was then over US$6.7 billion in 2000 dollars.[17] A table of US earthquakes lists the 1906 earthquake with about 3,000 deaths and notes that fires caused extensive damage and deaths.[16] In the 2008 handbook's ranking, the 1906 fire loss of US$7.3 billion in 2004 dollars was second only to the World Trade Center attack among US fires and explosions.[5] The handbook compares that sum with more than half the loss of all reported US fires in a typical year.[18] The contents of many of the city's new concrete and steel buildings were destroyed, but most of their walls, frames and floors remained intact.[17]
After the 1906 San Francisco and 1933 Long Beach earthquakes, requirements for earthquake resistance began to appear in US building codes.[19] Guidance for protecting sprinkler systems against earthquakes first appeared in the 1947 edition of NFPA 13, urged by insurance rating bureaus on the US West Coast. It was first tested in the 1971 San Fernando earthquake, which showed that a sprinkler system performed as well as the building that held it. Studies of sprinkler performance in the 1989 Loma Prieta and 1994 Northridge earthquakes led to further refinements.[8] In the handbook's 2008 property-loss table, Northridge and Loma Prieta led the US ranking at US$13–20 billion and US$7 billion in damage at the time, respectively.[20] A separate table in the same chapter instead gives Northridge damage as more than US$40 billion; the source does not reconcile the two estimates.[16]
Ignition and the loss of fire defences
The EPRI/NRC fire risk assessment methodology for US nuclear power plants (NUREG/CR-6850) lists four ways in which earthquakes and fires interact. Earthquakes can cause fires, degrade fire suppression systems, cause spurious actuation of detection and suppression systems, and degrade manual fire fighting.[1] In urban and industrial settings, post-earthquake fires are most often associated with pipes or storage tanks containing flammable gases, such as natural gas or hydrogen, or liquids such as gasoline and fuel oil. Electrical equipment that is not adequately restrained can shift or tip over and damage cables and connections. Because fire fighting is also compromised, a fire started by an earthquake has a greater potential for long duration than an ordinary plant fire.[2]
In individual plants and industrial facilities, however, post-earthquake fires have been uncommon. An EPRI survey in 1990 covered more than 100 plants and industrial facilities after 18 major earthquakes and found that such fires were not common. By 2005, no post-earthquake fire affecting a nuclear power plant had been documented.[2] Because of this low perceived risk and the limits of the state of the art, the methodology starts with a qualitative assessment based on walkdowns of the plant. A quantitative assessment or changes may follow if that assessment cannot rule out a significant risk.[1]
The earthquake can also disable the protection. A study by Brookhaven National Laboratory found that suppression systems installed to recognised codes generally had adequate pipe support. The main weakness was inadequate lateral restraint, which allowed sprinkler heads to strike nearby objects. Unrestrained gas suppression cylinders and cast-iron fire mains, which are seismically weak, were other concerns.[2]
A rupture in a site's fire water main can make every water-based system and hose station unavailable until the break is isolated.[21] Dust and steam released by the shaking can trigger smoke and heat detectors, and many spurious alarms can mask a real one. Pipe breaks, relay chatter in control panels and damaged deluge valves can discharge water or gas where no fire exists.[21][13]
Outside help may be limited for some time. A major earthquake could overtax the public fire service, so that a facility's own responders may need to carry out search and rescue.[6] Catastrophic events such as major earthquakes are likely to overwhelm both local and state resources, at least for a short period, and may destroy infrastructure and local government functions.[22] Unreinforced masonry buildings are liable to collapse in earthquakes, which concerns fire fighters who respond to them.[23] Dispatch and communication centres must keep working although water, gas and electricity may be unavailable.[24]
Water supplies
For fire protection water storage, the primary goal of seismic design is that the fire water supply and the systems it feeds remain in service after an earthquake. Ground shaking sets up a rocking action and sloshing of the water in a storage tank, which can produce stresses beyond those of ordinary dead, live and wind loads. In areas where earthquakes are likely, or where local codes require it, fire protection tanks are designed to resist them. The second goal is to limit water damage from leakage.[7][25]
Ground-level tanks are the most common type where seismic protection is required. The first of their four main seismic provisions is a pair of flexible couplings between the tank and the pump or the buried main. The second is anchorage of the tank on a foundation heavy enough to prevent rocking. The third is at least 50 mm (2 in.) of clearance where pipes pass through walls. The fourth is enough steel thickness near the base to prevent the buckling known as elephant footing.[25]
Public water mains are vulnerable. In active seismic areas, local regulations often require standpipe systems to be supplied from tanks and pumps in the building, because public supplies are susceptible to earthquake-induced failure.[26] Fireboats can provide another emergency source of water if an earthquake interrupts the normal supply.[27]
As described in the 2008 handbook, San Francisco built a separate high-pressure system under fire department control, primarily because an earthquake might put the regular Water distribution system out of service. Its pipes were tested on installation or repair to 3,103 kPa (450 psi), and two pumping stations could draw water from San Francisco Bay. The system was reported able to deliver 75,700 L/min (20,000 gpm) at 1,724 kPa (250 psi) to most of the main commercial district.[28] The handbook also reported more than 100 underground cisterns in service because of the earthquake threat, most holding 284 m³ (75,000 gal).[29]
Earthquake protection of sprinkler systems
The NFPA 13 edition described in the 2008 handbook protects sprinkler piping against earthquakes in three ways: flexibility through flexible couplings and clearances, restraint, and Seismic bracing, which is the most visible part.[30] Flexibility prevents stresses that could rupture the piping. Too much of it is also dangerous, however, because unrestrained piping could break under its own momentum or by striking other building components.[31] That edition does not say where earthquake protection is required. It leaves that decision, and the size of the design forces, to building codes or other authorities.[32]
Traditionally, NFPA 13 assumed a horizontal acceleration of half of gravity, so that a brace had to resist a horizontal force equal to half the weight of the water-filled pipe it supports. The 1989 Loma Prieta and 1994 Northridge earthquakes produced accelerations above 0.5 g, and from its 1994 edition the standard permitted other force factors.[32] A 2003 amendment clarified use of NFPA 13 with the ASCE 7 seismic design force formula for nonstructural components. In the ASCE 7-05 formulation discussed by the handbook, the force grows with mapped ground acceleration, height in the building and piping weight:[32] NFPA 13 (2007) also offers a simpler form, in which a seismic coefficient taken directly from the mapped acceleration multiplies the weight of the piping:[33]
| Symbol | Description | Unit |
|---|---|---|
| Horizontal seismic design force on a brace | N | |
| Weight of the piping in the brace's zone of influence (1.15 × water-filled pipe weight) | N | |
| Component amplification factor (2.5 in ASCE 7-05) | – | |
| Component response modification factor (4.5 for steel piping in ASCE 7-05) | – | |
| Component importance factor (1.5 for sprinkler systems) | – | |
| Height of the attachment divided by the average roof height | – | |
| Mapped short-period (0.2 s) acceleration with a 2% probability of exceedance in 50 years | g | |
| Site soil coefficient, from 0.8 for hard rock up to 2.5 for softer soil | – | |
| Design spectral acceleration, short period | g | |
| Seismic coefficient from Table 16.4.6 of the handbook (NFPA 13 Table 9.3.5.6.2) | – |
The factors are those of ASCE 7-05, which the 2006 International Building Code and NFPA 5000 adopted. The force at the roof is three times that at the base, and sprinkler systems are designed for the worst case at the top of the building. Because ASCE 7 uses strength design and NFPA 13 allowable stress design, the calculated force may be divided by 1.4.[32][34] The mapped acceleration corresponds to roughly the 2,500-year earthquake.[34] The seismic coefficient table assumes poor soil and the top storey. It gives = 0.31 for of 0.33 or less, 0.52 for 1.00, 0.71 for 1.50 and 1.43 for 3.00.[35]
As a worked example, take a 100 mm (4 in.) Schedule 40 feed main with longitudinal braces at the maximum spacing of 24.4 m (80 ft). Each brace carries the main halfway to the next brace in both directions, so its zone of influence is 24.4 m.[36] With 1.15 times the water-filled weight, the pipe weighs 28.07 kg/m.[37] is then 24.4 × 28.07 ≈ 684 kg, or about 6.7 kN. In an area with = 1.50, = 0.71 gives ≈ 0.71 × 6.7 ≈ 4.8 kN, compared with 3.4 kN under the traditional 0.5 g.
With the ASCE 7-05 factors at roof level, the full equation reduces to , or 0.71 after division by 1.4. The table value at = 1.50 thus corresponds to a soil coefficient of about 1.0. The brace, its fittings and its fasteners must each carry this load.[37]
Other provisions complete the protection. In the edition summarised by the 2008 handbook, retaining straps were required on C-type hanger clamps in earthquake areas. Powder-driven fasteners could not attach hangers where the design acceleration exceeded half of gravity unless they were specially listed.[30] A four-way brace was required at the top of each riser, and lateral braces on mains were traditionally spaced at no more than 12.2 m (40 ft).[36]
Barriers, conflagration and design frameworks
Fire barriers can fail in the same event. Freestanding fire walls are particularly vulnerable to collapse under seismic loads. Pipes, conveyors and cable trays passing through fire walls cause special problems in seismic areas, because the movement they need may conflict with the protection of the opening. The design becomes more complex when the simultaneous or consecutive occurrence of earthquake and fire must be considered, rather than one hazard at a time.[38]
A conflagration grows by fire spread from one building to the next. Radiation from a burning building reaching a neighbouring facade can be estimated as the product of the view factor and the radiation emitted from the openings. In an example in Introduction to Fire Safety Engineering, two openings emitting 120 kW/m² at 6 m from the opposite facade give a view factor of 0.032. The facade then receives 3.84 kW/m², below the limit of 15 kW/m² used in that example.[39] The same building-to-building spread drives conflagrations at the Wildland-urban interface, which the 2008 handbook called the most common conflagration scenario in recent US experience.[4] In its ranking of US fires and explosions, the 1991 Oakland interface fire storm placed fourth.[5]
Performance-based design can frame fire and earthquake in comparable scales. The ICC Performance Code for the United States sets design performance levels for events such as wind, earthquake or fire.[40] One proposed framework gives four earthquake load categories by mean return period: frequent (72 years), occasional (225 years), rare (474 years) and very rare (2,475 years). It separately gives four fire-load categories, from a fire contained to its object of origin to one that spreads through a building. The source notes a general correlation between event frequency and size; it does not equate any earthquake category with a particular fire size.[41]
The 2013 New Zealand commentary says the fire design scenarios for Verification Method C/VM2 were proposed to align with the structural design process for wind, earthquake and snow.[42] Codes generally do not require every building to remain fully operational after a 2,500-year earthquake. Where continued operation matters, as for hospitals or critical facilities, protection beyond the code may be needed.[43]
For Emergency management at earthquake-prone sites, the handbook recommends documenting the locations of water shutoff valves and of gas piping. Plans should also cover structural failure and leaks of natural gas or LP-gas, and consider whether public services can reach the site in a regional disaster.[6][44] For US nuclear power plants, the fire risk methodology adds a walkdown in seven steps. It identifies the areas needed for safe shutdown after an earthquake and checks the seismic restraint of electrical equipment, gas piping and fuel tanks. It also reviews the seismic ruggedness of fire pumps, fire mains, standpipes and water tanks, which could otherwise fail together.[45]
See also
Notes
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 Nowlen et al. (2005b), p. 13-1.
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 Nowlen et al. (2005b), p. 13-2.
- ↑ 3.0 3.1 Hall and Twomey (2008), p. 1-13.
- ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 Hall and Cote (2008), p. 3-11.
- ↑ 5.0 5.1 5.2 Hall and Cote (2008), p. 3-12.
- ↑ 6.0 6.1 6.2 Schmidt (2008), p. 1-146.
- ↑ 7.0 7.1 Edwards (2008), p. 15-4.
- ↑ 8.0 8.1 Fleming (2008a), p. 16-55.
- ↑ Hall and Twomey (2008), p. 1-15.
- ↑ 10.0 10.1 Meacham and Galioto (2008), p. 1-110.
- ↑ Manley (2008), p. 1-37.
- ↑ Schwartz (2008), p. 1-73.
- ↑ 13.0 13.1 Nowlen et al. (2005b), p. 13-4.
- ↑ Hall and Cote (2008), p. 3-10.
- ↑ Hall and Cote (2008), p. 3-8.
- ↑ 16.0 16.1 16.2 Hall and Twomey (2008), p. 1-16.
- ↑ 17.0 17.1 Cote and Grant (2008), p. 1-55.
- ↑ Ahrens et al. (2008), p. 3-87.
- ↑ Meacham and Galioto (2008), p. 1-109.
- ↑ Hall and Twomey (2008), p. 1-17.
- ↑ 21.0 21.1 Nowlen et al. (2005b), p. 13-3.
- ↑ Van Helden and Stewart (2008), p. 12-209.
- ↑ Corbett (2008), p. 12-134.
- ↑ Merklinger (2008), p. 12-254.
- ↑ 25.0 25.1 Edwards (2008), p. 15-5.
- ↑ Hague (2008b), p. 16-196.
- ↑ Tutterow (2008), p. 12-280.
- ↑ Wenzel (2008b), pp. 15-28–15-29.
- ↑ Edwards (2008), p. 15-20.
- ↑ 30.0 30.1 Fleming (2008a), p. 16-61.
- ↑ Fleming (2002), p. 4-84.
- ↑ 32.0 32.1 32.2 32.3 Fleming (2008a), p. 16-62.
- ↑ Fleming (2008a), p. 16-64.
- ↑ 34.0 34.1 Fleming (2008a), p. 16-63.
- ↑ Fleming (2008a), p. 16-65.
- ↑ 36.0 36.1 Fleming (2008a), p. 16-66.
- ↑ 37.0 37.1 Fleming (2008a), p. 16-67.
- ↑ Davoodi (2008), pp. 18-13–18-14.
- ↑ Van Rossum (2027), §5.4.
- ↑ National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), p. 0.2-6 (Part 0, United States).
- ↑ Meacham (2002), p. 5-169.
- ↑ Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2013), p. 11.
- ↑ Meacham and Galioto (2008), p. 1-112.
- ↑ Schmidt (2008), p. 1-147.
- ↑ Nowlen et al. (2005b), pp. 13-5–13-7.
References
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- Van Rossum, E. (2027). Introduction to Fire Safety Engineering. Fire Safety Academy.
- Wenzel, L. J. (2008b). Water supply requirements for public supply systems. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 15-23–15-33). National Fire Protection Association.