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Contents
  1. 1Properties and uses
  2. 2Behaviour in fire
  3. 3Conditions for detonation
  4. 4Major incidents
  5. 5Storage and separation
  6. 6Classification and transport
  7. 7Fire fighting and emergency response
  8. 8Limits and common misconceptions
  9. 9See also
  10. 10Notes
  11. 11References

Ammonium nitrate (AN) is an inorganic nitrate salt used as a fertiliser and as the oxidiser in many commercial blasting agents.[1][2] It is not combustible itself, but can intensify a fire by releasing nitrous oxide, an oxidising gas.[1] Wright's (2008a) transport table lists ammonium nitrate fertiliser as a Division 5.1 oxidiser and ammonium nitrate–fuel oil as a Division 1.5 explosive.[3] Even chemical- or fertiliser-grade material can detonate in a suitable crystalline form, after a sufficiently strong initiation, or when heated under sufficient confinement.[1] Explosions on ships and in warehouses have shown that initiation by explosives is not the only route to detonation.[4] Storage therefore requires separation from fuels and incompatible materials; where an explosion is possible, fire fighting may require a remote position or withdrawal.[5][1]

Properties and uses

Ammonium nitrate belongs to the inorganic nitrates, a group of salts that are widely used in fertilisers, salt baths and other industrial applications.[1] Like the other inorganic nitrates, it is an oxidising agent rather than a fuel. When heated, it gives off nitrous oxide as its oxidising gas, whereas sodium nitrate, for comparison, evolves oxygen when heated to about 370 °C (700 °F).[1] Nitrates dissolve in water, and some of them are hygroscopic, which means that they take up moisture.[1]

The handbook separates two kinds of product. Chemical-grade and fertiliser-grade ammonium nitrate must not be confused with formulated mixtures of ammonium nitrate and combustible material used as explosives.[1] The best-known mixture is ANFO, which is made by adding about 6 % fuel oil, such as No. 2 diesel fuel, to specially prepared ammonium nitrate particles called prills.[6] Classification as a Division 1.5 blasting agent also depends on the prescribed sensitivity tests; simple contact with fuel does not by itself establish that classification.[2]

Diagram: ammonium nitrate fertiliser is a Division 5.1 oxidiser in the 2008 transport table; formulated and tested ANFO is a Division 1.5 blasting agent.
The 2008 transport table distinguishes ammonium nitrate fertiliser from ANFO, a formulation of prepared prills with about 6 % fuel oil classified by sensitivity tests. Based on Davenport (2008), pp. 7-45–7-46, Santis (2008), pp. 6-248–6-249 and C. J. Wright (2008a), p. 13-119.

Santis (2008) estimates that blasting agents composed mainly of ammonium nitrate took about 99 % of the commercial explosives market in the preceding fifty years.[2] Ammonium nitrate is also usually the basic oxidiser in water gels, slurries and emulsions. Depending on their formulation and sensitivity, these products may be classified as Division 1.5 blasting agents or Division 1.1 explosives. They usually contain 10 to 25 % water and may be sensitised with materials such as paint-grade aluminium, monomethylamine nitrate, TNT (trinitrotoluene), gelling agents and emulsifiers.[6]

These products rely on the basic chemistry of combustion. Combustion is a set of mainly exothermic chemical reactions between a fuel and an oxidiser, which is usually oxygen from the air.[7] Powerful oxidising agents such as sodium nitrate form highly reactive mixtures when they are intimately mixed with a solid or liquid fuel; gunpowder is an old example.[8] Santis (2008) accordingly describes the most commonly used commercial explosive as a fuel and oxidiser system of ammonium nitrate and fuel oil.[6] The safety of plain ammonium nitrate therefore depends to a large degree on keeping fuels away from it.[1][4]

Large quantities move through the transport system. In 2005, ammonium nitrate fertilisers ranked 21st among the hazardous materials shipped by rail in the United States, with 17,631 shipments out of a total of 1,587,469 for all hazardous commodities.[9] On the road, it is one of the cargoes carried in dry bulk cargo tanks, together with corrosive solids.[10]

Behaviour in fire

Under fire conditions, inorganic nitrates can melt and release their oxidising gas, so that the fire intensifies.[1] Molten nitrates react with organic materials with considerable violence, and these reactions usually release toxic oxides of nitrogen.[1] Ammonium nitrate behaves in the same way: it is an oxidising agent that increases the intensity of a fire, although it is not combustible itself.[1]

The fire triangle shows why this matters. A fire needs fuel, oxygen and heat, and a fire stops spreading when the oxygen level falls far enough.[11] An oxidiser inside the fuel bed provides an extra supply of oxidant that does not depend on the surrounding air.[1] Grant (2002) states the general rule for fuels that contain their own oxidising agent, such as gunpowder, rocket propellants and cellulose nitrate. Such fuels burn freely even in the presence of halon, because the oxidiser is physically too close to the fuel for the agent to reach the fire zone fast enough.[12]

Packaging and building materials can turn a stored oxidiser into a fire load. Paper, burlap or cloth bags of nitrate that become moist during shipment or storage keep an impregnation of nitrate after drying and are then highly combustible.[1] For the same reason, bulk nitrates stored on wooden floors or against wooden walls or posts are hazardous.[1] Oxidisers in fibre packs or plastic containers may be safe under normal conditions, but in a fire the oxidiser and the combustible packaging can magnify the fire intensity.[5]

Water creates a separate hazard. Solid streams of water can produce steam explosions when they hit molten nitrate.[1] Davenport (2008) describes a water solution of ammonium nitrate as not hazardous unless spilled into combustible material and allowed to dry. On the same page, however, he cites research in which solutions containing up to 8 % water were detonated; adding a little water is therefore no general guarantee of safety.[4]

Conditions for detonation

Ammonium nitrate is not classed as an explosive, but it can detonate. Davenport (2008) names three situations in which any grade can be detonated. The material is in the proper crystalline form, the initiating source is sufficiently large, or the material is heated under sufficient confinement. The purest material needs the greatest confinement.[1] In a detonation the reaction front travels faster than the speed of sound in the reacting material. Its peak pressures are orders of magnitude higher than those of a deflagration, in which the front moves more slowly than sound.[13][14]

The United States Bureau of Mines carried out an extensive series of tests on fertiliser-grade ammonium nitrate exposed to fire (Van Dolah et al., 1966, as cited in Davenport, 2008). Davenport (2008) draws five conclusions from that study.[4][15] First, a fire cannot be ruled out completely as a cause of detonation. A direct transition from burning to detonation in commercial fertiliser-grade material, however, appears possible only in a pile of extremely large dimensions that is ignited at its bottom or centre. Second, projectiles from nearby explosions can initiate reactions that lead to detonation, particularly in hot ammonium nitrate. Ordinary sporting bullets cannot do so under normal storage conditions.[4]

The third conclusion concerns mixtures with fuel. When ammonium nitrate is intimately mixed with fuel oil, ground polyethylene or ground paper, a transition from burning to detonation is possible, though quite unlikely, in piles of the size found in storage and transport. The mixtures covered by the Bureau of Mines conclusions are classified as blasting agents and stored under the rules for explosive materials.[4] Fourth, the study concluded that gas detonations could not initiate detonation of the tested ammonium nitrate. Fifth, hot ammonium nitrate could be detonated by projectile impact.[4]

Five-row chart of initiation routes for ammonium nitrate: fire, projectiles, mixing with fuel, gas detonation and projectile impact on hot material.
Five conclusions from the United States Bureau of Mines tests on fertiliser-grade ammonium nitrate under fire exposure. Based on Davenport (2008), p. 7-46.

Dilution with other salts lowers the hazard. Tests conducted many years before 2008 indicated that mixtures with ammonium sulfate containing not more than 40 % ammonium nitrate by weight are not explosive under the conditions met in practice.[4] The same applies to mixtures with calcium carbonate, called calcium ammonium nitrate, containing not more than 61 % ammonium nitrate.[4]

In a fire, calcium ammonium nitrate forms calcium nitrate and ammonium carbonate. The ammonium carbonate absorbs heat while it decomposes into ammonia, carbon dioxide and water. The effect of contamination on these mixtures had not been thoroughly investigated.[4] Dissolving the salt in a little water does not remove the hazard either: research has shown that solutions containing up to 8 % water can be detonated (Fukuyama, 1957, as cited in Davenport, 2008).[4]

Major incidents

Davenport (2008) lists six events in which ammonium nitrate detonated without being initiated by explosives. Three were shipboard explosions: at Texas City, Texas, and Brest, France, both in 1947, and in the Red Sea in 1953. The fourth followed a freight train wreck at Traskwood, Arkansas, in December 1960. The other two were explosions in bulk warehouses near Pryor, Oklahoma, in January 1973 and in Toulouse, France, in September 2001.[4]

Timeline from 1947 to 2003 with ammonium nitrate detonations and ammonium-nitrate-based explosive incidents.
Ammonium nitrate detonations without initiation by explosives (top) and incidents with ammonium-nitrate-based explosives (bottom). Based on Davenport (2008), p. 7-46, Ahrens et al. (2008), p. 3-86, Santis (2008), p. 6-247, Zalosh (2008), p. 2-97 and Penney (2008), p. 5-31.

The material in the three shipboard explosions was coated with an organic substance and had burning characteristics substantially different from those of the ammonium nitrate manufactured around 2008.[4] At Traskwood, tank cars of gasoline and of nitric acid were also in the wreck. Detonation of the ammonium nitrate may have been initiated by projectiles from a detonation of gasoline mixed with nitric acid.[4]

The Texas City disaster involved the ship SS Grandcamp and the Monsanto Chemical plant. With 468 deaths, it ranks second for the 1940s in the list of the deadliest United States fires and explosions since 1900 given by Ahrens et al. (2008).[16] Its reported property loss of $67 million corresponds to $567 million in 2004 dollars, based on the consumer price index.[17]

Ammonium-nitrate-based explosives have also caused major losses. In 1988, six fire fighters were killed in Kansas City, Missouri, while fighting a fire in a storage facility for a blasting agent based on ammonium nitrate.[18] The 1995 Oklahoma City bombing used about 1,800 kg (4,000 lb) of ammonium nitrate and fuel oil, with an estimated TNT equivalence of 1,540 kg (3,400 lb).[19] It killed 168 people, including 19 children, and injured more than 500.[20]

On 7 February 2003, a car bomb exploded on the fourth floor of the El Nogal social club in Bogotá, Colombia. It contained about 272 kg (600 lb) of ammonium nitrate and chlorate mixed with fuel oil. About 750 people were in the twelve-storey building, and 38 were killed and 170 injured. The building, which had been designed for earthquake loading, stayed standing.[20]

The hazard is also recognised in the nuclear industry. The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission issued Information Notice 90-70, "Pump Explosions Involving Ammonium Nitrate", on 6 November 1990.[21] NUREG-1805 lists this notice among the NRC information notices related to fire protection.[21]

Storage and separation

Segregation is the first principle of good chemical storage. It means separation from other stored materials, from processing and handling operations and from incompatible materials.[5] Segregation can take the form of a separate detached building, fire walls and drainage within one building, or an intervening empty area or store of inert material. Its extent depends on the quantity stored, the physical state of the chemicals and their degree of incompatibility.[5]

For oxidising chemicals, Davenport (2008) adds specific rules. Combustible materials and flammable liquids should not be stored in the same areas as oxidisers, and the storage buildings should be of noncombustible or fire-resistive construction. Combustible packaging and wooden or plastic pallets represent a severe hazard and should be eliminated.[1] Nitrates should be transferred from bags or wooden barrels to noncombustible bins, and the emptied bags or barrels should be washed thoroughly.[1] Spills are cleaned up at once, because spilled material is likely to become mixed with combustible refuse.[1]

In the United States, the 2008 edition of the Fire Protection Handbook listed two NFPA codes covering these subjects. They were NFPA 430, Code for the Storage of Liquid and Solid Oxidizers, and NFPA 490, Code for the Storage of Ammonium Nitrate.[1][15] NFPA 490 was in its 2002 edition when Iqbal and Salley (2004) compiled their list of NFPA codes.[22] The ammonium-nitrate/fuel formulations that Davenport (2008) classifies as blasting agents fall under the then-cited NFPA 495, Explosive Materials Code.[4]

Where ammonium nitrate is stored near explosives or blasting agents, a further rule applies. The 2008 handbook reproduces a United States table of recommended separation distances intended to prevent such a store from being detonated by an explosion in a nearby store.[23] The exploding store is called the donor and the store to be protected the acceptor. Ammonium nitrate by itself is not considered a donor, while ammonium nitrate and ANFO are acceptors.[23] If ammonium nitrate lies within the sympathetic detonation distance of explosives or blasting agents, half its mass is added to the mass of the donor.[23]

The distances in the table apply to barricaded stores. The minimum thickness of an artificial barricade of earth or sand rises with the donor weight from 0.305 m (12 in.) to 1.52 m (60 in.). Natural barricades such as hills or dense timber are also permitted.[23] Without a barricade, the distances are multiplied by 6 to allow for high-velocity metal fragments from mixers, hoppers, truck bodies and containers around the donor.[23]

For ammonium nitrate, the barricaded distance is 0.914 m (3 ft) for a donor of up to 45.4 kg (100 lb). It rises to 19.5 m (64 ft) for the largest donors of 125,000 to 136,000 kg (275,000 to 300,000 lb).[23] These ammonium nitrate distances apply to material that gives a negative result in the UN Test Series 2 gap test and a positive result in the UN Test Series 1 gap test. Material that is sensitive enough to belong to DOT hazard Class 1 is spaced by the American Table of Distances for explosives instead.[23]

Step chart: separation distance rises from 0.9 to 19.5 m for ammonium nitrate and from 3.4 to 70 m for blasting agents as donor mass rises to 136,000 kg.
Recommended minimum separation distances, with barricades, between a donor store of explosives or blasting agents and an acceptor store of ammonium nitrate or blasting agent. Without barricades the distances are multiplied by 6. Based on Santis (2008), p. 6-255.

A worked example shows how the table is used. A magazine holds 4,540 kg (10,000 lb) of explosives, and an ammonium nitrate store is planned nearby. The donor falls in the row "over 8,000 lb, not over 10,000 lb", which requires 3.96 m (13 ft) to the ammonium nitrate and a barricade of at least 0.508 m (20 in.).[23] Without the barricade, the distance becomes 6 × 3.96 = 23.8 m (78 ft).

Suppose that 4,540 kg (10,000 lb) of ammonium nitrate already lies within the sympathetic detonation distance of the magazine. Half of its 10,000 lb counts as donor, giving 15,000 lb (about 6,800 kg) in all. For a further ammonium nitrate store, the row "over 12,000 lb, not over 16,000 lb" then gives 4.57 m (15 ft) behind a barricade of 0.635 m (25 in.), or 27.4 m (90 ft) unbarricaded.[23] Distances to inhabited buildings, passenger railways and public highways are taken from the American Table of Distances instead.[23] For the same 4,540 kg (10,000 lb) donor, that table requires 264 m (865 ft) to an inhabited building behind a barricade.[24]

Plan view: explosives magazine, nearby ammonium nitrate store, earth barricade and distances of 3.96 m, 23.8 m and 4.57 m.
Worked example: separation of ammonium nitrate stores from a magazine holding 4,540 kg of explosives, with and without a barricade, and after half of a nearby ammonium nitrate store is added to the donor. Based on Santis (2008), p. 6-255.

Classification and transport

In the international hazard class system used for transport, ammonium nitrate fertiliser is the example given for Division 5.1, the oxidisers.[3] Wright's table lists oxygen supply and possible sensitivity to heat, shock, friction or contamination as general hazard properties of Class 5, which also includes organic peroxides.[3] A mixture of ammonium nitrate and fuel oil is instead the example given for Division 1.5, the very insensitive explosives, which is the division of the blasting agents.[3][2]

The transport label says little about storage. Davenport (2008) notes that the label required for interstate shipment classifies a chemical by its hazard for transport only. A thorough knowledge of its fire, health and reactivity hazards should guide the storage arrangement.[1] In the 2008 handbook, Davenport points to manufacturers' material safety data sheets and to NFPA's Fire Protection Guide to Hazardous Materials, which then included NFPA 491, Guide to Hazardous Chemical Reactions.[25]

Fire fighting and emergency response

Water is normally the extinguishing agent for chemical storage, except on chemicals that react dangerously with water.[5] Toxic runoff can contaminate drinking water and sensitive areas, so the toxicity of the material in water is an additional factor.[5] Fire fighters should wear self-contained breathing apparatus and other protective equipment against toxic materials.[5] Molten nitrates in contact with organic material usually release toxic oxides of nitrogen.[1] Solid streams aimed at molten nitrate can cause steam explosions.[1]

Where an explosion is possible, manual fire fighting should be conducted from a remote location. In some cases the hazard is high enough that fire fighters should not approach the area at all.[5] For ammonium nitrate formulated and classified as an explosive material, Santis (2008) cites the NFPA 495 rule: fires involving explosive materials are not fought.[2][18] He gives an evacuation distance of at least 610 m (2,000 ft) for such fires.[26] The Kansas City fire of 1988, in which six fire fighters died, involved such a store.[18]

Limits and common misconceptions

Davenport (2008) warns against confusing fertiliser-grade ammonium nitrate with the ammonium nitrate and fuel mixtures used as explosives. The handbook takes a middle position on the plain material. It is an oxidiser that intensifies fire and is not considered a donor in the separation table, yet every grade can detonate under the conditions described above.[1][23] Engineered ANFO uses specially prepared prills and approximately 6 % fuel oil; the Division 1.5 classification depends on sensitivity testing, not merely the presence of fuel.[6][2]

Historical disasters should be read with care. The three shipboard explosions of 1947 and 1953 involved organic-coated material with burning characteristics that differ substantially from those of the product manufactured around 2008.[4] Davenport (2008) nevertheless lists the warehouse explosions near Pryor in 1973 and in Toulouse in 2001 among the events in which ammonium nitrate detonated without initiation by explosives.[4] The limits of 40 % and 61 % for diluted mixtures come from older tests, and the effect of contamination on them had not been fully investigated.[4]

The requirements described in this article reflect United States practice as presented in the 2008 edition of the Fire Protection Handbook. Applicable codes and the rules of other countries may differ from these historical references.[15][27] The separation table also covers only sympathetic detonation between stores. It does not give safe distances for people, buildings or roads.[23]

See also

Notes

  1. ↑ 1.00 1.01 1.02 1.03 1.04 1.05 1.06 1.07 1.08 1.09 1.10 1.11 1.12 1.13 1.14 1.15 1.16 1.17 1.18 1.19 1.20 1.21 1.22 1.23 1.24 Davenport (2008), p. 7-45.
  2. ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 Santis (2008), p. 6-248.
  3. ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 C. J. Wright (2008a), p. 13-119.
  4. ↑ 4.00 4.01 4.02 4.03 4.04 4.05 4.06 4.07 4.08 4.09 4.10 4.11 4.12 4.13 4.14 4.15 4.16 4.17 Davenport (2008), p. 7-46.
  5. ↑ 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 Davenport (2008), p. 7-44.
  6. ↑ 6.0 6.1 6.2 6.3 Santis (2008), p. 6-249.
  7. ↑ Van Rossum (2027), §4.1.
  8. ↑ Drysdale (2008), p. 2-17.
  9. ↑ C. J. Wright (2008b), p. 21-113.
  10. ↑ Routhier (2008), p. 21-25.
  11. ↑ Van Rossum (2027), §4.2.
  12. ↑ Grant (2002), p. 4-152.
  13. ↑ Zalosh (2008), p. 2-93.
  14. ↑ Zalosh (2008), p. 2-94.
  15. ↑ 15.0 15.1 15.2 Davenport (2008), p. 7-55.
  16. ↑ Ahrens et al. (2008), p. 3-86.
  17. ↑ Ahrens et al. (2008), p. 3-87.
  18. ↑ 18.0 18.1 18.2 Santis (2008), p. 6-247.
  19. ↑ Zalosh (2008), p. 2-97.
  20. ↑ 20.0 20.1 Penney (2008), p. 5-31.
  21. ↑ 21.0 21.1 Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. D-11.
  22. ↑ Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. E-8.
  23. ↑ 23.00 23.01 23.02 23.03 23.04 23.05 23.06 23.07 23.08 23.09 23.10 23.11 Santis (2008), p. 6-255.
  24. ↑ Santis (2008), p. 6-252.
  25. ↑ Davenport (2008), p. 7-43.
  26. ↑ Santis (2008), p. 6-254.
  27. ↑ Santis (2008), p. 6-256.

References

  • Ahrens, M., Frazier, P., & Kelch, G. (2008). Use of fire incident data and statistics. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 3-61–3-92). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Davenport, J. A. (2008). Storage and handling of chemicals. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 7-43–7-55). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Drysdale, D. (2008). Physics and chemistry of fire. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 2-3–2-20). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Grant, C. C. (2002). Halon design calculations. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 4-149–4-172). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
  • Iqbal, N., & Salley, M. H. (2004). Fire Dynamics Tools (FDTs): Quantitative fire hazard analysis methods for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Fire Protection Inspection Program (NUREG-1805). U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
  • Penney, G. (2008). Disaster preparedness education. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 5-29–5-43). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Routhier, B. (2008). Fire safety in commercial vehicles. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 21-15–21-27). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Santis, L. D. (2008). Explosives and blasting agents. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 6-247–6-256). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Van Rossum, E. (2027). Introduction to Fire Safety Engineering. Fire Safety Academy.
  • Wright, C. J. (2008a). Managing the response to hazardous material incidents. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 13-117–13-144). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Wright, C. J. (2008b). Rail transportation systems. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 21-109–21-134). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Zalosh, R. (2008). Explosions. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 2-93–2-106). National Fire Protection Association.