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Contents
  1. 1Why escalator openings need protection
  2. 2Protection of the floor opening
  3. 3Enclosure methods
  4. 4Escalators and means of escape
  5. 5Escalators in rail transit stations
  6. 6The King's Cross fire and the trench effect
  7. 7Fire prevention, inspection and limitations
  8. 8See also
  9. 9Notes
  10. 10References

Escalator fire protection is the set of measures that keeps the floor openings around escalators from spreading fire and smoke between storeys, and keeps escalators from becoming a fire hazard or an egress trap. An escalator is a power-driven, inclined, continuous stairway that raises or lowers passengers, and an escalator that connects floors passes through a floor opening.[1] In US practice, as summarised in the 2008 Fire Protection Handbook, NFPA 101 treats this opening like any other vertical opening. It must be enclosed, or, in a building sprinklered throughout, protected by alternative means such as a draft curtain with closely spaced sprinklers.[1] Older methods combine detection with smoke exhaust and a water curtain, or with water spray, and enclosure methods use rolling shutters or fire-rated enclosures with doors.[1][2]

Escalators themselves are installed under ASME A17.1, the safety code for elevators and escalators.[3] In new buildings they cannot form part of the means of egress, but in some existing buildings and in many rail transit stations they still carry people out in an emergency.[2][4] The 1987 fire at King's Cross Underground station in London, which killed 31 people, showed that a fire on an inclined escalator can spread far faster than on a level floor.[5][6]

Why escalator openings need protection

Unprotected vertical openings have been responsible for many large loss-of-life fires.[7] Such openings act as a chimney: smoke, hot gases and burning pyrolysis products flow upward under the stack effect and then spread out horizontally on the floors above.[7] The handbook calls the protection of vertical openings one of the most significant factors in the design of multistorey buildings, from the standpoint of life safety and exit design.[8] The Life Safety Code accordingly gives detailed requirements for the enclosing walls, doors, stairs, ramps and escalators of an exit system.[7]

Escalators create such openings by design. They were first found mainly in department stores and in bus and airline terminals, and are now common in offices, hospitals, banks, sports arenas and other places where many people must move quickly between floors.[1] In multistorey stores, vertical movement is most effectively achieved with escalators and stairs in open wells in highly visible and accessible areas.[9] The same open arrangement is preferred in transit stations, where escalators often penetrate two or more levels to reach a platform.[4] The handbook notes that it is common to find escalator installations with unprotected floor openings.[10]

The escalator itself is also a fuel path. On an inclined surface, flames can attach to the fuel and spread upward much as on a wall.[6] Introduction to Fire Safety Engineering explains that in upward flame spread along a vertical surface, much heat goes to the material above the flames, which preheats it and speeds up the spread.[11] Moving walks, which may be installed at an incline between floors, share these features. Some use a combustible belt, essentially a large conveyor belt, that can spread a fire by itself, and all moving walks can carry burning items along their length.[12]

Protection of the floor opening

NFPA 101, as described in the 2008 handbook, requires escalator floor openings to be enclosed or protected like other vertical openings.[1] In buildings protected throughout by a sprinkler system, escalators need not be enclosed if they are protected by alternative means. The method current in 2008 is the sprinkler draft curtain method detailed in NFPA 13.[1] A draft curtain 457 mm (18 in.) deep surrounds the escalator opening on the underside of the floor to which the escalator ascends. A row of automatic sprinklers outside the draft stop surrounds the escalator well.[1] In the handbook's typical installation, the sprinklers are not more than 1.83 m (6 ft) apart and lie 152 to 305 mm (6 to 12 in.) from the draft stop.[13]

The handbook does not spell out in words how the draft stop works in this method. In its drawing of the partial enclosure method, however, the stairway soffit is labelled as a curtain board that restricts the lateral spread of heat and smoke.[14] Elsewhere, the handbook notes that draft curtains or curtain boards reduce the horizontal spread of smoke and heat along a ceiling.[15] Codes in use when the World Trade Center towers were designed already contained this idea. NIST's comparison lists a 6 ft sprinkler spacing with an 18 in. draft curtain for escalators in the Chicago Building Code of the time.[16] The New York City code of the same period required a ¾-hour enclosure for escalators not used as exits, but allowed escalators connecting only two storeys to be unenclosed.[16]

Two older methods, recognised in previous editions of NFPA 101, are still found in existing buildings.[1] The sprinkler vent method combines automatic fire or smoke detection, an automatic exhaust system and an automatic water curtain. When a detector senses a fire, an automatic damper opens and vents smoke and hot gases through a large exhaust duct. Replacement air enters through an outdoor air intake above the escalator opening.[1] To control the smoke, an exhaust rate of about 60 air changes per hour is required, which replaces the air in the protected space about once a minute.[1] The sprinkler curtain provides a thermal barrier, and the system must be designed so that the sprinklers and the vents are both effective, a problem known as sprinkler-vent interaction.[1]

The spray nozzle method combines automatic fire or smoke detection with high-velocity water spray nozzles.[2] There must be enough nozzles, with suitable discharge angles, to fill the escalator opening between the top of the wellway housing and the treadway completely with a dense water spray.[2] Both older methods depend on detection, controls and, for the vent method, mechanical exhaust, whereas the draft curtain method relies only on the sprinklers and a fixed baffle.[1][2]

Enclosure methods

Two methods of enclosing the escalator opening are used in both new and existing buildings: the rolling shutter method and the partial enclosure method.[2] In the rolling shutter method, escalators above the street floor are protected by automatic self-closing rolling shutters that completely enclose the top of the escalator wellway.[2] To avoid injuries, the escalator must stop automatically before the shutter begins to close. The shutter should close slowly and have a pressure-sensitive leading edge that stops it on contact.[2] Rolling steel shutters are not recommended at the tops of escalators below the street floor, even where these escalators are not required exits under NFPA 101.[2] People escaping from a basement served by escalators could be trapped by a closed shutter at street level, although approved means of egress are available to them elsewhere.[2]

The partial enclosure method uses two fire-rated enclosures, one for the down escalator and one for the up escalator, to stop the spread of smoke and fire.[2] Fire doors, held open in normal use by electrical or pneumatic holder-closer devices, are released automatically when fire is detected.[14] A door that is not fully open must signal the escalator, which then stops automatically.[2] The enclosure should have a fire resistance rating equal to that of the floor-ceiling assemblies. No unprotected escalator penetration should extend over more than two floors.[2] In the handbook's typical installation, a recessed baffle at the ceiling prevents the first sprinkler that opens from wetting the adjacent sprinklers.[14]

Escalators and means of escape

In new buildings, escalators cannot be used as part of the means of egress under the codes described in the 2008 handbook.[2] Modern escalator design requires steps to be removed for normal maintenance, which makes the escalator unusable. A stopped escalator also presents a tripping hazard, because the first and last few steps do not have uniform riser heights.[2] Escalators are not an acceptable component of a means of egress in new construction in any occupancy, nor in existing buildings in many occupancies.[10]

In some existing buildings, escalators are still part of the means of egress. They should then be arranged to run only in the direction of egress, or they should be stopped during a fire.[2] Where the evacuation plan relies on escalators, efficient crowd control is needed to avoid serious crowding. NFPA 101 requires the openings of existing escalators used as required exits to be enclosed in the same manner as exit stairs.[2] Enclosed escalators and moving walkways in existing buildings are among the permissible types of exit.[17] Where unenclosed stairs and escalators connect other floors with the street floor, all communicating levels in the same fire area count as one floor area when the required egress capacity is determined.[18]

Earlier codes were more generous. The New York City Building Code of 1968, used for the World Trade Center towers, allowed escalators built to its rules to serve as exits in place of interior stairs.[19][20] It rated stairs and escalators in mercantile, business and assembly occupancies at 60 persons per 559 mm (22 in.) unit of egress width.[21] It also required sprinklers in high-rise mercantile spaces with an unenclosed stair or escalator between two or more floors.[22]

Escalators can move many people, which is both their value and a hazard. The SFPE Handbook gives a flow of 1.5 persons per second, or 90 persons per minute, for an escalator of 1.22 m (4 ft) nominal width. It notes that codes do not necessarily give escalators egress capacity credit, because of use and maintenance difficulties.[23] Critical occupancy is the gradual overloading of a pedestrian space, beginning below 0.28 m² (3 ft²) per person.[24] Because they deliver passengers continuously, escalators have caused critical occupancy fatalities where the space at the discharge end is restricted.[24] The handbook chapter on crowd management lists the landings at the discharge ends of escalators among the places where crowd pressure can push people over guardrails or down stairs.[25]

Escalators in rail transit stations

Most new rail transit systems described in the 2008 handbook installed escalators as the primary means to enter and exit stations.[4] Many designers prefer an open environment throughout a station, and vertical penetration of more than one floor without enclosures has been accomplished in some systems by increasing other fire protection measures.[4] Escalators designed to be reversible are acceptable as emergency exits, but they should not account for more than the number of exit units at any one level specified by NFPA 130.[4]

When escalators are designed as required exits, their usability in an emergency must be studied seriously.[4] Provisions must be made to stop all platform-bound escalators so that they can be used for egress, and reversible escalators should be set to run in the exit direction. NFPA 130 contains requirements for stopping escalators in a way that prevents injuries to passengers.[4] For underground stations, the handbook recommends automatic sprinklers with flow alarms and supervision in concessions, storage and fare collection areas, and in the steel truss area of all escalators in a single-entry station.[26] It names poor housekeeping and electrical fires in escalator machine rooms among the possible causes of station fires.[26]

The King's Cross fire and the trench effect

The King's Cross fire of 18 November 1987 in London is treated in several chapters of both the NFPA and the SFPE handbooks.[6][27] The fire originated within an escalator and killed 30 occupants and one firefighter.[28] It spread much more rapidly than expected up the 30° incline of a wooden escalator and trapped many people in the ticketing area at the top.[6]

It had been assumed that a local fire at any point on the escalator would spread sideways like the creeping flame spread of a pool fire.[6] Burner experiments by de Ris and Orloff had shown, however, that flames attach to an upward-facing burning surface inclined more than 15° from horizontal. Flame spread and heat transfer along the incline then behave much more like those on a vertical surface than on a horizontal one.[6] The escalator channel was inclined at more than double this angle, so the flames attached and spread rapidly, as on a vertical wall.[6]

Scale-model experiments and extensive field model calculations confirmed this scenario.[6] The SFPE Handbook explains the role of the escalator's sidewalls, which caused the flames to hug the steps.[27] This behaviour is known as the trench effect.

Computational fluid dynamics played an unusual part in the investigation. During the official inquiry, the model predicted that the flames would not rise in a vertical plume but would lie down in the trench of the escalator.[29] Only a study of sensitivity to the fire source conditions, and later physical tests, showed that this unexpected prediction was correct.[29] The flames lay down only when entrainment air could come from above and below the fire but not from the sides, which happened once the fire had spread across the escalator's width. In the published simulations, a 1.6 MW fire across the whole width lay in the trench, while a 0.5 MW fire across one third of the width rose vertically.[29][30] The authors compare the phenomenon with forest fires that accelerate up slopes through flame leaning.[29]

For design, the case shows that the geometry of an escalator, its incline and the sidewalls of its channel, governs how fast a fire spreads along it.[6][27] The handbook chapter on assembly occupancies uses King's Cross, together with the 1996 fire at Düsseldorf airport, to illustrate the potential for loss of life in unsprinklered passenger terminals.[28] The SFPE Handbook adds that at King's Cross the escalator fire had been burning for some time before attempts were made to close the station.[31]

Fire prevention, inspection and limitations

Housekeeping is an important factor in escalator fire prevention: the truss and machine areas should be kept free from oil, grease and dust, under a periodic cleaning schedule.[12] The electrical installation of escalators and moving walks falls under Article 620 of the National Electrical Code (NFPA 70), as summarised in the 2008 handbook. Receptacles of 125 V, 15 A and 20 A in escalator and moving walk wellways must be of the ground-fault circuit-interrupter type.[32] Existing escalators should at least conform to ASME A17.3, the safety code for existing elevators and escalators, which NFPA 101 requires. Equipment covered by ASME A17.1 must be tested and inspected periodically, with ASME A17.2 as a guide.[12]

Each protection method has limits. The draft curtain method is permitted only in buildings sprinklered throughout.[1] The sprinkler vent method needs careful design so that both sprinklers and vents remain effective. Shutters and fire doors must stop the escalator before they close, and shutters below the street floor can trap people.[1][2] A stopped escalator remains a tripping hazard, and a running one can overload its discharge landing.[2][24]

A common misconception is that an escalator is simply a moving stair and can be counted as one. The codes described in the 2008 handbook do not accept new escalators as egress components, and the SFPE Handbook notes that their flow is not necessarily credited.[10][23] A second misconception is that fire spread on an escalator resembles fire spread on a floor. King's Cross showed that an inclined, walled channel behaves more like a wall, and that a fire across its full width can lie down in the trench.[6][29]

See also

Notes

  1. ↑ 1.00 1.01 1.02 1.03 1.04 1.05 1.06 1.07 1.08 1.09 1.10 1.11 1.12 1.13 Donoghue (2008), p. 10-65.
  2. ↑ 2.00 2.01 2.02 2.03 2.04 2.05 2.06 2.07 2.08 2.09 2.10 2.11 2.12 2.13 2.14 2.15 2.16 2.17 2.18 Donoghue (2008), p. 10-66.
  3. ↑ Donoghue (2008), p. 10-57.
  4. ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 Peacock (2008), p. 21-102.
  5. ↑ Peacock (2008), p. 21-101.
  6. ↑ 6.00 6.01 6.02 6.03 6.04 6.05 6.06 6.07 6.08 6.09 Alpert (2008), p. 2-25.
  7. ↑ 7.0 7.1 7.2 Davoodi (2008), p. 18-12.
  8. ↑ Lathrop (2008a), p. 4-75.
  9. ↑ Schultz (2008), p. 20-98.
  10. ↑ 10.0 10.1 10.2 Lathrop (2008a), p. 4-87.
  11. ↑ Van Rossum (2027), §4.3.
  12. ↑ 12.0 12.1 12.2 Donoghue (2008), p. 10-67.
  13. ↑ Donoghue (2008), p. 10-65, Figure 10.3.5.
  14. ↑ 14.0 14.1 14.2 Donoghue (2008), p. 10-66, Figure 10.3.8.
  15. ↑ J. Moore (2008), p. 20-164.
  16. ↑ 16.0 16.1 Razza and Grill (2005b), p. 19.
  17. ↑ Lathrop (2008a), p. 4-81.
  18. ↑ Lathrop (2008a), p. 4-84.
  19. ↑ Grill and Johnson (2005b), p. 4.
  20. ↑ Grill and Johnson (2005b), p. 25.
  21. ↑ Grill and Johnson (2005b), p. 21.
  22. ↑ Grill and Johnson (2005b), p. 29.
  23. ↑ 23.0 23.1 Proulx (2002), p. 3-364.
  24. ↑ 24.0 24.1 24.2 Fruin (2008), p. 4-94.
  25. ↑ Fruin (2008), p. 4-101.
  26. ↑ 26.0 26.1 Peacock (2008), p. 21-106.
  27. ↑ 27.0 27.1 27.2 Quintiere (2002b), p. 2-254.
  28. ↑ 28.0 28.1 Miller and Roether (2008), p. 20-89.
  29. ↑ 29.0 29.1 29.2 29.3 29.4 Cox and Kumar (2002), p. 3-207.
  30. ↑ Cox and Kumar (2002), p. 3-208.
  31. ↑ Purser (2002), p. 2-142.
  32. ↑ Milatovich (2008), p. 8-161.

References

  • Alpert, R. L. (2008). Physics of fire configuration. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 2-21–2-29). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Cox, G., & Kumar, S. (2002). Modeling enclosure fires using CFD. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 3-194–3-218). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
  • Davoodi, H. (2008). Confinement of fire in buildings. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 18-3–18-21). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Donoghue, E. A. (2008). Building transportation systems. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 10-57–10-68). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Fruin, J. J. (2008). Techniques of crowd management. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 4-93–4-102). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Grill, R. A., & Johnson, D. A. (2005b). Fire protection and life safety provisions applied to the design and construction of WTC 1, 2, and 7 and post-construction provisions applied after occupancy (NIST NCSTAR 1-1D). National Institute of Standards and Technology.
  • Lathrop, J. K. (2008a). Concepts of egress design. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 4-69–4-91). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Milatovich, R. M. (2008). Electrical systems and appliances. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 8-127–8-173). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Miller, G., & Roether, E. (2008). Assembly occupancies. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 20-85–20-95). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Moore, J. (2008). Storage occupancies. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 20-157–20-178). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Peacock, T. (2008). Fixed guideway transit and light rail systems. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 21-101–21-107). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Proulx, G. (2002). Movement of people: The evacuation timing. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 3-342–3-366). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
  • Purser, D. A. (2002). Toxicity assessment of combustion products. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 2-83–2-171). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
  • Quintiere, J. G. (2002b). Surface flame spread. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 2-246–2-257). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
  • Razza, J. C., & Grill, R. A. (2005b). Comparison of codes, standards, and practices in use at the time of the design and construction of World Trade Center 1, 2, and 7 (NIST NCSTAR 1-1E). National Institute of Standards and Technology.
  • Schultz, E. (2008). Mercantile occupancies. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 20-97–20-103). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Van Rossum, E. (2027). Introduction to Fire Safety Engineering. Fire Safety Academy.