Contents
- 1Containing a layer beneath an open roof space
- 2Vents, replacement air and other protective systems
- 3What the system is intended to protect
- 4Fire locations and communicating spaces
- 5Smoke filling before extraction operates
- 6Choosing an analysis method
- 7How the two systems influence each other
- 8See also
- 9Notes
- 10References
A draft curtain is a downward-projecting barrier beneath a roof or ceiling that limits the lateral spread of a hot smoke layer. It helps define a smoke reservoir while leaving the lower part of the space open. The SFPE Handbook discusses this arrangement within smoke and heat venting, where smoke accumulation and removal must be considered together.[1][2]
The curtain banks heat and smoke within a defined ceiling area. It does not provide the same enclosure as a full-height separating wall. Its depth, location and relationship to the expected smoke layer affect when smoke can pass beneath it. Vents or mechanical extraction provide a separate route for removing the collected gases.[2]
The arrangement also influences the ceiling jet that heats detectors, sprinklers and thermal releases. Detector spacing and the position of a fusible link therefore interact with the flow geometry. The NFPA handbook gives particular attention to sprinkler-vent interaction and cautions against assuming that the separate systems' benefits simply add together.[3]
Containing a layer beneath an open roof space
A rising plume entrains air and carries smoke towards the ceiling. Without sufficient boundaries, the hot flow spreads laterally through a large building. The NFPA handbook describes curtain boards as a means of retaining the flow within a selected roof area. This can support prompt operation of vents exposed to the accumulated heat.[4]
Smoke and heat exhaust ventilation then removes gases from the reservoir. The curtain determines part of its geometry, but it does not supply exhaust capacity. If the incoming plume exceeds removal, the layer continues to deepen. Once the layer reaches the curtain's lower edge, smoke can spill into adjoining areas.[2][1]
The handbook relates curtain depth to the intended smoke-layer depth. Its 2008 account also gives geometric guidance for the venting arrangements being discussed. Such dimensions belong to that historical method and its stated assumptions; they do not establish a universal curtain size for every sprinklered warehouse, atrium or ceiling height.[2]
A special hazard can justify a more local reservoir arrangement. The handbook illustrates deeper boards around a defined process area; the relevant boundary is the path of the smoke layer, rather than the floor plan alone. Openings, roof slopes and equipment can alter that path and the location of the collected gases.[5]
Materials and support also belong to the arrangement. The handbook describes substantial noncombustible boards that resist smoke passage during the intended exposure. A decorative suspended element does not establish those functions by appearance; its continuity and relationship with the roof determine whether it creates the assumed reservoir boundary.[5]
Vents, replacement air and other protective systems
Removing gases requires replacement air to enter; the NFPA handbook describes low-level inlets as an integral part of venting, because restricted inlet area can throttle the exhaust. The inlet sequence also matters: a roof vent can open before adequate air admission exists. The actual system therefore includes the reservoir, outlets, inlets and their operation.[6]
A large outlet can draw clear air from beneath a shallow layer; this is plugholing, which uses part of the exhaust capacity without removing the intended smoke. Reservoir depth and the distribution of extraction points consequently interact. Nominal fan capacity alone cannot demonstrate the rate of smoke removal.[7][6]
Curtains can also obstruct hot gases moving towards a sprinkler or affect the water distribution reaching the fire. The NFPA handbook's research review reports that draft curtains changed sprinkler operation in some tests; those results depended on the test fuel, fire location and arrangement. They do not establish a single beneficial or adverse effect for every installation.[8]
The complete control sequence requires an operational check as well as a component inspection. The NFPA handbook describes interfaces between fire alarms and building ventilation systems, often installed by different trades. Correctly operating individual components does not establish that their combined sequence is correct; the initiating signal, damper positions and fan operation must describe the same intended fire condition.[9]
The Australian Building Codes Board's 2020 data sheets distinguish installation checks from tests of system performance in its required operating modes; they describe defect correction followed by retesting. These activities connect the design assumptions to the installed arrangement. A completed drawing or equipment label cannot supply the results of those operational tests.[10]
Changes to a building can alter both its leakage and its controls. New partitions change flow paths, while altered ventilation zones can change which spaces receive or lose air. Continued inspection and maintenance therefore concern the system configuration as well as the condition of each device. Access for checking dampers and other equipment supports that continuing assessment.[10]
Dependence on another protection system also belongs in the assessment. Where the smoke design assumes that sprinklers limit the fire, failure of suppression can increase smoke production and thermal exposure. The data sheets identify this as a linked failure condition; the two systems cannot be assigned independent successful outcomes when one depends on the other's performance.[11]
What the system is intended to protect
Atria connect spaces that might otherwise be separated into smaller compartments. Without suitable barriers, smoke can spread through the shared volume and reach communicating areas. Milke identifies this as a different problem from smoke control in a well-compartmented building. Pressure differences across barriers cannot perform the same function where the required physical separation is absent.[12]
The large volume can initially moderate the hazard. Air mixed into the plume reduces the concentration of combustion products and lowers the smoke temperature. However, dilution also increases the quantity of gas delivered to the layer. A benefit in concentration therefore accompanies an increased smoke-handling demand.[13]
Life-safety assessment considers several properties of the smoke environment. These include layer-interface height, visibility, temperature and the concentrations of harmful gases. The layer height describes whether an occupied level becomes immersed in smoke; it does not, by itself, describe the severity of every possible exposure within that layer.[13]
Reduced visibility can slow movement and increase disorientation. Milke also describes the potential for trips and falls where occupants cannot see obstructions or balcony edges. Longer evacuation then extends the period of exposure to smoke. A low predicted temperature does not remove these visibility-related effects.[13]
Property objectives can differ from life-safety objectives. Smoke can stain contents, expose equipment to corrosive products and interrupt the use of a building. A smoke concentration that permits short-term movement can still be unacceptable for sensitive contents. The chosen performance objective therefore influences the conditions that the system is intended to maintain.[13]
Fire locations and communicating spaces
The design distinguishes a fire on the atrium floor from a fire in an adjoining room. A fire remote from walls can produce an approximately axisymmetric plume, with air entering around its perimeter. Wall and corner locations restrict some of that air access. Their entrainment behaviour therefore differs from the free-plume case.[14]
A fire in a shop or another communicating space can produce a balcony spill plume. Smoke first rises to an intermediate ceiling, travels beneath it and then spills around an edge. Its subsequent rise into the atrium has a different geometry from a plume rising directly above a floor-level fire. The width and route of the spill become relevant inputs.[15]
An adjoining-room scenario can involve several stages of mixing before smoke reaches the upper layer; modelling only a fire in the open atrium can omit those stages. Milke therefore distinguishes a balcony spill plume from a plume rising directly above a fire in the open volume. The assessment includes the actual connections between the room of origin and the smoke-exhausted space.[16]
A balcony is not represented solely by subtracting its height from the plume rise. Milke identifies horizontal travel, the opening from the adjoining room and the width of the spill as relevant characteristics. Vertical barriers beneath a balcony can restrict lateral spreading. Their effect belongs to the particular smoke route being assessed.[15]
A fire curtain also raises a barrier-performance question within the overall strategy. Milke relates the effectiveness of separating barriers to leakage, pressure differences and resistance to the smoke's thermal exposure. A nominal boundary on a drawing does not determine those properties; the barrier arrangement and its role in the smoke path remain explicit parts of the scenario.[17]
Smoke filling before extraction operates
Smoke does not necessarily form a complete upper layer immediately after ignition. It first travels upwards in the plume and then spreads horizontally beneath the ceiling. Milke calls these intervals the plume and ceiling-jet transport lags. In a large atrium, the time required to establish a layer can be appreciable.[18]
Once a layer develops, its interface can descend rapidly. A high interface permits a long plume rise, with substantial entrainment before the plume enters the layer. As the interface descends, the clear plume height decreases and the entrainment changes; this makes the filling process time-dependent even when a simplified fire source is used.[19]
The period before system actuation therefore matters separately from the eventual exhaust capacity. A calculation of a steady layer after extraction begins does not establish the conditions during detection and start-up. Smoke can already have reached occupied levels during that earlier period. Milke evaluates the filling and vented periods as distinct stages of the same hazard analysis.[18][20]
Smoke stratification can also occur at an intermediate elevation below the roof. Warm air accumulated near the top of an atrium can reduce the relative buoyancy of an arriving plume. The plume may then stop rising before reaching ceiling-mounted detectors. This condition differs from a smoke layer that has formed at the ceiling and subsequently descended.[21]
Milke discusses beam detection below the expected stratification elevation as one response to this scenario. The objective is to intercept smoke where it actually travels. The source also describes how operating exhaust can remove the warm upper air and change the subsequent smoke movement. Detection and ventilation assumptions therefore need a consistent account of the initial temperature profile.[21]
Choosing an analysis method
A zone model represents an atrium using a small number of regions with uniform properties. This can describe layer development efficiently where its assumptions fit the geometry and smoke behaviour. Van Rossum identifies uniform layers, simple geometry and relatively undisturbed plume rise as central limitations. Complex local flow cannot be inferred merely from the model's average layer conditions.[22]
Milke identifies situations where that simplification becomes questionable. A narrow atrium can confine the widening plume before it reaches the ceiling. A broad atrium can have relevant horizontal differences within the smoke. Sprinkler cooling and spray-driven mixing can also alter the assumed separation between upper and lower regions.[17][21]
Field models and physical scale models provide other ways to investigate selected problems. Milke discusses their use for irregular geometries and situations where local conditions matter. Their selection still depends on the phenomena and accuracy required. A more detailed representation does not remove the need to define the fire, openings, thermal boundaries and operating sequence.[17]
Comparing model results requires a consistent definition of the smoke interface. Milke distinguishes the first detectable smoke in experiments from the boundary between idealised zones; their numerical elevations can differ without either calculation describing exactly the same quantity. The assessment therefore identifies which interface definition is being compared with an occupied level or another design criterion.[19]
Environmental and system assumptions also influence the appropriate method. Milke includes wind, stack effects, interacting ventilation systems and the period of interest among the selection considerations. A calculation that excludes an influence cannot demonstrate its insignificance merely through a precise numerical result. Its applicability instead rests on the stated relationship between the chosen model and the actual scenario.[17]
How the two systems influence each other
Sprinklers and fusible-link vents respond to the same flow. Both are triggered when the hot ceiling jet heats their fusible links or glass bulbs.[23] The physical phenomena behind each system can be expected to interact, to a greater or lesser extent, when both are present.[24] Vent design can therefore change sprinkler performance, and sprinkler design can change vent performance.[24]
In one direction, sprinkler sprays cool the smoke that rises from the fire and fills the space.[24] A vent design based only on the hot, uncooled smoke does not account for this cooling, so less smoke flows out of the vents than intended.[24] If the reduction is significant, the vents must be larger.[24]
In the other direction, ventilation can change where the hot gases go. The data sheets of the Australian Building Codes Board note that air flows can direct combustion products towards or away from detection devices, including sprinkler heads.[25] They also warn that a vent or exhaust system may remove hot gases before the sprinklers activate.[26] This could compromise the sprinkler system, especially one designed for early suppression.[26] Fast make-up air inlets close to a fire may increase its heat release rate or deflect its plume.[26]
See also
Notes
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 Cooper (2002), pp. 3-219–3-224.
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 Cote et al. (2008), §18.4, pp. 18-59–18-60.
- ↑ Cote et al. (2008), §18.4, pp. 18-58–18-60, 18-72.
- ↑ Cote et al. (2008), §18.4, pp. 18-58–18-59.
- ↑ 5.0 5.1 Cote et al. (2008), §18.4, p. 18-59.
- ↑ 6.0 6.1 Cote et al. (2008), §18.4, p. 18-60.
- ↑ Cote et al. (2008), §18.3, p. 18-53.
- ↑ Cote et al. (2008), §18.4, pp. 18-58, 18-72.
- ↑ Cote et al. (2008), §14.4, p. 14-47.
- ↑ 10.0 10.1 Australian Building Codes Board (2020), Data Sheet C4, pp. 130–131.
- ↑ Australian Building Codes Board (2020), Data Sheet C4, pp. 131–132.
- ↑ Milke (2002), pp. 4-292–4-294.
- ↑ 13.0 13.1 13.2 13.3 Milke (2002), pp. 4-292–4-293.
- ↑ Milke (2002), pp. 4-299–4-300.
- ↑ 15.0 15.1 Milke (2002), pp. 4-301–4-302.
- ↑ Milke (2002), pp. 4-301–4-302.
- ↑ 17.0 17.1 17.2 17.3 Milke (2002), pp. 4-294–4-295.
- ↑ 18.0 18.1 Milke (2002), pp. 4-295–4-296.
- ↑ 19.0 19.1 Milke (2002), pp. 4-296–4-298.
- ↑ Milke (2002), pp. 4-302–4-303.
- ↑ 21.0 21.1 21.2 Milke (2002), pp. 4-304–4-305.
- ↑ Van Rossum (2027), §§9.1–9.2.
- ↑ Cooper (2002), p. 3-239.
- ↑ 24.0 24.1 24.2 24.3 24.4 Cooper (2002), p. 3-236.
- ↑ Australian Building Codes Board (2020), Data Sheet B1, p. 20.
- ↑ 26.0 26.1 26.2 Australian Building Codes Board (2020), Data Sheet B1, p. 21.
References
- Australian Building Codes Board. (2020). Fire safety verification method: Data sheets (Handbook annex, Print version 1.1).
- Cooper, L. Y. (2002). Smoke and heat venting. In P. J. DiNenno (Ed.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 3-219–3-242). National Fire Protection Association.
- Cote, A. E., Grant, C. C., Hall, J. R., Jr., & Solomon, R. E. (Eds.). (2008). Fire protection handbook (20th ed.). National Fire Protection Association.
- Milke, J. A. (2002). Smoke management in covered malls and atria. In P. J. DiNenno (Ed.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 4-292–4-310). National Fire Protection Association.
- Van Rossum, E. (2027). Introduction to Fire Safety Engineering. Fire Safety Academy.