Contents
A cable fire is a fire in which the polymer insulation and jackets of electrical or communication cables burn, either as the item first ignited or as fuel that carries flame along a cable run. The hazard is greatest where many cables are grouped in trays, because grouped cables spread flame much faster than single cables.[1] A cable fire is often small, but it can destroy circuits, release toxic and corrosive smoke and shut down a power plant or a telephone network for weeks.[2][3][4] The 1975 cable fire at the Browns Ferry nuclear power plant led to a worldwide reappraisal of fire protection for nuclear power plants.[3] Engineers estimate the heat release of burning trays from bench-scale data and compare cable temperatures with damage thresholds of 205 °C for thermoplastic and 330 °C for thermoset cables.[5][6] Most of these methods come from the US nuclear industry and from the 20th edition of the NFPA Fire Protection Handbook (2008), so they reflect US practice of that period.
Cable construction and fire behaviour
An electrical cable carries power, control signals or instrument signals while keeping each conductor electrically isolated.[7] It consists of copper or aluminium conductors, each wrapped in insulation, with fillers, shields and an outer jacket.[8] The insulation provides the electrical function, while the jacket gives physical protection and sometimes extra flame retardancy.[8] A flame-retardant jacket slows flame spread, but it does not ensure that the circuit keeps working.[8] Because insulation and jackets are organic polymers, they burn under most fire conditions and release heat and toxic gases.[2]
Cable materials fall into two broad classes. Thermoplastic materials such as polyethylene (PE) and polyvinyl chloride (PVC) are not cross-linked; they melt when heated, and some produce dripping, flaming fires.[9] Thermoset materials such as cross-linked polyethylene (XLPE, also written XPE), ethylene propylene rubber and neoprene do not melt; they char, smoulder and burn in place.[8][10] Thermoset insulation typically fails at about 350 °C or higher, while thermoplastic insulation often fails well below 218 °C.[8] Rubber or plastic jacketing on grouped cables has provided the fuel for fires in the electrical and communications industries.[11] The wider behaviour of these polymers is treated under Plastics in fire and Thermoplastics and thermosets.
A 1966 NFPA study of 24 fires in US power plants was probably the first to show that grouped cables spread flame much faster than single cables.[1] Tray tests have revealed several burn modes, from uniform flaming over the bundle to melting into a burning mass and deep-seated combustion in charring cables.[5] In the deep-seated mode, flames appear in sporadic bursts and a glowing region creeps slowly along the cables.[5] Such a fire can recede when smoke starves it of oxygen and reignite when fresh air arrives.[12]
Ignition sources and frequency
Electricity can start a fire through an arc or through overheating.[13] An arc at a loose terminal can ignite the insulation of the conductor and throw molten metal onto nearby combustibles.[13] The heat generated in a conductor is proportional to its resistance and to the square of the current.[13] Under design conditions this heating is almost never a hazard, because the National Electrical Code (NFPA 70) specifies the ampacity, the maximum safe current of each conductor.[14]
Fire hazard analyses usually assume that only power cables carry enough energy to ignite themselves.[2] They distinguish a fire that starts within a cable tray from an exposure fire, such as an oil spill or a waste bin, that later ignites the tray.[2] In the US fire risk method NUREG/CR-6850 (2005), self-ignited cable fires have a generic mean frequency of 4.4 × 10−3 per reactor year.[15] Cable fires caused by welding and cutting are counted separately, at 1.6 × 10−3 to 2.0 × 10−3 per reactor year.[15]
Two self-ignited cable fires at the San Onofre nuclear plant in 1968 show how electrical stress becomes fire.[16] Investigators found the most probable cause in thermally and mechanically stressed cables, undersized for their loads, and in fusing that fed fault current back through healthy phases.[17] In the second event, three stacked trays burned out over a length of 4.60 m (15 ft).[18] In motor control centre rooms, heat from arcing can make normally slow-burning cables in stacked trays readily combustible.[19] In US home structure fires in 1999–2002, electrical wire or cable insulation was the item first ignited in 6% of fires.[20]
Notable fires
The fire at the Browns Ferry plant in Alabama on 22 March 1975 is the classic cable fire.[21] Workers were using a candle to check for air leaks where cable trays passed through a wall into the reactor building.[21][18] The air flow drew the flame into polyurethane foam sealing the opening, and fire spread along the cables, shorting out backup safety systems.[21] Temperatures reached about 816 °C, and more than 1,600 cables in 117 conduits and 26 trays were damaged.[7] At one point all power to the emergency core cooling motors and valves of Unit 1 was lost.[7]
The most intense burning covered only about 3.3 m by 2.5 m, yet the fire burned for some 7 hours because of reluctance to use water.[8] Portable carbon dioxide and dry chemical extinguishers failed for hours, but once water was used the reactor building fire was out within minutes.[22] The handbook puts the property damage at $302.93 million in 2007 US dollars and the outage at one and a half years for two 1,065 MW units.[3] NUREG-1805 gives a direct fire loss of $10 million plus $200 million for replacement electricity over 18 months.[18] The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission then issued new requirements in 10 CFR 50.48 and Appendix R, which shaped Nuclear facility fire protection.[1]
At a fossil-fuel plant outside the United States, an electrical fault ignited cables that consumed 5 tons of PVC in 10 hours.[3] The damage was $45.19 million (2007 US dollars), and the plant was out of service for nearly a year.[3] At Hinsdale, Illinois, in May 1988, a telephone exchange fire burned for over 3 hours but stayed within cable trays in an area of 9 m by 12 m (30 ft by 40 ft).[4] Such fires are small by most measures, but their impact on the community can be large, as described under Telecommunications facility.[4]
Heat release and fire spread in cable trays
Cable insulation and jackets dominate the fuel load in most areas of a nuclear power plant.[5] A typical boiling-water reactor needs about 97 km of power cable, 80.5 km of control cable and 402 km of instrument cable.[7] Babrauskas notes that only a few of the almost endless combinations of cable, tray, stacking and ignition source have been studied.[23] No reliable general correlation exists for the heat release rate of a full-scale tray fire.[5]
The method most used is a correlation by Lee (1985), based on tray tests by Tewarson and colleagues and by Sumitra.[24] The peak full-scale heat release rate equals 0.45 times the peak bench-scale heat release rate per unit area, times the tray area that is actively pyrolysing.[5] The bench-scale value is measured under an irradiance of 60 kW/m².[25]
| Symbol | Description | Unit |
|---|---|---|
| Peak full-scale heat release rate of the tray fire | kW | |
| Peak bench-scale heat release rate per unit area at 60 kW/m² irradiance | kW/m² | |
| Exposed tray area that is actively pyrolysing | m² |
| Cable sample (insulation/jacket) | (kW/m²) |
|---|---|
| PE (sample "ld PE") | 1,071 |
| PE/PVC | 589 |
| XPE/FRXPE | 475 |
| XPE/neoprene | 354 |
| PE, nylon/PVC, nylon | 231 |
| XPE/XPE | 178 |
| Silicone, glass braid | 128 |
| Teflon | 98 |
For a self-ignited fire, NUREG/CR-6850 takes an initial burning area equal to the square of the tray width.[26] Otherwise the area is the tray width times the burning length, and US nuclear plant trays are typically 0.6 to 0.9 m wide.[27][28] If a cable is not listed, analysts may select the highest bench-scale value.[27]
NUREG/CR-6850 separates flame spread along one tray from fire propagation between trays.[29] For horizontal trays it recommends spread rates of 0.9 mm/s for PVC cable and 0.3 mm/s for XPE cable.[30] Upward spread is much faster: a 70 kW fire under a vertical tray gives 11 mm/s for XPE cable and 112 to 258 mm/s for PE/PVC cables.[30][31] Armoured cables with thermoset insulation and no coating are assumed not to spread flame.[31]
In a stack of horizontal trays, fire grows mainly upward and widens by about 35 degrees to each side at each level.[28] The rule comes from a Sandia test with 14 trays of XPE cable spaced 0.2 m horizontally and 0.27 m vertically.[28] The burning length of each higher tray follows from the tray below:[32]
| Symbol | Description | Unit |
|---|---|---|
| Burning length of tray n (lowest tray: length of the fire base below it) | m | |
| Elevation of tray n+1 above the bottom of the lowest tray | m |
The method assumes that the second tray ignites 4 minutes after the first and the third 3 minutes after the second.[32] Each later tray follows after 2 minutes and then 1 minute, so the sixth tray burns 11 minutes after the first.[32] The timings reflect the Sandia observation that the spread accelerated as the fire climbed.[28]
As a worked example, take an exposure fire with a base 1.0 m long under 0.6 m wide trays of PE/PVC cable, spaced 0.27 m apart.[28][25] The lowest tray burns over 1.0 m × 0.6 m = 0.60 m², which gives 0.45 × 589 × 0.60 = 159 kW. The second tray burns over 1.0 + 2 × 0.27 × tan 35 degrees = 1.38 m, or 0.83 m², adding about 220 kW four minutes later. With XPE/XPE cable the same trays release only about 49 kW and 67 kW, so the cable type largely sets the fire size. NUREG-1805 obtains 517 kW in the same way for 2 m² (21 ft²) of PE/PVC tray ignited by a waste bin fire.[33]
Cable damage and failure criteria
In a fire hazard analysis, cable failure means a loss of electrical continuity or a diversion of energy to an unintended circuit.[7] Fire can cause an open circuit, a short to ground or a hot short, in which an energised conductor touches another and can energise it.[34] Hot shorts can operate equipment spuriously and have sometimes dominated fire risk in US nuclear plant studies.[35] Instrument cables are the most easily damaged, control cables less so and power cables least.[2] Because one fire can fail many cables at once, cable fragility is the key concern in nuclear plant fire risk assessment.[35]
NUREG/CR-6850 (2005) uses the same generic screening criteria for damage and for ignition of cables.[6] In a tray with mixed cables, the thermoplastic criteria apply, and a thermoset cable with a thermoplastic jacket also counts as thermoplastic.[6][36] Conduit and fire-retardant coatings get no credit for delaying damage.[6][36] NUREG-1805 found little basis for an older screening value of 370 °C for qualified cables, because failures occur at much lower temperatures.[37]
| Cable type | Temperature criterion | Radiant heat flux criterion | Typical insulation materials |
|---|---|---|---|
| Thermoplastic | 205 °C (400 °F) | 6 kW/m² | PE, PVC, nylon, fluoropolymers |
| Thermoset | 330 °C (625 °F) | 11 kW/m² | XLPE, ethylene propylene rubber, neoprene, silicone rubber |
Damage takes time. A thermoplastic cable fails after about 30 minutes at 205 °C, 10 minutes at 260 °C and 1 minute at 370 °C.[38] A thermoset cable fails after about 28 minutes at 330 °C and 13 minutes at 350 °C.[39] Under radiant heating, both types take about 19 minutes at their threshold flux and 1 minute at 16 to 20 kW/m² or more.[40] The THIEF model, tested in the US CAROLFIRE programme, treats a cable as a heated homogeneous cylinder.[41] In those tests, failure times ranged from a few minutes to nearly half an hour, the longer times for cables in steel conduit.[42]
A simple screening check compares the temperature of the fire plume at tray height with these criteria. Above the mean flame height, the centreline temperature falls with height, measured from a virtual origin that replaces the fire by an equivalent point source.[43][44] The equations assume a convective fraction of 0.65 and standard atmospheric conditions.[43] The virtual origin expression is limited to pool fires and horizontal burning.[44]
| Symbol | Description | Unit |
|---|---|---|
| Plume centreline gas temperature at height h | °C | |
| Total heat release rate of the fire | kW | |
| Height above the fuel surface | m | |
| Height of the virtual origin above the fuel surface | m | |
| Diameter of the fire source | m | |
| Ambient temperature | °C |
The handbook applies this check to a 500 kW fire about 1 m across, 7 m below a power cable tray in a large hall at 20 °C.[44] The virtual origin lies at −0.02 m, and the plume temperature at the tray is only 66 °C.[44] With the tray 2.5 m above the same fire, still above the mean flame height of about 1.7 m, the equation gives 273 °C.[45] This exceeds the thermoplastic criterion of 205 °C but not the thermoset criterion of 330 °C.[6] A thermoplastic cable at about 270 °C fails within 8 to 10 minutes, so 8 minutes is the safe-side estimate.[38]
Testing and classification
In the United States, NFPA 70 sets four levels of flame spread performance for electrical and optical fibre cables, as summarised in the handbook (2008).[46] General-purpose cables are tested grouped in a vertical tray with a 20 kW flame and must not spread fire to the top of the 2.4 m tray.[46] Riser cables face a 145 kW flame in a two-storey shaft rig.[46] Plenum cables, the highest level, are tested horizontally under NFPA 262, a version of the Steiner tunnel test, with an 88 kW flame.[46] Their flame travel may not exceed 1.52 m, with a peak optical density of at most 0.5.[46]
In US nuclear plants the reference is IEEE 383, whose flame test applies a 21 kW burner for 20 minutes to cables on a rack 2.4 m high.[47] A cable is called qualified only if it also passes the electrical tests of the standard, and qualified cables are typically thermoset.[48][49] NFPA 850 recommends cable that passes the IEEE 383 flame test for generating plants, but even such cable burns under certain circumstances.[3] Parallel panel tests with 4.88 m high panels gave the technical basis of the FM Global cable standard FM 3972.[50]
Tewarson's fire propagation index (FPI), measured in an oxygen-enriched apparatus, sorts cables into groups.[51] Group 1 cables do not propagate fire beyond the ignition zone or do so in a decelerating way, while Group 3 cables propagate rapidly and need fire protection.[51] In a worked example, a PE/PVC cable had an FPI of 29 (Group 3) and a cross-linked polyolefin cable an FPI of 4 (Group 1).[52] Only the cable spreading room area with PE/PVC cables therefore needed fixed fire protection.[53]
In Europe, the FIPEC research project of the late 1990s led to a cable test with heat and smoke measurement, EN 50399.[46] The handbook lists the resulting European reaction to fire classes Aca to Fca, with extra classes for smoke, flaming droplets and acidity.[54] Cables are excluded from the single burning item test used for other construction products.[55]
| Class | Flame spread | Total heat release in 1200 s | Peak heat release rate | Fire growth rate index (FIGRA) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| B1ca | ≤ 1.75 m | ≤ 10 MJ | ≤ 20 kW | ≤ 120 W/s |
| B2ca | ≤ 1.5 m | ≤ 15 MJ | ≤ 30 kW | ≤ 150 W/s |
| Cca | ≤ 2.0 m | ≤ 30 MJ | ≤ 60 kW | ≤ 300 W/s |
| Dca | not set | ≤ 70 MJ | ≤ 400 kW | ≤ 1300 W/s |
Cable smoke is a hazard in its own right. Chlorine-containing polymers release hydrogen chloride during pyrolysis even without flaming, and PVC releases it at about 225 to 275 °C.[56] Most of the chlorine in PVC leaves as hydrogen chloride, which makes the smoke acrid and corrosive.[57] The gas is a potent sensory and pulmonary irritant.[58] For sensitive equipment, the handbook gives a sample design criterion of no more than 5 ppm of hydrogen chloride at the target.[59] For people, Hirschler argues that low heat release reduces the hazard almost irrespective of smoke toxicity, because all combustibles produce carbon monoxide.[60]
Protection and design practice
Generating plants traditionally concentrate cables in a cable spreading room below the control room.[3] The handbook recommends enclosing such areas in walls and floors of 2-hour fire resistance with protected openings.[3] Grouped cables in concealed spaces may spread fire, although usually slowly and not far; foam-insulated coaxial cable is an exception.[61]
Where trays pass through fire barriers, the openings need tested firestop systems that stop smoke as well as fire.[21] These systems receive an F rating for the time they stop flame and a T rating for the time they keep the unexposed side below 163 °C (325 °F).[62] The 2006 editions of NFPA 5000 and the International Building Code require an F rating equal to the barrier rating, as explained under F rating and T rating.[62] In a 2012 New Zealand survey of over 5,000 passive fire protection systems, 36.7% of large penetrations such as cable trays were unsealed.[63] A further 14.2% had ad hoc arrangements.[63]
Detection can be difficult, because deep-seated combustion takes place mainly under a cooler surface.[12] At Browns Ferry, the normal air flow possibly drew smoke away from the detector in the cable spreading room.[22] Fuel-specific signatures, such as hydrogen chloride from PVC wire insulation, may be valuable for detection in telecommunications facilities.[64]
Water is effective on cable fires. Fixed water spray for exposure protection of cable trays uses 4.1 to 12.2 L/min/m² (0.1 to 0.3 gpm/ft²) of exposed surface.[65] For motor control centre rooms, the handbook lists preaction sprinklers or water spray over exposed cables, detection and a total flooding gaseous system.[19] The handbook recommends a fire risk evaluation to decide whether areas with much grouped cable need sprinklers.[3]
In Sandia tests, Halon 1301 suppressed surface flames on cable trays quickly but took much longer on deep-seated fires.[66] A concentration of 6% with a 10-minute soak extinguished unqualified cables, while qualified cables needed 15 minutes.[67] In one test the bundle kept heating after discharge and reignited when air returned.[66] The handbook reports no systematic evaluation of clean agents on grouped cables.[68] The ISO clean agent standard therefore requires 95% of the heptane extinguishing concentration for bundles over 100 mm across, trays more than 20% full or tray stacks closer than 250 mm.[68] Energised cables remain a Class C fuel with a continuing energy input, which makes rekindling more likely.[69]
Limits and uncertainty
The methods rest on a small experimental base. NUREG/CR-6850 states that its cable fire methods apply only to conditions similar to the tests and that they have not been verified and validated.[47] Lee's correlation is based on flaming fires and is less accurate for complex tray arrays.[70] The flame spread estimates ignore a deteriorating room environment, which can increase spread rates.[71] A reliability study of a halon system in a computer facility estimated a failure probability of 0.05 for an electrical cable fire.[72]
The damage criteria are generic. The value of 330 °C does not bound all thermoset products, and one proprietary insulation degraded at 153 °C.[37][73] The thermoplastic data showed considerable scatter, with very short failure times at the lowest temperatures.[74] The relative standard uncertainty of cable failure times in the CAROLFIRE tests was estimated at 12%.[75]
Several common assumptions are wrong. A flame-retardant cable can resist flame spread and still fail electrically.[8] At Browns Ferry, cables in conduits near the burning trays were also damaged.[22] Putting out the surface flames does not guarantee that a deep-seated fire inside a bundle is out.[12]
See also
Notes
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. 7-1.
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. 7-2.
- ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 Sheridan (2008), p. 9-187.
- ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 Transue (2008), p. 9-170.
- ↑ 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. 7-3.
- ↑ 6.0 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 Nowlen et al. (2005b), p. H-1.
- ↑ 7.0 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. A-1.
- ↑ 8.0 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.5 8.6 Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. A-2.
- ↑ 9.0 9.1 Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. A-7.
- ↑ 10.0 10.1 Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. A-8.
- ↑ Benedetti and Colonna (2008), p. 6-226.
- ↑ 12.0 12.1 12.2 Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. B-40.
- ↑ 13.0 13.1 13.2 Milatovich (2008), p. 8-127.
- ↑ Milatovich (2008), pp. 8-127, 8-131.
- ↑ 15.0 15.1 Nowlen et al. (2005b), p. 6-3.
- ↑ Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. H-6.
- ↑ Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. H-7.
- ↑ 18.0 18.1 18.2 Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. H-8.
- ↑ 19.0 19.1 Milatovich (2008), p. 8-159.
- ↑ Ahrens et al. (2008), pp. 3-72–3-73.
- ↑ 21.0 21.1 21.2 21.3 Kampmeyer (2008), p. 18-73.
- ↑ 22.0 22.1 22.2 Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. H-9.
- ↑ Babrauskas (2002b), p. 3-16.
- ↑ Lee (1985), as cited in Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. 7-3.
- ↑ 25.0 25.1 25.2 Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. 7-4.
- ↑ Nowlen et al. (2005b), p. R-2.
- ↑ 27.0 27.1 Nowlen et al. (2005b), p. R-4.
- ↑ 28.0 28.1 28.2 28.3 28.4 Nowlen et al. (2005b), p. R-9.
- ↑ Nowlen et al. (2005b), p. R-5.
- ↑ 30.0 30.1 Nowlen et al. (2005b), p. R-7.
- ↑ 31.0 31.1 Nowlen et al. (2005b), p. R-8.
- ↑ 32.0 32.1 32.2 Nowlen et al. (2005b), p. R-10.
- ↑ Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. 7-8.
- ↑ Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. A-6.
- ↑ 35.0 35.1 Siu (2002), p. 5-220.
- ↑ 36.0 36.1 Nowlen et al. (2005b), p. H-2.
- ↑ 37.0 37.1 Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. A-11.
- ↑ 38.0 38.1 Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. A-18.
- ↑ Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. A-16.
- ↑ Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. A-19.
- ↑ Stroup et al. (2016), p. 3-3.
- ↑ Stroup et al. (2016), p. 6-48.
- ↑ 43.0 43.1 Budnick et al. (2008), p. 3-154.
- ↑ 44.0 44.1 44.2 44.3 Budnick et al. (2008), p. 3-155.
- ↑ Budnick et al. (2008), p. 3-153.
- ↑ 46.0 46.1 46.2 46.3 46.4 46.5 Hirschler (2008a), p. 6-45.
- ↑ 47.0 47.1 Nowlen et al. (2005b), p. R-1.
- ↑ Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. 7-5.
- ↑ Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. A-13.
- ↑ Madrzykowski and Stroup (2008), p. 2-44.
- ↑ 51.0 51.1 Tewarson (2002), p. 3-92.
- ↑ Tewarson (2002), p. 3-93.
- ↑ Tewarson (2002), p. 3-94.
- ↑ 54.0 54.1 Hirschler (2008a), p. 6-55.
- ↑ Hirschler (2008a), p. 6-49.
- ↑ Gann and Bryner (2008), p. 6-13.
- ↑ Benedetti and Colonna (2008), p. 6-222.
- ↑ Gann and Bryner (2008), p. 6-16.
- ↑ Mowrer and Rosenbaum (2008), p. 3-186.
- ↑ Hirschler (2008a), p. 6-50.
- ↑ Davoodi (2008), p. 18-11.
- ↑ 62.0 62.1 Kampmeyer (2008), p. 18-74.
- ↑ 63.0 63.1 Australian Building Codes Board (2020a), Data Sheet C5, pp. 158–159.
- ↑ Custer and Milke (2008), p. 2-76.
- ↑ Bell (2008), p. 16-183.
- ↑ 66.0 66.1 Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. B-43.
- ↑ Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. B-44.
- ↑ 68.0 68.1 DiNenno and Taylor (2008), p. 17-112.
- ↑ Harrington (2008), p. 17-125.
- ↑ Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. 7-6.
- ↑ Nowlen et al. (2005b), p. R-6.
- ↑ Steciak and Zalosh (1992), as cited in National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), p. 3.7-3.
- ↑ Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. A-12.
- ↑ Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. A-17.
- ↑ Stroup et al. (2016), p. 3-38.
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