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Contents
  1. 1Hazards of the occupancy
  2. 2Fuel spill fires on hangar floors
  3. 3Fire protection systems
  4. 4Fire detection
  5. 5Design calculations
  6. 6Drainage, egress and other requirements
  7. 7Limits and open questions
  8. 8See also
  9. 9Notes
  10. 10References

An aircraft hangar is a building that gives aircraft weather protection and provides shop space for their maintenance and storage.[1] Its fire problem is unusual. Aircraft are often moved inside with fuel still on board, so large quantities of aviation fuel may be present, and the aircraft is often worth several times as much as the building. In one 121 m² (1300 ft²) JP-4 pool-fire test, the ceiling reached 927 °C (1700 °F) within 30 seconds, before the deluge discharged.[2]

NFPA 409, as summarised in the 20th edition of the NFPA Fire Protection Handbook (2008), no longer accepts water-only sprinkler systems for hangars. Foam-water deluge sprinklers, often combined with oscillating foam monitors at floor level, have become common practice.[1] Much of the design data for foam-water sprinklers was first developed in hangar fire tests.[3] Hangar design also deals with fire detection under very high roofs, drainage of fuel and foam, escape across large floors and the hazards of maintenance work. The requirements described here are US requirements of that period, not their current editions.

Hazards of the occupancy

Removing all fuel from an aircraft before it enters a hangar is often impractical and uneconomic.[1] Large aircraft in particular are often several times more valuable than the hangar, so protection must cover the aircraft as well as the structure. Maintenance adds further hazards. Many procedures use highly flammable solvents and sometimes unstable or toxic chemicals, and technicians enter integral fuel tanks.[4] Welding is often done on installed engines or on the aircraft structure, and NFPA 410 is used to develop procedures for welding, spray painting and fuel tank ventilation.

Fuel tanks are often tested for leaks inside hangars using high-flashpoint Jet A fuel or a combustible test fluid.[4] Many hangars have a fixed system to load and unload this fluid. Parking a fuel tank truck outside and running long hoses to the aircraft is discouraged, because the hose is the weak point of any system. Painting is also done in hangars, often relying on the sheer volume of the building and natural ventilation to dilute flammable vapours. In the United States, the National Electrical Code classifies certain areas in hangars as hazardous locations, defined in its Article 513 as Class I, Group D, Division 1 or 2 locations.[5][4]

Design and construction materials may differ depending on whether the owner and user see the aircraft or the building as the asset at risk.[6] Military reinforced concrete shelters house fuelling, maintenance, loading and electronic testing, and are fitted with ultrafast fire detection and suppression. At a few airfields, air-supported or steel-framed membrane tents are used as hangars. No consensus on their exact protection exists, but the handbook considers an installed fire protection system warranted.[1] NFPA 409 divides hangars into Types I, II and III, which roughly correspond to the size of the aircraft housed and their expected fuel load.

The ordinary combustible load can be modest. In its fabrication column, the International Fire Engineering Guidelines list a fire load density of 200 MJ/m² for aircraft hangars, the same value as for an airplane factory.[7] The handbook places the special hazard in the fuel carried by the aircraft rather than in the building contents.[1] Even a very short fire exposure can delaminate the honeycomb structures of an aircraft.[8]

Fuel spill fires on hangar floors

An unconfined fuel release on a floor spreads into a thin spill rather than a deep pool.[9] In tests, JP-8 and JP-4 spill fires burned at initial depths as low as 0.7 mm and 1.0 mm, and ignition increased the burning area by 22 to 89 %.[10] Small JP-8 and JP-5 spills were tested on polyurethane-coated concrete of the type used in US Navy hangars. Up to 2.5 m across, these unconfined fires burned at about one-fifth of the rate of a deep pool fire of the same diameter.[11][12] Heat loss into the concrete explains the difference. Larger JP-5 continuous-release tests instead approached pool burning rates; for large releases above about 10 L/min the authors recommend pool rates as a conservative assumption.[12]

Such fires are intense. Before foam was used, hangars had water deluge systems discharging about 10.2 L/min/m² (0.25 gpm/ft²; the source prints 10.4 L/min/m²), with sloped floors and drains.[2] Even with these systems, protection of an aircraft fuselage against burn-through for about a minute could not be ensured. Ceiling temperatures of 427 to 816 °C (800 to 1500 °F) were recorded in a space 18.3 m (60 ft) high. For a 121 m² (1300 ft²) JP-4 fire, the ceiling reached 927 °C (1700 °F) within 30 seconds of ignition, before the deluge system discharged. The roof structure of a hangar is usually unprotected steel, and preventing its collapse is the second protection objective after the aircraft.[13]

The rising plume of such a fire also explains why overhead systems struggle. In tests with 83.6 m² (900 ft²) JP-4 pool fires under an 18.3 m ceiling, plume centreline velocities of up to 23.2 m/s (76 ft/s) were measured.[2] Foam droplets fall at no more than about 9.1 m/s (30 ft/s), so droplets near the centreline never reached the fire, and extinguishment proceeded from the edge inwards. For a typical foam particle of 6.3 mm with a terminal velocity of 7.3 m/s, a JP-4 fire larger than about 0.7 m² (8 ft²) cannot be penetrated from above.[14]

Bar chart comparing fire plume velocities of 18 to 23 metres per second with foam droplet terminal velocities of 3 to 10 metres per second
Upward plume velocities over an 83.6 m² JP-4 fire in an 18.3 m high space compared with the terminal velocities of foam and water droplets.

Fire protection systems

In the past, fixed hangar protection mainly protected the structure, with water sprinklers sized to the extra-hazard pipe schedule or hydraulically calculated, mostly as a deluge system.[1] A deluge system has open sprinklers without heat-sensitive elements, and a deluge valve opened by a separate detection system releases water through all of them at once.[15] Such systems suit areas where fire can spread rapidly and cause thermal damage in a short time, and aircraft hangars are one application. With larger aircraft and fuel loads, NFPA 409 no longer recognises water-only systems, and the foam-water sprinkler system in deluge form has become common practice.[1]

Hangar floor around an aircraft covered with white foam during a fire protection system test
Foam blanket on a hangar floor during an acceptance test of a hangar foam system.

The first foam-water sprinkler systems used protein foam at 8.2 L/min/m² (0.20 gpm/ft²) through air-aspirating sprinklers.[2] Factory Mutual Research Corporation (FMRC) then tested aqueous film-forming foam (AFFF) for the US military. At 6.6 L/min/m² (0.16 gpm/ft²), AFFF from ordinary non-aspirating sprinklers was 1.3 to 1.6 times as effective as from air-aspirating sprinklers. The denser droplets from standard sprinklers penetrate the fire plume better.[16] NFPA 409 therefore allows 6.6 L/min/m² for overhead deluge systems with standard sprinklers, against 8.2 L/min/m² with air-aspirating sprinklers, a 20 % saving in foam.[14][17] Standard sprinklers also work at 69 kPa (10 psi), whereas air-aspirating sprinklers need 207 kPa (30 psi).

Large wings shield a fuel fire from overhead sprinklers, so significant damage could occur before the fire under a wing is extinguished.[14] The 2008 handbook therefore describes designs with foam-producing oscillating monitors at floor level to control the shadow area beneath the wings.[1][17] Where monitors provide the main extinguishing capability, they blanket the entire hangar floor with foam within 20 to 30 seconds. According to the handbook, one complete oscillation should take no more than 15 seconds, and a dispersed pattern rather than a straight stream limits turbulence where the foam hits the floor.[1] In large hangars, monitors can be mounted under the roof trusses with the barrel about 20 m (65 ft) above the floor.[18]

Cross-section of a hangar with an airliner, roof deluge sprinklers, floor-level foam monitors spraying under the wings, optical detectors and floor drains
Main elements of fixed fire protection in a large aircraft hangar as described in the 2008 handbook.

NFPA 409 bases its low-level criterion of 4.1 L/min/m² (0.10 gpm/ft²) on fire control within 30 seconds and extinguishment within 60 seconds.[19] It also recognises low-level AFFF combined with water-only sprinklers at the ceiling.[17] In-floor nozzles reduce AFFF spray onto aircraft after a false discharge, but they are generally too costly for commercial aviation.[20][19] In older hangars being modernised, closed-head sprinklers that deliver AFFF through standard sprinklers have been accepted by the authority having jurisdiction.[1]

Bar chart of application rates from 10.2 for water deluge down to 4.1 litres per minute per square metre for low-level AFFF
Application rates of hangar protection methods.

Other agents are used as well. The US Air Force recognises high-expansion foam for hangars, and the US Army has evaluated early suppression fast-response sprinklers for helicopter hangars.[21] High-expansion foam acts as a flooding agent for large spaces, but it reduces vision and hearing, so personnel must enter it only with breathing apparatus and lifelines.[22][23] Dry chemical hose stations can supply large quantities of agent for quick knockdown of large fires in hangars.[24] Portable extinguishers in the large open floor may stand on movable pedestals or wheeled carts, with their positions marked on the floor.[25]

Fire detection

Overhead sprinklers in hangars have mainly been actuated by rate-of-rise heat detectors.[1] As roofs have risen to as much as 46 m (150 ft) above the floor, these detectors can no longer respond fast enough to limit damage to aircraft. In cold climates, hangar doors opening and closing and fast-recovery heating make it hard to keep them stable and still sensitive. Optical detectors for ultraviolet or infrared radiation, or both, can detect relatively small fires quickly and actuate the monitors, and rapid temperature changes do not affect them.

The handbook warns that optical detectors must not be overly sensitive to welding, high-intensity lights, borescopes, radioisotopes or X-ray inspections.[18] The handbook recommends testing their sensitivity after installation and running the system in alarm-only mode for the first 60 to 90 days, with a recorder documenting what the detectors respond to. Video-based smoke detectors also offer advantages in large open spaces such as hangars, where smoke takes long to reach other detectors.[26] Military experience has shown that thermally activated systems may allow unacceptable damage under very high ceilings, while optical detectors can be prone to false alarms.[19]

False operation is a real concern. Foam-water deluge systems over military aircraft with open cockpits have been activated by lightning, water hammer, maintenance staff, vandalism, manual call points, pump relief valves, roof leaks and faulty detection.[19] The US Navy responded with a concept of low-level AFFF nozzles with minimal overspray, improved optical detectors and quick-response closed-head sprinklers in the ceiling.[21] In 23 full-scale tests, overhead water sprinklers had little effect on a low-level AFFF system at 4.0 L/min/m², which controlled the fire within 30 seconds and extinguished it within a minute.[21]

Design calculations

Two simple relations underlie a foam system design. The foam solution flow equals the protected area times the application rate, and the concentrate flow is the solution flow times the proportioning percentage.[27] The fire to be controlled can be sized with the pool fire equation of NUREG-1805, and the result divided by the area gives the power density.[28][29] For sprinklers, AFFF must extinguish listing test fires at 4.1 L/min/m². NFPA 16 requires at least 6.6 L/min/m² for all foam agents, unless standards such as NFPA 409 set specific rates.[30] For optical detectors, the distance at which a fire of a given size is detected is reduced by the field of view, temperature and humidity.[31]

Qs=ARQc=cQsQ˙=m˙″ΔHc,effAf(1−e−kβD)q˙″=Q˙Af

d=dnom(1−∑iεi)

Symbol Description Unit
Qs Foam solution flow L/min
A Protected floor area m²
R Design application rate L/(min·m²)
Qc Foam concentrate flow L/min
c Proportioning ratio (0.03 for 3 % AFFF) –
Q˙ Heat release rate of the fuel fire kW
m˙″ Burning rate per unit area kg/(m²·s)
ΔHc,eff Effective heat of combustion kJ/kg
Af, D Burning area and its diameter m², m
kβ Empirical constant for the fuel m⁻¹
q˙″ Power density of the fire kW/m²
dnom, d Nominal and reduced detection distance for a given fire size m
εi Sensitivity reductions as fractions of the nominal value –

As a worked example, take the hangar of an SFPE Handbook design example: 50 m by 80 m, with a 20 m ceiling.[31] A JP-4 fire of 83.6 m² (900 ft²), the size of the FMRC hangar tests, has an equivalent diameter of 10.3 m. With 0.051 kg/(m²·s), 43,500 kJ/kg and kβ = 3.6 m⁻¹ the bracket is practically 1, so the fire releases about 186 MW.[32] Its power density is about 2.2 MW/m², almost nine times the 250 kW/m² used in the textbook example of power density.[29] This 186 MW value is a large-pool model estimate, not a measured hangar fire or a prediction for a thin spill. The one-fifth rate observed in small JP-5 and JP-8 spills cannot be applied to this much larger JP-4 example.[11][12]

If the whole 4000 m² floor is protected simultaneously at the low-level rate of 4.1 L/min/m², the illustrative flow is Qs = 4000 × 4.1 = 16,400 L/min (4330 gpm) of foam solution.[19] With 3 % AFFF this needs 492 L of concentrate for every minute of discharge. An overhead system over the same area at 6.6 L/min/m² would need 26,400 L/min, and 32,800 L/min with air-aspirating sprinklers at 8.2 L/min/m².[14] Such flows need large water supplies, and gear pumps have been used since the 1960s for foam concentrate in fixed hangar systems, because centrifugal pumps are poorly suited to concentrates.[33]

For detection, the example sets a design fire of 1.0 m² of JP-4 and selects infrared detectors at 4.3 micrometres.[31] A detector that sees this fire at 40 m on its axis loses 30 % at the 45-degree edge of its field of view. It loses another 3 % at 50 °C and 3 % at 90 % relative humidity, so d = 40 × (1 − 0.30 − 0.03 − 0.03) = 25.6 m. The longest viewing distance at 45 degrees in the layout is 20 m, so the design is valid.

Hangar section 80 m long and 20 m high with infrared detectors and their viewing cones, plus a bar showing detection distance falling from 40 m to 25.6 m
Infrared detector layout for a 50 m by 80 m hangar and the reduction of detection distance for a 1 m² JP-4 fire.

Drainage, egress and other requirements

Floor drainage is part of the hangar fire protection system, because it carries away excess water and large quantities of liquid fuel from the fire area.[18] The handbook recommends flushing the drains with high volumes of water at least once a year and careful maintenance of oil and water separators to prevent pollution. Environmental concerns have restricted the disposal of AFFF solution after discharge, and the handbook recommends bypasses and retention areas in new designs for system testing. The low-level nozzles developed for the US Navy were designed to throw foam 7.6 m (25 ft) from a floor drainage trench, to the centreline between two trenches 15.2 m (50 ft) apart.[21]

The large open floor makes escape routes long, and flammable liquids compound the problem.[34] According to the handbook, exits must be placed at intervals of no more than 46 m (150 ft) along all exterior walls. Every part of the hangar must have access to at least two exits. Small access doors can be built into the large hangar doors, which cannot stay open in bad weather. From mezzanines an exit must be reached within 23 m (75 ft). In the United States a fire alarm system is required for life safety in unsprinklered hangars larger than 9300 m² (100,000 ft²).

The handbook table of NFPA 101 (2006) limits the common path in aircraft servicing hangars to 15 m (50 ft) without sprinklers and 30 m (100 ft) with sprinklers.[35] In New Zealand, C/VM2 (second edition, 2025) uses an occupant load factor of 50 m² per person for aircraft hangars.[36] For the 4000 m² example hangar this gives 80 people.

The airport fire service is the manual backup. Aircraft rescue and firefighting vehicles can be modified to fight fires in hangars and other airport buildings, but this use should not detract from their primary task at the runways.[37] Foam monitors of the type used on these vehicles are also effective in fixed systems protecting hangars.[38]

Limits and open questions

There is no universal agreement on the proper approach to hangar fire protection, at least for military hangars in North America.[21] Low-level systems may help with a three-dimensional spill fire, but they cannot be assumed to suppress a running fuel fire. Parked vehicles may block low-level nozzles, and both FMRC and the US Navy have reported reliability problems with turrets and monitors.[19] Low-level monitor systems have been found inefficient in their spray pattern, easily blocked and often out of service in the field.

Much of the test basis is old. The original criteria came from tests with low-flashpoint JP-4, while the 2002 SFPE handbook describes JP-5 and JP-8 as the predominant military fuels of its period.[2][19] Combined low-level and overhead systems give adequate burnback protection while AFFF is discharging, but this protection may be lost a few minutes after the discharge stops.[21] Fluorinated surfactants in AFFF raise environmental questions, which affects testing, training and the disposal of foam after an incident.[39]

Some data needed for design are not in the sources used here. The full NFPA 409 text and the detailed design areas of deluge zones are absent.[1] The SFPE handbook reproduces historical application rates and durations from NFPA 409 (1995): 10 minutes of overhead deluge, or 7 minutes above the minimum design rate, and 10 minutes of supplemental low-level discharge.[3] The whole-floor flows calculated above are illustrations, not a design for any particular hangar; later editions are not in the source set.

See also

Notes

  1. ↑ 1.00 1.01 1.02 1.03 1.04 1.05 1.06 1.07 1.08 1.09 1.10 1.11 Boucher (2008), p. 21-146.
  2. ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 Scheffey (2002), p. 4-107.
  3. ↑ 3.0 3.1 Scheffey (2002), p. 4-112.
  4. ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 Boucher (2008), p. 21-148.
  5. ↑ Milatovich (2008), p. 8-172.
  6. ↑ Boucher (2008), p. 21-135.
  7. ↑ National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), p. 3.4-3.
  8. ↑ Boucher (2008), p. 21-136.
  9. ↑ Gottuk and White (2002), p. 2-297.
  10. ↑ Gottuk and White (2002), p. 2-298.
  11. ↑ 11.0 11.1 Gottuk and White (2002), p. 2-311.
  12. ↑ 12.0 12.1 12.2 Gottuk and White (2002), p. 2-312.
  13. ↑ Scheffey (2002), p. 4-106.
  14. ↑ 14.0 14.1 14.2 14.3 Scheffey (2002), p. 4-108.
  15. ↑ Huggins (2008), p. 16-37.
  16. ↑ Scheffey (2008), pp. 17-63–17-64.
  17. ↑ 17.0 17.1 17.2 Scheffey (2008), p. 17-62.
  18. ↑ 18.0 18.1 18.2 Boucher (2008), p. 21-147.
  19. ↑ 19.0 19.1 19.2 19.3 19.4 19.5 19.6 Scheffey (2002), p. 4-110.
  20. ↑ Scheffey (2008), p. 17-63.
  21. ↑ 21.0 21.1 21.2 21.3 21.4 21.5 Scheffey (2002), p. 4-111.
  22. ↑ Scheffey (2008), p. 17-45.
  23. ↑ Scheffey (2008), p. 17-48.
  24. ↑ Lake (2008), p. 17-20.
  25. ↑ Conroy (2008), p. 17-83.
  26. ↑ Dungan (2008a), p. 14-23.
  27. ↑ Scheffey and Hickey (2002), pp. 4-130–4-131.
  28. ↑ Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. 3-3.
  29. ↑ 29.0 29.1 Van Rossum (2027), §4.6.
  30. ↑ Scheffey (2008), p. 17-64.
  31. ↑ 31.0 31.1 31.2 Schifiliti et al. (2002), pp. 4-31–4-32.
  32. ↑ Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. 3-4.
  33. ↑ Jensen (2008), p. 15-86.
  34. ↑ J. Moore (2008), p. 20-170.
  35. ↑ Lathrop (2008a), p. 4-80.
  36. ↑ Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2025b), p. 11.
  37. ↑ Tutterow (2008), p. 12-280.
  38. ↑ Scheffey (2008), p. 17-59.
  39. ↑ Scheffey (2008), pp. 17-68–17-69.

References

  • Boucher, B. (2008). Aviation. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 21-135–21-149). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Conroy, M. T. (2008). Fire extinguisher use and maintenance. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 17-71–17-92). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Dungan, K. W. (2008a). Automatic fire detectors. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 14-15–14-28). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Gottuk, D. T., & White, D. A. (2002). Liquid fuel fires. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 2-297–2-316). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
  • Huggins, R. (2008). Automatic sprinkler systems. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 16-29–16-53). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Iqbal, N., & Salley, M. H. (2004). Fire Dynamics Tools (FDTs): Quantitative fire hazard analysis methods for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Fire Protection Inspection Program (NUREG-1805). U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
  • Jensen, J. D. (2008). Water distribution. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 15-85–15-103). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Lake, J. D. (2008). Chemical extinguishing agents and application systems. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 17-17–17-29). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Lathrop, J. K. (2008a). Concepts of egress design. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 4-69–4-91). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Milatovich, R. M. (2008). Electrical systems and appliances. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 8-127–8-173). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment. (2025b). Verification Method C/VM2: Framework for fire safety design (2nd ed.).
  • Moore, J. (2008). Storage occupancies. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 20-157–20-178). National Fire Protection Association.
  • National Research Council of Canada, International Code Council, Department of Building and Housing, & Australian Building Codes Board. (2005). International fire engineering guidelines (2005 ed.). Australian Building Codes Board.
  • Scheffey, J. L. (2002). Foam agents and AFFF system design considerations. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 4-88–4-122). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
  • Scheffey, J. L. (2008). Foam extinguishing agents and systems. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 17-45–17-70). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Scheffey, J. L., & Hickey, H. E. (2002). Foam system calculations. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 4-123–4-148). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
  • Schifiliti, R. P., Meacham, B. J., & Custer, R. L. P. (2002). Design of detection systems. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 4-1–4-43). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
  • Tutterow, R. (2008). Fire department apparatus and equipment. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 12-267–12-287). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Van Rossum, E. (2027). Introduction to Fire Safety Engineering. Fire Safety Academy.