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Contents
  1. 1Fire scenarios and statistics
  2. 2Fire entering from outside
  3. 3Fires in flight
  4. 4Cabin materials and fire tests
  5. 5Evacuation and survival time
  6. 6Protection systems and limits
  7. 7See also
  8. 8Notes
  9. 9References

An aircraft cabin fire is a fire in the passenger or crew compartment of an aircraft. It either enters the cabin from a fuel fire outside the fuselage after a crash, or starts inside the aircraft in flight or on the ground. The post-crash fire after an impact that most occupants survive is the scenario that has shaped aviation fire safety rules.[1] In that scenario the cabin can become unsurvivable within two to three minutes, and the fatalities of survivable accidents are mostly caused by smoke inhalation or burns rather than by the impact.[2][3]

Fires in flight are rare but can expose occupants for much longer, until the aircraft has landed.[4] Protection rests on fire-resistant cabin materials, detection and extinguishers on board, a rapid evacuation and the airport fire service. In the United States, cabin materials must pass heat release limits and seat cushions must be fire-blocked, and an aircraft must be shown to empty through half of its exits within 90 seconds.[5][6][7] The rules in this article are those described in the 20th edition of the NFPA Fire Protection Handbook (2008) and the SFPE Handbook (2002), not their current versions.

Fire scenarios and statistics

Most aviation accidents happen during take-off or landing. In-flight fires are extremely rare, especially in the United States, and when fire becomes a threat it usually involves jet fuel spilled in a crash.[1] At sufficiently high impact forces, the crash leaves no survivors. This led to the recognition of the impact-survivable post-crash fire, in which most occupants survive the crash and could escape if they had enough time. Cabin fires in flight are usually discovered early and quickly extinguished, but the potential loss of life is severe once a fire grows beyond the reach of handheld extinguishers.[6] Fires during cleaning, refurbishment and maintenance on the ground form a third group.[8][9]

In a study of 60 survivable accidents in US National Transportation Safety Board reports, 78 % of the fatalities occurred after impact, and 95.4 % of these resulted from smoke inhalation or burns.[3] In large turbine aircraft the structure absorbs more impact energy, so the post-accident fire is the more important cause of death. In light aircraft more people die of impact trauma.[8]

Big multiple-death vehicle fires can involve high-occupancy vehicles such as commercial airliners.[10] The in-flight fire of a ValuJet DC-9 over the Florida Everglades on 11 May 1996 killed 110 people. It was the third deadliest US fire or explosion of 1995 to 2004 and one of only five US incidents since 1955 with 100 or more deaths.[11][12][13] The handbook attributes this fire to chemical oxygen generators that were improperly packaged and carried in a cargo bay.[9] A cargo aircraft fire in flight near Newburgh, New York, in September 1996 caused a loss of $395 million.[14]

Survival is possible even when the aircraft is destroyed. In August 2005 an Airbus A340-300 overran the runway at Toronto and was consumed by fire, but the cabin attendants were credited with evacuating all passengers.[15] The handbook reports neither fire deaths nor severe fire injuries in that accident and cites it when discussing the fire performance rules for cabin materials.[5]

Fire entering from outside

An external fuel fire can reach the cabin by flame impingement and burn-through, through an open door or through a fracture in the hull.[16] In a fuel spill fire the aluminium skin burns through in about one minute. The insulation of an intact fuselage keeps the cabin survivable until the windows melt out after about three minutes.[17] The cabin then heats up both from burning interior materials and from fire gases that enter the fuselage.[18] In an FAA study the air at the cabin ceiling reached 704 °C (1300 °F) within 50 seconds with the doors open, and 204 °C (400 °F) with all but one door closed.[3]

Cross-section of an airliner fuselage over a burning fuel pool, with arrows for burn-through, open door, hull fracture and windows, and internal fire sources
Routes by which fire reaches the cabin from an external fuel fire, and internal sources of cabin fires.

A full-scale test shows how fast conditions change. A Boeing 707 cabin with a few rows of seats faced an open doorway, outside which 189 L (50 gal) of aviation fuel was burning.[19] The cabin contents were quickly involved and produced a dense smoke with large amounts of carbon monoxide (CO) and hydrogen cyanide (HCN) halfway down the fuselage. The smoke tenability limit was exceeded after 1 minute 40 seconds, and incapacitation by asphyxiant gases was predicted at 2 minutes 15 seconds.[2] Averaged over the half minute up to the 3-minute mark, the gas contained 8410 ppm CO, 740 ppm HCN and 16 % oxygen at 274 °C.

Line chart of carbon monoxide, hydrogen cyanide and gas temperature in a Boeing 707 cabin from 0.5 to 3.5 minutes with tenability markers
Gas concentrations and temperature halfway down a Boeing 707 cabin with a few rows of seats in one external fuel fire test with an open door.

Death was predicted to follow rapidly, mainly from the effects of HCN, and high HCN levels were found in the blood of the victims of the Manchester accident in the United Kingdom.[19] HCN has a lethal dose about 25 times smaller than that of CO and acts very quickly.[20] Irritants also matter. In the 707 test the average concentrations between 1 and 4 minutes were 1027 ppm hydrogen chloride (HCl) and 1228 ppm hydrogen bromide (HBr).[2] PVC releases all its HCl at about 250 to 300 °C, and in another FAA test HCl and hydrogen fluoride reached high levels before other gases became toxic.[21] Sensory irritation slows movement and hinders escape, and smoke toxicity depends on the burning conditions and on all products involved, so fire toxicity is not a property of a single product.[22]

FAA research on aircraft exposed to an external fuel fire found that passengers had about 90 seconds before flashover occurred in the cabin.[1] Flashover is the stage at which the whole space suddenly becomes involved in fire; one criterion is a hot layer above 500 °C, which radiates about 20 kW/m² to the materials below.[23] In the 707 test the gas at mid-cabin reached 408 °C, with 13 % oxygen, after 3.5 minutes. By then occupants would have been incapacitated for more than a minute.[2]

Fires in flight

Besides a post-impact fuel fire, the handbook lists three causes of cabin fires.[9] Electrical failure and arcing in concealed spaces, often behind the decorative cabin lining, can stay undetected for a long time and grow beyond the control of handheld extinguishers. The wiring for radar, radios and flight controls is subject to embrittlement, abrasion, vibration and cracking. Flammable liquids used in cleaning and refurbishment and the improper use or disposal of smoking materials are the other causes. In a crash, an oxygen cylinder whose fuse plug opens in the heat can release oxygen into the cabin and locally intensify the fire.

Fire on the flight deck, often reported as smoke in the cockpit, threatens the aircraft by obscuring the pilots' vision, disabling instruments and incapacitating the crew.[9] Aircraft lavatories must have smoke detectors, and tampering with them is a serious offence. All aircraft have fire protection systems in their washrooms, because passengers may smoke and drop cigarette ends into the waste bin.[8] For design purposes, fires of 50 to 300 kW cover most trash bag and waste basket fires in occupancies such as airplanes.[24]

Cargo compartments in passenger aircraft are often fitted with fire detection. A common method of extinguishment is air starvation: ventilation to the compartment is shut off and the fire dies for lack of oxygen.[7] Above a certain compartment volume a suppression system is required, traditionally using Halon 1301 or Halon 1211, which have to be replaced by treaty-compliant alternatives. Twin-engine aircraft operating under Extended Twin Operations (ETOPS) guidelines must have fire protection systems that suppress a fire for at least 60 minutes and up to 207 minutes.[8]

In the cabin itself the crew relies on portable extinguishers. The FAA requires them in all air transport category aircraft, and at least two extinguishers on large transport aircraft must be of the Halon 1211 or Halon 1211/1301 type.[7] NFPA 408 no longer accepts carbon dioxide or dry chemical for use on aircraft. Carbon dioxide is ineffective on solid materials and needs concentrations incompatible with life, while dry chemical obscures vision, can coat electrical contacts and can corrode aircraft metals. In flight the exposure lasts until landing, on average about 30 minutes for an emergency diversion according to the FAA. Even low concentrations of fire gases can therefore impair the later evacuation.[4]

Cabin materials and fire tests

Before the mid-1940s there were few if any rules for cabin furnishings, and aircraft had wicker chairs and gauze curtains.[6] After the Second World War a small horizontal sample had to resist a short Bunsen burner flame. This created a wide impression that cabin furnishings were fire resistive, which they were not. In the late 1960s and early 1970s the samples had to be self-extinguishing in a vertical position, with exceptions such as carpets. In the late 1970s and early 1980s researchers developed fire blocking for seat cushions, a layer between the polyurethane foam and the upholstery. By the time of the 2008 handbook, the FAA required it for all commercial aircraft seat cushions.

Timeline from the 1940s to 1990 showing successive US fire test requirements for aircraft cabin materials
Development of US fire requirements for aircraft cabin materials up to 1990.

The FAA regulates textile flammability in crew and passenger compartments with a vertical test. The average char length of three samples may not exceed 203 mm (8 in.), afterflame must stop within 15 seconds and drips must stop flaming within 5 seconds.[25] Seats are tested with a kerosene burner using 7.57 L/h (2 gal/h), with a 152 mm (6 in.) nozzle 102 mm (4 in.) from the seat and 1010 °C (1850 °F) at the specimen.[26] In at least half of the three or more seats tested, flames must not reach the far side of the cushion, average weight loss may not exceed 10 % and no flaming drips may fall. Assemblies that pass include wool and nylon covers, polyurethane foam and interliners of aluminised or plain Nomex or polybenzimidazole (PBI) fabric, which keep pyrolysis gases from venting towards the flames. Such interliners have been used in aircraft seating for several decades.[27]

For large surfaces such as wall panels and stowage bins, the FAA limits the heat release rate measured in the Ohio State University (OSU) calorimeter at an incident heat flux of 35 kW/m².[5] The first criteria, in force from 1986, allowed a peak of 100 kW/m² and an average of 50 kW/m² over the first two minutes.[28] Since 1990 the peak during the five-minute test may not exceed 65 kW/m², and the average over the first two minutes 32.5 kW/m². The handbook quotes the latter as 65 kW·min/m² of total heat, for passenger airplanes built after 20 August 1990 that use US airports. The criteria were calculated to give a 5-minute escape time after a survivable crash with a fuel tank rupture and fire.[5] Heat release rate is the property that most controls the time available for escape.[5]

Modern sidewall panels, partitions, bins and ceiling panels are typically composites with a Nomex honeycomb core, phenolic-impregnated facesheets and coloured thermoplastics.[16] An epoxy aircraft panel needs a heat flux of about 28 kW/m² to ignite, against 20 kW/m² for untreated wool carpet.[29] The amount of fuel is still large. In the investigation of the 2001 attacks in New York, a Boeing 767-200 was found to carry about 4460 kg of cabin materials such as seats, galleys, lavatories, bins, linings and carpets. It also carried 400 kg of blankets and pillows and 660 to 1110 kg of carry-on items and clothing.[30]

Evacuation and survival time

US rules set the number of exits by passenger capacity, and the manufacturer or operator must show that a full load can evacuate in 90 seconds or less with half of the exits inoperative.[7] The demonstration uses a mix of passenger types, emergency lighting only, and exits blocked without warning. It has known shortcomings: there is no smoke, and the subjects know it is a test, many have taken part before, and none carry hand luggage.[31][4] Real crashes have shown exits obstructed by failed overhead bins, carry-on luggage and service carts, and many passengers try to leave through the door by which they entered.[31]

Exits with a sill more than 1.5 m (5 ft) above the ground have inflatable slides that deploy automatically.[31] A collapsed landing gear changes the slide angle, and older slide material deflated after slight flame exposure, although newer material has a heat-reflective coating that not all aircraft had received. Exit signs are mounted low, the exit access must be visible from at least 11 m (35 ft) with smoke above seat-back height, and path lighting is fitted in the floor or the aisle armrests. Jin cites this floor lighting as an existing form of the floor-level guidance lighting studied for escape through smoke in buildings.[32] At the gate the slides are disarmed, so the loading bridge becomes the main escape route, and NFPA 415 requires it to give 5 minutes of safe passage to the terminal.[33]

Inflatable evacuation slide deployed from the door of an airliner on the ground
An inflatable evacuation slide deployed from an airliner door.

Fire safety engineering compares the available safe egress time (ASET) with the required safe egress time (RSET). The available time must exceed the required time by a safety factor or a margin.[34] A study of seat fire blocking converted extra escape time into lives saved. It assumed an exit flow of one person per second through a main door and one per two seconds through a window exit or fuselage break.[35]

ASET≥k⋅RSETN=Δt∑iri

Symbol Description Unit
ASET Available safe egress time, until conditions become untenable s
RSET Required safe egress time s
k Safety factor –
N Number of extra occupants able to leave persons
Δt Extra safe egress time gained s
ri Flow through exit i (1 for a main door, 0.5 for a window exit) persons/s

As a worked example across separate studies, compare the 90-second evacuation certification benchmark with the tenability times from the 707 test. The 90 seconds was not measured in that fire and is not an aircraft-specific RSET. The difference from the smoke tenability limit at 100 seconds is 10 seconds (ratio 1.1); the difference from incapacitation by asphyxiant gases at 135 seconds is 45 seconds (ratio 1.5).[2] In the fire blocking study, a measure that added 4 seconds with two main doors and two window exits available was credited with 4 × (1 + 1 + 0.5 + 0.5) = 12 passengers.[35] The same exits pass three people per second, so each extra second of tenable cabin counts.

Bars comparing a 90-second certification benchmark with 100, 135 and 165 seconds of tenability from a separate Boeing 707 test
A 90-second evacuation certification benchmark beside tenability times from a separate Boeing 707 cabin fire test; these are not measured margins for an actual evacuation.

The heat criteria point the same way. Dutch practice uses 2.5 kW/m² as the limit for escape under a smoke layer, which a layer of about 200 °C reaches.[36] In the 707 test the measured radiation was 2.3 kW/m² at 2.5 minutes and 2.8 kW/m² at 3 minutes, and the radiant tenability limit was predicted at 2 minutes 45 seconds.[2] These cross-study differences illustrate the short times involved; they do not establish an evacuation margin for an actual aircraft fire.

Protection systems and limits

From 1985 the UK Civil Aviation Authority and the FAA, with Transport Canada, Airbus and Boeing, developed a fine water spray system for passenger cabins.[37] It used zoned piping, automatic thermal activation of each zone and a 3-minute water supply in pressurised cylinders, aimed at extending the survivable evacuation time. The system met its objectives in tests, but a cost-benefit study found the fleet cost too high for the lives saved, so it was not made mandatory. For a wide-body jet a zoned system was estimated in 1983 to cost $86,000 and to weigh about 540 kg (1190 lb).[38]

Where occupants cannot escape alone, aircraft rescue and firefighting crews must remove them from the hazardous atmosphere or make the cabin atmosphere safe for them.[18] They attack an interior fire from the unburned side and ventilate at the same time, because water on the fire quickly fills the cabin with smoke and steam. Piercing nozzles can put agent into the fuselage without opening a door.[39] On the ground, interior painting is often done in an aircraft hangar. Latex paints with little solvent are used for interiors, and flammable paints inside the aircraft require special precautions for ventilation and ignition sources.[40]

Engineering analysis of cabin fires has particular limits. Aircraft cabins are long and narrow, so some assumptions of zone models may not hold. Cabins are pressurised to the equivalent of about 2440 m (8000 ft), which lowers the oxygen partial pressure, and their ventilation systems strongly affect fire growth and smoke movement.[41] Material burning rates are often reported only at high heat fluxes, because the materials hardly burn at typical levels.[41]

The sources also differ in detail. For the seat burner, one handbook chapter gives 115 kW and another a heat flux of 10 Btu/ft² per second, printed as 115 kW/m²; the latter converts to about 114 kW/m².[42][26] The rules described here are US rules from before 2008, but the handbook notes that cabin fire safety features vary little worldwide, because manufacturers must have their products accepted in world markets.[43]

See also

Notes

  1. ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 Bukowski (2002), p. 5-227.
  2. ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 Purser (2002), p. 2-143.
  3. ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 Kreckie (2008), p. 13-114.
  4. ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 Bukowski (2002), p. 5-230.
  5. ↑ 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 Hirschler (2008a), p. 6-46.
  6. ↑ 6.0 6.1 6.2 Boucher (2008), p. 21-139.
  7. ↑ 7.0 7.1 7.2 7.3 Boucher (2008), p. 21-141.
  8. ↑ 8.0 8.1 8.2 8.3 Boucher (2008), p. 21-136.
  9. ↑ 9.0 9.1 9.2 9.3 Boucher (2008), p. 21-140.
  10. ↑ Ahrens et al. (2008), p. 3-87.
  11. ↑ Ahrens et al. (2008), p. 3-86.
  12. ↑ Hall and Cote (2008), p. 3-11.
  13. ↑ Hall and Cote (2008), p. 3-5.
  14. ↑ Hall and Cote (2008), p. 3-13.
  15. ↑ Boucher (2008), p. 21-144.
  16. ↑ 16.0 16.1 Kreckie (2008), p. 13-101.
  17. ↑ Scheffey (2002), p. 4-103.
  18. ↑ 18.0 18.1 Kreckie (2008), p. 13-110.
  19. ↑ 19.0 19.1 Purser (2002), p. 2-141.
  20. ↑ Gann and Bryner (2008), p. 6-15.
  21. ↑ Purser (2002), p. 2-142.
  22. ↑ Gann and Bryner (2008), p. 6-11.
  23. ↑ Van Rossum (2027), §4.7.
  24. ↑ Babrauskas (2002b), p. 3-28.
  25. ↑ Stull and Chines (2008), p. 6-97.
  26. ↑ 26.0 26.1 Stull and Chines (2008), pp. 6-97–6-98.
  27. ↑ Babrauskas (2008b), p. 6-103.
  28. ↑ Janssens (2002), p. 3-52.
  29. ↑ Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. 6-11.
  30. ↑ Gann, Hamins, et al. (2005), p. 59.
  31. ↑ 31.0 31.1 31.2 Boucher (2008), p. 21-142.
  32. ↑ Jin (2002), p. 2-51.
  33. ↑ Boucher (2008), pp. 21-147–21-148.
  34. ↑ Van Rossum (2027), §7.1.
  35. ↑ 35.0 35.1 Bukowski (2002), p. 5-228.
  36. ↑ Van Rossum (2027), §7.7.
  37. ↑ Mawhinney (2008), p. 16-141.
  38. ↑ Kreckie (2008), pp. 13-112–13-113.
  39. ↑ Kreckie (2008), p. 13-106.
  40. ↑ Boucher (2008), p. 21-148.
  41. ↑ 41.0 41.1 Bukowski (2002), p. 5-229.
  42. ↑ Babrauskas (2008b), p. 6-116.
  43. ↑ Boucher (2008), p. 21-135.

References

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  • Babrauskas, V. (2002b). Heat release rates. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 3-1–3-37). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
  • Babrauskas, V. (2008b). Upholstered furniture and mattresses. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 6-103–6-128). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Boucher, B. (2008). Aviation. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 21-135–21-149). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Bukowski, R. W. (2002). Fire hazard assessment for transportation vehicles. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 5-227–5-233). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
  • Gann, R. G., & Bryner, N. P. (2008). Combustion products and their effects on life safety. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 6-11–6-34). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Gann, R. G., Hamins, A., McGrattan, K. B., Mulholland, G. W., Nelson, H. E., Ohlemiller, T. J., Pitts, W. M., & Prasad, K. R. (2005). Reconstruction of the fires in the World Trade Center towers (NIST NCSTAR 1-5). National Institute of Standards and Technology.
  • Hall, J. R., Jr., & Cote, A. E. (2008). An overview of the fire problem and fire protection. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 3-3–3-30). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Hirschler, M. M. (2008a). Concepts and protocols of fire testing. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 6-35–6-60). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Iqbal, N., & Salley, M. H. (2004). Fire Dynamics Tools (FDTs): Quantitative fire hazard analysis methods for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Fire Protection Inspection Program (NUREG-1805). U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
  • Janssens, M. (2002). Calorimetry. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 3-38–3-62). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
  • Jin, T. (2002). Visibility and human behavior in fire smoke. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 2-42–2-53). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
  • Kreckie, J. (2008). Aircraft rescue and fire fighting (ARFF). In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 13-99–13-115). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Mawhinney, J. R. (2008). Water mist fire suppression systems. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 16-135–16-180). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Purser, D. A. (2002). Toxicity assessment of combustion products. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 2-83–2-171). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
  • Scheffey, J. L. (2002). Foam agents and AFFF system design considerations. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 4-88–4-122). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
  • Stull, J. O., & Chines, S. A. (2008). Fibers and textiles. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 6-75–6-102). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Van Rossum, E. (2027). Introduction to Fire Safety Engineering. Fire Safety Academy.