Skip to content
From Fire Safety Academy Wiki
Revision as of 13:18, 12 November 2026 by Peter (talk | contribs) (Add SVG figures fse-power-station-fire-protection-v1.svg, fse-power-station-fire-protection-v2.svg, fse-power-station-fire-protection-v3.svg, fse-power-station-fire-protection-v4.svg (list-3 visual plan))
Contents
  1. 1Plant types and fire hazards
  2. 2Fire protection programme, life safety and water supply
  3. 3Fuel handling, boilers and flue gas treatment
  4. 4Turbine-generators and combustion turbines
  5. 5Cables, transformers and converter stations
  6. 6Hydroelectric and wind plants
  7. 7Worked example
  8. 8Loss experience and limits of the guidance
  9. 9See also
  10. 10Notes
  11. 11References

Power station fire protection is the combination of fire prevention, fire protection systems and emergency planning that protects an electric generating plant. Its aims are life safety, continuity of operation and protection of property.[1] In the United States the main guidance is NFPA 850, a recommended practice for electric generating plants and high-voltage direct current converter stations, with NFPA 851 for hydroelectric plants.[2] A power station combines several special hazards in one site: coal and fuel oil, large lubricating oil systems, hydrogen-cooled generators, oil-filled transformers and long runs of grouped cable.[3][4] In one study of 20 significant turbine-generator fires, the average loss was $47 million per fire and the average forced outage 200 days.[5]

Protection therefore starts with a fire risk evaluation of the hazards and relies on special hazard protection rather than on sprinklers throughout the buildings.[2][3] This article describes fossil-fuelled, combustion turbine, hydroelectric and wind plants as covered by the 20th edition of the Fire Protection Handbook (2008). Nuclear plants share many of these hazards but have additional safety requirements.[6]

Plant types and fire hazards

In the United States in 2005, electricity came from coal (49.7 %), nuclear power (19.3 %), natural gas (18.7 %), hydropower (6.5 %) and other sources (5.8 %).[2] Units of the 1920s had a capacity of about 20 MW, whereas plants designed in the two decades before 2008 exceeded 1000 MW.[1]

The power block houses the steam generator (boiler-furnace), the turbine-generator and auxiliary equipment. It is usually a large open structure of several storeys with a heavy steel frame, clad in insulated metal panels in cold climates and partly open in warm climates. A combined cycle plant contains one or more combustion turbines, heat recovery steam generators and a steam turbine-generator.[2][7] Enclosed boiler buildings can be up to 76 m (250 ft) high, with many grating levels around a continuous vertical opening, which can spread smoke to workers on the upper levels.[7]

Schematic of a coal-fired power station: coal yard, conveyors, boiler, turbine hall, transformers and cable rooms, each with its main protection
Main fire hazard areas of a coal-fired power station and typical protection measures according to NFPA 850 as summarised in the 2008 Fire Protection Handbook. Based on Sheridan (2008), pp. 9-180–9-188.

The International Fire Engineering Guidelines (2005) reproduce a Swiss survey from 1967–1969. It lists a variable fire load density of 600 MJ/m² for a power station, the same floor-area value as for an engineering office.[8] The guidelines caution that these historic values vary between sites and may have changed with new technologies and materials.[8] Fire load density is the total energy that the combustible contents could release, divided by the floor area.[9] For egress design under NFPA 101 and NFPA 5000, a turbine-generator building is an example of a special-purpose industrial occupancy: low or moderate hazard, very few occupants and mostly equipment on the floor.[10] Nuclear stations add radiological hazards and are treated in nuclear facility fire protection.[1]

Fire protection programme, life safety and water supply

A well-protected plant starts with a management policy to protect lives, conserve property and keep the plant running. For an operating plant this includes a written fire prevention programme, covering control of combustibles, housekeeping and hot work. It also includes a fire emergency plan and programmes for testing, inspection and maintenance. When a plant is designed or changed, a fire risk evaluation should identify all fire hazards and the strategies to cope with them. This is a form of fire risk assessment that addresses the concepts of NFPA 850 and NFPA 851.[2]

Staffing affects the emergency organisation. Whether to form a plant fire brigade depends on US occupational safety rules (29 CFR 1910.156) and on the distance to public fire departments. Some smaller plants run unmanned or with as few as three people per shift. Fire fighters who may respond, from a plant brigade or a public fire department, should be trained in the plant's unique hazards.[2]

Life safety design follows locally adopted codes and, at a minimum, NFPA 101, the Life Safety Code. Control room operators often delay their escape to carry out emergency shutdown procedures. Control rooms should therefore have a means of egress separate from other plant areas. At many existing plants the control room lies too close to likely fire origins such as the turbine-generator.[7]

NFPA 850 recommends special hazard protection in turbine-generator and boiler buildings instead of complete automatic sprinkler protection. In general this is accepted as equivalent to full sprinkler protection, which allows the extended travel distances, common paths of travel and dead-end limits of NFPA 101. The authority having jurisdiction should approve this interpretation.[3]

An adequate and reliable water supply is essential. For many plants this means two independent supplies, each sized for the hydraulically most demanding sprinkler system plus 1900 L/min (500 gal/min) for hose streams during 2 hours. The hose allowance alone is 1900 × 120 = 228,000 L, or 228 m³, per supply. Open reservoirs of raw water can allow biological growth and contribute to microbiological corrosion.[3] Valves must be kept open: a closed sprinkler control valve contributed to a 1993 fire at an electrical power plant in Newark, New Jersey, in which three workers died.[10]

Fuel handling, boilers and flue gas treatment

Coal remains the main fuel of many plants: in 2000 it supplied 57 % of the electricity in the United States.[11] Its principal hazards are combustibility, spontaneous ignition and fugitive dust. These hazards are greater for low-sulphur subbituminous coal from the Powder River Basin (PRB) and for lignite.[3] Open piles of stored coal are compacted to prevent spontaneous heating, because air fills about 35 % of an uncompacted pile but only 12 % of a compacted one.[3][12]

In-plant silos hold 544 to 907 t (600 to 1000 tons) of coal and bunkers up to 4536 t (5000 tons). They should be emptied during plant outages to prevent spontaneous ignition. Coal fires are difficult to extinguish and can last for several days or even weeks.[13] Carbon dioxide injected into a burning silo is generally considered successful at a concentration of 65 %. With a low-pressure system, a quantity of about three times the gross silo volume should be ordered.[14]

Coal conveyor belts are combustible and can be ignited by friction between belt and roller, belt slippage, static electricity or uncontrolled hot work. Automatic sprinkler or water spray protection is needed above and below the belts, and fire-retardant belts cannot replace it.[3] The best approach is to stop the belts on a fire signal, so that burning coal is not carried through the plant.[15][16] Crusher buildings, transfer buildings and tripper galleries also need such protection.[13]

an enclosed coal conveyor with water spray nozzles above and below the belt
Coal conveyor protected by a deluge water spray system with nozzles above and below the belt.

One of the largest US coal-handling fires began with a dust explosion in a crusher building without fixed suppression. It burned several thousand feet of belt, caused $35.42 million in damage (in 2007 dollars) and a 4-month outage.[13] Coal dust explosions can develop pressures of 34.5 to 690 kPa (5 to 100 psi).[15] Electrical equipment in coal handling areas should meet the NEC criteria for Class II, Division 1 or 2, Group F locations.[3]

Fuel oil is often heated before it is pumped to the burners, and pipe failure or human error can then cause a fire. For pumping and heating equipment, NFPA 850 calls for automatic suppression and a fire barrier of at least 2 hours.[17] The boiler-furnace itself can explode when flame is lost at a burner and fresh fuel accumulates until another burner or a hot surface ignites it. In the handbook's chapter on boilers, a large boiler-furnace is described as always just a few seconds away from catastrophe.[18] Between 1977 and 1996, eight such explosions caused an average of $53.75 million in damage each (in 2007 dollars).[17]

Burner front fires occur when released oil ignites on the hot boiler face and can extend several storeys. NFPA 850 therefore recommends suppression for fuel and ignition piping and burner areas within 6.1 m (20 ft) of the boiler face on all firing levels.[17] Flue gas desulphurisation scrubbers can contain large quantities of plastics, and their emergency quench systems need a dedicated water supply that also works during a station blackout.[5]

Turbine-generators and combustion turbines

A study of 20 significant turbine-generator fires worldwide over 10 years, at fossil and nuclear plants, found four deaths and several injuries. The average damage was $47 million per fire, with an average forced outage of 200 days, and two plants were closed permanently.[5] The core of the problem is the pressurised lubrication oil system, which runs at a gauge pressure of 1035 to 1725 kPa (150 to 250 psi). It uses a combustible liquid with a flash point of 204 to 260 °C and an autoignition temperature of 371 °C. A breached oil line can ignite on a hot surface and produce a spray fire, a three-dimensional fire, a pool fire or all three. The machine takes 20 to 40 minutes to coast down, and motor-driven backup pumps keep feeding oil while the shaft rotates.[5]

NFPA 850 and an Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) study set out the protection. Automatic sprinklers and heat detectors should be provided over all bearings, and sprinklers over all lubrication oil piping and the areas beneath the turbine where oil can spread. The oil reservoir and filters should be protected and ideally housed in a room with a fire barrier rating of at least 2 hours. Smoke and heat venting helps to prevent structural failure of the turbine hall roof.[5] Concentric or guarded oil piping is good practice but does not replace sprinklers. An instrumentation line failure, a leak from a concentric pipe and an error at a filter caused losses of $24.43, $19.54 and $65.96 million (in 2007 dollars).[5]

Cross-section of a turbine-generator on its operating floor with lube oil reservoir, pumps and piping, hot surfaces and sprinkler and detector locations
Turbine-generator lubrication oil system with the main fire paths (spray, pool and three-dimensional fire) and the protection recommended by NFPA 850. Based on Sheridan (2008), p. 9-185.

Two beliefs have shaped practice. Water from sprinklers was long thought to cause thermal shock to hot turbine parts, but an EPRI study of 24 events found that water caused no significant damage. A dissertation later found that the fire risk far exceeds any damage caused by the fire protection system. Most generators are hydrogen cooled, yet explosions inside the generator are considered unlikely because the hydrogen is almost pure and lacks oxygen.[5]

Combustion turbines are usually bought as packages, and the seller chooses the suppression system. Most have been protected with carbon dioxide or halon, and more recently FM-200; fear of thermal shock is the chief reason for avoiding water-based systems. Interest was growing in water mist systems approved for large combustion turbines.[19]

Some of the most severe fires in the nuclear industry involved turbine-generators, because of their large oil quantity, hydrogen coolant and rotational energy. Blade failure that ruptured a lubrication oil line was the root cause of the worst events.[20] At Vandellos in Spain in 1989, burning oil cascaded to lower levels and flooding followed. At Narora in India in 1993, an oil fire caused an extended station blackout and forced the abandonment of the control room because of smoke.[21] NUREG-1824 describes the turbine building as a multi-level enclosure with high ceilings, where an oil pool fire grows fast and threatens structural steel, fire barriers and cables.[22]

Bar chart of generic fire frequencies per reactor-year for turbine building sources: feedwater pumps, turbine-generator oil, hydrogen, excitor and boiler
Generic fire frequencies per reactor-year for turbine building ignition sources at US nuclear power plants. Based on Nowlen et al. (2005b), p. 6-5.

Cables, transformers and converter stations

Power, control and instrumentation cables usually run in open trays through the power block. Many plants concentrate cables below the control room: a cable spreading room lies beneath it, with burner management, motor control and relay rooms on lower levels. These areas should be enclosed by walls and floors of 2-hour fire resistance.[4]

Grouped cables with organic insulation have caused severe cable fires. In 1975 a candle flame used to check a polyurethane penetration seal at the Browns Ferry nuclear plant ignited the seal and then the cables. The fire caused $302.93 million in damage (in 2007 dollars) and a 1½-year outage of two 1065 MW units. At a fossil-fuel plant outside the United States, an electrical fault consumed 5 tons of PVC cable in 10 hours.[4] NFPA 850 recommends cable that passes the IEEE 383 flame propagation test, but such cable can still burn, so a fire risk evaluation decides whether grouped cable areas need sprinklers.[4]

Large outdoor transformers for generator step-up and station service hold 75,000 to 94,750 L of oil and can rupture violently after an internal fault. Fire has spread from a transformer to the generator and in the opposite direction, as described in transformer fire.[4] NFPA 850 calls for separation of at least 7.6 m (25 ft) or a fire wall for transformers holding 1,895 to 18,950 L of oil. It also recommends drainage, lightning protection and automatic water spray designed to NFPA 15, whose main purpose is exposure protection.[4][23]

High-voltage direct current converter stations link power systems that are not synchronised. The 2008 handbook reports about 30 minor and 3 major fires at roughly 75 converter stations worldwide between 1989 and 1993, all major ones in thyristor valves. Its description also calls the study 30 years long, so the actual observation period is unclear. These valve stacks contain energised components with combustible dielectric fluids and plastics. Isolating and grounding them can take up to an hour, which delays manual fire fighting. Air sampling smoke detection should be considered for early warning, while automatic sprinklers are expected to see limited use.[23]

Hydroelectric and wind plants

Hydroelectric plants lack many fuel hazards and large high-pressure oil systems, but they have their own problems. Plants may lie several storeys below grade, use oil-filled and grouped cable, and run unattended even at 1300 MW.[7] Transformer exposure, hydraulic and lubrication oil for penstock or wicket gates, and the generator windings add further hazards.[19] Older windings with thermoplastic insulation such as asphalt are highly combustible, whereas thermoset fibreglass-epoxy insulation tends to self-extinguish once de-energised. In one of the largest hydroelectric plant fires, in 1981, a fault in an oil-filled cable caused a hot, smoky fire in a cable tunnel that was hard to reach. The water supply proved inadequate, damage reached $39.09 million (in 2007 dollars) and the 700 MW unit was out of service for a year.[19]

Generator protection shows how practice differs between countries. Carbon dioxide systems designed to NFPA 12 have long been used for hydroelectric generators. In the United States the trend in 2008 was to replace aging high-pressure systems with low-pressure bulk carbon dioxide. In Canada the trend was to replace carbon dioxide with deluge water spray, for life safety below grade and to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Rings of water spray piping above and below the rotor direct water at the stator windings, and interlocks first de-energise the generator.[19] In New Zealand and Australia the trend was to eliminate thermoplastic windings or to replace carbon dioxide with FM-200 or Inergen.[4]

Wind turbine technology was evolving rapidly. Onshore units of 2 to 3 MW were available, and offshore units of up to 6 MW. Europe had more than 40,000 MW of wind capacity in 2005, and the United States more than 9000 MW.[4]

Worked example

For fire risk analysis of US nuclear plant turbine buildings, NUREG/CR-6850 models a severe turbine-generator oil fire as an oil spill of 20 ft², based on the 1987 Fort St. Vrain fire. It states that this corresponds to an oil fire of 3 to 4 MW.[24] Lubricating oil burns much like transformer oil, for which a confined pool releases about 1790 kW/m².[25][26] The check uses the pool fire relation, which multiplies the heat release rate per unit area by the spill area:[25] Q˙=q˙″A With A = 20 ft² = 1.86 m², the result is 1790 × 1.86 ≈ 3330 kW, or 3.3 MW, inside the stated range. The generic frequency of turbine-generator oil fires is 9.5 × 10⁻³ per reactor-year, and 5 % of them are classed as severe.[27][24] The modelled frequency of a severe oil fire is therefore about 9.5 × 10⁻³ × 0.05 = 4.8 × 10⁻⁴ per reactor-year, or one per 2,100 reactor-years. Manual fire fighting is modelled with a non-suppression probability P(T>t)=e−λt.[28] This curve uses selected US nuclear plant events involving manual suppression; fixed-system-only, self-extinguished and supervised-burnout events were excluded, and reported fire duration stood in for missing suppression times.[29] For the selected turbine-generator fires, including types other than the severe oil-fire scenario, the revised rate λ is 0.025 per minute and the tabulated probability of no manual suppression after 30 minutes is 0.475.[30]

The second example concerns coal dust. Dust settled on floors and ledges can be lifted by a first explosion and then burn in a stronger secondary explosion.[31] In a closed enclosure, the fractional pressure rise of a deflagration is taken as equal to the fraction of the total fuel mass that has burned:[32] P−P0Pm−P0=mbm0 The SFPE Handbook applies this to a coal-fired power plant room with a 4 m ceiling and a dust layer of 1000 g/m² on the floor. A primary explosion is assumed to lift the dust into a worst-case cloud of 500 g/m³ in the lower part of the room. The cloud would need 500 × 4 = 2000 g per square metre of floor, so the ratio is 1000/2000 = 0.5. With a maximum pressure rise of 9.1 bar for bituminous coal, the pressure rises by 9.1 × 0.5 = 4.55 bar, or 455 kPa, without venting. At a bulk density of 500 kg/m³, the dust layer would be only 2 mm thick.[33] The handbook calls housekeeping and dust control vitally important in coal handling areas.[3]

Line chart of secondary explosion pressure rise versus coal dust layer thickness in a 4 m high unvented room, reaching 4.55 bar at 2 mm
Pressure rise of a secondary coal dust explosion in an unvented room 4 m high as a function of the settled dust layer thickness (bituminous coal, cloud 500 g/m³). Based on Zalosh (2002), pp. 3-408–3-410.
Symbols used in the worked example
Symbol Description Unit
Q˙ heat release rate of the oil fire kW
q˙″ heat release rate per unit area of the burning oil kW/m²
A area of the oil spill m²
P(T>t) modelled probability of no manual suppression by time t in the selected turbine-generator events –
λ suppression rate 1/min
t time (recorded fire duration) min
P pressure reached in the explosion bar
P0 initial pressure bar
Pm−P0 maximum pressure rise of a closed-vessel dust explosion bar
mb mass of dust that burns, per unit floor area g/m²
m0 total mass of the worst-case dust cloud in the enclosure, per unit floor area g/m²

Loss experience and limits of the guidance

Power station fires rank among the largest fire losses in the United States. A 1999 fire at the power plant of an automobile manufacturing complex in Dearborn, Michigan, caused $650 million in damage. The same list includes the nuclear power plant fire of 22 March 1975 near Decatur, Alabama, with $100 million at the time, or $351 million in 2004 dollars.[34] That was the Browns Ferry fire, for which the chapter on generating plants gives $302.93 million in 2007 dollars, so the adjusted estimates differ between chapters.[35][4]

The guidance in this article has clear limits. NFPA 850 and NFPA 851 are recommended practices, and the handbook summarises their editions current in 2008; local codes and the authority having jurisdiction decide what is required.[7] Practice also differs between countries, as the choice of generator suppression in the United States, Canada, New Zealand and Australia shows. The fire load value comes from a Swiss survey of the late 1960s, and the turbine-generator frequencies and suppression rates are derived from US nuclear plant experience. Newer technologies such as wind turbines and integrated gasification combined cycle plants were not yet covered by NFPA 850 in 2008.[13][4]

See also

Notes

  1. ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 Sheridan (2008), p. 9-179.
  2. ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 Sheridan (2008), p. 9-180.
  3. ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 Sheridan (2008), p. 9-182.
  4. ↑ 4.00 4.01 4.02 4.03 4.04 4.05 4.06 4.07 4.08 4.09 Sheridan (2008), p. 9-187.
  5. ↑ 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 Sheridan (2008), p. 9-185.
  6. ↑ Holmes (2008a), p. 9-194.
  7. ↑ 7.0 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 Sheridan (2008), p. 9-181.
  8. ↑ 8.0 8.1 National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), pp. 3.4-2, 3.4-6.
  9. ↑ Van Rossum (2027), §4.4.
  10. ↑ 10.0 10.1 Demers (2008a), p. 20-208.
  11. ↑ Dungan (2008b), p. 7-3.
  12. ↑ Dungan (2008b), p. 7-4.
  13. ↑ 13.0 13.1 13.2 13.3 Sheridan (2008), p. 9-183.
  14. ↑ Dungan (2008b), p. 7-5.
  15. ↑ 15.0 15.1 Dungan (2008b), p. 7-7.
  16. ↑ Dungan (2008b), p. 7-8.
  17. ↑ 17.0 17.1 17.2 Sheridan (2008), p. 9-184.
  18. ↑ Mattern et al. (2008), p. 10-92.
  19. ↑ 19.0 19.1 19.2 19.3 Sheridan (2008), p. 9-186.
  20. ↑ Nowlen et al. (2005b), p. O-1.
  21. ↑ Nowlen et al. (2005b), pp. O-2–O-3.
  22. ↑ Najafi et al. (2007), p. 2-8.
  23. ↑ 23.0 23.1 Sheridan (2008), p. 9-188.
  24. ↑ 24.0 24.1 Nowlen et al. (2005b), p. O-5.
  25. ↑ 25.0 25.1 Budnick et al. (2008), p. 3-149.
  26. ↑ Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. 2-21.
  27. ↑ Nowlen et al. (2005b), p. 6-5.
  28. ↑ Nowlen et al. (2005b), p. P-8.
  29. ↑ Nowlen et al. (2005b), p. P-7.
  30. ↑ Hyslop et al. (2010), pp. 14-10–14-11.
  31. ↑ Zalosh (2002), p. 3-409.
  32. ↑ Zalosh (2002), p. 3-408.
  33. ↑ Zalosh (2002), p. 3-410.
  34. ↑ Ahrens et al. (2008), p. 3-89.
  35. ↑ Kampmeyer (2008), p. 18-73.

References

  • Ahrens, M., Frazier, P., & Kelch, G. (2008). Use of fire incident data and statistics. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 3-61–3-92). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Budnick, E. K., Hunt, S. P., & Wright, M. T. (2008). Closed form enclosure fire calculations. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 3-145–3-166). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Demers, D. P. (2008a). Industrial occupancies. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 20-203–20-210). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Dungan, K. W. (2008b). Storage and handling of solid fuels. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 7-3–7-13). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Holmes, W. D. (2008a). Nuclear facilities. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 9-191–9-201). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Hyslop, J. S., Kratchman, J., Siu, N., Afshar, C., Najafi, B., Joglar, F., Li, Y., Henneke, D., & Warner, M. (2010). Fire probabilistic risk assessment methods enhancements: Supplement 1 to NUREG/CR-6850 and EPRI 1011989 (NUREG/CR-6850, Supplement 1; EPRI 1019259). Electric Power Research Institute; U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research.
  • Iqbal, N., & Salley, M. H. (2004). Fire Dynamics Tools (FDTs): Quantitative fire hazard analysis methods for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Fire Protection Inspection Program (NUREG-1805). U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
  • Kampmeyer, J. E. (2008). Penetration sealing. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 18-73–18-78). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Mattern, L. J., Catania, E., & Ehrlich, S. (2008). Boiler furnaces. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 10-91–10-104). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Najafi, B., Joglar, F., & Dreisbach, J. (2007). Verification and validation of selected fire models for nuclear power plant applications: Vol. 1. Main report (NUREG-1824; EPRI 1011999). U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research; Electric Power Research Institute.
  • National Research Council of Canada, International Code Council, Department of Building and Housing, & Australian Building Codes Board. (2005). International fire engineering guidelines (2005 ed.). Australian Building Codes Board.
  • Nowlen, S. P., Najafi, B., Wyant, F. J., Forester, J., Kazarians, M., Kolaczkowski, A., Joglar, F., Funk, D., Hannaman, G., & Anoba, R. (2005b). EPRI/NRC-RES fire PRA methodology for nuclear power facilities: Vol. 2. Detailed methodology (NUREG/CR-6850; EPRI 1011989). Electric Power Research Institute; U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research.
  • Sheridan, D. J. (2008). Electric generating plants. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 9-179–9-189). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Van Rossum, E. (2027). Introduction to Fire Safety Engineering. Fire Safety Academy.
  • Zalosh, R. (2002). Explosion protection. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 3-402–3-421). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.