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Contents
  1. 1Definition and classification
  2. 2Composition and types
  3. 3Sensitivity and fire behaviour
  4. 4Blast performance
  5. 5Use in mining and construction
  6. 6Storage and separation
  7. 7Transport and emergency response
  8. 8Limits and common misconceptions
  9. 9See also
  10. 10Notes
  11. 11References

A blasting agent is an explosive material made of a fuel and an oxidiser that is intended for blasting but is so insensitive that it cannot be detonated by a standard blasting cap.[1][2] In the United Nations transport classification it belongs to Division 1.5, the very insensitive explosives, and in the United States it was called a blasting agent as a separate hazard class before 1991.[3] The best-known blasting agent is ANFO, a mixture of ammonium nitrate with about 6 % fuel oil.[4]

Blasting agents based on ammonium nitrate took over about 99 % of the commercial explosives market in the fifty years before 2008, and at that time over 90 % were delivered to the work site in bulk.[1] Their low sensitivity makes accidental initiation very unlikely under normal transport conditions. It does not make them harmless: once a blasting agent detonates, the damage is comparable to that of Division 1.1 explosives, which have a mass explosion hazard.[3][5] Their relative insensitivity can make personnel careless around them, as a fire and explosion at a mixing house near Norton, Virginia, illustrated. A fire and explosion at a blasting agent store in Kansas City, Missouri, killed six fire fighters in 1988.[6]

Definition and classification

The 2008 Fire Protection Handbook gives the United States definition used in the explosives industry. Blasting agents are Division 1.5 materials that have been classified according to tests specified in Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Parts 170 to 189.[1] They are found to be so insensitive that there is very little probability of accidental initiation to explosion or of transition from deflagration to detonation. They cannot be detonated in the standard blasting cap sensitivity test.[1]

The explanatory notes to the American Table of Distances give a more detailed wording. A blasting agent is any material or mixture consisting of fuel and oxidiser, intended for blasting and not otherwise defined as an explosive. The finished product, as mixed for use or shipment, must not be detonable by a No. 8 test blasting cap when unconfined.[2] This cap test is one criterion, not a complete classification procedure. The NUREG-1805 glossary also requires classification as Explosive 1.5D under the DOT Hazardous Materials Regulations, 49 CFR 173.56 to 173.58.[7]

Flowchart: finished blasting mixture fails or passes the unconfined No. 8 cap test, then requires full DOT tests for a Division 1.5 or other classification.
Simplified classification path: failure to detonate in the unconfined No. 8 cap test is one criterion for a blasting agent, and the full DOT test sequence determines its class.

Under the UN recommendations, Division 1.5 consists of very insensitive explosives. These substances have a mass explosion hazard, but they are so insensitive that initiation, or transition from burning to detonation, is very unlikely under normal conditions of transport.[3][8] A mass explosion is one that affects almost the entire load instantaneously.[3] The example given for Division 1.5 in the international hazard class table is an ammonium nitrate and fuel oil mix.[9] Before 1 January 1991, the same materials formed the United States hazard class "blasting agents".[3]

Detonator sensitivity is a distinguishing property of blasting agents. Secondary high explosives such as TNT, dynamite and RDX are generally detonator-sensitive.[4] In the classification system described by Santis (2008), the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) also used blasting agents as one of three classes of explosive materials, next to high explosives and low explosives.[4]

Composition and types

Blasting agents combine a fuel and an oxidiser in one product, the same two reactants that take part in any combustion.[10] Powerful oxidising agents form highly reactive mixtures when they are intimately mixed with a solid or liquid fuel.[11] According to Santis (2008), the most commonly used explosive is a fuel and oxidiser system that consists mainly of ammonium nitrate and a fuel such as No. 2 diesel fuel. This formulation is called ANFO and is sold under a variety of trade names.[4]

ANFO is made by adding about 6 % fuel oil to specially prepared ammonium nitrate particles known as prills. The combination offers low cost, high energy, satisfactory fume characteristics and much greater safety than nitroglycerin dynamites.[4] It also has limits. Its use in wet conditions is restricted, and its shattering power is not particularly strong.[4]

Many variations have therefore been developed. Powdered aluminium or other fuels can be added to raise the energy and blasting efficiency. Ammonium nitrate solutions can be emulsified or slurried with other ingredients into a semisolid explosive material and then mixed with ammonium nitrate or ANFO; its eventual classification depends on its formulation and sensitivity.[4]

Water gels, slurries and emulsions were developed for work that needs a very water-resistant product and a higher shock energy than ANFO can give.[4] Ammonium nitrate is usually their basic oxidiser. They can be sensitised with paint-grade aluminium, monomethylamine nitrate, TNT and various gelling agents and emulsifiers, and they usually contain 10 to 25 % water.[4] Depending on formulation and sensitivity, they are classed either as Division 1.5 blasting agents or as Division 1.1 explosives.[4] Davenport (2008) adds, on the basis of Bureau of Mines tests, that ammonium nitrate intimately mixed with fuel oil, ground polyethylene or ground paper is properly classified as a blasting agent.[12]

ANFO uses prepared ammonium nitrate prills and about 6 % fuel oil; water gels usually contain 10 to 25 % water and may be Division 1.1 or 1.5.
ANFO and related ammonium-nitrate-based explosive materials, including products that may be Division 1.1 or 1.5.

Modern blasting agents were introduced in the mid-1950s and ended the long dominance of dynamite.[13] Santis (2008) attributes the shift to economic considerations and to the greatly improved safety of water-based explosive materials. By 2008, over 90 % of blasting agents were delivered to the work site in bulk.[1] Some ingredients are hazardous in their own right, among them nitric acid, aluminium powder, ammonium nitrate, ammonium perchlorate, sodium nitrate and fuel oil.[6]

Sensitivity and fire behaviour

A blasting agent is insensitive, not inert. In an unconfined fire, blasting agents and secondary explosives are generally expected to burn, but confinement may allow burning to change into a detonation.[4] Bureau of Mines tests reported by Davenport (2008) found such a transition possible but quite unlikely in typical storage and transport piles. The mixtures tested were ammonium nitrate intimately mixed with fuel oil, ground polyethylene or ground paper.[12] The UN definition of Division 1.5 likewise describes the transition as very unlikely under normal conditions of transport, not as impossible.[3]

Santis (2008) stresses the human side of this hazard. Because of the relative insensitivity of Division 1.5 materials, there is always a danger that personnel become careless around them.[6] A fire and explosion in a blasting agent mixing house near Norton, Virginia, illustrated the hazard of the careless use of heat-producing equipment (Van Dolah and Malesky, 1962, as cited in Santis, 2008).[6][14] Another fire and explosion, in a blasting agent storage facility in Kansas City, Missouri, killed six fire fighters who were fighting the fire. The store held a blasting agent based on ammonium nitrate, and the event took place in 1988.[13][6]

The consequences of a detonation do not scale with the sensitivity. Division 1.5 materials are appreciably less sensitive than Division 1.1 materials, but once initiated to detonation, they produce comparable damage.[5] The 2008 handbook therefore calls for meticulous housekeeping and excludes smoking and fire-producing equipment where explosive materials are produced, handled, stored or used. During manufacture, it permits flame-producing equipment only in designated areas under strict safety procedures.[5][6]

Blast performance

An explosion can be expressed as a TNT equivalence: the mass of TNT estimated to produce the same specified energy release or blast effect. One kilogram of TNT releases 4.2 × 106 J.[15] In an analysis of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, about 1,800 kg (4,000 lb) of ammonium nitrate and fuel oil had an estimated TNT equivalence of 1,540 kg (3,400 lb).[16] The ratio of the rounded figures is 3,400/4,000 = 0.85. This is an event estimate, not a fixed energy value or a general ANFO equivalence.

Zalosh (2008) gives detonation speeds of 2,000 to 8,200 m/s for high explosives and cites a study of airblast TNT equivalence for commercial blasting explosives (Wharton et al., 2000, as cited in Zalosh, 2008).[15][17] The handbook does not give a separate detonation speed for ANFO. It does note that ANFO has no particularly strong shattering power and that additives such as aluminium increase its energy.[4] For ideal far-field blast waves, TNT-equivalent mass can be used in scaled-distance correlations; local terrain, structures and reflections complicate an actual blast assessment.[18][16]

Use in mining and construction

Mining is the main user in Santis's 2008 account. He reports that industry used over 7 billion pounds (about 3.2 million metric tonnes) of explosives and blasting agents in 2005; about 90 % went to mining and most of the rest to construction.[13] The bulk explosives described in this account dominate large mining, quarrying and construction blasting. These Division 1.5 products can consist of ANFO, water gels, slurries or emulsions, or blends of these.[5] They are mixed at a plant and delivered by bulk truck, or mixed at the blast site in the bulk truck itself. From the truck they are moved by auger or pumped directly into the blastholes.[5]

Fire is a safety concern in every type of bulk truck. The driver or operator must be thoroughly trained in the mixing, pumping and augering equipment and in the emergency procedures for the materials carried.[5] Pumping operations should follow industry standards, and in the United States the operator needs a commercial driver's licence with a hazardous materials endorsement.[5]

The NUREG-1805 glossary defines the blast site as the area where explosive material is handled during loading of the blastholes. It extends 15.3 m (50 ft) in all directions from the perimeter formed by the loaded holes, along their full depth. A minimum of 9.15 m (30 ft) may replace this if the perimeter is marked and separated from other areas by a barrier.[7] Underground, at least 4.6 m (15 ft) of solid rib, pillar or broken rock may be substituted for the 15.3 m distance.[7] These boundaries define a handling area, not a safe distance for a detonation.[7]

Plan view: grid of loaded blastholes, bulk truck, blast site boundary 15.3 m from the holes or 9.15 m with a marked barrier.
Blast site around loaded blastholes as defined in the NUREG-1805 glossary: 15.3 m from the perimeter of loaded holes, or 9.15 m where the perimeter is marked and separated by a barrier.

The NIST investigation of World Trade Center Building 7 distinguished seismic signals from local quarry blasts around New York City. It described quarry blasts involving about 100 holes in the bedrock and about 36,000 kg of ammonium nitrate and fuel oil.[19] In the practice described there, sequential firing of blasting caps at 25 ms intervals greatly reduced the ground-vibration signals. Their peak amplitude was roughly proportional to the largest charge per delay, not the total charge (Kim et al., 1994, as cited in McAllister et al., 2008).[19]

Blasting also affects the risk of a mine fire or explosion underground. In some metal mines, sulfide dust can be ignited during a blast: the blast may create a combustible dust that the flame of the explosive or blasting agent then ignites.[20] Where sulfide dust explosions are possible, special anti-incendive blasting agents are available. For coal mines, Moore (2008) states that explosives must be permissible and used under special blasting regulations.[21] Explosives magazines are among the areas with a high combustible load that can be designed to minimise ignition sources. In noncoal mines, Moore calls for oil, grease and diesel fuel in tightly sealed containers in fire-resistive areas at safe distances from magazines.[21][22]

Storage and separation

In the United States practice described by the 2008 Fire Protection Handbook, NFPA 495, Explosive Materials Code, set out protection requirements for explosives and blasting agents.[22] Blasting agents were stored in magazines like other explosive materials. Because their damage after detonation is comparable to that of Division 1.1 materials, the American Table of Distances was used for their separation from inhabited buildings, public highways and passenger railways.[5] This storage table is not a method for setting safe distances for blasting work.[6] Their lower sensitivity is recognised in the distances between stores. Stores of Division 1.1 and Division 1.5 materials, or two stores of Division 1.5 materials, need not be as far apart as two stores of Division 1.1 materials.[5][6]

These shorter distances come from a separate table of recommended separation distances. It is reproduced in the 2008 handbook for ammonium nitrate and blasting agents placed near explosives or blasting agents, called the donor.[23] For a blasting agent store, the barricaded distance is 3.35 m (11 ft) for a donor of up to 45.4 kg (100 lb). It rises to 70.1 m (230 ft) for donors of 125,000 to 136,000 kg (275,000 to 300,000 lb).[23] Without a barricade the distances are multiplied by 6. The distances apply only to blasting agents that pass the insensitivity test in the regulations of the DOT and the ATF.[23]

A worked example shows how the two 2008 tables combine. Consider a magazine with 20,000 lb (about 9,070 kg) of blasting agent. The American Table of Distances row "over 18,000 lb, not over 20,000 lb" applies.[24] For a barricaded store, it gives 297 m (975 ft) to an inhabited building and 88.4 m (290 ft) to a Class A to D highway. For a passenger railway or a highway with over 3,000 vehicles per day, it gives 248 m (813 ft). Without a barricade, these become 594 m, 177 m and 496 m.[24] The ATD's artificial-barricade definition requires at least 0.9 m (3 ft) of earth; the separate store-to-store table below specifies its own barrier thickness.[2]

Consider a second blasting agent store on the same site. If the first store is the donor, the separation table gives 17.7 m (58 ft) behind an earth or sand barricade at least 0.635 m (25 in.) thick, or 106 m (348 ft) unbarricaded.[23] These are recommended distances intended to prevent propagation from the donor to the acceptor, not distances for people near a blast.[23] Under the American Table of Distances, two magazines of Division 1.1 materials of the same size would have a 29.9 m (98 ft) barricaded separation.[24] The tabulated barricaded distance between the blasting agent stores is thus about 41 % shorter, while the distances to the public remain those of the American Table.

2008 storage distances for 20,000 lb of blasting agent: buildings, roads, railway and a second store, with and without barricades, 17.7 to 594 m.
Worked example using 2008 storage tables for 20,000 lb (about 9,070 kg) of blasting agent; these are storage distances, not blasting-work standoffs.

Without barricades the comparison reverses: the factor of 6 gives 106 m, against 59.7 m (196 ft) in the American Table. A note to the separation table states that distances beyond those of the American Table are not required where storage is in bullet-resistant magazines or behind a bullet-resistant wall.[23]

Transport and emergency response

In the United States framework described by Santis (2008), the DOT regulated transport of explosive materials and approved and classified each product before shipment.[5] Detonators could travel in limited quantities on the same vehicle as explosives and blasting agents if the DOT conditions on quantity and container type were met.[5] The 2008 handbook describes NFPA 495 as covering driver qualifications, vehicle design, placarding, fire-fighting equipment and operation for vehicles carrying explosive materials.[25] Hildebrand and Noll (2008) cite the then-title of OSHA rule 29 CFR 1910.119 as "Process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous Chemicals, Explosives, and Blasting Agents".[26]

For a fire involving explosive material, Santis (2008) says to stop fire-fighting, withdraw and evacuate the area to at least 610 m (2,000 ft); this is a minimum emergency-response distance, not a predicted blast radius.[6][14] A truck fire is especially dangerous because occupants of other vehicles may be within the radius of any blast. Santis calls for immediate evacuation in a truck fire and discusses control of ignition sources until cargo can be moved clear.[6] He places the Kansas City deaths of 1988 directly after the general rule: six fire fighters died while fighting a fire in a blasting agent store.[13]

Limits and common misconceptions

Insensitivity to a blasting cap does not make a material safe in a fire. Confinement can turn burning into detonation, and the damage of a detonating blasting agent is comparable to that of Division 1.1 explosives.[4][5] The blasting-agent designation applies to the finished product as mixed for use or shipment after the required tests. A change in formulation can move a water gel or emulsion into Division 1.1.[4][2]

Fertiliser-grade ammonium nitrate and a blasting agent are also different things. The handbook warns against confusing the two: the first is an oxidiser, while the second is a mixture of ammonium nitrate with combustible material.[27] The Oklahoma City value is an estimate for one event and not a property of ANFO in general.[16]

The definitions, tables and rules in this article describe United States practice as presented in the 2008 edition of the Fire Protection Handbook and in NUREG-1805 (2004). Later editions of NFPA 495 and of the American Table of Distances, which the Institute of Makers of Explosives revises periodically, and the rules of other countries may differ.[5]

See also

Notes

  1. ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 Santis (2008), p. 6-248.
  2. ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 Santis (2008), p. 6-253.
  3. ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 Santis (2008), p. 6-250.
  4. ↑ 4.00 4.01 4.02 4.03 4.04 4.05 4.06 4.07 4.08 4.09 4.10 4.11 4.12 4.13 Santis (2008), p. 6-249.
  5. ↑ 5.00 5.01 5.02 5.03 5.04 5.05 5.06 5.07 5.08 5.09 5.10 5.11 5.12 Santis (2008), p. 6-251.
  6. ↑ 6.00 6.01 6.02 6.03 6.04 6.05 6.06 6.07 6.08 6.09 Santis (2008), p. 6-254.
  7. ↑ 7.0 7.1 7.2 7.3 Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. F-8.
  8. ↑ C. J. Wright (2008a), p. 13-118.
  9. ↑ C. J. Wright (2008a), p. 13-119.
  10. ↑ Van Rossum (2027), §4.1.
  11. ↑ Drysdale (2008), p. 2-17.
  12. ↑ 12.0 12.1 Davenport (2008), p. 7-46.
  13. ↑ 13.0 13.1 13.2 13.3 Santis (2008), p. 6-247.
  14. ↑ 14.0 14.1 Santis (2008), p. 6-256.
  15. ↑ 15.0 15.1 Zalosh (2008), p. 2-94.
  16. ↑ 16.0 16.1 16.2 Zalosh (2008), p. 2-97.
  17. ↑ Zalosh (2008), p. 2-105.
  18. ↑ Zalosh (2008), p. 2-95.
  19. ↑ 19.0 19.1 McAllister et al. (2008), p. 672.
  20. ↑ L. J. Moore (2008), p. 9-214.
  21. ↑ 21.0 21.1 L. J. Moore (2008), p. 9-217.
  22. ↑ 22.0 22.1 L. J. Moore (2008), p. 9-220.
  23. ↑ 23.0 23.1 23.2 23.3 23.4 23.5 Santis (2008), p. 6-255.
  24. ↑ 24.0 24.1 24.2 Santis (2008), p. 6-252.
  25. ↑ Routhier (2008), p. 21-19.
  26. ↑ Hildebrand and Noll (2008), p. 13-84.
  27. ↑ Davenport (2008), p. 7-45.

References

  • Davenport, J. A. (2008). Storage and handling of chemicals. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 7-43–7-55). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Drysdale, D. (2008). Physics and chemistry of fire. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 2-3–2-20). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Hildebrand, M. S., & Noll, G. G. (2008). Public fire protection and hazmat management. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 13-81–13-98). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Iqbal, N., & Salley, M. H. (2004). Fire Dynamics Tools (FDTs): Quantitative fire hazard analysis methods for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Fire Protection Inspection Program (NUREG-1805). U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
  • McAllister, T. P., Gann, R. G., Averill, J. D., Gross, J. L., Grosshandler, W. L., Lawson, J. R., McGrattan, K. B., Pitts, W. M., Prasad, K. R., Sadek, F. H., & Nelson, H. E. (2008). Structural fire response and probable collapse sequence of World Trade Center Building 7 (NIST NCSTAR 1-9, Vols. 1–2). National Institute of Standards and Technology.
  • Moore, L. J. (2008). Mining and mineral processing. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 9-203–9-223). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Routhier, B. (2008). Fire safety in commercial vehicles. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 21-15–21-27). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Santis, L. D. (2008). Explosives and blasting agents. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 6-247–6-256). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Van Rossum, E. (2027). Introduction to Fire Safety Engineering. Fire Safety Academy.
  • Wright, C. J. (2008a). Managing the response to hazardous material incidents. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 13-117–13-144). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Zalosh, R. (2008). Explosions. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 2-93–2-106). National Fire Protection Association.