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Contents
  1. 1Intended use and the evacuation strategy
  2. 2Occupants and access to the lift
  3. 3Waiting, travel and capacity
  4. 4Fire isolation and smoke exposure
  5. 5Management, communication and continued performance
  6. 6Notes
  7. 7References

An evacuation lift is a lift intended to assist occupants to evacuate a building as part of its planned emergency arrangements. The ABCB's 2020 Fire Safety Verification Method handbook reproduces a performance requirement describing this use in addition to required exits. It relates the lift's type, number, location and fire isolation to the building, population, fire systems and evacuation procedures.[1] This is a functional description from that supplied edition, rather than a statement of current requirements in every jurisdiction.

The assessment extends beyond the lift car's ability to move between floors. It includes reaching the lift, waiting, travelling, capacity, reliability and availability during the scenario.[1] Occupants must also avoid untenable conditions along the route. The ABCB data sheets therefore require examination of each relevant enclosure and exit, while referring detailed lift design to separate guidance.[2]

Intended use and the evacuation strategy

The defining issue is the lift's intended role in the emergency strategy. A lift that happens to be present in a building does not, by that fact alone, establish a planned evacuation function. The ABCB description explicitly connects its use with appropriate protection and emergency procedures. Its role must therefore be understood within the building's evacuation arrangements.[1]

A firefighting lift has a related but distinct operational purpose. NIST's 2005 report discusses protected lifts for responder access and firefighter-controlled rescue alongside the question of occupant evacuation. These functions involve different users and control arrangements. That historical discussion does not establish that every lift serving firefighters is automatically available for general occupant evacuation.[3][4]

The NIST report describes the emergency recall arrangements considered in its 2005 investigation. Recall returned passenger lifts to a designated floor and removed them from normal service. It separately describes firefighter-controlled manual operation for access or rescue. These historical arrangements illustrate why normal passenger availability, recall and a planned occupant evacuation service are different operating concepts.[3]

In a high-rise building, the number of storeys served is one factor in the assessment. The ABCB also identifies building function and the number and characteristics of occupants. These inputs influence the evacuation task assigned to the lift. A description based only on its normal passenger service omits the emergency population and operating conditions.[1]

A strategy using phased evacuation releases different populations at different stages. The International Fire Engineering Guidelines describe staged management in some high-rise and hospital scenarios. If lift use forms part of such arrangements, its demand and availability must be assessed against that sequence. The existence of staged evacuation does not itself specify a lift dispatch procedure.[5][1]

Occupants and access to the lift

Occupant mobility is an explicit consideration in the ABCB performance description. The associated data sheets identify lift evacuation among possible provisions for people with limited mobility. They also mention additional circulation space, protected areas and horizontal exits. The lift is therefore one element of an accessible evacuation route and management strategy.[1][6]

Disability can affect recognition of warnings, response and movement, as well as the ability to use stairs. The data sheets recognise temporary and permanent limitations and other factors affecting evacuation. Assessing only the number of wheelchair users would consequently be a narrower population description than the source requires. Relevant occupant characteristics must be considered for the actual building.[6]

Travel distance to the lift is another explicit input. Occupants must be able to reach the intended service point within the assessed conditions. A lift capacity calculation cannot establish the suitability of the approach route. The ABCB requires conditions to be checked throughout the enclosures and exits traversed during evacuation.[1][2]

An evacuation route connects an occupied space, waiting area, lift journey and discharge path.
An evacuation-lift assessment includes the approach, waiting, journey and continuing route. Based on ABCB (2020a), p. 106, and ABCB (2020b), p. 277.

The assessment also needs the emergency procedures applicable to these occupants. The data sheets' management-strategy definition includes provisions for people with disabilities, the organisation responsible and the expected performance. Those provisions connect the physical route with the assistance and information needed to use it. Their adequacy cannot be inferred from car capacity alone.[7]

Waiting, travel and capacity

The ABCB requirement lists waiting time, travel time and lift capacity separately. This prevents the assessment from treating a short car journey as the complete evacuation experience. People may spend time reaching the lift and waiting before they travel. The relevant conditions must remain acceptable during those parts of the process as well.[1][2]

Lift evacuation performance links occupant demand, transport service and availability.
Capacity is assessed together with waiting, travel, reliability and the population served. Based on ABCB (2020a), p. 106.

The number of occupants and storeys connected also belongs to that assessment. They describe the demand the selected lift arrangement may have to serve. The type, number and location of lifts are then considered in relation to that demand. The supplied requirement does not provide a universal passenger count or journey-time allowance.[1]

Reliability and availability are identified as separate considerations. A strategy that assigns occupants to a lift depends on that service being available in the analysed emergency. Nominal capacity describes what the lift can carry when operating under the stated conditions. It does not alone demonstrate that the assigned service will remain available throughout the evacuation.[1]

A numerical transport model would therefore need more information than a car's rated load. The source framework calls for waiting, travel and availability to be considered together with occupant characteristics and procedures. The supplied data sheets explicitly leave detailed lift use outside their scope. They do not provide a dispatch algorithm or an evacuation-cycle calculation for general adoption.[1][2]

Fire isolation and smoke exposure

Fire isolation is part of the ABCB description of an appropriate evacuation-lift arrangement. The installed fire safety systems must also be considered. These provisions concern the conditions under which the intended transport function is expected to operate. The lift's movement capability cannot substitute for examination of the fire and smoke environment.[1]

Klote explains that elevator shafts can provide routes for smoke spread to floors remote from a fire. He also describes transient pressures caused by a car moving within its shaft. This piston effect can draw smoke into a lobby or shaft that is otherwise pressurised. The mechanism shows why moving-car conditions can differ from a static pressure assessment.[8]

A moving lift car changes shaft pressures and can influence airflow from an adjoining lobby.
Car movement can cause transient pressures that affect smoke movement in a shaft or lobby. Based on Klote (2002), p. 4-288.

Stair pressurisation addresses a different enclosure and set of openings. Klote treats stair and elevator smoke control separately. His chapter explicitly excludes the design of smoke-control systems for elevators intended for fire evacuation. Its general discussion therefore cannot be treated as a complete evacuation-lift protection specification.[8]

The route assessment extends to the spaces where occupants approach and wait. The ABCB data sheets require checking tenability in each enclosure along the travel path and within exits. An acceptable car journey cannot compensate for untenable exposure before boarding. Protection and evacuation timing must consequently refer to the same route and scenario.[2]

Management, communication and continued performance

The ABCB management-strategy definition includes the emergency organisation, warning and communication systems, evacuation procedures and alternative means such as lifts. It also includes training, drills and expected evacuation performance. These elements describe how the physical system is intended to be used. They provide necessary context for assessing whether the planned transport role is credible.[7]

The handbook requires the fire safety strategy to address all people and the management arrangements needed throughout the building's life. A lift-based provision is therefore linked to continuing operational responsibilities. Changes in population, building use or management can affect assumptions used in the assessment. The stated strategy needs to remain consistent with those assumptions.[9][1]

The supplied documents support this functional assessment but do not contain a complete evacuation-lift design method. Their dedicated references for detailed lift guidance are separate publications. Consequently, they do not establish universal dimensions, control logic, protection durations or commissioning criteria. Those details require the applicable dedicated sources and project-specific evidence.[1][2][8]

Notes

  1. ↑ 1.00 1.01 1.02 1.03 1.04 1.05 1.06 1.07 1.08 1.09 1.10 1.11 1.12 1.13 Australian Building Codes Board (2020a), p. 106.
  2. ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 Australian Building Codes Board (2020b), p. 277.
  3. ↑ 3.0 3.1 Lew, Bukowski, and Carino (2005), p. 161.
  4. ↑ Lew, Bukowski, and Carino (2005), p. 191.
  5. ↑ Australian Building Codes Board (2005), p. 2.8-2.
  6. ↑ 6.0 6.1 Australian Building Codes Board (2020b), p. 254.
  7. ↑ 7.0 7.1 Australian Building Codes Board (2020b), p. 293.
  8. ↑ 8.0 8.1 8.2 Klote (2002), p. 4-288.
  9. ↑ Australian Building Codes Board (2020a), p. 117.

References

  • Australian Building Codes Board. (2005). International fire engineering guidelines (2005 ed.).
  • Australian Building Codes Board. (2020a). Handbook: Fire Safety Verification Method (Version 1.1).
  • Australian Building Codes Board. (2020b). Data sheets: Fire Safety Verification Method (Version 1.1).
  • Klote, J. H. (2002). Smoke control. In P. J. DiNenno (Ed.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 4-274–4-291). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Lew, H. S., Bukowski, R. W., & Carino, N. J. (2005). Design, construction, and maintenance of structural and life safety systems (NIST NCSTAR 1-1). National Institute of Standards and Technology.