Contents
NFPA 68 is the US document of the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) on protecting enclosures against deflagrations by venting.[1] Its 2007 edition is titled Standard on Explosion Protection by Deflagration Venting.[1] A deflagration vent is an opening in an enclosure through which material expands and flows out, so that the pressure inside stays below a level the enclosure can withstand.[2] The standard links the required vent area to the volume and strength of the enclosure and to the reactivity of the fuel, expressed as the deflagration index or the fundamental burning velocity.[3] It also covers vent ducts, elongated enclosures and the fireball outside the vent.[4]
The first NFPA document on the subject dates from 1945; later versions appeared as guides before the 2007 edition was issued as a standard.[1] Venting limits damage but does not prevent ignition.[5] It is one of four explosion protection options, next to pressure containment, suppression and isolation.[6] This article describes the 1998 and 2007 editions as summarised in the Fire Protection Handbook (2008) and the SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering (2002); later editions may differ.
History and editions
The first NFPA document on explosion venting was NFPA 68-T, Standard on Explosion Venting, tentatively adopted in 1945.[1] A Guide for Explosion Venting followed in 1954 and brought together the best information then available, which Schwab (2008b) describes as sparse.[1] Its data had no theoretical basis, and vent area was given as a vent ratio in square feet per cubic foot of enclosure volume.[1] Enclosure strength was given little weight, although strong enclosures were known to need less vent area than weak ones.[1]
Work at the US Bureau of Mines and larger test programmes in Great Britain, Germany and Switzerland increased the evidence during the late 1960s and early 1970s. This led to the 1974 edition, printed in the handbook as Guide for Venting of Deflagration.[1] The procedures for enclosures of 1.5 psig (10.4 kPa) or stronger rest mainly on the work of Bartknecht and his associates.[7] Those for weaker structures are based on the work of Swift and Epstein.[7] The 1998 version still had the title Guide for Venting of Deflagrations.[8] Its equation for dusts in high-strength enclosures was then the same as in the VDI 3673 guideline, and the technical committee had proposed a new dust equation for the 2002 edition.[9] By 2007 the document had become a standard, titled Standard on Explosion Protection by Deflagration Venting.[1] In that edition, data on the fundamental burning velocity can be used to set the venting parameter for more individual fuels than in earlier editions.[10]
Scope and definitions
NFPA 68 clearly separates the terms deflagration, detonation and explosion.[1] A deflagration is a combustion zone that spreads from the ignition point at less than the speed of sound in the unreacted medium.[1] In a detonation it travels faster than sound.[1] An explosion, in the narrow sense used by NFPA 68 and NFPA 69, is "the bursting or rupture of an enclosure or a container due to the development of internal pressure from a deflagration".[11] The standard calls the relief of pressure from a combustion process slower than sound explosion (deflagration) venting, and it states that detonations cannot be vented.[1]
The fuel may be a flammable gas, a mist, a combustible dust, or a hybrid mixture of dust with gas or mist.[12] Venting a dust explosion is therefore within its scope as well as venting a gas explosion.[13] A deflagration needs a fuel concentration between the lower and upper combustible limits, enough oxidant (usually air) and an ignition source with enough energy.[1] Solid particles smaller than 420 µm (0.017 in.), which pass a US No. 40 standard sieve, are classified as dusts.[14] A flammable gas added to a dust cloud lowers the lower flammable limit and the ignition energy, even when gas and dust are each below their own limits.[14] It also raises the effective dust deflagration index, and with it the vent area needed.[14]
Deflagration venting limits damage to the protected enclosure; it is not a preventive measure.[5] It presupposes that a combustible mixture will form in the enclosure and will be ignited, and it keeps the damage to a level chosen in advance.[5] Some users accept a permanently deformed enclosure, while others accept only elastic deformation.[15]
Fuel parameters
Without venting, most fuels produce a maximum deflagration pressure, Pmax, of 6 to 10 times the absolute pressure at the moment of ignition.[12] Both this pressure and the maximum rate of pressure rise are measured in closed vessels at the optimum concentration, using a strong igniter.[12] The basis of venting theory is the "cubic law", which defines the deflagration index K as the maximum rate of pressure rise in a closed vessel multiplied by the cube root of the vessel volume:[12]
The index is written KG for gases and KSt for dusts, and it is not a true constant, although older literature called it one.[12] For dusts it is measured in roughly spherical calibrated vessels of at least 20 L to ASTM E1226, whereas the method for KG has not been standardised.[12] According to Ural and Garzia (2008), no standard test for KG and burning velocity existed yet, but Annex C of NFPA 68 (2007) gives data and test guidance.[16]
The fundamental burning velocity, Su, is the burning velocity of a laminar flame relative to the unburned gas under stated conditions of composition, temperature and pressure.[14] Flame speed, measured against a fixed point, is at least the burning velocity times the expansion ratio of the gas.[14] It rises with turbulence from obstructions, enclosure volume and ignition energy.[14] The table gives values for common gases.
| Gas | Pmax (bar) | KG (bar·m/s) | Su (cm/s) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Methane | 7.1 | 55 | 40 |
| Propane | 7.9 | 100 | 46 |
| Butane (Su for n-butane) | 8.0 | 92 | 45 |
| Hydrogen | 6.8 | 550 | 312 |
Pmax and KG were measured in a 5 L sphere with an ignition energy of 10 J; Su is from a separate table.[12][5] NFPA 68 (2007 edition, Table B.1, as reproduced in the handbook) places dusts in three hazard classes.[12] Class St-1 covers KSt up to 200 bar·m/s, St-2 covers 201–300 bar·m/s and St-3 covers more than 300 bar·m/s, with Pmax values of 10, 10 and 12 bar.[12] Wheat flour with a particle size of 57 µm, for example, has a Pmax of 8.3 bar and a KSt of 87 bar·m/s, which puts it in class St-1.[17] Irregular particles from a hammer mill give a faster pressure rise than spherical ones of similar size, so dust from the actual process should be tested.[14]
Enclosure strength and reduced pressure
The reduced pressure, Pred, is the maximum pressure developed in a vented enclosure during a vented deflagration.[2] The rate of pressure rise is the most important design parameter: a fast rise leaves little time for venting and, other factors being equal, needs a larger vent.[2] A larger vent gives a lower Pred, open vents work better than covered ones, and light closures respond faster than heavy ones.[2] Weak structures leave little margin: an ordinary masonry wall of 20 cm (8 in.) brick or concrete block cannot withstand a pressure difference of more than 0.035 bar (0.5 psi).[2]
Because the pressure rises quickly, the enclosure may feel it as a dynamic load rather than a static one.[2] The ratio of maximum dynamic to static deflection under the same peak load is the dynamic load factor (DLF).[18] NFPA 68 (2007), as summarised by Schwab (2008b), limits Pred to the static enclosure strength divided by this factor:[18]
Here Pes is the enclosure strength from static calculations for deformation or burst, and Xm and Xs are the dynamic and static deflections.[18] Without a detailed structural response analysis, a conservative DLF of 1.5 is used, based on the weakest structural element, so that Pred reaches two-thirds of the enclosure strength.[18]
For pressure vessels built to the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, the limit uses the maximum allowable working pressure.[18] Where permanent deformation is accepted, Pred may reach two-thirds of that pressure times Fu, the ratio of ultimate to allowable stress.[18] Where it is not, Fy, the ratio of yield to allowable stress, replaces Fu.[18] For carbon steel or low-alloy stainless steel, Fu and Fy are about 3.5 and 1.75.[19] A vessel with a maximum allowable working pressure of 1.0 bar may then reach a Pred of 2.33 bar if it may deform, or 1.17 bar if it may not. The ASME code accepts the NFPA 68 method for this purpose, so the allowable Pred can exceed the stamped working pressure.[18][6] For comparison, Ural and Garzia (2008) give 0.3 barg (5 psig) as a common deflagration load for venting or suppression and 10 barg (150 psig) for containment.[6]
Vent area equations
NFPA 68 uses separate methods for low-strength and high-strength enclosures, with the boundary at a Pred of 0.1 bar (1.5 psi).[18] Zalosh (2002) explains that the high-strength guidelines came mainly from European test programmes without low-pressure tests, while many US programmes used large, low-strength structures.[20] All pressures in the equations are gauge pressures in bar unless stated otherwise.[18]
Low-strength enclosures
Enclosures that can withstand a Pred of no more than 0.1 bar are sized with an equation based on the internal surface area.[18] The vent area grows with the surface area and with a venting parameter C for the fuel, and it falls with the square root of the allowed pressure.[18] In the 2007 method, C follows from the fundamental burning velocity for fuels with Su below 60 cm/s.[18] Where several fuels may be present, the one with the highest burning velocity governs.[10]
| Symbol | Description | Unit |
|---|---|---|
| Av | Vent area | m² |
| C | Venting parameter | bar1/2 |
| As | Internal surface area of the enclosure | m² |
| Pred | Maximum pressure in the vented enclosure | bar (gauge) |
| Su | Fundamental burning velocity, below 60 cm/s | cm/s |
Worked example. Zalosh (2002) sizes a vent for a 4 m × 4 m × 3 m room with a worst-case butane–air mixture.[9] The damage threshold is 1.0 psig and the vent opens at 0.2 psig.[9]
The internal surface area is 2 × (4 × 4 + 4 × 3 + 4 × 3) = 80 m².[9] With Su = 45 cm/s for n-butane, the equation gives C = 0.0498 bar1/2.[5] With Pred = 1.0 psi = 0.0689 bar, the vent area is 0.0498 × 80 / √0.0689 ≈ 15.2 m², about one-fifth of the internal surface area. The 1998 method that Zalosh (2002) used, with C = 0.17 psi1/2 for gases with a burning velocity below 60 cm/s, gave 13.6 m² for the same room.[9] The 2007 equation therefore asks for about 11 % more vent area in this case.
High-strength enclosures
Compact enclosures have a length-to-diameter ratio (L/D) of 2 or less.[2] For gas deflagrations in them, the 2007 method uses KG, Pred, the vent opening pressure Pstat and the volume:[10]
Its limits are KG up to 550 bar·m/s, Pstat up to 0.5 bar and a volume up to 1,000 m³.[10] Pred is printed as 2 bar and at least 0.5 bar above Pstat.[10] Extra terms enlarge the area for L/D between 2 and 5 and for panels heavier than a threshold mass.[10]
For dusts and hybrid mixtures, the equation applies to enclosures stronger than 0.1 bar with L/D up to 2.[13] The initial pressure is 1 bar absolute (±0.2 bar):[13]
| Symbol | Description | Unit |
|---|---|---|
| Avo | Vent area | m² |
| Pstat | Nominal static burst pressure of the vent, up to 0.75 | bar |
| KSt | Dust deflagration index, 10 to 800 | bar·m/s |
| V | Enclosure volume, 0.1 to 10,000 | m³ |
| Pmax | Maximum deflagration pressure, 5 to 12 | bar |
| Pred | Reduced pressure after the vent opens | bar |
For L/D above 2 and up to 6, the area is multiplied by 1 + 0.6 (L/D − 2)0.75 exp(−0.95 Pred2).[13] For top-fed bins, hoppers and silos, L/D can be increased to 8.[13]
Worked example. A 50 m³ compact enclosure (L/D ≤ 2) handles wheat flour with Pmax = 8.3 bar and KSt = 87 bar·m/s.[17] Its weakest element withstands 0.75 bar, so with a DLF of 1.5 the design value is Pred = 0.50 bar.[18] With a vent of Pstat = 0.1 bar, the three factors are 1.072, 500.75 = 18.8 and √(8.3/0.50 − 1) = 3.95. The vent area is 10−4 × 1.072 × 87 × 18.8 × 3.95 = 0.692 m², rounded up to 0.70 m². A vent cover that opens at 0.2 bar instead raises the area to 0.77 m², and an L/D of 4 with the 0.1 bar vent raises it to about 1.25 m².
As a check, Zalosh (2002) sized vents for a 400 m³ electrostatic precipitator in a power plant firing bituminous coal (KSt = 59 bar·m/s, Pmax = 9.1 bar).[21] With Pred = 1.2 bar and Pstat = 0.4 bar, he found 1.96 m² with the equation then proposed for the 2002 edition.[21] The 2007 equation above gives 1.97 m² for the same inputs. Zalosh used the damage threshold of 1.2 bar directly as Pred; with the 2007 load factor of 1.5, Pred would be 0.8 bar and the area 2.47 m².
Vent ducts, panel mass and elevated pressure
A duct that leads the vented gases to a safe outside location resists the outflow and raises the pressure in the enclosure, so the vent area must be increased.[2] The correction is found by trial and error from the resistance coefficient of the duct.[2] Reaction forces on the enclosure and the place where the fireball leaves the duct must also be considered.[13] NFPA 68 intends ducts to be as short and straight as possible and vent closures to be as light as possible; insulated panels add mass and can raise the achieved Pred.[13] Where a dust cloud is above 0.2 bar before ignition, vents are allowed only under extra conditions.[13] These include an initial pressure below 4.0 bar and a panel mass below 40 kg/m².[13]
Effects outside the vent
Flames and pressure waves that leave the vent must not ignite nearby combustibles or injure people.[2] For a vented dust or hybrid deflagration, the handbook estimates the axial reach of the fireball D (m) from the volume V (m³) and the number of evenly distributed vents n:[13]
The flame length factor K is 10 for metal dusts and 8 for chemical and agricultural dusts, and the distance is limited to 60 m (200 ft).[4] For gas and vapour deflagrations the equation is D = 3.1 (V/n)0.402, with a hazard zone to the sides of half that distance.[22] The maximum external pressure is estimated as 0.2 Pred Av0.1 V0.18, and at a distance r of at least 0.2D from the vent it falls in proportion to 0.2D/r.[22]
For the wheat flour enclosure with one vent, the fireball reaches 8 × 501/3 = 29.5 m, rounded up to 30 m. The maximum external pressure is 0.2 × 0.50 × 0.6920.1 × 500.18 ≈ 0.2 bar, falling to about 0.04 bar at 30 m from the vent. Gagnon (2008) warns that explosion venting louvres must not be placed where an explosion relief blast could injure an operator or a passer-by.[23] Iqbal and Salley (2004) add that gases released through an explosion vent, even a door or a window, can produce turbulence and a second pressure peak, citing Harris (1983).[24]
Equipment may also be vented inside a building through a flame-arresting and particulate retention device.[22] The pressure rise in an unvented building is then 1.47 times the ambient pressure times the ratio of equipment volume to free building volume.[22] A 10 m³ collector in a building with 5,000 m³ of free volume would raise the pressure by about 3 mbar.
Use in design and regulation
Ural and Garzia (2008) name four explosion protection strategies: pressure containment, deflagration venting, deflagration suppression and deflagration isolation.[6] Venting suits cases where material toxicity and environmental contamination are not a concern and a safe discharge location exists, and it is then often a low-cost protection option.[19] NFPA 68, the VDI 3673 guideline and the European standard EN 14491 publish their correlations, so vendors, owners and authorities having jurisdiction can all check a vent size.[19] Suppression, by contrast, discharges no flame or fuel, so it suits indoor equipment and toxic materials.[25]
Many chapters of the 2008 handbook point to NFPA 68 for specific equipment in the United States. Woodworking dust collectors may be protected by venting to NFPA 68, or by venting through a listed retention and quenching device or by suppression to NFPA 69.[26] Coal dust collection systems should have explosion-relief vents sized to NFPA 68.[27] Deflagration relief vents on ducts that carry explosible mixtures should lead by the most direct practical route outdoors.[28] Refrigeration machinery rooms with flammability Class 2 or 3 refrigerants should be outdoors or of damage-limiting construction to NFPA 68.[29] In process pipes, vents placed to Chapter 9 of NFPA 68 limit pressure and flame speed, although the flame can still travel through the whole pipe.[30]
Buildings can be designed so that some elements dislocate at low pressure while others stay in place, but Lemoff (2008) notes that this suits industrial structures rather than most ordinary buildings.[31] For grain elevators, Maness and Sargent (2008) call doors, windows, multiple explosion-relief panels and light-gauge coverings on steel structures a practical approach to an acceptable design.[32]
Limitations
The vent equations rest on tests in fairly large enclosures with near worst-case mixtures, and many of the gas data were enveloped rather than correlated.[20] The recommended C values of the 1998 method are the highest values inferred from 18 test references, covering volumes from 0.18 to 82.3 m³.[9] For propane, the most likely value was about one-third of the recommended one, but a very turbulent case such as a hammer mill could exceed it.[9] The guidelines do not account for application-specific turbulence, equipment obstructions or partial filling of the enclosure.[9] Since the vent area is proportional to KSt, which varies widely among coals and other materials, it should be based on samples from the site.[25]
Pressure builds quickly: in an enclosure of 1 m radius with a burning velocity of 45 cm/s, it reaches 0.14 bar (2 psig) in about 0.2 s.[33] At that damage threshold, venting would have to act within 0.2 s of ignition.[33] Venting relieves pressure but does nothing to stop the continued burning of the fuel.[23] It may be inappropriate where toxic or noxious materials are involved or where vents cannot discharge to a safe location.[19] Finally, the handbook refers readers to the NFPA catalogue for current editions, and the equations here describe US practice of about 1998 to 2007.[22]
See also
Notes
- ↑ 1.00 1.01 1.02 1.03 1.04 1.05 1.06 1.07 1.08 1.09 1.10 1.11 1.12 1.13 Schwab (2008b), p. 18-79.
- ↑ 2.00 2.01 2.02 2.03 2.04 2.05 2.06 2.07 2.08 2.09 Schwab (2008b), p. 18-83.
- ↑ Schwab (2008b), pp. 18-84–18-85.
- ↑ 4.0 4.1 Schwab (2008b), pp. 18-86–18-87.
- ↑ 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 Schwab (2008b), p. 18-82.
- ↑ 6.0 6.1 6.2 6.3 Ural and Garzia (2008), p. 17-154.
- ↑ 7.0 7.1 Schwab (2008c), p. 6-148.
- ↑ Zalosh (2002), p. 3-420.
- ↑ 9.0 9.1 9.2 9.3 9.4 9.5 9.6 9.7 Zalosh (2002), p. 3-416.
- ↑ 10.0 10.1 10.2 10.3 10.4 10.5 Schwab (2008b), p. 18-85.
- ↑ Ural and Garzia (2008), p. 17-141.
- ↑ 12.0 12.1 12.2 12.3 12.4 12.5 12.6 12.7 12.8 Schwab (2008b), p. 18-80.
- ↑ 13.00 13.01 13.02 13.03 13.04 13.05 13.06 13.07 13.08 13.09 Schwab (2008b), p. 18-86.
- ↑ 14.0 14.1 14.2 14.3 14.4 14.5 14.6 Schwab (2008b), p. 18-81.
- ↑ Schwab (2008b), pp. 18-82–18-83.
- ↑ Ural and Garzia (2008), pp. 17-146–17-147.
- ↑ 17.0 17.1 Schwab (2008c), p. 6-146.
- ↑ 18.00 18.01 18.02 18.03 18.04 18.05 18.06 18.07 18.08 18.09 18.10 18.11 18.12 18.13 Schwab (2008b), p. 18-84.
- ↑ 19.0 19.1 19.2 19.3 Ural and Garzia (2008), p. 17-155.
- ↑ 20.0 20.1 Zalosh (2002), p. 3-415.
- ↑ 21.0 21.1 Zalosh (2002), pp. 3-416–3-417.
- ↑ 22.0 22.1 22.2 22.3 22.4 Schwab (2008b), p. 18-87.
- ↑ 23.0 23.1 Gagnon (2008), p. 16-130.
- ↑ Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. 15-5.
- ↑ 25.0 25.1 Zalosh (2002), p. 3-417.
- ↑ Cholin (2008d), p. 9-22.
- ↑ Dungan (2008b), p. 7-7.
- ↑ Lataille (2008), p. 8-14.
- ↑ Febo (2008), p. 8-124.
- ↑ Ural and Garzia (2008), p. 17-158.
- ↑ Lemoff (2008), p. 6-175.
- ↑ Maness and Sargent (2008), pp. 9-99–9-100.
- ↑ 33.0 33.1 Zalosh (2008), p. 2-99.
References
- Cholin, J. M. (2008d). Woodworking facilities and processes. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 9-3–9-25). National Fire Protection Association.
- Dungan, K. W. (2008b). Storage and handling of solid fuels. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 7-3–7-13). National Fire Protection Association.
- Febo, H. L., Jr. (2008). Refrigeration systems. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 8-117–8-125). National Fire Protection Association.
- Gagnon, R. M. (2008). Ultra-High-Speed water spray systems. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 16-109–16-133). National Fire Protection Association.
- Iqbal, N., & Salley, M. H. (2004). Fire Dynamics Tools (FDTs): Quantitative fire hazard analysis methods for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Fire Protection Inspection Program (NUREG-1805). U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
- Lataille, J. I. (2008). Air-Moving equipment. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 8-3–8-15). National Fire Protection Association.
- Lemoff, T. C. (2008). Gases. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 6-165–6-186). National Fire Protection Association.
- Maness, J. E., & Sargent, L. M. (2008). Storage and handling of grain mill products. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 9-85–9-103). National Fire Protection Association.
- Schwab, R. F. (2008b). Deflagration (explosion) venting. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 18-79–18-88). National Fire Protection Association.
- Schwab, R. F. (2008c). Dusts. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 6-141–6-152). National Fire Protection Association.
- Ural, E. A., & Garzia, H. W. (2008). Explosion prevention and protection. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 17-141–17-165). National Fire Protection Association.
- Zalosh, R. (2002). Explosion protection. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 3-402–3-421). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
- Zalosh, R. (2008). Explosions. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 2-93–2-106). National Fire Protection Association.