Contents
An area of refuge is a protected space where occupants can remain while immediate onward evacuation is delayed or assistance is arranged. It forms part of a defined escape strategy. The Society of Fire Protection Engineers (SFPE) Handbook discusses refuge among several provisions supporting evacuation of people with disabilities, while recognising that no single option resolves every need.[1][2]
The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Fire Protection Handbook describes different possible forms, including a separated compartment, a protected lobby or an enlarged stair landing. The intended function depends on protection, access and the arrangements for subsequent movement. An ordinary waiting area does not acquire that function simply because people can stand there.[3]
Refuge can support phased evacuation, assisted evacuation or temporary relocation across a horizontal exit. Its use must agree with the building's protection and management arrangements. The assessment includes the people expected to wait, how their presence is communicated and how they can reach the next place of safety.[4][5]
Protection, space and a reachable destination
Refuge is a function provided by a space within a larger system; the NFPA handbook describes temporary holding areas protected from the immediate effects of fire. The relevant protection may depend on separation, location and other fire-safety provisions. Its adequacy therefore depends on the fire conditions and the intended duration of reliance.[2]
A smoke compartment can provide such a destination for horizontal relocation. A horizontal exit can connect occupants to the protected receiving side. These arrangements are particularly relevant when stair movement is difficult; the receiving space still needs enough room for the transferred population and an identified onward route.[6]
A landing used for refuge has a different relationship with circulation; people waiting there share space with those continuing down the stair and with responders arriving to assist. The handbook illustrates enlarged landings and particular stair arrangements. The waiting provision should therefore be assessed together with the continuing flow, rather than deducted from circulation space without review.[7]
The International Fire Engineering Guidelines describe a safe place through protection from untenable conditions, communication and sufficient space. This helps define what the destination must provide beyond a marked position on a plan. A person must be able to reach it, remain there and participate in the intended next stage.[5]
Accessible means of egress consequently includes the route to the refuge as well as the space itself. A narrow door, a level change or excessive operating force can prevent arrival; the SFPE discussion of door negotiation and mobility illustrates these separate tasks. The route must be assessed for the people expected to use it.[8]
Waiting, communication and onward movement
The presence of a refuge does not establish when assistance will arrive. The selected strategy must identify how occupants' locations become known and who will provide the required support; Proulx notes limitations of assistance registers and nominated helpers. Information can be outdated, while helpers may not be present when needed.[9]
An evacuation lift can provide onward transport where the building has an appropriate emergency-use arrangement; the NFPA handbook distinguishes such planned use from ordinary passenger-lift operation. Power, controls, exposure and waiting conditions require consideration. A refuge beside a conventional lift does not alone demonstrate a suitable evacuation system.[10]
Stair assistance is another possible task, but its practicality depends on the person, equipment and route; Proulx describes the need for training with evacuation devices and suitable storage. The plan should also consider the effect on other stair users. A device specified in a document has no practical value if it cannot be reached or operated.[8]
Occupants may choose to move despite an instruction to wait. Proulx observes that many people with mobility limitations remain able to move to some degree and may attempt evacuation; a strategy therefore needs understandable information and credible protection. It should not rely on an unsupported assumption that everyone will remain motionless at the designated location.[9]
The historical NFPA account also discusses situations in which fire control makes further evacuation unnecessary; that outcome belongs to a defend-in-place strategy supported by the building's protection. It should remain distinct from a failed assistance arrangement. Waiting is an intentional protective stage only when its conditions and continuation have been planned.[11] The waiting population can vary during the emergency. Space assigned to refuge should therefore correspond to the intended occupants and their equipment, while preserving the circulation needed for onward movement.[12]
Occupant capabilities and assistance
Occupants do not form a single mobility group. Proulx describes people who walk independently, use a technical aid or require another person's assistance; some limitations are temporary, while others affect strength, balance, hearing, vision or interpretation. The relevant assessment therefore concerns the activities required along the proposed route.[1]
Level walking and stair movement are different activities; a person who moves independently on a floor may need rest, a handrail or assistance on stairs. Proulx's reviewed experiments included selected participants who could negotiate stairs; their observations do not describe everyone with a mobility limitation. Applying an average speed without that population definition loses an essential condition.[8]
Doors create another task. Opening a leaf, maintaining balance and moving an aid through the opening can take additional time. The research reviewed by Proulx relates performance to the aid used, strength and dexterity; a clear opening width alone does not establish whether the complete manoeuvre is practicable.[13]
Assistance arrangements have their own dependencies. A nominated helper must be present and able to carry out the intended task; an evacuation device needs an accessible storage location and trained operators. A register of people needing assistance can become incomplete or outdated. These are operational conditions that affect whether the planned support is available.[9]
Warning also needs to reach the intended population. Visual signals can assist people who cannot hear an audible alarm, while clear instructions can support interpretation. The appropriate arrangement depends on the person's needs and the building context; Proulx treats accessible evacuation as a combination of measures rather than one universally sufficient device.[14]
The International Fire Engineering Guidelines connect movement analysis with the design occupant group; the selected speeds and assistance conditions should represent the group controlling the movement process. The scope also needs an explicit destination, whether a protected internal area or the outside. That decision determines which tasks the occupants must complete.[15]
International Fire Engineering Guidelines (IFEG) divides evacuation measures into physical provisions and emergency organisation. Routes, corridors, exits and signs need an organisation that maintains procedures, education, training and testing. The two groups must reflect the same fire-safety assumptions.[16]
Commissioning should examine both the constructed route and the procedures for using it. Differences between design and construction can require adjustments to the emergency plan. A documented plan that assumes an unavailable route would not provide the intended function.[16]
Regular checks should keep paths clear, doors operating and signage in good condition. Lighting and emergency-power functions also need appropriate testing. These checks preserve the physical chain on which the evacuation analysis depends.[16][17] Staff positions and training need to be maintained as well. Procedures should be reviewed, exercises conducted and records kept. Changes in staffing or occupancy can undermine assumptions about directions and assistance.[16]
Alterations should trigger comparison with the original escape design. New partitions, furniture, storage or changed room use can alter distance, capacity and wayfinding. A previously acceptable route may no longer serve the building in its altered form.[18][16]
Purpose and route continuity
The central purpose is timely movement away from a threat. A route begins where occupants may be present and continues through the connected spaces and components leading to safety. Every link must be usable, because a failure near the destination can defeat an otherwise adequate path.[19][20] The threatened end deserves particular attention; Proulx distinguishes an emphasis on exit capacity from an emphasis on the decisions and conditions facing occupants at the start. A route with a safe discharge does not help if occupants cannot recognise or reach it in time.[21]
A place of safety must suit the intended occupants. The 2005 International Fire Engineering Guidelines (IFEG) give an example performance framework for this destination. It describes protection from untenable conditions, suitable communication and enough space for those expected to use it. The destination is therefore part of the escape provision, not an undefined endpoint beyond the exit.[22]
Evacuation uses these provisions within a timed human response. Warning, interpretation and preparation occur before directed travel, and queues can occur along the way. The physical route must be assessed together with those stages rather than in isolation.[23][24]
Route continuity also includes doors and other operating elements. A door that cannot open in the required condition interrupts the path just as a physical obstruction would. Management and maintenance must preserve the route's intended operation.[16]
Protected routes and boundaries
A protected escape route uses construction and closures to limit fire and smoke exposure along the path. The level of protection must support the time for which occupants rely on it. Open stairs and protected exit facilities should not be treated as equivalent without examining the applicable requirements;[25] fire-resistant boundaries can help preserve the route while fire develops elsewhere. Doors and other openings require suitable operation because an open or damaged boundary can compromise that function. The whole assembly matters, not only the wall material.[16][25]
New Zealand's C/VM2 includes a design scenario in which fire in an escape route can block an exit. It asks for a viable route or multiple routes where necessary under the relevant performance criteria. This scenario illustrates why route protection and alternative paths are assessed together.[26]
Radiation can also affect an escape route without direct flame contact. C/VM2 includes an analysis for occupants passing particular window openings, with conditions and limitations specific to that method. Those provisions should not be converted into a universal radiation limit.[27]
A safe place within the building can rely on separation and smoke control. This makes its boundary and ventilation conditions part of the escape system. The occupants must be able to reach and remain in that place for the intended period.[22][23]
Queues and route capacity
Travel along a route differs from passing through a restriction; Proulx distinguishes movement time to a destination from flow time through part of the circulation system. A complete assessment needs both forms of time.[28] Exit capacity can govern how quickly a group leaves even where travel distance is short. If arrival demand exceeds the flow through a doorway or stair, a queue develops. The delay depends on the number of people and the effective flow through that restriction.[28]
C/VM2 compares the time to reach a doorway with the time required for occupants to flow through it. The greater governs evacuation from the space in that method. This procedure identifies two distinct time components rather than treating distance as always dominant.[29]
Downstream restrictions can be more important than the nearest exit. C/VM2 calls for the entire escape route to be checked, because occupants can encounter another limitation closer to the final exit. Measuring only distance to the first door would miss that constraint.[30]
Effective width can be smaller than measured width. Boundary layers near walls, rails and obstacles reduce the stream width used in flow calculations. Travel distance and effective width are therefore separate geometric inputs with different effects on the result.[30][28]
Occupants and regulatory context
Occupant characteristics affect route length, preparation, speed and assistance. A route suitable for awake, familiar and independently mobile adults may not serve sleeping occupants or people needing support. The design population should be defined explicitly.[31]
Building regulations establish jurisdiction-specific objectives and performance criteria for escape. They can address route number, size, obstruction, protection, illumination and signage. These requirements must be read with the relevant edition and building type.[19]
IFEG reproduces historical New Zealand performance criteria for escape routes. These address route size, obstruction, length, fire-spread resistance, findability, illumination and safe use. They illustrate related design functions; the excerpt is not presented as the current text of New Zealand law.[19]
C/VM2 provides one verification method within the New Zealand context. Its 2025 travel and flow procedures include particular inputs and restrictions, such as door-flow provisions. Those values belong to the method and should not be treated as international defaults.[20]
The applicable safety systems can change the escape analysis. Suppression, smoke control and compartmentation may limit exposure, but their required operation must be supported. A design should not rely on an ideal system state while ignoring failure or maintenance.[16][32]
See also
Notes
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 Proulx (2002), pp. 3-359–3-361.
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 Cote et al. (2008), §4.5, p. 4-106.
- ↑ Cote et al. (2008), §4.3, p. 4-88; §4.5, p. 4-106.
- ↑ Cote et al. (2008), §4.5, pp. 4-104–4-107.
- ↑ 5.0 5.1 Australian Building Codes Board et al. (2005), pp. 1.2-15, 2.8-2–2.8-4.
- ↑ Cote et al. (2008), §4.5, pp. 4-106–4-107; §20.15, p. 20-147.
- ↑ Cote et al. (2008), §4.3, p. 4-88.
- ↑ 8.0 8.1 8.2 Proulx (2002), pp. 3-360–3-361.
- ↑ 9.0 9.1 9.2 Proulx (2002), pp. 3-360.
- ↑ Cote et al. (2008), §4.5, p. 4-107; §10.3, p. 10-63.
- ↑ Cote et al. (2008), §4.5, pp. 4-106–4-107.
- ↑ Cote et al. (2008), §4.3, p. 4-88; §4.5, pp. 4-106–4-107.
- ↑ Proulx (2002), pp. 3-361.
- ↑ Proulx (2002), pp. 3-360–3-362.
- ↑ Australian Building Codes Board et al. (2005), pp. 2.8-2–2.8-4.
- ↑ 16.0 16.1 16.2 16.3 16.4 16.5 16.6 16.7 Australian Building Codes Board et al. (2005), pp. 1.8-13–1.8-14.
- ↑ Razza and Grill (2005), pp. 3–4.
- ↑ Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2025), p. 32.
- ↑ 19.0 19.1 19.2 Australian Building Codes Board et al. (2005), p. 1.2-18.
- ↑ 20.0 20.1 Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2025), pp. 32–33.
- ↑ Proulx (2002), pp. 3-342–3-343.
- ↑ 22.0 22.1 Australian Building Codes Board et al. (2005), p. 1.2-15.
- ↑ 23.0 23.1 Australian Building Codes Board et al. (2005), pp. 2.8-1–2.8-2.
- ↑ Proulx (2002), pp. 3-347–3-348.
- ↑ 25.0 25.1 Australian Building Codes Board et al. (2005), pp. 1.2-16–1.2-17.
- ↑ Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2025), p. 37.
- ↑ Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2025), pp. 34–36.
- ↑ 28.0 28.1 28.2 Proulx (2002), pp. 3-347–3-348.
- ↑ Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2025), p. 32.
- ↑ 30.0 30.1 Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2025), p. 33.
- ↑ Proulx (2002), p. 3-350.
- ↑ Australian Building Codes Board (2020), pp. 131–132.
References
- Australian Building Codes Board, National Research Council of Canada, International Code Council, & Department of Building and Housing New Zealand. (2005). International fire engineering guidelines. Australian Building Codes Board.
- Australian Building Codes Board. (2020). Fire safety verification method: Data sheets (Handbook annex, Print version 1.1).
- Cote, A. E., Grant, C. C., Hall, J. R., Jr., & Solomon, R. E. (Eds.). (2008). Fire protection handbook (20th ed.). National Fire Protection Association.
- Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment. (2025). C protection from fire: Verification method C/VM2 (2nd ed.).
- Proulx, G. (2002). Movement of people: The evacuation timing. In P. J. DiNenno (Ed.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 3-342–3-366). National Fire Protection Association.
- Razza, J. C., & Grill, R. A. (2005). Comparison of the 1968 and current (2003) New York City building code provisions (NIST NCSTAR 1-1F). National Institute of Standards and Technology.