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'''Impairment management''' is the coordinated management of a period when a fire protection system or part of it is unavailable. <ref name="H_16_11_16-208_16-209_16-221">Cote (2008), ch. 16.11, pp. 16-208–16-209,16-221.</ref><ref name="I_1_7-8">National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), | '''Impairment management''' is the coordinated management of a period when a fire protection system or part of it is unavailable. <ref name="H_16_11_16-208_16-209_16-221">Cote (2008), ch. 16.11, pp. 16-208–16-209,16-221.</ref><ref name="I_1_7-8">National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), p. 1.7-8.</ref> It covers planned work and unexpected failures from identification of the interruption through verified restoration. The process links affected areas, responsibilities, temporary measures, notifications and records. Completing a repair does not alone demonstrate that every valve, alarm interface and water route has returned to its intended state. <ref name="H_16_11_16-221">Cote (2008), ch. 16.11, p. 16-221.</ref> | ||
Continued protection depends on both a suitable original design and preservation of its intended operating state. An observation of one component cannot establish every function of the complete installation. Inspection, flow testing and restoration records provide complementary evidence. Changes to occupancy, storage, construction or supply can also require reassessment even where the equipment appears to remain in working order. <ref name="H_16_11_16-205_16-212">Cote (2008), ch. 16.11, pp. 16-205–16-212.</ref><ref name="I_1_7-8" /> Valve position alone does not prove the water path. <ref name="H_16_11_16-209_16-210">Cote (2008), ch. 16.11, pp. 16-209–16-210.</ref> | Continued protection depends on both a suitable original design and preservation of its intended operating state. An observation of one component cannot establish every function of the complete installation. Inspection, flow testing and restoration records provide complementary evidence. Changes to occupancy, storage, construction or supply can also require reassessment even where the equipment appears to remain in working order. <ref name="H_16_11_16-205_16-212">Cote (2008), ch. 16.11, pp. 16-205–16-212.</ref><ref name="I_1_7-8" /> Valve position alone does not prove the water path. <ref name="H_16_11_16-209_16-210">Cote (2008), ch. 16.11, pp. 16-209–16-210.</ref> | ||
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The handbook's [[NFPA 25]] discussion assigns a coordinating role from shutdown through restoration; possible temporary arrangements include a [[Fire watch|fire watch]] or an alternative water provision, depending on the interruption. These measures do not automatically recreate the unavailable automatic function. Their purpose and limitations remain part of the managed condition. <ref name="H_16_11_16-221" /> | The handbook's [[NFPA 25]] discussion assigns a coordinating role from shutdown through restoration; possible temporary arrangements include a [[Fire watch|fire watch]] or an alternative water provision, depending on the interruption. These measures do not automatically recreate the unavailable automatic function. Their purpose and limitations remain part of the managed condition. <ref name="H_16_11_16-221" /> | ||
A closed valve can isolate multiple systems, while a disabled alarm interface can prevent notification even after water delivery is restored; physical reinstatement and functional verification therefore need separate attention. Records reconcile the intended configuration with the observed final state. This connects the maintenance activity to the continued assumptions of the fire safety design. <ref name="H_14_4_14-43">Cote (2008), ch. 14.4, | A closed valve can isolate multiple systems, while a disabled alarm interface can prevent notification even after water delivery is restored; physical reinstatement and functional verification therefore need separate attention. Records reconcile the intended configuration with the observed final state. This connects the maintenance activity to the continued assumptions of the fire safety design. <ref name="H_14_4_14-43">Cote (2008), ch. 14.4, p. 14-43.</ref><ref name="I_1_7-8" /> | ||
NUREG/CR-6850 (2005), developed for United States nuclear power facilities, distinguishes personnel presence, periodic patrols and fire-watch arrangements in detection analysis; it also distinguishes brigade arrival from the start of effective firefighting. These are contextual risk-analysis observations rather than generic staffing requirements. They explain why a temporary human response needs an explicit operational description when automatic protection is unavailable. <ref name="U_11-17">Science Applications International Corporation and Sandia National Laboratories (2005), | NUREG/CR-6850 (2005), developed for United States nuclear power facilities, distinguishes personnel presence, periodic patrols and fire-watch arrangements in detection analysis; it also distinguishes brigade arrival from the start of effective firefighting. These are contextual risk-analysis observations rather than generic staffing requirements. They explain why a temporary human response needs an explicit operational description when automatic protection is unavailable. <ref name="U_11-17">Science Applications International Corporation and Sandia National Laboratories (2005), p. 11-17.</ref> | ||
== Isolation and restoration of protection == | == Isolation and restoration of protection == | ||
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[[File:fse-impairment-management-v3.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Different evidence of readiness. Mechanism and application limits are distinguished.|Different evidence of readiness. Schematic explanation; dimensions are not installation instructions.]] | [[File:fse-impairment-management-v3.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Different evidence of readiness. Mechanism and application limits are distinguished.|Different evidence of readiness. Schematic explanation; dimensions are not installation instructions.]] | ||
The handbook treats changes in occupancy, materials, partitions, ceilings and heating as relevant to sprinkler performance; a system can remain mechanically intact while its design assumptions no longer match the protected hazard. An inspection limited to leaks or gauge readings would miss that change. Readiness therefore includes both equipment condition and the continued relevance of the design basis. <ref name="H_16_11_16-205">Cote (2008), ch. 16.11, | The handbook treats changes in occupancy, materials, partitions, ceilings and heating as relevant to sprinkler performance; a system can remain mechanically intact while its design assumptions no longer match the protected hazard. An inspection limited to leaks or gauge readings would miss that change. Readiness therefore includes both equipment condition and the continued relevance of the design basis. <ref name="H_16_11_16-205">Cote (2008), ch. 16.11, p. 16-205.</ref> | ||
An indicating control valve makes its position observable, while electrical supervision can report departure from the intended position; neither proves that every downstream route is unobstructed. Flow testing provides different evidence by exercising a water path. Valve identification and drawings help establish which part of the protection is affected by a particular closure. <ref name="H_16_3_16-42_16-43">Cote (2008), ch. 16.3, pp. 16-42–16-43.</ref><ref name="H_16_11_16-209_16-210" /> | An indicating control valve makes its position observable, while electrical supervision can report departure from the intended position; neither proves that every downstream route is unobstructed. Flow testing provides different evidence by exercising a water path. Valve identification and drawings help establish which part of the protection is affected by a particular closure. <ref name="H_16_3_16-42_16-43">Cote (2008), ch. 16.3, pp. 16-42–16-43.</ref><ref name="H_16_11_16-209_16-210" /> | ||
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A waterflow alarm communicates that water is moving through the monitored sprinkler arrangement; depending on the equipment, movement can be detected through an alarm valve, a pressure-operated switch or a vane-type flow switch. The resulting signal can operate local notification and a remote receiving system. The hydraulic event and the subsequent notification are separate stages. <ref name="H_14_4_14-40_14-42">Cote (2008), ch. 14.4, pp. 14-40–14-42.</ref> | A waterflow alarm communicates that water is moving through the monitored sprinkler arrangement; depending on the equipment, movement can be detected through an alarm valve, a pressure-operated switch or a vane-type flow switch. The resulting signal can operate local notification and a remote receiving system. The hydraulic event and the subsequent notification are separate stages. <ref name="H_14_4_14-40_14-42">Cote (2008), ch. 14.4, pp. 14-40–14-42.</ref> | ||
An alarm check valve normally retains water on the sprinkler side; when its clapper lifts during discharge, an alarm passage becomes available. Water or pressure from that passage can operate mechanical or electrical alarm equipment. A retard arrangement limits unwanted signalling from short supply-pressure disturbances. <ref name="H_14_4_14-41">Cote (2008), ch. 14.4, | An alarm check valve normally retains water on the sprinkler side; when its clapper lifts during discharge, an alarm passage becomes available. Water or pressure from that passage can operate mechanical or electrical alarm equipment. A retard arrangement limits unwanted signalling from short supply-pressure disturbances. <ref name="H_14_4_14-41">Cote (2008), ch. 14.4, p. 14-41.</ref> | ||
The alarm passage does not create an additional extinguishing supply; nor does an alarm check valve perform the same purpose as an isolation valve. Its condition influences check and alarm functions within the installed arrangement. The system still requires an available upstream supply and a discharge route through the operating sprinkler. <ref name="H_14_4_14-40_14-42" /><ref name="H_16_3_16-42_16-43" /> | The alarm passage does not create an additional extinguishing supply; nor does an alarm check valve perform the same purpose as an isolation valve. Its condition influences check and alarm functions within the installed arrangement. The system still requires an available upstream supply and a discharge route through the operating sprinkler. <ref name="H_14_4_14-40_14-42" /><ref name="H_16_3_16-42_16-43" /> | ||
A supervisory signal concerns an abnormal condition that can impair readiness, such as an unsuitable control-valve position; the handbook distinguishes these signals from waterflow fire alarms. The receiving organisation interprets and acts on them differently. This separation avoids treating a warning of reduced protection as evidence that suppression is already operating. <ref name="H_14_4_14-43" /><ref name="H_16_11_16-212">Cote (2008), ch. 16.11, | A supervisory signal concerns an abnormal condition that can impair readiness, such as an unsuitable control-valve position; the handbook distinguishes these signals from waterflow fire alarms. The receiving organisation interprets and acts on them differently. This separation avoids treating a warning of reduced protection as evidence that suppression is already operating. <ref name="H_14_4_14-43" /><ref name="H_16_11_16-212">Cote (2008), ch. 16.11, p. 16-212.</ref> | ||
Testing through an alarm bypass can exercise the alarm pipe and connected devices; it does not necessarily prove that the main valve opens properly under actual sprinkler discharge. The inspector's test connection produces a defined discharge for testing appropriate waterflow functions. For a dry system, a suitable remote test can also measure valve trip and water delivery. <ref name="H_14_4_14-42_14-43" /><ref name="H_16_11_16-211">Cote (2008), ch. 16.11, | Testing through an alarm bypass can exercise the alarm pipe and connected devices; it does not necessarily prove that the main valve opens properly under actual sprinkler discharge. The inspector's test connection produces a defined discharge for testing appropriate waterflow functions. For a dry system, a suitable remote test can also measure valve trip and water delivery. <ref name="H_14_4_14-42_14-43" /><ref name="H_16_11_16-211">Cote (2008), ch. 16.11, p. 16-211.</ref> | ||
Interconnected systems introduce further consequences; a test signal can initiate building notification, remote response or operation of other equipment. The handbook therefore treats test coordination and restoration of bypassed interfaces as part of the procedure. The final operating state matters as much as the observed signal during the test. <ref name="H_14_4_14-43" /> | Interconnected systems introduce further consequences; a test signal can initiate building notification, remote response or operation of other equipment. The handbook therefore treats test coordination and restoration of bypassed interfaces as part of the procedure. The final operating state matters as much as the observed signal during the test. <ref name="H_14_4_14-43" /> | ||
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== Measuring the available supply == | == Measuring the available supply == | ||
A supply test relates an observed discharge to the pressure remaining elsewhere in the connected system; the initial static reading describes the condition before the test discharge begins. The residual reading describes the pressure while the measured discharge is flowing. Both belong to the same test arrangement and must be recorded with its location and operating conditions. <ref name="F_4-81">Fleming (2002), ch. 4-3, | A supply test relates an observed discharge to the pressure remaining elsewhere in the connected system; the initial static reading describes the condition before the test discharge begins. The residual reading describes the pressure while the measured discharge is flowing. Both belong to the same test arrangement and must be recorded with its location and operating conditions. <ref name="F_4-81">Fleming (2002), ch. 4-3, p. 4-81.</ref><ref name="H_15_3_15-46_15-47">Cote (2008), ch. 15.3, pp. 15-46–15-47.</ref> | ||
The flowing outlet and the pressure observation have different functions; a pitot measurement in an appropriate free jet supports an estimate of outlet flow. A gauge at the residual hydrant measures pressure in the distribution system during that discharge. Substituting jet pressure for residual system pressure confuses two different physical quantities. <ref name="H_15_3_15-46_15-47" /><ref name="F_4-81" /> | The flowing outlet and the pressure observation have different functions; a pitot measurement in an appropriate free jet supports an estimate of outlet flow. A gauge at the residual hydrant measures pressure in the distribution system during that discharge. Substituting jet pressure for residual system pressure confuses two different physical quantities. <ref name="H_15_3_15-46_15-47" /><ref name="F_4-81" /> | ||
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A main-drain test provides a different kind of evidence; the handbook uses changes from previous static and flowing readings to identify possible deterioration or obstruction. This is useful for detecting change, but it does not independently establish the full sprinkler demand. Test opening, supply state and instrument condition affect whether successive observations are comparable. <ref name="H_16_11_16-210_16-211">Cote (2008), ch. 16.11, pp. 16-210–16-211.</ref> | A main-drain test provides a different kind of evidence; the handbook uses changes from previous static and flowing readings to identify possible deterioration or obstruction. This is useful for detecting change, but it does not independently establish the full sprinkler demand. Test opening, supply state and instrument condition affect whether successive observations are comparable. <ref name="H_16_11_16-210_16-211">Cote (2008), ch. 16.11, pp. 16-210–16-211.</ref> | ||
Pump testing likewise separates a start test from a flow-performance test; running successfully without substantial discharge demonstrates some operating functions but does not establish the entire pump curve. Flowing observations across the relevant operating range give evidence about delivery capability. The handbook describes retaining records so that deterioration and the ability to meet system demand can be assessed. <ref name="H_16_11_16-220">Cote (2008), ch. 16.11, | Pump testing likewise separates a start test from a flow-performance test; running successfully without substantial discharge demonstrates some operating functions but does not establish the entire pump curve. Flowing observations across the relevant operating range give evidence about delivery capability. The handbook describes retaining records so that deterioration and the ability to meet system demand can be assessed. <ref name="H_16_11_16-220">Cote (2008), ch. 16.11, p. 16-220.</ref> | ||
== See also == | == See also == | ||
Latest revision as of 00:41, 16 November 2026
Impairment management is the coordinated management of a period when a fire protection system or part of it is unavailable. [1][2] It covers planned work and unexpected failures from identification of the interruption through verified restoration. The process links affected areas, responsibilities, temporary measures, notifications and records. Completing a repair does not alone demonstrate that every valve, alarm interface and water route has returned to its intended state. [3]
Continued protection depends on both a suitable original design and preservation of its intended operating state. An observation of one component cannot establish every function of the complete installation. Inspection, flow testing and restoration records provide complementary evidence. Changes to occupancy, storage, construction or supply can also require reassessment even where the equipment appears to remain in working order. [4][2] Valve position alone does not prove the water path. [5]
Controlling an interruption
A sprinkler system can be impaired by a closed sprinkler control valve, unavailable supply or failed component. Reliability of fire protection systems therefore changes during the work, even where the original design remains adequate. Fire safety management addresses that temporary condition and its effect on the building's activities. The scope follows the actual function lost, not simply the room where work occurs. [1]
The handbook's NFPA 25 discussion assigns a coordinating role from shutdown through restoration; possible temporary arrangements include a fire watch or an alternative water provision, depending on the interruption. These measures do not automatically recreate the unavailable automatic function. Their purpose and limitations remain part of the managed condition. [3]
A closed valve can isolate multiple systems, while a disabled alarm interface can prevent notification even after water delivery is restored; physical reinstatement and functional verification therefore need separate attention. Records reconcile the intended configuration with the observed final state. This connects the maintenance activity to the continued assumptions of the fire safety design. [6][2]
NUREG/CR-6850 (2005), developed for United States nuclear power facilities, distinguishes personnel presence, periodic patrols and fire-watch arrangements in detection analysis; it also distinguishes brigade arrival from the start of effective firefighting. These are contextual risk-analysis observations rather than generic staffing requirements. They explain why a temporary human response needs an explicit operational description when automatic protection is unavailable. [7]
Isolation and restoration of protection
An impairment occurs when some intended fire protection function is unavailable; planned maintenance, an emergency leak and replacement after a fire can all create that condition. The affected area may be wider than the location of the work if an upstream valve serves several systems. Defining the scope of isolation is therefore part of describing the impairment itself. [1]
The handbook describes an impairment coordinator who follows the work from shutdown through restoration; preparation includes identifying the system, the work, the necessary people and equipment, and the parties that need notification. Having materials available before isolation reduces avoidable downtime. Sectional isolation can preserve protection elsewhere where the installed arrangement permits it. [8]
Temporary measures depend on the unavailable function and the activities taking place; the handbook discusses temporary water arrangements, fire watch and control of hazardous activities among possible responses. These measures have their own limitations and do not automatically reproduce an automatic sprinkler system. Their role must be understood in relation to the actual interruption. [1]
Identification prevents a closed valve or disconnected interface from becoming an unnoticed permanent condition; the handbook describes tags and documented isolation arrangements, including equipment that must remain safe during work. The record identifies the responsible person and the component affected. Emergency impairments need this same controlled return to service, even when advance preparation was impossible. [3]
Restoration involves more than declaring that a repair is complete; valves return to their normal operating positions, relevant tests verify the restored functions, and temporarily bypassed alarm interfaces are reconnected. Tags and records are reconciled with the actual installation. Notifications then communicate the restored condition to parties that were relying on the impairment information. [6][9]
The sequence matters because maintenance itself can introduce a hidden loss of protection; a mechanically repaired pipe still lacks water if its supply remains closed. A functioning sprinkler may fail to summon assistance if its signalling path remains disabled after testing. The International Fire Engineering Guidelines (IFEG)'s management framework therefore connects physical work, commissioning evidence and the maintained operating state. [6][2]
Inspection and evidence of readiness
Inspection, testing and maintenance provide different forms of evidence; visual inspection can identify closed valves, damaged sprinklers, unsuitable storage or missing components. A functional test can demonstrate operation under a defined condition. Maintenance addresses deterioration or defects, while records connect those actions to the installation's intended state. [4]
The handbook treats changes in occupancy, materials, partitions, ceilings and heating as relevant to sprinkler performance; a system can remain mechanically intact while its design assumptions no longer match the protected hazard. An inspection limited to leaks or gauge readings would miss that change. Readiness therefore includes both equipment condition and the continued relevance of the design basis. [10]
An indicating control valve makes its position observable, while electrical supervision can report departure from the intended position; neither proves that every downstream route is unobstructed. Flow testing provides different evidence by exercising a water path. Valve identification and drawings help establish which part of the protection is affected by a particular closure. [11][5]
Deposits on a sprinkler can interfere with heating or mechanical release; corrosion can affect both the operating mechanism and water passage. Inside pipes, scale or foreign material can migrate to smaller fittings and outlets. These mechanisms explain why an apparently pressurised system may still have reduced effective protection. [12]
The purpose of a test determines its interpretation; an alarm test can establish signalling without demonstrating the full water demand. A main-drain comparison can reveal a changed supply condition without reproducing every operating sprinkler. A pump start test exercises starting functions, while a flow test examines delivery capability over selected operating points. [13][14]
The IFEG links commissioning to the performance assumed in a fire engineering evaluation; it also links subsequent management and maintenance to keeping those assumptions valid. This provides a useful framework for reading test records: the observation must answer the performance question being claimed. Successful operation of one component is evidence about that component and the functions actually exercised. [2]
Waterflow signals and valve supervision
A waterflow alarm communicates that water is moving through the monitored sprinkler arrangement; depending on the equipment, movement can be detected through an alarm valve, a pressure-operated switch or a vane-type flow switch. The resulting signal can operate local notification and a remote receiving system. The hydraulic event and the subsequent notification are separate stages. [15]
An alarm check valve normally retains water on the sprinkler side; when its clapper lifts during discharge, an alarm passage becomes available. Water or pressure from that passage can operate mechanical or electrical alarm equipment. A retard arrangement limits unwanted signalling from short supply-pressure disturbances. [16]
The alarm passage does not create an additional extinguishing supply; nor does an alarm check valve perform the same purpose as an isolation valve. Its condition influences check and alarm functions within the installed arrangement. The system still requires an available upstream supply and a discharge route through the operating sprinkler. [15][11]
A supervisory signal concerns an abnormal condition that can impair readiness, such as an unsuitable control-valve position; the handbook distinguishes these signals from waterflow fire alarms. The receiving organisation interprets and acts on them differently. This separation avoids treating a warning of reduced protection as evidence that suppression is already operating. [6][17]
Testing through an alarm bypass can exercise the alarm pipe and connected devices; it does not necessarily prove that the main valve opens properly under actual sprinkler discharge. The inspector's test connection produces a defined discharge for testing appropriate waterflow functions. For a dry system, a suitable remote test can also measure valve trip and water delivery. [13][18]
Interconnected systems introduce further consequences; a test signal can initiate building notification, remote response or operation of other equipment. The handbook therefore treats test coordination and restoration of bypassed interfaces as part of the procedure. The final operating state matters as much as the observed signal during the test. [6]
Availability and common dependencies
Two components do not necessarily provide two independent supplies; a pair of pumps may share the same tank, intake, electrical route or vulnerable connecting main. A looped network may still depend on one source connection. The relevant question is whether the required water path remains available after the particular failure being considered. [19][20]
The NIST investigation of the World Trade Center's 2001 fire suppression systems provides a specific illustration; its review identified vulnerabilities associated with floor-feed arrangements and with the limits of some hydraulic calculation paths. It also considered the dependence of manually operated equipment on personnel access and action. These findings describe that complex and that investigation; they are not failure probabilities for all buildings. [20]
The case also shows why upstream duplication alone is insufficient; alternative water sources may converge on a single downstream segment. Damage or isolation at that segment can interrupt the route to the affected area despite apparently generous upstream equipment. Conversely, a reserve serving another pressure zone does not automatically become a usable alternative without an available connection. [20]
Automatic and manual supply functions need separate treatment; a fire department connection depends on responding apparatus, water, personnel and access. A stored or pumped automatic supply can begin serving a demand without those same preliminary actions, provided its own operating chain remains intact. Calling both arrangements a water supply does not make their activation times or dependencies equivalent. [21][22]
Duration introduces further common dependencies; refill may rely on the same utility that a reserve is intended to supplement. Fuel and cooling water can constrain a driver even when the pump itself is mechanically sound. Seasonal source variation can affect both the initial reserve and its replenishment. Such dependencies belong in the description of the actual arrangement. [23][24][25]
Availability also changes during maintenance; sectional isolation can limit the area affected by work, while unclear valve identification can enlarge it. The handbook links planned shutdowns to preparation, notification and verified restoration. Records of the normal configuration make these operational controls meaningful rather than relying on an assumed open water path. [1]
Flow, pressure and duration
A fire water supply has several necessary characteristics: adequate flow, sufficient pressure at that flow, an appropriate duration and availability when needed; these characteristics cannot replace one another. A large reservoir may have insufficient delivery capacity, while a high-pressure connection may offer too little sustained flow. The required combination depends on the fire protection demand being assessed. [26][27]
Demand must identify which outlets operate together; sprinkler calculations assemble the flows of individual operating sprinklers and include other applicable demands under the selected design basis. Municipal fire-flow planning addresses a different question and may include wider firefighting activity. Treating every quoted fire-flow value as a sprinkler demand obscures these differences. [28][29]
The supply location also matters; a pressure measured in a street main is not automatically available at a building riser. Connecting pipework, backflow assemblies and changes in elevation affect the transfer. The assessment follows the supply through these elements to the same reference point used for the calculated demand. [21][30]
Storage introduces a time dimension that a pressure-flow curve alone does not show; usable water is the quantity that the outlet or pump can actually draw while meeting its operating conditions. Water below the effective intake, or reserved for another purpose, cannot simply be counted as fire reserve. Replenishment contributes only through an identified source and a delivery arrangement that remains available. [23][31]
A constant-flow volume calculation multiplies flow by duration. In the following form, flow is in litres per minute and usable volume is in cubic metres. The factor converts litres to cubic metres. [31]
| Symbol | Description | Unit |
|---|---|---|
| Usable water volume | m³ | |
| Constant discharge and duration | L/min; min |
A worked example separates usable water from gross capacity. Using Fleming's example of 530 L/min for 30 minutes gives 15,900 L, or 15.9 m³, of usable water. This arithmetic does not select a design duration or establish the gross tank volume. The example is a historical worked calculation, with tank configuration and unavailable volume assessed separately. [31]
Public supplies can change with domestic use, industrial demand, maintenance and seasonal conditions; tank levels and pump operation can change during a fire as well. The design record therefore needs the conditions represented by the available supply, including relevant adverse conditions. A favourable isolated reading does not establish availability throughout the required incident duration. [26][32]
Measuring the available supply
A supply test relates an observed discharge to the pressure remaining elsewhere in the connected system; the initial static reading describes the condition before the test discharge begins. The residual reading describes the pressure while the measured discharge is flowing. Both belong to the same test arrangement and must be recorded with its location and operating conditions. [33][34]
The flowing outlet and the pressure observation have different functions; a pitot measurement in an appropriate free jet supports an estimate of outlet flow. A gauge at the residual hydrant measures pressure in the distribution system during that discharge. Substituting jet pressure for residual system pressure confuses two different physical quantities. [34][33]
The discharge estimate depends on outlet geometry and the coefficient representing its losses; a disturbed or nonuniform jet makes a single point reading less representative. Probe alignment and position also influence the measurement. For some discharge devices, a calibrated nozzle or suitable flowmeter provides a more appropriate method than applying a simple pitot relation. [34]
Test results describe a network state, rather than an unlimited promise of future supply; domestic demand, pumps, source levels and closed valves can change that state. The pressure reference must also be carried correctly to the building calculation. A test performed at a different elevation or upstream of additional resistance needs hydraulic interpretation before comparison with system demand. [26][30]
A main-drain test provides a different kind of evidence; the handbook uses changes from previous static and flowing readings to identify possible deterioration or obstruction. This is useful for detecting change, but it does not independently establish the full sprinkler demand. Test opening, supply state and instrument condition affect whether successive observations are comparable. [35]
Pump testing likewise separates a start test from a flow-performance test; running successfully without substantial discharge demonstrates some operating functions but does not establish the entire pump curve. Flowing observations across the relevant operating range give evidence about delivery capability. The handbook describes retaining records so that deterioration and the ability to meet system demand can be assessed. [36]
See also
Notes
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 Cote (2008), ch. 16.11, pp. 16-208–16-209,16-221.
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), p. 1.7-8.
- ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 Cote (2008), ch. 16.11, p. 16-221.
- ↑ 4.0 4.1 Cote (2008), ch. 16.11, pp. 16-205–16-212.
- ↑ 5.0 5.1 Cote (2008), ch. 16.11, pp. 16-209–16-210.
- ↑ 6.0 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 Cote (2008), ch. 14.4, p. 14-43.
- ↑ Science Applications International Corporation and Sandia National Laboratories (2005), p. 11-17.
- ↑ Cote (2008), ch. 16.11, pp. 16-208,16-221.
- ↑ Cote (2008), ch. 16.11, pp. 16-208–16-211,16-221.
- ↑ Cote (2008), ch. 16.11, p. 16-205.
- ↑ 11.0 11.1 Cote (2008), ch. 16.3, pp. 16-42–16-43.
- ↑ Cote (2008), ch. 16.11, pp. 16-207–16-212.
- ↑ 13.0 13.1 Cote (2008), ch. 14.4, pp. 14-42–14-43.
- ↑ Cote (2008), ch. 16.11, pp. 16-210–16-211,16-220.
- ↑ 15.0 15.1 Cote (2008), ch. 14.4, pp. 14-40–14-42.
- ↑ Cote (2008), ch. 14.4, p. 14-41.
- ↑ Cote (2008), ch. 16.11, p. 16-212.
- ↑ Cote (2008), ch. 16.11, p. 16-211.
- ↑ Cote (2008), ch. 15.2, pp. 15-27–15-30.
- ↑ 20.0 20.1 20.2 Hopkins et al. (2005), pp. xxxvii–xlii.
- ↑ 21.0 21.1 Cote (2008), ch. 15.4, pp. 15-63–15-65.
- ↑ Cote (2008), ch. 16.10, pp. 16-200–16-201.
- ↑ 23.0 23.1 Cote (2008), ch. 15.1, pp. 15-3–15-5.
- ↑ Cote (2008), ch. 15.6, pp. 15-98–15-99.
- ↑ Cote (2008), ch. 13.4, pp. 13-40–13-44.
- ↑ 26.0 26.1 26.2 Cote (2008), ch. 15.2, pp. 15-23–15-24.
- ↑ Cote (2008), ch. 15.4, pp. 15-63–15-67.
- ↑ Cote (2008), ch. 15.2, pp. 15-23–15-29.
- ↑ Fleming (2002), ch. 4-3, pp. 4-74–4-81.
- ↑ 30.0 30.1 Fleming (2002), ch. 4-3, pp. 4-81–4-83.
- ↑ 31.0 31.1 31.2 Fleming (2002), ch. 4-3, pp. 4-83–4-84.
- ↑ Cote (2008), ch. 15.4, pp. 15-63–15-64.
- ↑ 33.0 33.1 Fleming (2002), ch. 4-3, p. 4-81.
- ↑ 34.0 34.1 34.2 Cote (2008), ch. 15.3, pp. 15-46–15-47.
- ↑ Cote (2008), ch. 16.11, pp. 16-210–16-211.
- ↑ Cote (2008), ch. 16.11, p. 16-220.
References
- Cote, A. E. (Ed.). (2008). Fire protection handbook (20th ed.). National Fire Protection Association.
- Fleming, R. P. (2002). Automatic sprinkler system calculations. In P. J. DiNenno (Ed.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 4-72–4-87). National Fire Protection Association.
- Hopkins, M., Schoenrock, J., & Budnick, E. (2005). Fire suppression systems (NIST NCSTAR 1-4B). National Institute of Standards and Technology.
- National Research Council of Canada, International Code Council, Department of Building and Housing, & Australian Building Codes Board. (2005). International fire engineering guidelines. Australian Building Codes Board.
- Science Applications International Corporation, & Sandia National Laboratories. (2005). EPRI/NRC-RES fire PRA methodology for nuclear power facilities: Volume 2, detailed methodology (NUREG/CR-6850; EPRI 1011989). Electric Power Research Institute; U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.