FSE wiki: fact-check: correct historical statistics, design-fire scope and tank safeguards (written by Claude Opus 5.5) |
Add SVG figures fse-commercial-vehicle-fire-v1.svg, fse-commercial-vehicle-fire-v2.svg, fse-commercial-vehicle-fire-v3.svg, fse-commercial-vehicle-fire-v4.svg (list-3 visual plan) |
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Tyres are a second typical source. If one tyre of a dual-tyre pair runs flat or is seriously underinflated, flexing can build up enough internal heat to ignite it.<ref name="Routhier-21-22" /> Overloading, sustained high speed and high ambient temperatures add to this risk, and dual tyres spaced so closely that they rub can also ignite. Tyres can also be ignited by an overheated axle and then release a large amount of heat.<ref name="Babrauskas-3-27">Babrauskas (2002b), pp. 3-27–3-28.</ref> The 2002 SFPE handbook cited one documented test: a burning pair of truck tyres in a tandem arrangement reached roughly 1 MW, read from its published curve. | Tyres are a second typical source. If one tyre of a dual-tyre pair runs flat or is seriously underinflated, flexing can build up enough internal heat to ignite it.<ref name="Routhier-21-22" /> Overloading, sustained high speed and high ambient temperatures add to this risk, and dual tyres spaced so closely that they rub can also ignite. Tyres can also be ignited by an overheated axle and then release a large amount of heat.<ref name="Babrauskas-3-27">Babrauskas (2002b), pp. 3-27–3-28.</ref> The 2002 SFPE handbook cited one documented test: a burning pair of truck tyres in a tandem arrangement reached roughly 1 MW, read from its published curve. | ||
[[File:fse-commercial-vehicle-fire-v2.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Side view of a tractor-trailer with numbered callouts at brakes, dual tyres, axle, exhaust, fuel line, battery and cargo|Typical ignition sources on a heavy goods vehicle. Based on Routhier (2008), pp. 21-15–21-23, and Babrauskas (2002b), p. 3-27.]] | |||
The fuel and electrical systems are a third source. Diesel has a higher [[Flash point|flash point]] than petrol, but diesel engines run hotter, so fuel in the return line is warmer and more likely to ignite if it leaks onto a hot surface.<ref name="Routhier-21-21">Routhier (2008), p. 21-21.</ref> A manual battery disconnect switch is desirable on buses and trucks, but such switches are rarely fitted. For buses, the great majority of fires are engine fires.<ref name="Bukowski-5-228" /> Cargo can also be ignited by careless smoking during loading, which is why motor carriers generally prohibit it.<ref name="Routhier-21-23">Routhier (2008), p. 21-23.</ref> | The fuel and electrical systems are a third source. Diesel has a higher [[Flash point|flash point]] than petrol, but diesel engines run hotter, so fuel in the return line is warmer and more likely to ignite if it leaks onto a hot surface.<ref name="Routhier-21-21">Routhier (2008), p. 21-21.</ref> A manual battery disconnect switch is desirable on buses and trucks, but such switches are rarely fitted. For buses, the great majority of fires are engine fires.<ref name="Bukowski-5-228" /> Cargo can also be ignited by careless smoking during loading, which is why motor carriers generally prohibit it.<ref name="Routhier-21-23">Routhier (2008), p. 21-23.</ref> | ||
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As summarised in the handbook, NFPA 502 (2008 edition) gives peaks of 20–30 MW for a bus, 70–200 MW for a heavy goods truck and 200–300 MW for a tanker.<ref name="Bendelius-21-204" /> The peak may be reached within 10 minutes, and temperatures directly above the fire can reach 1,000 to 1,400 °C. In the Memorial Tunnel test programme of 1993–1995 in West Virginia, a 20 MW test fire represented a bus or truck, 50 MW a large truck and 100 MW a petrol tanker.<ref name="Bendelius-21-208">Bendelius (2008), p. 21-208.</ref> | As summarised in the handbook, NFPA 502 (2008 edition) gives peaks of 20–30 MW for a bus, 70–200 MW for a heavy goods truck and 200–300 MW for a tanker.<ref name="Bendelius-21-204" /> The peak may be reached within 10 minutes, and temperatures directly above the fire can reach 1,000 to 1,400 °C. In the Memorial Tunnel test programme of 1993–1995 in West Virginia, a 20 MW test fire represented a bus or truck, 50 MW a large truck and 100 MW a petrol tanker.<ref name="Bendelius-21-208">Bendelius (2008), p. 21-208.</ref> | ||
[[File:fse-commercial-vehicle-fire-v1.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Range bars on a logarithmic scale comparing peak heat release rates of cars, buses, heavy goods vehicles and tankers from design tables and fire tests|Peak heat release rates of road vehicles: NFPA 502 (2008) design values and full-scale test results. Based on Bendelius (2008), p. 21-204, Mawhinney (2008), p. 16-140, and Babrauskas (2002b), pp. 3-27–3-28.]] | |||
These numbers show why the load of an ordinary truck is the main uncertainty in a [[Tunnel fire]]. Unlike transit tunnels, where the operator controls vehicles and loads, a road tunnel admits any truck.<ref name="Bendelius-21-189">Bendelius (2008), p. 21-189.</ref> An innocent-looking truck may carry a load that supports a fast-growing, potentially lethal fire without being classed as hazardous cargo. The incident truck in the Mont Blanc fire carried mainly margarine and flour, and other tunnel fires involved tyres, cheese, glue and rolls of plastic.<ref name="Bendelius-21-191">Bendelius (2008), pp. 21-190–21-191.</ref> The wood floors of trailers and buses, in contrast, are relatively hard to ignite, burn slowly and matter only in very severe incidents.<ref name="Routhier-21-20">Routhier (2008), p. 21-20.</ref> | These numbers show why the load of an ordinary truck is the main uncertainty in a [[Tunnel fire]]. Unlike transit tunnels, where the operator controls vehicles and loads, a road tunnel admits any truck.<ref name="Bendelius-21-189">Bendelius (2008), p. 21-189.</ref> An innocent-looking truck may carry a load that supports a fast-growing, potentially lethal fire without being classed as hazardous cargo. The incident truck in the Mont Blanc fire carried mainly margarine and flour, and other tunnel fires involved tyres, cheese, glue and rolls of plastic.<ref name="Bendelius-21-191">Bendelius (2008), pp. 21-190–21-191.</ref> The wood floors of trailers and buses, in contrast, are relatively hard to ignite, burn slowly and matter only in very severe incidents.<ref name="Routhier-21-20">Routhier (2008), p. 21-20.</ref> | ||
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As a worked example, consider a diesel spill on a concrete surface that feeds a 20 MW fire, the size of the Memorial Tunnel bus or truck fire.<ref name="Bendelius-21-208" /> With 390 kW/m² for unconfined diesel, the pool needs an area of 20,000/390 = 51.3 m².<ref name="Budnick-3-149" /> At a depth of 2.8 mm, this pool holds only 51.3 × 0.0028 = 0.144 m³, or about 144 litres. With about 36 MJ per litre of diesel, the pool contains about 5,170 MJ.<ref name="NIPV-25">Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 25.</ref> Using unrounded values gives an estimated duration of about 258 s, or 4.3 minutes. Because both energy and burning rate scale with area, a thin unconfined film burns for about the same time whatever its size. | As a worked example, consider a diesel spill on a concrete surface that feeds a 20 MW fire, the size of the Memorial Tunnel bus or truck fire.<ref name="Bendelius-21-208" /> With 390 kW/m² for unconfined diesel, the pool needs an area of 20,000/390 = 51.3 m².<ref name="Budnick-3-149" /> At a depth of 2.8 mm, this pool holds only 51.3 × 0.0028 = 0.144 m³, or about 144 litres. With about 36 MJ per litre of diesel, the pool contains about 5,170 MJ.<ref name="NIPV-25">Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 25.</ref> Using unrounded values gives an estimated duration of about 258 s, or 4.3 minutes. Because both energy and burning rate scale with area, a thin unconfined film burns for about the same time whatever its size. | ||
[[File:fse-commercial-vehicle-fire-v4.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Line chart of pool fire heat release rate against pool area for confined and unconfined diesel, with the worked example marked at 51 square metres and 20 MW|Heat release rate of diesel pool fires against pool area, confined and unconfined, with the worked example. Based on Budnick et al. (2008), p. 3-149.]] | |||
The example shows that a spill on its own can give an intense but short fire, while the long fires of heavy goods vehicles may be fed by cargo. For tankers the picture changes, because the load itself is liquid fuel. As an illustration, a 200–300 MW fire would require a confined petrol pool of about 83–125 m² at 2,400 kW/m²; this area is calculated from the pool-fire model, not specified by NFPA 502.<ref name="Budnick-3-149" /> The tanker design fire in NFPA 502 assumes adequate drainage that limits the area and duration of the pool fire.<ref name="Bendelius-21-204" /> The method has clear limits. It assumes a steady fire, and the source gives the 2.8 mm spill depth for concrete surfaces only.<ref name="Budnick-3-149" /><ref name="Budnick-3-150">Budnick et al. (2008), p. 3-150.</ref> | The example shows that a spill on its own can give an intense but short fire, while the long fires of heavy goods vehicles may be fed by cargo. For tankers the picture changes, because the load itself is liquid fuel. As an illustration, a 200–300 MW fire would require a confined petrol pool of about 83–125 m² at 2,400 kW/m²; this area is calculated from the pool-fire model, not specified by NFPA 502.<ref name="Budnick-3-149" /> The tanker design fire in NFPA 502 assumes adequate drainage that limits the area and duration of the pool fire.<ref name="Bendelius-21-204" /> The method has clear limits. It assumes a steady fire, and the source gives the 2.8 mm spill depth for concrete surfaces only.<ref name="Budnick-3-149" /><ref name="Budnick-3-150">Budnick et al. (2008), p. 3-150.</ref> | ||
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The 2008 handbook describes tank vehicles built to NFPA 385 and US Department of Transportation rules as able to withstand all but the most violent impacts without rupturing.<ref name="Ordile-7-31">Ordile (2008), p. 7-31.</ref> Vents let vapour burn at the vent if the tank is exposed to fire, reducing the risk of rupture from internal pressure. For liquids other than viscous ones, a shutoff valve inside the tank shell stays closed except during loading and unloading. A shear section in the piping breaks in an accident and leaves this valve undamaged and closed. A remote control and a fusible element that operates at no more than 121 °C (250 °F) let the valve close in a fire. | The 2008 handbook describes tank vehicles built to NFPA 385 and US Department of Transportation rules as able to withstand all but the most violent impacts without rupturing.<ref name="Ordile-7-31">Ordile (2008), p. 7-31.</ref> Vents let vapour burn at the vent if the tank is exposed to fire, reducing the risk of rupture from internal pressure. For liquids other than viscous ones, a shutoff valve inside the tank shell stays closed except during loading and unloading. A shear section in the piping breaks in an accident and leaves this valve undamaged and closed. A remote control and a fusible element that operates at no more than 121 °C (250 °F) let the valve close in a fire. | ||
[[File:fse-commercial-vehicle-fire-v3.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Cutaway side view of a tank trailer showing vent, internal shutoff valve, shear section, remote control and placard|Fire protection features of a cargo tank for flammable liquids. Based on Ordile (2008), p. 7-31, and Routhier (2008), p. 21-27.]] | |||
For fire fighters, the main hazards are wrong or mixed loads, defective safety controls, large releases and a possible [[BLEVE]].<ref name="Routhier-21-24" /> Missing or incorrect placards and shipping papers make the situation worse. Responders therefore approach from upwind, avoid contact with spilled material and first identify the product. | For fire fighters, the main hazards are wrong or mixed loads, defective safety controls, large releases and a possible [[BLEVE]].<ref name="Routhier-21-24" /> Missing or incorrect placards and shipping papers make the situation worse. Responders therefore approach from upwind, avoid contact with spilled material and first identify the product. | ||
Revision as of 13:21, 12 November 2026
A commercial vehicle fire is a fire in a motor vehicle used in business to carry goods or passengers, such as a truck, tractor-trailer, tank truck, delivery van or bus. Commercial vehicles share electrical wiring and combustible trim with other motor vehicles. Combustion-powered models also carry flammable fuel and have hot engine and exhaust parts.[1] What sets commercial vehicles apart is often the load. Trucks may carry cargo that is flammable, and tank trucks and other bulk vehicles may carry hazardous materials whose release turns a vehicle fire into a hazardous materials incident.[2] Heavy vehicles also bring their own ignition sources, such as overheated brakes and dual tyres.
A heavy goods truck can burn far more intensely than a car: road tunnel design fires for such trucks range from 70 to 200 MW, against 5–10 MW for a passenger car.[3] The road tunnel fires at Mont Blanc and in the Tauern Tunnel in 1999 killed 51 people and destroyed 34 trucks and tractor-trailers.[4] The 2008 handbook describes US Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations for commercial vehicles in use, including fire extinguishers, fuelling precautions and rules for vehicles carrying hazardous materials.[5]
Definition and regulatory scope
The fire hazard of a commercial vehicle depends on the vehicle type, its use in commercial service, its age and maintenance, its fuel and the way that fuel is stored on board.[1] The materials carried as cargo, such as upholstery, plastic, wood, fuel and hazardous materials, are a further factor. The fuel may be diesel, petrol, propane, natural gas or alcohol.
The 2008 US handbook distinguishes two sets of federal rules. The Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS) of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration apply to new vehicles.[6] The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (FMCSRs), administered by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA), address vehicles in use.[5] At the time, these regulations in Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Parts 325–399, covered commercial vehicles in interstate or foreign commerce. The handbook states that most states had adopted them by reference for intrastate commerce.
Several of the fuel system rules for light vehicles stop at a gross vehicle weight rating of 4,536 kg (10,000 lb). The FMVSS 301 crash tests for fuel leakage apply to cars, trucks and buses up to that weight.[6] School buses above 4,536 kg using a fuel with a boiling point above 0 °C were also covered, with a moving barrier striking the bus at the front, rear and sides. The handbook describes hazardous materials rules in 49 CFR Parts 105–180 for both interstate and intrastate transport.[5]
Fire problem and major incidents
The US fire statistics in the source documents do not separate trucks and buses from cars. The handbook's year-by-year table estimates 252,400 highway vehicle fires, 310 civilian deaths and 1,100 civilian injuries in 2000.[2] In 1999–2003, fires in the cargo or trunk area made up 3% of all highway vehicle fires and 7% of the civilian injuries.[6] More detailed analyses of truck fires by the FMCSA were described in 2008 as dated.[2] Death and injury result from direct exposure to heat and from breathing toxic combustion products, sometimes because jammed doors or seats prevent escape.[2]
Hazardous cargo makes some commercial vehicle fires far more severe. The National Transportation Safety Board, the FMCSA and NFPA investigated many crashes in which hazardous materials exploded or burned.[2] These investigations led to changes in the rules for hazardous materials containers, but such cargo fires and explosions still occur. Fires on or under bridges can also damage the structure. In 1998, a tank truck carrying 33,000 litres of petrol jumped a barrier on Interstate 95 in Pennsylvania and exploded, killing both drivers involved.[7] In 2004, a tank truck carrying 45,500 litres of fuel oil burned on the same highway in Connecticut, and the fire melted steel support beams of a bridge.
The cited serious incidents include fires in long road tunnels. In the Mont Blanc Tunnel between France and Italy in March 1999, 39 people died and 34 vehicles were destroyed, including 20 tractor-trailers.[4] In the Austrian Tauern Tunnel in May 1999, 12 people died and 14 trucks and 20 cars were destroyed. For the Swiss St. Gotthard Tunnel fire of October 2001, the handbook's detailed table lists eight deaths and 23 vehicles destroyed, while its summary table lists eleven deaths. It does not reconcile the death toll.[4]
Bus fires can also kill many people at once. In a 1988 crash in Kentucky, a pickup truck struck a church bus, and the following fire killed 27 people.[8] Fuel leaking from the bus tank burned through cracks in the floor, the crash destroyed the front door, and luggage blocked the rear emergency exit.
Causes and ignition sources
Heavy vehicles share the ignition sources of all motor vehicles: electrical faults, hot exhaust parts, engine backfire and friction sparks from a collision.[1] Some sources, however, grow with the size and weight of the vehicle. Overused brakes can overheat until they smoulder or burn, and this problem increases with the size and gross weight of the vehicle.[9] On long downgrades, drivers rely mainly on engine braking in a low gear, and engine braking devices are used on diesel trucks, especially in mountainous regions.
Tyres are a second typical source. If one tyre of a dual-tyre pair runs flat or is seriously underinflated, flexing can build up enough internal heat to ignite it.[9] Overloading, sustained high speed and high ambient temperatures add to this risk, and dual tyres spaced so closely that they rub can also ignite. Tyres can also be ignited by an overheated axle and then release a large amount of heat.[10] The 2002 SFPE handbook cited one documented test: a burning pair of truck tyres in a tandem arrangement reached roughly 1 MW, read from its published curve.
The fuel and electrical systems are a third source. Diesel has a higher flash point than petrol, but diesel engines run hotter, so fuel in the return line is warmer and more likely to ignite if it leaks onto a hot surface.[11] A manual battery disconnect switch is desirable on buses and trucks, but such switches are rarely fitted. For buses, the great majority of fires are engine fires.[8] Cargo can also be ignited by careless smoking during loading, which is why motor carriers generally prohibit it.[12]
Heat release rate and fire load
The cargo can dominate the heat release rate of a burning truck. A European test programme burned nearly two dozen vehicles, including cars, buses, trams, trucks and rail vehicles.[10] Many of these fires peaked at about 10–35 MW, and in the published curve a school bus peaked just below 35 MW after about 15 minutes. A truck loaded with 2 tonnes of modern upholstered furniture, however, peaked at about 120 MW. Example fire loads in Van Rossum are 19,000 MJ for an unloaded truck and 6,000–12,000 MJ for a passenger car; the truck example is about 1.6–3.2 times the car range.[13]
Full-scale tests in the Runehamar Tunnel in Norway in 2003 confirmed these large values. A typical heavy goods vehicle carrying furniture or foam mattresses produced a fire of 75 to 200 MW.[14] Describing the earlier design basis, Mawhinney reports that NFPA 502 suggested 30 MW for such a vehicle. Ventilation designed for 30 MW cannot cope with a 150 MW fire, a fivefold underestimate in that scenario. The 2008 NFPA 502 range reproduced in the handbook's road-tunnel chapter is 70–200 MW.[3]
As summarised in the handbook, NFPA 502 (2008 edition) gives peaks of 20–30 MW for a bus, 70–200 MW for a heavy goods truck and 200–300 MW for a tanker.[3] The peak may be reached within 10 minutes, and temperatures directly above the fire can reach 1,000 to 1,400 °C. In the Memorial Tunnel test programme of 1993–1995 in West Virginia, a 20 MW test fire represented a bus or truck, 50 MW a large truck and 100 MW a petrol tanker.[15]
These numbers show why the load of an ordinary truck is the main uncertainty in a Tunnel fire. Unlike transit tunnels, where the operator controls vehicles and loads, a road tunnel admits any truck.[16] An innocent-looking truck may carry a load that supports a fast-growing, potentially lethal fire without being classed as hazardous cargo. The incident truck in the Mont Blanc fire carried mainly margarine and flour, and other tunnel fires involved tyres, cheese, glue and rolls of plastic.[17] The wood floors of trailers and buses, in contrast, are relatively hard to ignite, burn slowly and matter only in very severe incidents.[18]
Fuel spills and pool fires
If escaped fuel or liquid cargo ignites as a pool fire, the pool's power depends on its area rather than on the vehicle materials.[19] The heat release rate equals the burning rate per unit area of the liquid times the area of the pool.[20] The duration equals the energy in the fuel divided by the heat release rate. A spill that spreads freely on concrete burns at about one fifth of the rate per unit area of a deep, confined pool, because heat is lost to the surface beneath. Such an unconfined spill is about 2.8 mm deep or less.
| Symbol | Description | Unit |
|---|---|---|
| Heat release rate of the pool fire | kW | |
| Heat release rate per unit area (diesel: 1,950 confined, 390 unconfined) | kW/m² | |
| Area of the burning pool | m² | |
| Fire duration | s | |
| Energy in the fuel: mass times heat of combustion, or volume times energy per litre | kJ |
As a worked example, consider a diesel spill on a concrete surface that feeds a 20 MW fire, the size of the Memorial Tunnel bus or truck fire.[15] With 390 kW/m² for unconfined diesel, the pool needs an area of 20,000/390 = 51.3 m².[20] At a depth of 2.8 mm, this pool holds only 51.3 × 0.0028 = 0.144 m³, or about 144 litres. With about 36 MJ per litre of diesel, the pool contains about 5,170 MJ.[21] Using unrounded values gives an estimated duration of about 258 s, or 4.3 minutes. Because both energy and burning rate scale with area, a thin unconfined film burns for about the same time whatever its size.
The example shows that a spill on its own can give an intense but short fire, while the long fires of heavy goods vehicles may be fed by cargo. For tankers the picture changes, because the load itself is liquid fuel. As an illustration, a 200–300 MW fire would require a confined petrol pool of about 83–125 m² at 2,400 kW/m²; this area is calculated from the pool-fire model, not specified by NFPA 502.[20] The tanker design fire in NFPA 502 assumes adequate drainage that limits the area and duration of the pool fire.[3] The method has clear limits. It assumes a steady fire, and the source gives the 2.8 mm spill depth for concrete surfaces only.[20][22]
Cargo tanks and hazardous materials
A Cargo tank vehicle, also called a tank truck or tank motor vehicle, is the most common vehicle for moving flammable, combustible and corrosive liquids and compressed gases by road.[12] When such a tank is involved in an accident, the disaster potential is substantial. Leakage can occur in both contact and non-contact accidents, and the main causes of unintentional release are poor maintenance and deviation from tank specifications.[23]
The 2008 handbook describes tank vehicles built to NFPA 385 and US Department of Transportation rules as able to withstand all but the most violent impacts without rupturing.[24] Vents let vapour burn at the vent if the tank is exposed to fire, reducing the risk of rupture from internal pressure. For liquids other than viscous ones, a shutoff valve inside the tank shell stays closed except during loading and unloading. A shear section in the piping breaks in an accident and leaves this valve undamaged and closed. A remote control and a fusible element that operates at no more than 121 °C (250 °F) let the valve close in a fire.
For fire fighters, the main hazards are wrong or mixed loads, defective safety controls, large releases and a possible BLEVE.[23] Missing or incorrect placards and shipping papers make the situation worse. Responders therefore approach from upwind, avoid contact with spilled material and first identify the product.
Hazardous materials placarding gives this information on the outside of the vehicle. The 2008 handbook describes US placards of about 273 mm by 273 mm (10.8 in., rounded) on bulk packages such as cargo tanks.[25] They show the hazard class by colour, symbol and number, together with either the class name or a four-digit identification number. At the time, up to 454 kg (1,000 lb) of certain hazardous materials could be carried without a placard, so a vehicle without placards could still carry hazardous materials.
Vehicle design and on-board protection
The FMCSA fuel tank rules described in the 2008 handbook closely followed UL standards and had applied to diesel tanks since 1973.[11] They required drop, rupture, vent and spillage tests, with a safety vent limiting the pressure rise to 345 kPa (50 psig) in a specified fire test. The handbook reported no FMVSS, NHTSA or FMCSA fire-retardance requirement for cargo trailers or truck bodies.[18] It described FMCSR requirements for flooring in good condition and a prohibition on floors soaked with oil or petrol.
The FMCSRs described in the 2008 handbook required commercial vehicles in interstate commerce to carry fire extinguishers and drivers to check them at the start of each trip.[5] A power unit without placardable hazardous materials needed a 5-B:C extinguisher or two 4-B:C extinguishers.[9] A power unit carrying hazardous materials needed a 10-B:C extinguisher. The Fire extinguisher rating B:C means the unit is suitable for flammable liquid fires and fires in energised electrical equipment.[26] The number indicates its relative extinguishing power.
The 2002 SFPE handbook describes only a few US fire safety requirements for buses.[8] These include FMVSS 302 limits on interior linings and seats, a fire-resistive barrier around the engine compartment and protection of the fuel tank against penetration. The barrier gives the driver time to stop the bus and let the passengers out, and some buses also have fixed extinguishing systems in the engine compartment.
The FMVSS 302 test exposes a horizontal sample to a 38 mm Bunsen flame for 15 seconds and limits the burn rate to 100 mm per minute.[27] It provides only minimum protection, and in 2008 work was in progress on a more realistic test, especially for school buses. Extra padding on school bus seats protects occupants in a crash, but it also adds fuel. In a hazard assessment based on bench-scale and full-scale tests, two seat assemblies produced incapacitating conditions within 3 minutes, while three others did not produce untenable conditions.[8]
New drive systems add new hazards. Vehicles that run on liquefied petroleum gas range from cars to heavy-duty trucks.[28] Under NFPA 58, as summarised in 2008, buses could carry containers with a total water capacity of no more than 0.75 m³, against 1.1 m³ for vehicles not designed to carry passengers. A later NIPV report describes 10 to 400 kWh battery systems for trucks, electric ships and other uses; it also notes 600 kW chargers for buses and trucks.[29]
Fire response
The first steps are the same as for any vehicle fire. The engine and electrical systems are shut off, everyone moves well away, preferably uphill and upwind, the fire department is called, and the fire is fought only if this is safe.[9] If a combination vehicle is involved, the power unit is unhooked and moved away from the fire, if this can be done safely.[12] A burning flammable gas is left to burn until the leak is controlled, while a container exposed to flames is kept cool. If no hose streams are available, the handbook advises running away immediately.
Two cases need special care. A tyre fire results from internal heat build-up, so portable extinguishers can only control the open flames, and large quantities of water are needed to cool the tyre.[12] A hot tyre is moved well away from the vehicle, or the driver waits until it is cool, because it may burst into flames and destroy the vehicle and its load. If smoke seeps from a closed van body, the doors stay closed until the fire department arrives. Opening them lets in oxygen and may cause a sudden flare-up.
In European road tunnels, fixed suppression has gained ground since the Runehamar tests. These tests suggested that water-based suppression is in fact necessary to reduce the impact of heavy goods vehicle fires to a level that ventilation can handle.[14] A water mist system cools the gases, prevents spread beyond the first one or two vehicles and reduces the buoyant spread of smoke. It does not, however, clean the smoke: visibility does not improve enough and carbon monoxide is not removed. Full-scale tests have shown that water mist can protect life and property even against catastrophic heavy goods vehicle fires.[30] In the Memorial Tunnel tests, a foam system with 3% aqueous film-forming foam put out a 50 MW fuel pan fire within 5 to 25 seconds in the transverse ventilation tests.[15]
See also
Notes
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 Routhier (2008), p. 21-15.
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 Routhier (2008), p. 21-16.
- ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 Bendelius (2008), p. 21-204.
- ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 Bendelius (2008), pp. 21-189–21-190.
- ↑ 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.3 Routhier (2008), p. 21-18.
- ↑ 6.0 6.1 6.2 Routhier (2008), p. 21-17.
- ↑ Bendelius (2008), p. 21-210.
- ↑ 8.0 8.1 8.2 8.3 Bukowski (2002), p. 5-228.
- ↑ 9.0 9.1 9.2 9.3 Routhier (2008), p. 21-22.
- ↑ 10.0 10.1 Babrauskas (2002b), pp. 3-27–3-28.
- ↑ 11.0 11.1 Routhier (2008), p. 21-21.
- ↑ 12.0 12.1 12.2 12.3 Routhier (2008), p. 21-23.
- ↑ Van Rossum (2027), §4.4.
- ↑ 14.0 14.1 Mawhinney (2008), p. 16-140.
- ↑ 15.0 15.1 15.2 Bendelius (2008), p. 21-208.
- ↑ Bendelius (2008), p. 21-189.
- ↑ Bendelius (2008), pp. 21-190–21-191.
- ↑ 18.0 18.1 Routhier (2008), p. 21-20.
- ↑ Long et al. (2008), p. 21-9.
- ↑ 20.0 20.1 20.2 20.3 Budnick et al. (2008), p. 3-149.
- ↑ Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 25.
- ↑ Budnick et al. (2008), p. 3-150.
- ↑ 23.0 23.1 Routhier (2008), p. 21-24.
- ↑ Ordile (2008), p. 7-31.
- ↑ C. J. Wright (2008a), p. 13-124.
- ↑ Rivkin (2008a), p. 21-38.
- ↑ Stull and Chines (2008), p. 6-98.
- ↑ Rivkin (2008b), p. 21-72.
- ↑ Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), pp. 12, 21.
- ↑ Mawhinney (2008), p. 16-141.
References
- Babrauskas, V. (2002b). Heat release rates. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 3-1–3-37). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
- Bendelius, A. G. (2008). Road tunnels and bridges. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 21-187–21-212). National Fire Protection Association.
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