New FSE wiki article: Aerosol product (written by GPT-6) |
FSE wiki: Fact-check: qualify warehouse sprinkler scope, gas alarms and suppression test quantities (written by GPT-6) |
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An '''aerosol product''' is a product packaged in a pressurised container, usually a small metal can, from which a base product is dispensed by a propellant gas.<ref name="FR-257">Fredrickson (2008), p. 6-257.</ref> Lubricants, cleaning agents, personal care products, pharmaceuticals, food products, paints and pesticides are all sold in this form.<ref name="FR-257" /> The most widely used propellants are hydrocarbons, typically blends of propane and butane, so many aerosol products contain a [[flammable gas]] under pressure.<ref name="FR-258">Fredrickson (2008), p. 6-258.</ref> In a fire the containers can rupture, produce fireballs and rocket through a storage area, starting new fires that may overwhelm automatic sprinklers.<ref name="MO-160">J. Moore (2008), p. 20-160.</ref> | An '''aerosol product''' is a product packaged in a pressurised container, usually a small metal can, from which a base product is dispensed by a propellant gas.<ref name="FR-257">Fredrickson (2008), p. 6-257.</ref> Lubricants, cleaning agents, personal care products, pharmaceuticals, food products, paints and pesticides are all sold in this form.<ref name="FR-257" /> The most widely used propellants are hydrocarbons, typically blends of propane and butane, so many aerosol products contain a [[flammable gas]] under pressure.<ref name="FR-258">Fredrickson (2008), p. 6-258.</ref> In a fire the containers can rupture, produce fireballs and rocket through a storage area, starting new fires that may overwhelm automatic sprinklers.<ref name="MO-160">J. Moore (2008), p. 20-160.</ref> | ||
In the United States, NFPA 30B, ''Code for the Manufacture and Storage of Aerosol Products'', first issued in 1990, classifies aerosol products into three hazard levels. One classification method uses their aggregate chemical heat of combustion.<ref name="FR-257" /><ref name="FR-259">Fredrickson (2008), p. 6-259.</ref> Level 1 products are easy to protect, while Level 2 and Level 3 products need fast-responding sprinklers designed for the | In the United States, NFPA 30B, ''Code for the Manufacture and Storage of Aerosol Products'', first issued in 1990, classifies aerosol products into three hazard levels. One classification method uses their aggregate chemical heat of combustion.<ref name="FR-257" /><ref name="FR-259">Fredrickson (2008), p. 6-259.</ref> In warehouse storage, Level 1 products are easy to protect, while Level 2 and Level 3 products need fast-responding sprinklers designed for the arrangement.<ref name="FR-259" /> The 1982 fire that destroyed the Kmart distribution centre in Falls Township, Pennsylvania, is one of the most notable examples of an aerosol [[warehouse fire]].<ref name="FR-259" /> Filling plants add a second hazard, the release and explosion of propellant gas.<ref name="FR-259" /><ref name="FR-260">Fredrickson (2008), p. 6-260.</ref> | ||
== Components == | == Components == | ||
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In the United States, NFPA 30B, as described by Fredrickson (2008), allows limited amounts of aerosol products in assembly, business, educational, industrial and institutional occupancies. In a single fire area, storage is limited to 454 kg (1,000 lb) of Level 2 and 227 kg (500 lb) of Level 3 products. Larger amounts go into separate inside storage areas or a [[flammable liquid storage cabinet]].<ref name="FR-262">Fredrickson (2008), p. 6-262.</ref> In general-purpose warehouses, Level 2 and Level 3 products must be segregated, and very large quantities belong in an aerosol warehouse separated from other occupancies by fire-rated construction or by distance.<ref name="FR-263">Fredrickson (2008), p. 6-263.</ref> | In the United States, NFPA 30B, as described by Fredrickson (2008), allows limited amounts of aerosol products in assembly, business, educational, industrial and institutional occupancies. In a single fire area, storage is limited to 454 kg (1,000 lb) of Level 2 and 227 kg (500 lb) of Level 3 products. Larger amounts go into separate inside storage areas or a [[flammable liquid storage cabinet]].<ref name="FR-262">Fredrickson (2008), p. 6-262.</ref> In general-purpose warehouses, Level 2 and Level 3 products must be segregated, and very large quantities belong in an aerosol warehouse separated from other occupancies by fire-rated construction or by distance.<ref name="FR-263">Fredrickson (2008), p. 6-263.</ref> | ||
Wet-pipe automatic sprinklers are required for Level 2 and Level 3 storage.<ref name="FR-263" /> NFPA 30B gives design tables for palletised (solid pile) storage and for [[rack storage]] of cartoned and uncartoned products. For ceiling sprinklers they specify the sprinkler type and orifice, the response and temperature rating, and the design as a number of sprinklers at a given discharge pressure.<ref name="FR-262" /> | Wet-pipe automatic sprinklers are required for Level 2 and Level 3 storage.<ref name="FR-263" /> NFPA 30B gives design tables for palletised (solid pile) storage and for [[rack storage]] of cartoned and uncartoned products. For ceiling sprinklers they specify the sprinkler type and orifice, the response and temperature rating, and the design as a number of sprinklers at a given discharge pressure.<ref name="FR-262" /> In warehouse storage, both levels need rapid sprinkler response. [[Quick-response sprinkler]]s such as the [[ESFR sprinkler]], or an [[in-rack sprinkler]] close to the product, generally operate on the carton fire before the aerosol products themselves become involved.<ref name="FR-259" /> Properly protected fires are often extinguished by the sprinklers, without rocketing containers.<ref name="FR-259" /> | ||
{| class="wikitable" | {| class="wikitable" | ||
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Aerosol filling plants control fire and explosion hazards with three layers of protection: incident prevention, fire and explosion suppression, and mitigation of the incident's size.<ref name="FR-259" /> Where these layers were missing, explosions have destroyed filling facilities, injured employees and caused deaths.<ref name="FR-259" /> Propellant gases are stored in remote bulk facilities. Propellant is charged into the cans in an area separated from the main manufacturing area, often a separate charging house.<ref name="FR-260" /> In the through-the-valve method the propellant is injected through the stem of a sealed actuator; in the undercup method the filler head lifts the actuator, charges the propellant and seals it.<ref name="FR-260" /> Filled cans pass through hot water test baths, and containers for rejected cans should be ventilated to remove propellant and vapour.<ref name="FR-260" /> | Aerosol filling plants control fire and explosion hazards with three layers of protection: incident prevention, fire and explosion suppression, and mitigation of the incident's size.<ref name="FR-259" /> Where these layers were missing, explosions have destroyed filling facilities, injured employees and caused deaths.<ref name="FR-259" /> Propellant gases are stored in remote bulk facilities. Propellant is charged into the cans in an area separated from the main manufacturing area, often a separate charging house.<ref name="FR-260" /> In the through-the-valve method the propellant is injected through the stem of a sealed actuator; in the undercup method the filler head lifts the actuator, charges the propellant and seals it.<ref name="FR-260" /> Filled cans pass through hot water test baths, and containers for rejected cans should be ventilated to remove propellant and vapour.<ref name="FR-260" /> | ||
Small propellant losses during charging are controlled by a dedicated ventilation system and a flammable gas detection system interlocked to ventilation, equipment and alarms.<ref name="FR-260" /> According to Fredrickson (2008), above 20 % of the propellant's lower explosive limit the ventilation rate should rise to at least 150 % of the design airflow or two air changes per minute, whichever is greater. At 40 %, the aerosol line and the main propellant supply should shut down automatically.<ref name="FR-261">Fredrickson (2008), p. 6-261.</ref | Small propellant losses during charging are controlled by a dedicated ventilation system and a flammable gas detection system interlocked to ventilation, equipment and alarms.<ref name="FR-260" /> According to Fredrickson (2008), above 20 % of the propellant's lower explosive limit the ventilation rate should rise to at least 150 % of the design airflow or two air changes per minute, whichever is greater. Audible and visual alarms should activate. At 40 %, the aerosol line and the main propellant supply should shut down automatically, with audible and visual alarms.<ref name="FR-261">Fredrickson (2008), p. 6-261.</ref> | ||
Suppression has been tested in simulated filling rooms. In tests reported by Senecal, a propane release of 90.7 g (3.2 oz) at a simulated fill station in an 80.1 m³ (2,827 ft³) room was suppressed. The | The term explosive range is sometimes used as a synonym for the flammable range of a gas, so the lower explosive limit can be read as the lower flammable limit.<ref name="LE-166">Lemoff (2008), p. 6-166.</ref> For propane, with a lower limit of 2.1 %, the two thresholds correspond to 0.42 % and 0.84 % by volume.<ref name="FR-258" /> If prevention fails, an [[explosion suppression system]] and wet-pipe sprinklers act, and the charging room needs deflagration relief through [[explosion venting]] directed away from buildings and people.<ref name="FR-261" /> | ||
Suppression has been tested in simulated filling rooms. In tests reported by Senecal, a propane release of 90.7 g (3.2 oz) at a simulated fill station in an 80.1 m³ (2,827 ft³) room was suppressed. The report lists 20.0 kg (44.1 lb) for the named halocarbon agents HFC-227ea, FC-3-1-10 and HFC-236fa, and 10.0 kg (22 lb) for water; the flame front extended about 1.22 m (4 ft). These are test quantities, not design values.<ref name="DT-97">Senecal (1993) and Senecal et al. (1994), as cited in DiNenno and Taylor (2008), p. 17-97.</ref> Aerosol filling rooms are a typical application of total flooding with halogenated agents.<ref name="DT-108">DiNenno and Taylor (2008), p. 17-108.</ref> In explosion suppression systems for such rooms, ultraviolet or combined ultraviolet and infrared [[flame detector]]s are preferred.<ref name="UG-157">Ural and Garzia (2008), p. 17-157.</ref> | |||
=== Partial-volume deflagration: worked example === | === Partial-volume deflagration: worked example === | ||
Revision as of 04:34, 8 November 2026
An aerosol product is a product packaged in a pressurised container, usually a small metal can, from which a base product is dispensed by a propellant gas.[1] Lubricants, cleaning agents, personal care products, pharmaceuticals, food products, paints and pesticides are all sold in this form.[1] The most widely used propellants are hydrocarbons, typically blends of propane and butane, so many aerosol products contain a flammable gas under pressure.[2] In a fire the containers can rupture, produce fireballs and rocket through a storage area, starting new fires that may overwhelm automatic sprinklers.[3]
In the United States, NFPA 30B, Code for the Manufacture and Storage of Aerosol Products, first issued in 1990, classifies aerosol products into three hazard levels. One classification method uses their aggregate chemical heat of combustion.[1][4] In warehouse storage, Level 1 products are easy to protect, while Level 2 and Level 3 products need fast-responding sprinklers designed for the arrangement.[4] The 1982 fire that destroyed the Kmart distribution centre in Falls Township, Pennsylvania, is one of the most notable examples of an aerosol warehouse fire.[4] Filling plants add a second hazard, the release and explosion of propellant gas.[4][5]
Components
The most common aerosol containers are high-strength metal units holding from 10 millilitres to about 1 litre. Their top and base are domed for strength, and the working pressure of a unit ranges from 965 to 1,241 kPa (140 to 180 psi).[1] A finished product consists of the container, the base product, an actuator assembly with a valve and nozzle, and the propellant. Pressing the plunger opens a hole in the valve, and the pressurised mixture of product and propellant flows out through the exit orifice.[1][2]
The base product, also called the concentrate, is the material other than propellant that leaves the container. Its fire hazard ranges from minimal, as for a water-based liquid, to high, as for many lubricants and coatings.[2] The base product and the propellant both shape the fire protection needed in a facility.
Propellants are liquefied or compressed gases. Hydrocarbons are the most widely used, partly because they keep a fairly constant pressure and spray pattern throughout the life of the product.[2] Liquefied gas propellants are typically blends of propane and butane, which are also the main components of commercial liquefied petroleum gas.[2][6] They are gaseous at ambient conditions, condense under moderate pressure and keep a constant pressure in the can at a given temperature.[2]
Compressed gas propellants, used less often, include carbon dioxide, nitrous oxide, nitrogen and air.[2] Nitrous oxide is an oxidant, and an oxygen-enriched atmosphere may develop where it is used.[7] In 1978 the United States banned chlorofluorocarbons in nonessential aerosols to reduce depletion of the ozone layer.[8]
A propellant gas or blend is often named after its vapour pressure at 21.1 °C (70 °F). A-31, for example, is aerosol-grade isobutane with a vapour pressure of 214 kPa (31 psig), and A-108 is propane at 745 kPa (108 psig).[2] The table gives the fire properties of common liquefied propellants. All except tetrafluoroethane are flammable, with lower flammability limits of 1.4–3.9 % by volume and flash points far below room temperature.[2]
| Propellant | Lower flammable limit (% by volume in air) | Upper flammable limit (% by volume in air) | Flash point (°C) | Autoignition temperature (°C) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Propane | 2.1 | 9.5 | −104 | 504 |
| Isobutane | 1.8 | 8.4 | −83 | 477 |
| n-Butane | 1.8 | 8.4 | −74 | 430 |
| iso-Pentane | 1.4 | 7.6 | −51 | 420 |
| n-Pentane | 1.5 | 7.8 | −40 | 260 |
| Difluoroethane | 3.9 | 16.9 | −50 | – |
| Tetrafluoroethane | nonflammable | |||
| Dimethyl ether | 3.4 | 18.0 | −40 | 350 |
Hazard classification
Before NFPA 30B, US fire protection of aerosol products followed NFPA 30, Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code. Under NFPA 30, aerosol products were treated as equivalent to Class IA flammable liquids, which many users considered excessive for storage facilities.[1] Fire tests in the early to mid-1980s by a consortium of manufacturers, suppliers, distributors and insurers showed a more complicated picture. Some products presented a severe hazard, while others were a much lower challenge than a Class IA liquid.[1] This work led to a classification system, to better protection strategies and, in 1990, to the first edition of NFPA 30B.[1]
The 1994 edition of NFPA 30B, as described by Fredrickson (2008), first recognised a classification method developed by Factory Mutual Research Corporation. It is based on the chemical heats of combustion of the propellant and the base product together.[2][4] Tewarson (2002) defines the chemical heat of combustion as the energy released per unit mass of fuel in reactions that may be incomplete. It is smaller than the net heat of combustion for complete combustion, and the ratio of the two is the combustion efficiency.[9][10] The levels are:[4]
- Level 1: aggregate chemical heat of combustion of 20.0 kJ/g (8,600 Btu/lb) or less;
- Level 2: more than 20.0 kJ/g (8,600 Btu/lb), up to 30.2 kJ/g (13,000 Btu/lb);
- Level 3: more than 30.2 kJ/g (13,000 Btu/lb).
The handbook rounds the upper boundary to 30 kJ/g.[4] The 1998 edition added a second method, a fire test of a 12-pallet array.[4] The reasoning behind a heat-based scale is general. Van Rossum (2027) explains that a material that releases much energy and needs little energy for pyrolysis or evaporation burns faster and with a higher heat release rate.[11]
Aggregate heat of combustion: worked example
Because the levels are expressed per unit mass of product, the aggregate value is the total chemical heat of all components divided by the total mass. Each component therefore contributes in proportion to its mass. For a product with components i this is a sum weighted by mass fraction:
| Symbol | Description | Unit |
|---|---|---|
| aggregate chemical heat of combustion of the aerosol product | kJ/g | |
| mass fraction of component i (propellant, solvent, water and so on); the fractions add up to 1 | – | |
| chemical heat of combustion of component i | kJ/g |
The handbook does not reproduce the detailed NFPA 30B calculation method. The values below come from Tewarson (2002) for well-ventilated fires and only illustrate the principle: 43.7 kJ/g for propane, 42.6 kJ/g for butane, 25.6 kJ/g for ethyl alcohol and 40.3 kJ/g for kerosene.[12] Water is treated as contributing no heat of combustion. Three hypothetical formulations then give:
- 10 % propane and 90 % water: 0.10 × 43.7 = 4.4 kJ/g, which is Level 1;
- 30 % butane, 50 % ethyl alcohol and 20 % water: 0.30 × 42.6 + 0.50 × 25.6 = 25.6 kJ/g, which is Level 2;
- 30 % butane and 70 % kerosene: 0.30 × 42.6 + 0.70 × 40.3 = 41.0 kJ/g, which is Level 3.
The results match the typical products named by Fredrickson (2008): Level 2 products are typically alcohol-based and Level 3 products petroleum solvent-based.[4] The first example also shows why a product with a flammable propellant can still be Level 1. The method assumes that the components do not interact and that the data apply to the real product, so a borderline result needs the method and data of NFPA 30B itself.
Fire behaviour
Large-scale fire tests have shown how much the behaviour depends on the level and on the sprinkler protection.[4] In an uncontrolled fire, Level 2 and Level 3 products can produce intense heat. Ruptured containers rocket through the area and make manual fire fighting extremely difficult.[4] Level 1 products, even with flammable propellants, have proved very easy to protect.[4]
The two higher levels differ in their base products. Level 2 products are mostly water-soluble, so they are easier to protect than Level 3 products despite a very intense fire. Level 3 products have a higher heat output and do not mix with water, and they burn extremely intensely when sprinkler protection is not adequate.[4] Some full-scale tests used arrays of up to 64 pallets.[4]
Several costly warehouse fires preceded NFPA 30B. In 1982 a fire in palletised storage of Level 3 aerosol products overwhelmed the sprinklers of the Kmart distribution centre in Falls Township, Pennsylvania.[4] The fire spread beyond the aerosol storage area and destroyed a building of about 10.9 ha (27 acres), with a loss above $100 million in 1982 dollars.[4] J. Moore (2008) adds that rocketing cans spread the fire to adjoining areas.[3]
Aerosol products were also involved in the loss of a storage facility in Elizabeth, New Jersey, in 1985 and of a coatings distribution facility in Dayton, Ohio, in 1987.[4] According to J. Moore (2008), a single pallet of flammable aerosols is enough to burn a general storage warehouse to the ground.[3]
Storage protection
In the United States, NFPA 30B, as described by Fredrickson (2008), allows limited amounts of aerosol products in assembly, business, educational, industrial and institutional occupancies. In a single fire area, storage is limited to 454 kg (1,000 lb) of Level 2 and 227 kg (500 lb) of Level 3 products. Larger amounts go into separate inside storage areas or a flammable liquid storage cabinet.[13] In general-purpose warehouses, Level 2 and Level 3 products must be segregated, and very large quantities belong in an aerosol warehouse separated from other occupancies by fire-rated construction or by distance.[14]
Wet-pipe automatic sprinklers are required for Level 2 and Level 3 storage.[14] NFPA 30B gives design tables for palletised (solid pile) storage and for rack storage of cartoned and uncartoned products. For ceiling sprinklers they specify the sprinkler type and orifice, the response and temperature rating, and the design as a number of sprinklers at a given discharge pressure.[13] In warehouse storage, both levels need rapid sprinkler response. Quick-response sprinklers such as the ESFR sprinkler, or an in-rack sprinkler close to the product, generally operate on the carton fire before the aerosol products themselves become involved.[4] Properly protected fires are often extinguished by the sprinklers, without rocketing containers.[4]
| Level | Maximum ceiling height | Maximum storage height | Ceiling sprinklers | Design | Water supply duration | Hose stream demand |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | 7.62 m (25 ft) | 5.49 m (18 ft) | large drop, standard response, ordinary temperature | 15 sprinklers at 3.45 bar (50 psi) | 2 h | 1,890 L/min (500 gpm) |
| 2 | 7.62 m (25 ft) | 6.10 m (20 ft) | ESFR pendent, quick response | 12 sprinklers at 1.72–3.45 bar (25–50 psi), depending on K-factor | 1 h | 946 L/min (250 gpm) |
| 2 | 9.14 m (30 ft) | 1.52 m (5 ft) | spray, standard response, high temperature | 12.2 mm/min over 232 m² (0.30 gpm/ft² over 2,500 ft²) | 2 h | 1,890 L/min (500 gpm) |
| 3 | 6.10 m (20 ft) | 3.05 m (10 ft) | large drop, standard response, ordinary temperature | 15 sprinklers at 5.17 bar (75 psi) | 2 h | 1,890 L/min (500 gpm) |
| 3 | 9.14 m (30 ft) | 1.52 m (5 ft) | spray, standard response, high temperature | 24.4 mm/min over 232 m² (0.60 gpm/ft² over 2,500 ft²) | 2 h | 1,890 L/min (500 gpm) |
| 3 | 9.14 m (30 ft) | 4.57 m (15 ft) | ESFR pendent, quick response | 12 sprinklers at 1.72–5.17 bar (25–75 psi), depending on K-factor | 1 h | 946 L/min (250 gpm) |
For sprinkler design, Level 1 products count as a Class III commodity under NFPA 13, and protection can follow the standard for the storage arrangement.[15] In the commodity classification described by Golinveaux (2008), Class III covers ordinary combustibles such as wood and paper in cardboard cartons on wood pallets. The most challenging commodity in an undivided area determines the protection for all of it.[16] In the SFPE Handbook, Scheffey and Hickey (2002) list rack container storage of aerosols among the special hazards suited to foam protection.[17] For fire fighters, J. Moore (2008) notes that burning aerosol products may be beyond the capability of the sprinkler system, and that crews must know the stock in a warehouse.[18][19]
Filling plants
Aerosol filling plants control fire and explosion hazards with three layers of protection: incident prevention, fire and explosion suppression, and mitigation of the incident's size.[4] Where these layers were missing, explosions have destroyed filling facilities, injured employees and caused deaths.[4] Propellant gases are stored in remote bulk facilities. Propellant is charged into the cans in an area separated from the main manufacturing area, often a separate charging house.[5] In the through-the-valve method the propellant is injected through the stem of a sealed actuator; in the undercup method the filler head lifts the actuator, charges the propellant and seals it.[5] Filled cans pass through hot water test baths, and containers for rejected cans should be ventilated to remove propellant and vapour.[5]
Small propellant losses during charging are controlled by a dedicated ventilation system and a flammable gas detection system interlocked to ventilation, equipment and alarms.[5] According to Fredrickson (2008), above 20 % of the propellant's lower explosive limit the ventilation rate should rise to at least 150 % of the design airflow or two air changes per minute, whichever is greater. Audible and visual alarms should activate. At 40 %, the aerosol line and the main propellant supply should shut down automatically, with audible and visual alarms.[20]
The term explosive range is sometimes used as a synonym for the flammable range of a gas, so the lower explosive limit can be read as the lower flammable limit.[21] For propane, with a lower limit of 2.1 %, the two thresholds correspond to 0.42 % and 0.84 % by volume.[2] If prevention fails, an explosion suppression system and wet-pipe sprinklers act, and the charging room needs deflagration relief through explosion venting directed away from buildings and people.[20]
Suppression has been tested in simulated filling rooms. In tests reported by Senecal, a propane release of 90.7 g (3.2 oz) at a simulated fill station in an 80.1 m³ (2,827 ft³) room was suppressed. The report lists 20.0 kg (44.1 lb) for the named halocarbon agents HFC-227ea, FC-3-1-10 and HFC-236fa, and 10.0 kg (22 lb) for water; the flame front extended about 1.22 m (4 ft). These are test quantities, not design values.[22] Aerosol filling rooms are a typical application of total flooding with halogenated agents.[23] In explosion suppression systems for such rooms, ultraviolet or combined ultraviolet and infrared flame detectors are preferred.[24]
Partial-volume deflagration: worked example
A small release can be dangerous even when it could not make the whole room flammable. The same relation applies to enclosures that are only partly filled with a fuel-air mixture, a partial-volume deflagration.[25] Zalosh (2002) gives the fractional pressure rise in a closed room as equal to the fraction of the room's total gas mass that burns:[25]
| Symbol | Description | Unit |
|---|---|---|
| deflagration pressure | bar | |
| initial pressure | bar | |
| maximum pressure of a closed-vessel deflagration of the mixture | bar | |
| mass of fuel-air mixture burned | kg | |
| total mass of gas in the enclosure before ignition | kg |
In his example, about 200 g of n-butane escape from one large deodorant can into a filling room of 4 m × 4 m × 3 m (48 m³).[26] The butane mixes stoichiometrically with part of the air and is ignited. A stoichiometric butane-air mixture contains 3.1 % butane, and filling the whole room with it would take about 3.52 kg of butane. Because the same fuel fraction applies to the burned cloud and a room-filling stoichiometric mixture, their total-mass ratio equals the corresponding fuel-mass ratio: 0.20/3.52 = 0.057.[26]
With a value of 8.0 bar for Pm − P0 for n-butane, the pressure rise is 8.0 × 0.057 ≈ 0.46 bar (6.6 psi).[27][26] Zalosh notes that this exceeds the strength of rooms in industrial facilities, so venting or suppression is needed.[26] Spread evenly through the room, the same 200 g would give only about 0.18 % butane, a tenth of its lower limit of 1.8 %.[2] The estimate assumes a closed, unvented room and a uniform stoichiometric cloud in part of it.[25]
Limitations and misconceptions
A common misconception is that every aerosol product is a highly flammable liquid. The NFPA 30 rule that treated all aerosols as Class IA liquids was replaced because tests showed large differences between products.[1] Level 1 products can contain flammable propellants and still be easy to protect, while a single pallet of Level 3 products can destroy an unprotected warehouse.[4][3]
The opposite error is to rely on general warehouse sprinklers. The handbook stresses that Level 2 and Level 3 products must be arranged and protected according to the NFPA 30B tables, which are based on live fire tests.[15] Fredrickson (2008) draws from the Kmart, Elizabeth and Dayton fires the lesson that storage arrangements must stay within the capability of the fire protection provided.[4]
The values in this article describe US practice around 2006–2008, and some printed values are rounded. The SI version of the NFPA 30B table, for example, lists 25 mm/min where 0.60 gpm/ft² converts to 24.4 mm/min.[14][15] The upper level boundary of 13,000 Btu/lb is printed as 30 kJ/g, though it converts to 30.2 kJ/g.[4] Aerosol cans also bring hazards outside storage. Pressurised containers such as aerosol cans can explode when incinerated or burned with rubbish, and they have caused explosions in incinerator combustion chambers.[28][29]
See also
- Storage occupancy
- Flammable and combustible liquid classification
- Pesticide fire hazards
- Hazardous waste
Notes
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 Fredrickson (2008), p. 6-257.
- ↑ 2.00 2.01 2.02 2.03 2.04 2.05 2.06 2.07 2.08 2.09 2.10 2.11 Fredrickson (2008), p. 6-258.
- ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 J. Moore (2008), p. 20-160.
- ↑ 4.00 4.01 4.02 4.03 4.04 4.05 4.06 4.07 4.08 4.09 4.10 4.11 4.12 4.13 4.14 4.15 4.16 4.17 4.18 4.19 4.20 4.21 4.22 4.23 Fredrickson (2008), p. 6-259.
- ↑ 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 Fredrickson (2008), p. 6-260.
- ↑ Lemoff (2008), p. 6-183.
- ↑ Rosales and Stoltzfus (2008), pp. 9-226–9-227.
- ↑ Febo (2008), p. 8-117.
- ↑ Tewarson (2002), p. 3-103.
- ↑ Tewarson (2002), p. 3-108.
- ↑ Van Rossum (2027), §4.3.
- ↑ Tewarson (2002), p. 3-111.
- ↑ 13.0 13.1 Fredrickson (2008), p. 6-262.
- ↑ 14.0 14.1 14.2 Fredrickson (2008), p. 6-263.
- ↑ 15.0 15.1 15.2 Fredrickson (2008), p. 6-264.
- ↑ Golinveaux (2008), p. 16-72.
- ↑ Scheffey and Hickey (2002), p. 4-125.
- ↑ J. Moore (2008), p. 20-172.
- ↑ J. Moore (2008), p. 20-173.
- ↑ 20.0 20.1 Fredrickson (2008), p. 6-261.
- ↑ Lemoff (2008), p. 6-166.
- ↑ Senecal (1993) and Senecal et al. (1994), as cited in DiNenno and Taylor (2008), p. 17-97.
- ↑ DiNenno and Taylor (2008), p. 17-108.
- ↑ Ural and Garzia (2008), p. 17-157.
- ↑ 25.0 25.1 25.2 Zalosh (2002), p. 3-408.
- ↑ 26.0 26.1 26.2 26.3 Zalosh (2002), p. 3-410.
- ↑ Zalosh (2002), p. 3-407.
- ↑ Mattern (2008b), p. 11-34.
- ↑ Doucet and Gilyeat (2008), p. 11-6.
References
- DiNenno, P. J., & Taylor, G. M. (2008). Halon and halon replacement agents and systems. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 17-93–17-121). National Fire Protection Association.
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