New FSE wiki article: Telecommunications facility (written by Claude Opus 5.5) |
FSE wiki: Fact-check: date historic NFPA 76 guidance and clarify NRC event-tree assumptions and source conflict (written by Claude Opus 5.5) |
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A '''telecommunications facility''' is a building or enclosure that houses the switching, transmission and power equipment of a telecommunications network, such as a telephone exchange, also called a central office (CO). | A '''telecommunications facility''' is a building or enclosure that houses the switching, transmission and power equipment of a telecommunications network, such as a telephone exchange, also called a central office (CO). The 2008 NFPA ''Fire Protection Handbook'' describes NFPA 76 as capturing the best practices of US and Canadian network providers through prescriptive and performance-based methods.<ref name="Transue-9-168">Transue (2008), p. 9-168.</ref> A central concern is continuity of service: even a small fire can cut off emergency calls, banking and data traffic for a whole community.<ref name="Transue-9-167">Transue (2008), p. 9-167.</ref><ref name="Transue-9-170">Transue (2008), p. 9-170.</ref> The 1988 fire in the Hinsdale exchange in Illinois stayed within cable trays covering about 9 m by 12 m, yet most service took 12 days to restore.<ref name="Transue-9-170" /><ref name="Transue-9-169">Transue (2008), p. 9-169.</ref> Burning PVC insulation produces dense, corrosive smoke that can damage equipment far from the fire.<ref name="Transue-9-176">Transue (2008), p. 9-176.</ref><ref name="Tewarson-3-137">Tewarson (2002), p. 3-137.</ref> Traditional protection therefore relies on a chain of measures: fire-resistant equipment and cable, compartmentation, very early warning detection, rapid response by trained staff and, where needed, automatic suppression.<ref name="Transue-9-172">Transue (2008), p. 9-172.</ref> | ||
== Network and facilities == | == Network and facilities == | ||
In the | In the traditional US network described in 2008, buildings called central offices or telephone exchanges housed its primary control functions. Nearly 25,000 smaller structures supported them.<ref name="Transue-9-168" /> Each customer telephone connected to one central office, so a failure there or in the cables between offices could isolate customers on one side of the failure.<ref name="Transue-9-168" /> The US network design criteria aimed at universal service at a low price, not uninterrupted service, although established companies provided redundant paths on high-traffic routes.<ref name="Transue-9-168" /> | ||
Inside a central office, cables enter through the cable vault, where they split into smaller, more fire-resistant cables.<ref name="Transue-9-171">Transue (2008), p. 9-171.</ref> They rise to the main distributing frame (MDF), where they break into individual wire pairs, and continue to the switching and transmission systems.<ref name="Transue-9-171" /> Standby generators, battery systems and power distribution equipment support the operation.<ref name="Transue-9-171" /> Major metropolitan central offices are built of reinforced concrete, and traditional equipment areas have ceilings of 4.3 to 4.9 m (14 to 16 ft) for heavy copper cable and tall equipment frames.<ref name="Transue-9-170" /><ref name="Transue-9-171" /> Newer equipment areas may have lower ceilings and raised floors, and contain less cable because of fibre optics and data compression.<ref name="Transue-9-171" /> | Inside a central office, cables enter through the cable vault, where they split into smaller, more fire-resistant cables.<ref name="Transue-9-171">Transue (2008), p. 9-171.</ref> They rise to the main distributing frame (MDF), where they break into individual wire pairs, and continue to the switching and transmission systems.<ref name="Transue-9-171" /> Standby generators, battery systems and power distribution equipment support the operation.<ref name="Transue-9-171" /> Major metropolitan central offices are built of reinforced concrete, and traditional equipment areas have ceilings of 4.3 to 4.9 m (14 to 16 ft) for heavy copper cable and tall equipment frames.<ref name="Transue-9-170" /><ref name="Transue-9-171" /> Newer equipment areas may have lower ceilings and raised floors, and contain less cable because of fibre optics and data compression.<ref name="Transue-9-171" /> | ||
The 2008 handbook describes telecommunications equipment arranged in parallel rows, or "lineups", 48 to 66 cm wide and 1.83 to 2.14 m high in its then-current generation.<ref name="Transue-9-171" /> It describes metal cabinets needing forced ventilation and equipment sensitive to rapid changes of a few degrees or a few percent of humidity.<ref name="Transue-9-171" /> Under NFPA 101, as illustrated in the handbook, equipment areas were treated as special-purpose industrial areas and office areas as offices.<ref name="Transue-9-171" /> | |||
== Differences from data processing == | == Differences from data processing == | ||
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Structure fires in US telephone exchanges reported to local fire departments fell from 132 in 1980 to 37 in 1998, and averaged about 40 to 50 a year in the late 1990s.<ref name="Transue-9-169" /> Only a small fraction start in the specialised equipment, and most remain very small and develop slowly.<ref name="Transue-9-169" /> The handbook attributes the low average loss per fire to the use of fire-resistive equipment, wire and cable that meet industry standards.<ref name="Transue-9-169" /> These standards were developed after large-loss fires in the 1960s and 1970s.<ref name="Transue-9-167" /> | Structure fires in US telephone exchanges reported to local fire departments fell from 132 in 1980 to 37 in 1998, and averaged about 40 to 50 a year in the late 1990s.<ref name="Transue-9-169" /> Only a small fraction start in the specialised equipment, and most remain very small and develop slowly.<ref name="Transue-9-169" /> The handbook attributes the low average loss per fire to the use of fire-resistive equipment, wire and cable that meet industry standards.<ref name="Transue-9-169" /> These standards were developed after large-loss fires in the 1960s and 1970s.<ref name="Transue-9-167" /> | ||
A study for the US Federal Communications Commission covered the years 1988 to 1992 and more than 93% of US telephone lines.<ref name="Transue-9-170" /> It found 189 fire events, an average of 38 a year, of which only 8 a year affected service.<ref name="Transue-9-170" /> The US telecommunications industry | A study for the US Federal Communications Commission covered the years 1988 to 1992 and more than 93% of US telephone lines.<ref name="Transue-9-170" /> It found 189 fire events, an average of 38 a year, of which only 8 a year affected service.<ref name="Transue-9-170" /> The 2008 handbook stated that the US telecommunications industry had recorded no fire deaths up to that time.<ref name="Transue-9-170" /> Its list of notable North American central office fires covers 1975 to 2006.<ref name="Transue-9-169" /> | ||
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The signal processing values assume that equipment and cable meet the industry fire resistance standards.<ref name="Transue-9-175" /> Technical support areas within the equipment areas, administrative areas and building service areas complete the list.<ref name="Transue-9-175" /> The IFEG (2005) lists a variable fire load density of 80 MJ/m² for telephone exchanges, from Swiss surveys of 1967–69.<ref name="IFEG-3.4-2">National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), pp. 3.4-2, 3.4-7.</ref> | The signal processing values assume that equipment and cable meet the industry fire resistance standards.<ref name="Transue-9-175" /> Technical support areas within the equipment areas, administrative areas and building service areas complete the list.<ref name="Transue-9-175" /> The IFEG (2005) lists a variable fire load density of 80 MJ/m² for telephone exchanges, from Swiss surveys of 1967–69.<ref name="IFEG-3.4-2">National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), pp. 3.4-2, 3.4-7.</ref> The guidelines caution that such values can change with new technologies and materials.<ref name="IFEG-3.4-2" /> Grouped communications cables can still carry fire through concealed spaces: at One New York Plaza, flame moved through a ceiling plenum that contained communications cables and exposed foam insulation.<ref name="Davoodi-18-11">Davoodi (2008), p. 18-11.</ref> | ||
PVC wire insulation releases [[Hydrogen chloride|hydrogen chloride]], a corrosive gas that the handbook also names as a useful fire signature for detection in telecommunications facilities.<ref name="CusterMilke-2-76">Custer and Milke (2008), p. 2-76.</ref> PVC starts to release it at about 100 °C, and up to about 200 to 220 °C it is the main product.<ref name="Tewarson-3-138">Tewarson (2002), p. 3-138.</ref> Much telephone equipment and ductwork has zinc-coated surfaces.<ref name="Tewarson-3-136">Tewarson (2002), p. 3-136.</ref> With hydrogen chloride, zinc forms zinc chloride, which absorbs moisture from air as dry as 10% relative humidity and becomes a conductive liquid that causes serious short circuits.<ref name="Tewarson-3-136" /><ref name="Tewarson-3-137" /> In two major central office losses, zinc chloride governed both the rate of restoration and the ability to salvage equipment.<ref name="Tewarson-3-137" /> | PVC wire insulation releases [[Hydrogen chloride|hydrogen chloride]], a corrosive gas that the handbook also names as a useful fire signature for detection in telecommunications facilities.<ref name="CusterMilke-2-76">Custer and Milke (2008), p. 2-76.</ref> PVC starts to release it at about 100 °C, and up to about 200 to 220 °C it is the main product.<ref name="Tewarson-3-138">Tewarson (2002), p. 3-138.</ref> Much telephone equipment and ductwork has zinc-coated surfaces.<ref name="Tewarson-3-136">Tewarson (2002), p. 3-136.</ref> With hydrogen chloride, zinc forms zinc chloride, which absorbs moisture from air as dry as 10% relative humidity and becomes a conductive liquid that causes serious short circuits.<ref name="Tewarson-3-136" /><ref name="Tewarson-3-137" /> In two major central office losses, zinc chloride governed both the rate of restoration and the ability to salvage equipment.<ref name="Tewarson-3-137" /> | ||
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== Detection, response and suppression == | == Detection, response and suppression == | ||
Very early warning fire detection (VEWFD), for example with [[Aspirating smoke detection|aspirating smoke detection]], is central to the chain.<ref name="Transue-9-172" /><ref name="Hyslop-13-1">Hyslop et al. (2010), p. 13-1.</ref> Laser spot detectors, up to 100 times as sensitive as ordinary units, are also intended for telecommunications hubs.<ref name="Dungan-14-22">Dungan (2008a), p. 14-22.</ref> A US nuclear regulatory report cites the sensitivity criteria of NFPA 76 (2009 edition).<ref name="Hyslop-13-2">Hyslop et al. (2010), p. 13-2.</ref> | Very early warning fire detection (VEWFD), for example with [[Aspirating smoke detection|aspirating smoke detection]], is central to the chain.<ref name="Transue-9-172" /><ref name="Hyslop-13-1">Hyslop et al. (2010), p. 13-1.</ref> Laser spot detectors, up to 100 times as sensitive as ordinary units, are also intended for telecommunications hubs.<ref name="Dungan-14-22">Dungan (2008a), p. 14-22.</ref> A US nuclear regulatory report cites the sensitivity criteria of NFPA 76 (2009 edition).<ref name="Hyslop-13-2">Hyslop et al. (2010), p. 13-2.</ref> It gives 0.2% per foot of obscuration for an alert and 1% per foot for an alarm, measured as effective sensitivity at each sampling port.<ref name="Hyslop-13-2" /> These equal about 0.65% and 3.2% per metre. The same report notes that the 2009 NFPA 76 edition essentially requires such systems in main distribution frame and signal processing areas.<ref name="Hyslop-13-1" /> | ||
The | The handbook's NFPA 76 depowering decision tree sends a technician to investigate a VEWFD alert, while an alarm also calls the fire department.<ref name="Transue-9-173" /> If a clean agent is released, staff monitor for reignition, and power is cut only if necessary.<ref name="Transue-9-173" /> The handbook says NFPA 76 recommended a means to disconnect power for every facility, but not an automatic or readily available one; it was meant for knowledgeable provider or fire service personnel.<ref name="Transue-9-176" /> | ||
The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission's 2010 interim position uses a simplified event tree for VEWFD in electrical cabinets of 250 V or less in nuclear plants.<ref name="Hyslop-13-1" /><ref name="Hyslop-13-5">Hyslop et al. (2010), p. 13-5.</ref> The method takes no credit for preventing a fire before flaming and assumes the cabinet lacks fast-acting components that could bypass the detectable incipient phase.<ref name="Hyslop-13-5" /><ref name="Hyslop-13-7">Hyslop et al. (2010), p. 13-7.</ref> After an initiating event, outside targets are damaged if a stationed responder fails to suppress the fire promptly, or if detection or response fails and normal suppression then also fails:<ref name="Hyslop-13-7" /><ref name="Hyslop-13-8">Hyslop et al. (2010), p. 13-8.</ref> | |||
<math display="block">P_{damage} = (1-\beta)(1-\gamma)\,\varepsilon_1 + \left[\beta + (1-\beta)\,\gamma\right]\varepsilon_2</math> | <math display="block">P_{damage} = (1-\beta)(1-\gamma)\,\varepsilon_1 + \left[\beta + (1-\beta)\,\gamma\right]\varepsilon_2</math> | ||
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! Symbol !! Description !! Unit | ! Symbol !! Description !! Unit | ||
|- | |- | ||
| <math>P_{damage}</math> || Probability of fire damage outside the cabinet, given | | <math>P_{damage}</math> || Probability of fire damage outside the cabinet, given an initiating event in an eligible cabinet || – | ||
|- | |- | ||
| <math>\beta</math> || Probability that the detection system does not issue an alert (unavailability and unreliability) || – | | <math>\beta</math> || Probability that the detection system does not issue an alert (unavailability and unreliability) || – | ||
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The report gives ''β'' = 0.01, ''γ'' = 0.005 for a system that identifies the individual cabinet (0.01 otherwise) and ''ε''<sub>1</sub> = 0.001.<ref name="Hyslop-13-5" | The report gives ''β'' = 0.01, ''γ'' = 0.005 for a system that identifies the individual cabinet (0.01 otherwise) and ''ε''<sub>1</sub> = 0.001.<ref name="Hyslop-13-5" /><ref name="Hyslop-13-6">Hyslop et al. (2010), p. 13-6.</ref><ref name="Hyslop-13-8" /> These values assume at least one hour of warning before open flaming.<ref name="Hyslop-13-6" /> As a conservative worked example, set ''ε''<sub>2</sub> = 1, so no ordinary suppression is credited. Then ''P'' = 0.99 × 0.995 × 0.001 + (0.01 + 0.99 × 0.005) × 1 ≈ 0.016. This is a model result for the stated nuclear-cabinet conditions, not a measured telecommunications protection rate. | ||
The report contains an internal conflict. Its prose defines ''ε''<sub>1</sub> as failure to suppress soon enough to prevent outside-target damage.<ref name="Hyslop-13-7" /><ref name="Hyslop-13-8" /> Its event tree on p. 13-8 instead labels that branch as having no such damage.<ref name="Hyslop-13-8" /> The equation above follows the prose and counts the branch as damage; following the diagram's endpoint instead gives about 0.015. The largest term in either interpretation is detector unreliability ''β'', which the report ties to testing, maintenance and setpoint control.<ref name="Hyslop-13-5" /><ref name="Hyslop-13-6" /> | |||
Automatic suppression follows the chain logic. Gaseous agents are widely used for telecommunications equipment, and a [[Gaseous extinguishing system|gaseous extinguishing system]] can reach fuel inside closed cabinets.<ref name="Harrington-17-124">Harrington (2008), p. 17-124.</ref><ref name="Harrington-17-125">Harrington (2008), p. 17-125.</ref><ref name="Harrington-17-135">Harrington (2008), p. 17-135.</ref> Clean agent systems even protect telecommunications rooms at the top of air traffic control towers.<ref name="Harrington-17-127">Harrington (2008), p. 17-127.</ref> If power stays on, the fire is a Class C fire that is harder to extinguish and can rekindle.<ref name="Harrington-17-125" /> | Automatic suppression follows the chain logic. Gaseous agents are widely used for telecommunications equipment, and a [[Gaseous extinguishing system|gaseous extinguishing system]] can reach fuel inside closed cabinets.<ref name="Harrington-17-124">Harrington (2008), p. 17-124.</ref><ref name="Harrington-17-125">Harrington (2008), p. 17-125.</ref><ref name="Harrington-17-135">Harrington (2008), p. 17-135.</ref> Clean agent systems even protect telecommunications rooms at the top of air traffic control towers.<ref name="Harrington-17-127">Harrington (2008), p. 17-127.</ref> If power stays on, the fire is a Class C fire that is harder to extinguish and can rekindle.<ref name="Harrington-17-125" /> | ||
Water-based agents and powders have their own limits. FM Global | Water-based agents and powders have their own limits. In 2008, Mawhinney reported FM Global support for water mist in central offices, but slow acceptance among North American users.<ref name="Mawhinney-16-139">Mawhinney (2008), p. 16-139.</ref> In the tests he cites, electrical charge did not transmit through atomised mist, which could be applied in switchboard compartments for 10 minutes or more before leakage currents reached dangerous levels.<ref name="Mawhinney-16-139" /> Dry chemical should not be used where relays and delicate contacts are present, such as in telephone exchanges, because its insulating residue can make equipment inoperative.<ref name="Lake-17-20">Lake (2008), p. 17-20.</ref> | ||
== Private exchanges and newer facilities == | == Private exchanges and newer facilities == | ||
A private branch exchange (PBX) serves a single building or complex and resembles central office equipment.<ref name="Transue-9-174" /> It differs in three ways: it need not meet the rigorous fire resistance standards for central office equipment, replacements are easier to obtain, and it is easier to switch off.<ref name="Transue-9-174" /> The handbook recommends protecting a PBX like an important computer room, in a room with a fire barrier of at least 1 hour, limited access and strict housekeeping.<ref name="Transue-9-174" /> | A private branch exchange (PBX) serves a single building or complex and resembles central office equipment.<ref name="Transue-9-174" /> It differs in three ways: it need not meet the rigorous fire resistance standards for central office equipment, replacements are easier to obtain, and it is easier to switch off.<ref name="Transue-9-174" /> The 2008 handbook recommends protecting a PBX like an important computer room, in a room with a fire barrier of at least 1 hour, limited access and strict housekeeping.<ref name="Transue-9-174" /> It calls for smoke detection that alarms at a constantly attended location and power shutdown procedures for responding fire fighters.<ref name="Transue-9-174" /> It says the code exceptions then allowing central offices to omit automatic suppression in equipment areas did not apply to PBX rooms or telephone closets.<ref name="Transue-9-174" /> | ||
Internet servers and routers increasingly | The 2008 handbook observed that Internet servers and routers were increasingly being colocated with traditional network equipment.<ref name="Transue-9-176" /> It warned that they might lack the fire resistance ratings or redundancy of traditional equipment and occupy buildings of different design.<ref name="Transue-9-176" /> It gave two examples meeting the NFPA 76 edition then in use: rating the servers and cables like telecommunications equipment, or putting unrated equipment in separate fire-resistive compartments with automatic suppression.<ref name="Transue-9-176" /> | ||
== Fire service concerns and limits == | == Fire service concerns and limits == | ||
Fires in telecommunications equipment can produce very large quantities of dense, corrosive smoke, in which visibility may become nearly impossible even with hand lamps.<ref name="Transue-9-176" /> Even 10 to 12 portable smoke fans may be inadequate, so the handbook advises fire departments to ask owners for manual smoke exhaust systems.<ref name="Transue-9-176" /> Such systems have proven highly effective in at least one actual telecommunications fire.<ref name="Transue-9-176" /> Fire fighters | Fires in telecommunications equipment can produce very large quantities of dense, corrosive smoke, in which visibility may become nearly impossible even with hand lamps.<ref name="Transue-9-176" /> Even 10 to 12 portable smoke fans may be inadequate, so the handbook advises fire departments to ask owners for manual smoke exhaust systems.<ref name="Transue-9-176" /> Such systems have proven highly effective in at least one actual telecommunications fire.<ref name="Transue-9-176" /> Fire fighters need to know the owner's power disconnect procedures. The 2008 handbook stated that Illinois, where the Hinsdale fire occurred, required a power shutdown plan for every telecommunications facility.<ref name="Transue-9-176" /> Large batteries and electrical power are further hazards, and tours of the facilities help crews prepare.<ref name="Transue-9-176" /> | ||
The guidance rests on US and Canadian experience and best practice.<ref name="Transue-9-177">Transue (2008), p. 9-177.</ref> Facilities without rated equipment and cable, strong prevention practices or fast response to detection signals need more than the prescriptive measures of NFPA 76, and a performance-based analysis is then required.<ref name="Transue-9-177" /> The fire statistics end in 1998 and the incident list in 2006, and the requirements described are those of the NFPA 76 edition summarised in the 2008 handbook.<ref name="Transue-9-169" /> The event-tree values were set for nuclear plant cabinets and rest on limited data on how long incipient degradation lasts.<ref name="Hyslop-13-3">Hyslop et al. (2010), p. 13-3.</ref> | The guidance rests on US and Canadian experience and best practice.<ref name="Transue-9-177">Transue (2008), p. 9-177.</ref> Facilities without rated equipment and cable, strong prevention practices or fast response to detection signals need more than the prescriptive measures of NFPA 76, and a performance-based analysis is then required.<ref name="Transue-9-177" /> The fire statistics end in 1998 and the incident list in 2006, and the requirements described are those of the NFPA 76 edition summarised in the 2008 handbook.<ref name="Transue-9-169" /> The event-tree values were set for nuclear plant cabinets and rest on limited data on how long incipient degradation lasts.<ref name="Hyslop-13-3">Hyslop et al. (2010), p. 13-3.</ref> | ||
Revision as of 02:10, 8 November 2026
A telecommunications facility is a building or enclosure that houses the switching, transmission and power equipment of a telecommunications network, such as a telephone exchange, also called a central office (CO). The 2008 NFPA Fire Protection Handbook describes NFPA 76 as capturing the best practices of US and Canadian network providers through prescriptive and performance-based methods.[1] A central concern is continuity of service: even a small fire can cut off emergency calls, banking and data traffic for a whole community.[2][3] The 1988 fire in the Hinsdale exchange in Illinois stayed within cable trays covering about 9 m by 12 m, yet most service took 12 days to restore.[3][4] Burning PVC insulation produces dense, corrosive smoke that can damage equipment far from the fire.[5][6] Traditional protection therefore relies on a chain of measures: fire-resistant equipment and cable, compartmentation, very early warning detection, rapid response by trained staff and, where needed, automatic suppression.[7]
Network and facilities
In the traditional US network described in 2008, buildings called central offices or telephone exchanges housed its primary control functions. Nearly 25,000 smaller structures supported them.[1] Each customer telephone connected to one central office, so a failure there or in the cables between offices could isolate customers on one side of the failure.[1] The US network design criteria aimed at universal service at a low price, not uninterrupted service, although established companies provided redundant paths on high-traffic routes.[1]
Inside a central office, cables enter through the cable vault, where they split into smaller, more fire-resistant cables.[8] They rise to the main distributing frame (MDF), where they break into individual wire pairs, and continue to the switching and transmission systems.[8] Standby generators, battery systems and power distribution equipment support the operation.[8] Major metropolitan central offices are built of reinforced concrete, and traditional equipment areas have ceilings of 4.3 to 4.9 m (14 to 16 ft) for heavy copper cable and tall equipment frames.[3][8] Newer equipment areas may have lower ceilings and raised floors, and contain less cable because of fibre optics and data compression.[8]
The 2008 handbook describes telecommunications equipment arranged in parallel rows, or "lineups", 48 to 66 cm wide and 1.83 to 2.14 m high in its then-current generation.[8] It describes metal cabinets needing forced ventilation and equipment sensitive to rapid changes of a few degrees or a few percent of humidity.[8] Under NFPA 101, as illustrated in the handbook, equipment areas were treated as special-purpose industrial areas and office areas as offices.[8]
Differences from data processing
The equipment looks much like that of a data centre, but several differences change the fire protection approach.[8] A telecommunications system does not store customer data; it transfers it in real time. During a disruption all information in transit is lost and cannot be reloaded later, whereas a computer can usually repeat interrupted work from stored data.[8][7]
The power supply also differs. Data processing equipment receives alternating current, but telecommunications equipment is fed with direct current at 12, 24, 48 or 130 V from a separate power plant.[7] An emergency power off switch, common in computer rooms, would abruptly end 9-1-1 and other emergency services, so the industry avoids it.[7] NFPA 76 instead uses a decision-based approach to normal electrical disconnection.[7]
Switching usually runs on two processors in parallel, so that one can take over if the other fails.[7] The control programs can run to millions of lines of code, and restarting an electronic switch after a power loss can take many hours.[7] The thermal shock of suddenly restoring power to the whole system is another reason for the delay.[7] The handbook concludes that telecommunications facilities must be analysed on their own merits and characteristics.[8]
Fire record
Structure fires in US telephone exchanges reported to local fire departments fell from 132 in 1980 to 37 in 1998, and averaged about 40 to 50 a year in the late 1990s.[4] Only a small fraction start in the specialised equipment, and most remain very small and develop slowly.[4] The handbook attributes the low average loss per fire to the use of fire-resistive equipment, wire and cable that meet industry standards.[4] These standards were developed after large-loss fires in the 1960s and 1970s.[2]
A study for the US Federal Communications Commission covered the years 1988 to 1992 and more than 93% of US telephone lines.[3] It found 189 fire events, an average of 38 a year, of which only 8 a year affected service.[3] The 2008 handbook stated that the US telecommunications industry had recorded no fire deaths up to that time.[3] Its list of notable North American central office fires covers 1975 to 2006.[4]
| Incident | Area of fire origin | Extent of service interruption |
|---|---|---|
| New York City, 1975 | Cable vault | 170,000 customers, several weeks |
| Brooklyn, 1987 | Main distribution frame; smoke spread to fourth floor | 41,000 customers, all restored within 16 days |
| Hinsdale, Illinois, 1988 | Cable tray with ac and dc cables | 38,000 customers, most restored in 12 days |
| Los Angeles, 1994 | Battery plant under reconfiguration | 9-1-1 service for 12 hours |
| Portland, Oregon, 1996 | Cables fire, loss of power to transmission equipment | 88,900 lines, all restored in 15 hours |
| Toronto, 1999 | ac switchgear under reconfiguration | 113,000 lines for less than one day |
In none of these fires did an occupant or fire fighter die.[4] Several started in cables or power equipment, and two began during reconfiguration work. The Hinsdale fire burned for over 3 hours, and the handbook calls it the most significant telecommunications fire in recent history.[3] Its consequences are discussed under Cable fire and Business continuity.
Hazard areas and smoke damage
NFPA 76, as summarised in the handbook, divides a facility into eight types of hazard area, each with its own fire scenario.[9][10] The hazard types are the same whether a prescriptive or a performance-based solution is chosen.[9] Where one compartment combines several types, it is protected as the most demanding of them.[9] NUREG-1805 compares the cable hazard of nuclear power plants with that of telephone exchanges, which also carry many power, control and instrument cables in trays.[11]
| Area | Contents | Fire scenario |
|---|---|---|
| Signal processing equipment area | Electronic equipment in racks or cabinets, cables in racks or under a raised floor | Slowly developing smoky fire with corrosive vapours, typically 5 to 15 kW, not over 150 kW for a fully involved cabinet or rack |
| Cable entrance facility | Cables without fire resistance rating from outside, spliced to rated cables | High or low heat release rate; corrosive products can spread |
| Power areas | Batteries, rectifiers, switchgear, bus bars, cables | Low heat release rate; some corrosive vapours or acid spill |
| Main distribution frame area | Large amounts of low-voltage wire | Low to medium heat release rate smoky fires |
| Standby engine area | Engine generator with day tank and batteries | More electrical than fuel fires in the record |
The signal processing values assume that equipment and cable meet the industry fire resistance standards.[10] Technical support areas within the equipment areas, administrative areas and building service areas complete the list.[10] The IFEG (2005) lists a variable fire load density of 80 MJ/m² for telephone exchanges, from Swiss surveys of 1967–69.[12] The guidelines caution that such values can change with new technologies and materials.[12] Grouped communications cables can still carry fire through concealed spaces: at One New York Plaza, flame moved through a ceiling plenum that contained communications cables and exposed foam insulation.[13]
PVC wire insulation releases hydrogen chloride, a corrosive gas that the handbook also names as a useful fire signature for detection in telecommunications facilities.[14] PVC starts to release it at about 100 °C, and up to about 200 to 220 °C it is the main product.[15] Much telephone equipment and ductwork has zinc-coated surfaces.[16] With hydrogen chloride, zinc forms zinc chloride, which absorbs moisture from air as dry as 10% relative humidity and becomes a conductive liquid that causes serious short circuits.[16][6] In two major central office losses, zinc chloride governed both the rate of restoration and the ability to salvage equipment.[6]
Engineers judge smoke damage by the chloride deposited on equipment. In central office fires involving PVC cables, contamination of about 5 to 900 µg/cm² has been observed, whereas clean equipment carries less than 2 µg/cm².[6] For comparison, an electronic switch collects only about 5 to 9 µg/cm² from its environment over a working life of more than 20 years.[6] The levels below link deposition to the chance of restoring the equipment.[15]
| Level | Chloride ion (µg/cm²) | Damage, cleaning and restoration |
|---|---|---|
| One | 2 | No damage expected; no cleaning needed |
| Two | below 30 | Easily restored by cleaning, little effect on long-term reliability |
| Three | 30 to 90 | Restorable by cleaning if the environment is strictly controlled soon after the fire |
| Four | above 90 | Cleaning cost approaches replacement cost |
Deposition on wet surfaces was almost four times that on dry surfaces in laboratory tests, so prompt control of humidity after a fire matters.[15] In room tests with PVC flooring, chloride on most wall surfaces reached 30 to 90 µg/cm², the third level.[15] A handbook example of performance criteria for sensitive equipment limits hydrogen chloride at the target to 5 ppm.[17]
The NFPA 76 protection chain
The traditional practice of the US industry is a chain of actions and elements, in which any missing link raises the fire risk.[7] The chain consists of excellent fire prevention, noncombustible construction, compartmentation, fire resistance-rated equipment and cable, very early warning fire detection, rigorous alarm processing and rapid response.[7] Suppression, power interruption and smoke ventilation follow when needed.[7] The prescriptive solutions in NFPA 76 assume that this chain stays unbroken for the life of the facility.[7] Where most equipment and cable is not fire resistance-rated, the chain is broken, and an alternative strategy, generally with automatic suppression, is needed.[7]
The risk factors are the community served, public safety services, life safety, service continuity, the services provided, redundancy and property.[18] A switching centre serving a major medical complex, for instance, may be more critical than one serving a small town.[18] The prescriptive method approximates criticality by size: large facilities have more than 232 m² (2,500 ft²) of enclosed network equipment area and receive more protection.[9] The performance-based method, which follows the SFPE engineering guide, instead uses the community served, network redundancy, recovery time and business interruption costs.[7][9]
Performance criteria of this kind appear in a handbook example for a data centre with telecommunications equipment.[19] It limits interruption of critical telecommunications operations to 4 hours and of noncritical operations to 48 hours.[20] Power to critical equipment is maintained during a fire, so the agent must extinguish fires in energised equipment at or below 2 kW.[20] Halide acids from the agent are limited to 200 ppm, and reignition must be prevented for at least 10 minutes.[20]
Detection, response and suppression
Very early warning fire detection (VEWFD), for example with aspirating smoke detection, is central to the chain.[7][21] Laser spot detectors, up to 100 times as sensitive as ordinary units, are also intended for telecommunications hubs.[22] A US nuclear regulatory report cites the sensitivity criteria of NFPA 76 (2009 edition).[23] It gives 0.2% per foot of obscuration for an alert and 1% per foot for an alarm, measured as effective sensitivity at each sampling port.[23] These equal about 0.65% and 3.2% per metre. The same report notes that the 2009 NFPA 76 edition essentially requires such systems in main distribution frame and signal processing areas.[21]
The handbook's NFPA 76 depowering decision tree sends a technician to investigate a VEWFD alert, while an alarm also calls the fire department.[18] If a clean agent is released, staff monitor for reignition, and power is cut only if necessary.[18] The handbook says NFPA 76 recommended a means to disconnect power for every facility, but not an automatic or readily available one; it was meant for knowledgeable provider or fire service personnel.[5]
The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission's 2010 interim position uses a simplified event tree for VEWFD in electrical cabinets of 250 V or less in nuclear plants.[21][24] The method takes no credit for preventing a fire before flaming and assumes the cabinet lacks fast-acting components that could bypass the detectable incipient phase.[24][25] After an initiating event, outside targets are damaged if a stationed responder fails to suppress the fire promptly, or if detection or response fails and normal suppression then also fails:[25][26]
| Symbol | Description | Unit |
|---|---|---|
| Probability of fire damage outside the cabinet, given an initiating event in an eligible cabinet | – | |
| Probability that the detection system does not issue an alert (unavailability and unreliability) | – | |
| Probability that staff fail to respond to the alert and find the component in time | – | |
| Probability that staff stationed at the cabinet fail to suppress an outbreak of flame ("enhanced" nonsuppression) | – | |
| Probability of "normal" nonsuppression by other means | – |
The report gives β = 0.01, γ = 0.005 for a system that identifies the individual cabinet (0.01 otherwise) and ε1 = 0.001.[24][27][26] These values assume at least one hour of warning before open flaming.[27] As a conservative worked example, set ε2 = 1, so no ordinary suppression is credited. Then P = 0.99 × 0.995 × 0.001 + (0.01 + 0.99 × 0.005) × 1 ≈ 0.016. This is a model result for the stated nuclear-cabinet conditions, not a measured telecommunications protection rate.
The report contains an internal conflict. Its prose defines ε1 as failure to suppress soon enough to prevent outside-target damage.[25][26] Its event tree on p. 13-8 instead labels that branch as having no such damage.[26] The equation above follows the prose and counts the branch as damage; following the diagram's endpoint instead gives about 0.015. The largest term in either interpretation is detector unreliability β, which the report ties to testing, maintenance and setpoint control.[24][27]
Automatic suppression follows the chain logic. Gaseous agents are widely used for telecommunications equipment, and a gaseous extinguishing system can reach fuel inside closed cabinets.[28][29][30] Clean agent systems even protect telecommunications rooms at the top of air traffic control towers.[31] If power stays on, the fire is a Class C fire that is harder to extinguish and can rekindle.[29]
Water-based agents and powders have their own limits. In 2008, Mawhinney reported FM Global support for water mist in central offices, but slow acceptance among North American users.[32] In the tests he cites, electrical charge did not transmit through atomised mist, which could be applied in switchboard compartments for 10 minutes or more before leakage currents reached dangerous levels.[32] Dry chemical should not be used where relays and delicate contacts are present, such as in telephone exchanges, because its insulating residue can make equipment inoperative.[33]
Private exchanges and newer facilities
A private branch exchange (PBX) serves a single building or complex and resembles central office equipment.[9] It differs in three ways: it need not meet the rigorous fire resistance standards for central office equipment, replacements are easier to obtain, and it is easier to switch off.[9] The 2008 handbook recommends protecting a PBX like an important computer room, in a room with a fire barrier of at least 1 hour, limited access and strict housekeeping.[9] It calls for smoke detection that alarms at a constantly attended location and power shutdown procedures for responding fire fighters.[9] It says the code exceptions then allowing central offices to omit automatic suppression in equipment areas did not apply to PBX rooms or telephone closets.[9]
The 2008 handbook observed that Internet servers and routers were increasingly being colocated with traditional network equipment.[5] It warned that they might lack the fire resistance ratings or redundancy of traditional equipment and occupy buildings of different design.[5] It gave two examples meeting the NFPA 76 edition then in use: rating the servers and cables like telecommunications equipment, or putting unrated equipment in separate fire-resistive compartments with automatic suppression.[5]
Fire service concerns and limits
Fires in telecommunications equipment can produce very large quantities of dense, corrosive smoke, in which visibility may become nearly impossible even with hand lamps.[5] Even 10 to 12 portable smoke fans may be inadequate, so the handbook advises fire departments to ask owners for manual smoke exhaust systems.[5] Such systems have proven highly effective in at least one actual telecommunications fire.[5] Fire fighters need to know the owner's power disconnect procedures. The 2008 handbook stated that Illinois, where the Hinsdale fire occurred, required a power shutdown plan for every telecommunications facility.[5] Large batteries and electrical power are further hazards, and tours of the facilities help crews prepare.[5]
The guidance rests on US and Canadian experience and best practice.[34] Facilities without rated equipment and cable, strong prevention practices or fast response to detection signals need more than the prescriptive measures of NFPA 76, and a performance-based analysis is then required.[34] The fire statistics end in 1998 and the incident list in 2006, and the requirements described are those of the NFPA 76 edition summarised in the 2008 handbook.[4] The event-tree values were set for nuclear plant cabinets and rest on limited data on how long incipient degradation lasts.[35]
See also
Notes
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 Transue (2008), p. 9-168.
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 Transue (2008), p. 9-167.
- ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 Transue (2008), p. 9-170.
- ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7 Transue (2008), p. 9-169.
- ↑ 5.00 5.01 5.02 5.03 5.04 5.05 5.06 5.07 5.08 5.09 Transue (2008), p. 9-176.
- ↑ 6.0 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 Tewarson (2002), p. 3-137.
- ↑ 7.00 7.01 7.02 7.03 7.04 7.05 7.06 7.07 7.08 7.09 7.10 7.11 7.12 7.13 7.14 Transue (2008), p. 9-172.
- ↑ 8.00 8.01 8.02 8.03 8.04 8.05 8.06 8.07 8.08 8.09 8.10 Transue (2008), p. 9-171.
- ↑ 9.00 9.01 9.02 9.03 9.04 9.05 9.06 9.07 9.08 9.09 Transue (2008), p. 9-174.
- ↑ 10.0 10.1 10.2 10.3 Transue (2008), p. 9-175.
- ↑ Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. 1-7.
- ↑ 12.0 12.1 National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), pp. 3.4-2, 3.4-7.
- ↑ Davoodi (2008), p. 18-11.
- ↑ Custer and Milke (2008), p. 2-76.
- ↑ 15.0 15.1 15.2 15.3 15.4 Tewarson (2002), p. 3-138.
- ↑ 16.0 16.1 Tewarson (2002), p. 3-136.
- ↑ Mowrer and Rosenbaum (2008), p. 3-186.
- ↑ 18.0 18.1 18.2 18.3 Transue (2008), p. 9-173.
- ↑ Harrington (2008), p. 17-134.
- ↑ 20.0 20.1 20.2 Harrington (2008), p. 17-136.
- ↑ 21.0 21.1 21.2 Hyslop et al. (2010), p. 13-1.
- ↑ Dungan (2008a), p. 14-22.
- ↑ 23.0 23.1 Hyslop et al. (2010), p. 13-2.
- ↑ 24.0 24.1 24.2 24.3 Hyslop et al. (2010), p. 13-5.
- ↑ 25.0 25.1 25.2 Hyslop et al. (2010), p. 13-7.
- ↑ 26.0 26.1 26.2 26.3 Hyslop et al. (2010), p. 13-8.
- ↑ 27.0 27.1 27.2 Hyslop et al. (2010), p. 13-6.
- ↑ Harrington (2008), p. 17-124.
- ↑ 29.0 29.1 Harrington (2008), p. 17-125.
- ↑ Harrington (2008), p. 17-135.
- ↑ Harrington (2008), p. 17-127.
- ↑ 32.0 32.1 Mawhinney (2008), p. 16-139.
- ↑ Lake (2008), p. 17-20.
- ↑ 34.0 34.1 Transue (2008), p. 9-177.
- ↑ Hyslop et al. (2010), p. 13-3.
References
- Custer, R. L. P., & Milke, J. A. (2008). Fundamentals of fire detection. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 2-75–2-78). National Fire Protection Association.
- Davoodi, H. (2008). Confinement of fire in buildings. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 18-3–18-21). National Fire Protection Association.
- Dungan, K. W. (2008a). Automatic fire detectors. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 14-15–14-28). National Fire Protection Association.
- Harrington, J. L. (2008). Application of gaseous agents to special hazards fire protection. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 17-123–17-139). National Fire Protection Association.
- Hyslop, J. S., Kratchman, J., Siu, N., Afshar, C., Najafi, B., Joglar, F., Li, Y., Henneke, D., & Warner, M. (2010). Fire probabilistic risk assessment methods enhancements: Supplement 1 to NUREG/CR-6850 and EPRI 1011989 (NUREG/CR-6850, Supplement 1; EPRI 1019259). Electric Power Research Institute; U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research.
- Iqbal, N., & Salley, M. H. (2004). Fire Dynamics Tools (FDTs): Quantitative fire hazard analysis methods for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Fire Protection Inspection Program (NUREG-1805). U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
- Lake, J. D. (2008). Chemical extinguishing agents and application systems. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 17-17–17-29). National Fire Protection Association.
- Mawhinney, J. R. (2008). Water mist fire suppression systems. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 16-135–16-180). National Fire Protection Association.
- Mowrer, F. W., & Rosenbaum, E. R. (2008). Overview of performance-based fire protection design. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 3-183–3-194). National Fire Protection Association.
- National Research Council of Canada, International Code Council, Department of Building and Housing, & Australian Building Codes Board. (2005). International fire engineering guidelines (2005 ed.). Australian Building Codes Board.
- Tewarson, A. (2002). Generation of heat and chemical compounds in fires. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 3-82–3-161). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
- Transue, R. E. (2008). Fire protection of telecommunications facilities. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 9-167–9-177). National Fire Protection Association.