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FSE wiki: Fact-check: distinguish vapour-cloud and dust-layer flash fires; qualify blast, exposure, clothing and dilution claims (written by Claude Opus 5.5)
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A '''flash fire''' is a fire that sweeps rapidly through a cloud of flammable gas, vapour or dust mixed with air, without producing a damaging pressure wave. In the SFPE Handbook, Barry defines it as a fire involving the delayed ignition of a dispersed vapour cloud that does not cause blast damage. The flame is slower than in an unconfined vapour cloud explosion, but it spreads quickly through the flammable zone of the cloud.<ref name="Ba184">Barry (2002), p. 5-184.</ref>
A '''flash fire''' involves flame propagation without damaging blast. In the SFPE Handbook, Barry defines the chemical-process case as delayed ignition of a dispersed vapour cloud that causes no blast damage. Its flame spreads quickly through the flammable zone, but more slowly than in an unconfined vapour cloud explosion.<ref name="Ba184">Barry (2002), p. 5-184.</ref> The ''Fire Protection Handbook'' also applies the term to unconfined dust-cloud combustion and to flames spreading along accumulated layers of dust or lint.<ref name="MS998">Maness and Sargent (2008), p. 9-98.</ref><ref name="M1131">Mattern (2008b), p. 11-31.</ref>


A flash fire lasts only seconds, yet it can kill or severely burn anyone inside the cloud. Risk assessments for the chemical process industries assume that people within the flame envelope of a flash fire die.<ref name="Ba186">Barry (2002), p. 5-186.</ref> Flash fires also occur in layers and clouds of combustible dust and lint, and the ''Fire Protection Handbook'' (2008) treats them as a hazard in many industries, from grain handling to woodworking.<ref name="MS998">Maness and Sargent (2008), p. 9-98.</ref><ref name="M1131">Mattern (2008b), p. 11-31.</ref> NFPA records show that most fires or explosions in manufacturing facilities that killed 10 or more people involved explosions or, to a lesser extent, flash fires or fuel spills.<ref name="HC326">Hall and Cote (2008), p. 3-26.</ref> Flame-resistant clothing is required for workers such as those in petrochemical plants, because the principal injuries have come from burning clothing rather than from the flash itself.<ref name="SC687">Stull and Chines (2008), p. 6-87.</ref>
A flash fire can cause severe burns or death during a brief thermal exposure. Barry's general method for chemical-process risk assessment assumes fatalities within the flame envelope of a flash fire.<ref name="Ba186">Barry (2002), p. 5-186.</ref> The ''Fire Protection Handbook'' (2008) treats dust and lint flash fires as hazards in industries from grain handling to woodworking.<ref name="MS998" /><ref name="M1131" /> NFPA records show that most fires or explosions in manufacturing facilities that killed 10 or more people involved explosions or, to a lesser extent, flash fires or fuel spills.<ref name="HC326">Hall and Cote (2008), p. 3-26.</ref> Stull and Chines (2008) describe flame-resistant clothing as required for petrochemical workers, because early studies identified continued clothing combustion as the principal cause of injury.<ref name="SC687">Stull and Chines (2008), p. 6-87.</ref>


== Definition and related events ==
== Definition and related events ==
Barry lists five fire and explosion outcomes of an accidental release of flammable liquid or gas: a pool fire, a torch fire, a fireball, a flash fire and an unconfined vapour cloud explosion.<ref name="Ba184" /> A torch fire or flame jet burns at the point of a pressurised release and is usually tied to immediate ignition. A flash fire and a vapour cloud explosion both follow delayed ignition of a cloud. The difference is whether the flame becomes fast enough to produce damaging overpressure.<ref name="Ba184" /> Barry groups the flash fire with pool fires, torch fires and fireballs as a radiant heat hazard, whereas the [[vapour cloud explosion]] is an overpressure hazard.<ref name="Ba182">Barry (2002), p. 5-182.</ref>
Barry lists five fire and explosion outcomes of an accidental release of flammable liquid or gas: a pool fire, a torch fire, a fireball, a flash fire and an unconfined vapour cloud explosion.<ref name="Ba184" /> A torch fire or flame jet burns at the point of a pressurised release and is usually tied to immediate ignition. A flash fire and a vapour cloud explosion both follow delayed ignition of a cloud. The difference is whether the flame becomes fast enough to produce damaging overpressure.<ref name="Ba184" /> Barry groups the flash fire with pool fires, torch fires and fireballs as a radiant heat hazard, whereas the [[vapour cloud explosion]] is an overpressure hazard.<ref name="Ba182">Barry (2002), p. 5-182.</ref> The immediate fireball shown for an instantaneous gas release in Barry's event tree differs from the delayed BLEVE fireball he describes for a heated pressurised vessel.<ref name="Ba183">Barry (2002), p. 5-183.</ref><ref name="Ba184" />


Zalosh explains what makes the flame fast. A vapour cloud explosion follows the release of a large quantity of flammable gas or vapour outdoors under conditions that promote rapid flame speeds.<ref name="Z2104">Zalosh (2008), p. 2-104.</ref> These conditions are turbulent jet releases, partial confinement by large structures, repeated obstructions such as congested process equipment and piping, and ignition delays that allow large clouds to form above the lower flammable limit.<ref name="Z2104" /> Flame speeds of the order of 100 m/s are needed to generate damaging overpressures in a virtually unconfined area, and lower speeds suffice as confinement increases.<ref name="Z2104" /> A cloud in which the flame stays well below such speeds burns as a flash fire.<ref name="Ba184" />
Zalosh explains what makes the flame fast. A vapour cloud explosion follows the release of a large quantity of flammable gas or vapour outdoors under conditions that promote rapid flame speeds.<ref name="Z2104">Zalosh (2008), p. 2-104.</ref> These conditions are turbulent jet releases, partial confinement by large structures, repeated obstructions such as congested process equipment and piping, and ignition delays that allow large clouds to form above the lower flammable limit.<ref name="Z2104" /> Flame speeds of the order of 100 m/s are needed to generate damaging overpressures in a virtually unconfined area, and lower speeds suffice as confinement increases.<ref name="Z2104" /> If the dispersed cloud ignites without producing damaging overpressure, Barry classifies the event as a flash fire.<ref name="Ba184" />


The same distinction is drawn for dusts. In the handbook chapter on grain mill products, Maness and Sargent note that a grain dust explosion without any confinement produces minimal pressures. Such an incident should more properly be called a flash fire.<ref name="MS998" /> With increasing confinement, the pressures can build up to more than 690 kPa (100 psig).<ref name="MS998" />
The same distinction is drawn for dusts. In the handbook chapter on grain mill products, Maness and Sargent note that a grain dust explosion without any confinement produces minimal pressures. Such an incident should more properly be called a flash fire.<ref name="MS998" /> With increasing confinement, the pressures can build up to more than 690 kPa (100 psig).<ref name="MS998" />
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== How a flash fire develops ==
== How a flash fire develops ==
Because the fuel and air in a dispersed cloud are mixed before ignition, a flash fire burns as a [[premixed flame]]. ''Introduction to Fire Safety Engineering'' describes a premixed flame as one in which the air and fuel are mixed before the mixture is ignited, as in a gas burner or a Bunsen burner.<ref name="VR43">Van Rossum (2027), §4.3.</ref> Such flame fronts can only propagate within a range of compositions known as the [[flammability limits]].<ref name="Bey2172">Beyler (2002b), p. 2-172.</ref> For methane in air at normal temperature and pressure, the lower flammable limit (LFL) is 5 percent and the upper flammable limit (UFL) 15 percent by volume.<ref name="Bey2172" /> For most simple hydrocarbons, the limits correspond to roughly half and three times the stoichiometric fuel-air ratio, and the LFL is about 48 g of fuel per cubic metre.<ref name="Bey2172" />
In a dispersed vapour cloud, fuel and air are mixed before ignition, so the flame is a [[premixed flame]]. ''Introduction to Fire Safety Engineering'' describes a premixed flame as one in which the air and fuel are mixed before the mixture is ignited, as in a gas burner or a Bunsen burner.<ref name="VR43">Van Rossum (2027), §4.3.</ref> Such flame fronts can only propagate within a range of compositions known as the [[flammability limits]].<ref name="Bey2172">Beyler (2002b), p. 2-172.</ref> For methane in air at normal temperature and pressure, the lower flammable limit (LFL) is 5 percent and the upper flammable limit (UFL) 15 percent by volume.<ref name="Bey2172" /> For most simple hydrocarbons, the limits correspond to roughly half and three times the stoichiometric fuel-air ratio, and the LFL is about 48 g of fuel per cubic metre.<ref name="Bey2172" />


The typical sequence starts with a release that is not ignited at once. A leak of gas or the evaporation of a liquid pool forms a cloud that drifts and mixes with air. Barry notes that analyses of such vapour dispersion must document the topography, the weather and other assumptions.<ref name="Ba182" /> Generic event trees in his chapter lead from a release with immediate ignition to a fireball or jet flame. A release with delayed ignition leads instead, after dispersion, to a flash fire or explosion.<ref name="Ba183">Barry (2002), p. 5-183.</ref> When the cloud meets an ignition source, the fire spreads quickly throughout the flammable zone of the cloud.<ref name="Ba184" />
The typical sequence starts with a release that is not ignited at once. A leak of gas or the evaporation of a liquid pool forms a cloud that drifts and mixes with air. Barry notes that analyses of such vapour dispersion must document the topography, the weather and other assumptions.<ref name="Ba182" /> Generic event trees in his chapter lead from a release with immediate ignition to a fireball or jet flame. A release with delayed ignition leads instead, after dispersion, to a flash fire or explosion.<ref name="Ba183">Barry (2002), p. 5-183.</ref> When the cloud meets an ignition source, the fire spreads quickly throughout the flammable zone of the cloud.<ref name="Ba184" />
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<math display="block">V_v = 0.83\,\frac{SG}{VD}</math>
<math display="block">V_v = 0.83\,\frac{SG}{VD}</math>


The vapour is just too lean to burn when diluted with air down to the LFL. The volume of air needed per unit volume of vapour is then:<ref name="S6202" />
The lower flammable limit marks the lean edge of flame propagation.<ref name="S6202" /> Below it, a vapour-air mixture is too lean to burn. At that limit, the air-to-vapour volume ratio is:


<math display="block">\frac{V_a}{V_v} = \frac{100 - \mathrm{LFL}}{\mathrm{LFL}}</math>
<math display="block">\frac{V_a}{V_v} = \frac{100 - \mathrm{LFL}}{\mathrm{LFL}}</math>
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|}
|}


Slye's worked example uses acetone, with a specific gravity of 0.792, a vapour density of 2 and a flammable range of 2.6 to 12.8 percent.<ref name="S6202" /> One litre gives 0.83 × 0.792 / 2 ≈ 0.33 m³ of vapour. Each volume of vapour needs (100 − 2.6) / 2.6 ≈ 37 volumes of air, so about 12.2 m³ of air dilutes the vapour of 1 L of acetone to the LFL.<ref name="S6202" /> In other words, 1 L of evaporated acetone could, if evenly mixed, form some 12.6 m³ of mixture at the LFL. For hydrocarbons in general, an LFL of about 48 g/m³ means that each kilogram of vapour could form up to about 21 m³ of mixture at the LFL.<ref name="Bey2172" /> Real clouds are not evenly mixed, and parts of them are richer than this limit.
Slye's worked example uses acetone, with a specific gravity of 0.792, a vapour density of 2 and a flammable range of 2.6 to 12.8 percent.<ref name="S6202" /> One litre gives 0.83 × 0.792 / 2 ≈ 0.33 m³ of vapour. Each volume of vapour needs (100 − 2.6) / 2.6 ≈ 37 volumes of air to reach approximately the LFL. Using Slye's rounded values, 0.33 m³ of vapour thus needs about 12.2 m³ of air; slightly more air makes the mixture too lean.<ref name="S6202" />
 
Using unrounded inputs, 1 L of evaporated acetone could, if evenly mixed, form some 12.6 m³ of mixture at the LFL. For most simple hydrocarbons, an approximate LFL of 48 g/m³ means that each kilogram of vapour could form about 21 m³ of mixture at the LFL.<ref name="Bey2172" /> Real clouds are not evenly mixed, and parts of them are richer than this limit.


Barry's chapter shows how such zones are plotted in risk assessment. His illustrative example is a 30 minute release of liquefied petroleum gas, calculated with a computer model for a wind speed of 2.24 m/s (5 mph) and stable atmospheric conditions. The LFL cloud profile reached 48.2 m (158 ft) downwind. The profile at half the LFL reached 69.8 m (229 ft).<ref name="Ba187">Barry (2002), p. 5-187.</ref> Barry notes that the cloud could drift in any direction.<ref name="Ba187" /> The same zone is used to count the ignition sources that a drifting cloud might reach.<ref name="Ba191">Barry (2002), p. 5-191.</ref>
Barry's chapter shows how such zones are plotted in risk assessment. His illustrative example is a 30 minute release of liquefied petroleum gas, calculated with a computer model for a wind speed of 2.24 m/s (5 mph) and stable atmospheric conditions. The LFL cloud profile reached 48.2 m (158 ft) downwind. The profile at half the LFL reached 69.8 m (229 ft).<ref name="Ba187">Barry (2002), p. 5-187.</ref> Barry notes that the cloud could drift in any direction.<ref name="Ba187" /> The same zone is used to count the ignition sources that a drifting cloud might reach.<ref name="Ba191">Barry (2002), p. 5-191.</ref>


== Effects on people and protective clothing ==
== Effects on people and protective clothing ==
The thermal exposure in a flash fire is intense but short. Barry's general method for assessing damage and human exposure assumes fatalities within the flame envelope of the flash fire, and estimates secondary damage to equipment or structures within the flame exposure zone.<ref name="Ba186" /> Stull and Chines report early studies which found that the principal injuries to exposed workers came from the continued burning of their clothing, not from the flash fire exposure itself.<ref name="SC687" /> Clothing that resists ignition over the relatively short duration of a flash fire therefore gives a much larger level of safety. For petrochemical workers, flame-retardant-treated or inherently flame-resistant clothing is required because of the potential for flash fire.<ref name="SC687" />
The thermal exposure in a flash fire is intense but short. Barry's general method for assessing damage and human exposure assumes fatalities within the flame envelope of the flash fire, and estimates secondary damage to equipment or structures within the flame exposure zone.<ref name="Ba186" /> Stull and Chines report early studies which found that the principal injuries to exposed workers came from the continued burning of their clothing, not from the flash fire exposure itself.<ref name="SC687" /> Clothing that resists ignition over the relatively short duration of a flash fire therefore gives a much larger level of safety. The 2008 handbook describes flame-retardant-treated or inherently flame-resistant clothing as required for petrochemical workers because of the potential for flash fire.<ref name="SC687" />


Several test methods simulate a flash fire, and they form part of the wider field of [[textile flammability]]. The Thermal Protective Performance (TPP) test was developed to simulate the exposure in a flash fire. A horizontal specimen is exposed to a combined convective and radiant heat flux of 84 kW/m² (2.0 cal/cm²s).<ref name="SC693">Stull and Chines (2008), p. 6-93.</ref> A copper calorimeter behind the specimen measures the heat transfer, which is related to human skin tolerance data to predict the times to pain and to a second-degree burn.<ref name="SC693" /> A full manikin test, standardised as ASTM F1930, places a garment on a human-form manikin with more than 100 heat sensors. The manikin is engulfed by flames from propane burners for 3 to 12 seconds, and the sensors predict where second- and third-degree burns would occur.<ref name="SC693" /><ref name="SC695">Stull and Chines (2008), p. 6-95.</ref>
Several test methods simulate a flash fire, and they form part of the wider field of [[textile flammability]]. The Thermal Protective Performance (TPP) test was developed to simulate the exposure in a flash fire. A horizontal specimen is exposed to a combined convective and radiant heat flux of 84 kW/m² (2.0 cal/cm²s).<ref name="SC693">Stull and Chines (2008), p. 6-93.</ref> A copper calorimeter behind the specimen measures the heat transfer, which is related to human skin tolerance data to predict the times to pain and to a second-degree burn.<ref name="SC693" /> A full manikin test, standardised as ASTM F1930, places a garment on a human-form manikin with more than 100 heat sensors. The manikin is engulfed by flames from propane burners for 3 to 12 seconds, and the sensors predict where second- and third-degree burns would occur.<ref name="SC693" /><ref name="SC695">Stull and Chines (2008), p. 6-95.</ref>
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== Prevention and design ==
== Prevention and design ==
Prevention rests on the same principles as for any flammable vapour. Slye lists the exclusion of ignition sources, the exclusion of air, storage in closed containers, ventilation to keep vapour below the flammable range and the use of an inert gas atmosphere.<ref name="S6198">Slye (2008), p. 6-198.</ref> Because most flammable vapours are heavier than air, removal at floor level, including pits, is usually the proper method of ventilation.<ref name="S6207" /> For dusts and lint, good housekeeping is the main defence. Cleaning should use vacuum or air-moving systems so that dust is not dislodged into a cloud.<ref name="M1131" /> In dust conveying systems, a "choke" at suitable points helps to stop the spread of a flash fire.<ref name="L811">Lataille (2008), p. 8-11.</ref>
Prevention rests on the same principles as for any flammable vapour. Slye lists the exclusion of ignition sources, the exclusion of air, storage in closed containers, ventilation to keep vapour below the flammable range and the use of an inert gas atmosphere.<ref name="S6198">Slye (2008), p. 6-198.</ref> Because most flammable vapours are heavier than air, removal at floor level, including pits, is usually the proper method of ventilation.<ref name="S6207" /> For dusts and lint, good housekeeping is the main defence. Mattern recommends soft brooms, brushes or suitable vacuum equipment and warns against blowing dust into suspension with compressed air.<ref name="M1131" /> In dust conveying systems, a "choke" at suitable points helps to stop the spread of a flash fire.<ref name="L811">Lataille (2008), p. 8-11.</ref>


Flash fires also affect the design of fire protection systems. A dust flash fire can drop burning material onto combustibles near the floor, starting many spot fires. These can open many sprinkler heads and often overtax the water supply.<ref name="M1131" /> Martin notes that where a flash fire hazard is present, it is usually necessary to provide enough water to operate all the sprinklers in any individual fire area.<ref name="Mar1566">Martin (2008), p. 15-66.</ref> Huggins records that NFPA had no record of a fire killing more than two people in a completely sprinklered building with a properly operating system. The exceptions were explosions, flash fires and deaths of brigade members or employees during fire suppression.<ref name="H1632">Huggins (2008), p. 16-32.</ref>
Flash fires also affect the design of fire protection systems. A dust flash fire can drop burning material onto combustibles near the floor, starting many spot fires. These can open many sprinkler heads and often overtax the water supply.<ref name="M1131" /> Martin notes that where a flash fire hazard is present, it is usually necessary to provide enough water to operate all the sprinklers in any individual fire area.<ref name="Mar1566">Martin (2008), p. 15-66.</ref> Huggins records that NFPA had no record of a fire killing more than two people in a completely sprinklered building with a properly operating system. The exceptions were explosions, flash fires and deaths of brigade members or employees during fire suppression.<ref name="H1632">Huggins (2008), p. 16-32.</ref>

Revision as of 00:06, 8 November 2026

A flash fire involves flame propagation without damaging blast. In the SFPE Handbook, Barry defines the chemical-process case as delayed ignition of a dispersed vapour cloud that causes no blast damage. Its flame spreads quickly through the flammable zone, but more slowly than in an unconfined vapour cloud explosion.[1] The Fire Protection Handbook also applies the term to unconfined dust-cloud combustion and to flames spreading along accumulated layers of dust or lint.[2][3]

A flash fire can cause severe burns or death during a brief thermal exposure. Barry's general method for chemical-process risk assessment assumes fatalities within the flame envelope of a flash fire.[4] The Fire Protection Handbook (2008) treats dust and lint flash fires as hazards in industries from grain handling to woodworking.[2][3] NFPA records show that most fires or explosions in manufacturing facilities that killed 10 or more people involved explosions or, to a lesser extent, flash fires or fuel spills.[5] Stull and Chines (2008) describe flame-resistant clothing as required for petrochemical workers, because early studies identified continued clothing combustion as the principal cause of injury.[6]

Definition and related events

Barry lists five fire and explosion outcomes of an accidental release of flammable liquid or gas: a pool fire, a torch fire, a fireball, a flash fire and an unconfined vapour cloud explosion.[1] A torch fire or flame jet burns at the point of a pressurised release and is usually tied to immediate ignition. A flash fire and a vapour cloud explosion both follow delayed ignition of a cloud. The difference is whether the flame becomes fast enough to produce damaging overpressure.[1] Barry groups the flash fire with pool fires, torch fires and fireballs as a radiant heat hazard, whereas the vapour cloud explosion is an overpressure hazard.[7] The immediate fireball shown for an instantaneous gas release in Barry's event tree differs from the delayed BLEVE fireball he describes for a heated pressurised vessel.[8][1]

Zalosh explains what makes the flame fast. A vapour cloud explosion follows the release of a large quantity of flammable gas or vapour outdoors under conditions that promote rapid flame speeds.[9] These conditions are turbulent jet releases, partial confinement by large structures, repeated obstructions such as congested process equipment and piping, and ignition delays that allow large clouds to form above the lower flammable limit.[9] Flame speeds of the order of 100 m/s are needed to generate damaging overpressures in a virtually unconfined area, and lower speeds suffice as confinement increases.[9] If the dispersed cloud ignites without producing damaging overpressure, Barry classifies the event as a flash fire.[1]

The same distinction is drawn for dusts. In the handbook chapter on grain mill products, Maness and Sargent note that a grain dust explosion without any confinement produces minimal pressures. Such an incident should more properly be called a flash fire.[2] With increasing confinement, the pressures can build up to more than 690 kPa (100 psig).[2]

Cholin describes the same range for wood dust. Where the particles are relatively large, the flame front moves slowly enough that an observer would call it a rapidly expanding fireball or flash fire. Finer particles burn too fast to follow and appear as an instantaneous burst of flame.[10] A flash fire is therefore closely related to the dust explosion.

How a flash fire develops

In a dispersed vapour cloud, fuel and air are mixed before ignition, so the flame is a premixed flame. Introduction to Fire Safety Engineering describes a premixed flame as one in which the air and fuel are mixed before the mixture is ignited, as in a gas burner or a Bunsen burner.[11] Such flame fronts can only propagate within a range of compositions known as the flammability limits.[12] For methane in air at normal temperature and pressure, the lower flammable limit (LFL) is 5 percent and the upper flammable limit (UFL) 15 percent by volume.[12] For most simple hydrocarbons, the limits correspond to roughly half and three times the stoichiometric fuel-air ratio, and the LFL is about 48 g of fuel per cubic metre.[12]

The typical sequence starts with a release that is not ignited at once. A leak of gas or the evaporation of a liquid pool forms a cloud that drifts and mixes with air. Barry notes that analyses of such vapour dispersion must document the topography, the weather and other assumptions.[7] Generic event trees in his chapter lead from a release with immediate ignition to a fireball or jet flame. A release with delayed ignition leads instead, after dispersion, to a flash fire or explosion.[8] When the cloud meets an ignition source, the fire spreads quickly throughout the flammable zone of the cloud.[1]

Slye describes how this happens with liquids. Gasoline and almost all other flammable liquids produce vapours heavier than air, which settle on the floor or in pits and depressions. Such vapours may flow along the floor or ground for long distances, be ignited at a remote point and flash back to the source.[13] The NUREG-1805 fire dynamics tools of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission add a warning about released compressed gases such as butane. The visible fog-like cloud shows only where the cold gas condenses moisture from the air. Beyond it, the gas may linger out of sight at concentrations within the flammable range, so a person can stand in an invisible flammable cloud.[14]

The speed of the flame depends on the mixture. The burning velocity is the speed at which a premixed flame moves normal to its surface into the unburnt mixture.[15] Simmons lists maximum laminar burning velocities of 41 cm/s for propane-air, 68 cm/s for ethene-air, 175 cm/s for acetylene-air and 320 cm/s for hydrogen-air mixtures.[16] Zalosh points out that the observed flame speed is often much higher than the burning velocity. It includes the movement of unburnt gas pushed ahead by the expanding burnt gas behind the flame.[17] Near the middle of the flammable range, ignition is more intense and violent than near either limit.[18]

Sources of flash fires

Flammable liquids are a common source. In dipping and coating processes, Katunar notes that flash fire conditions can prevail in flammable liquid fires, so emergency personnel should be trained to act immediately.[19] The handbook chapter on construction sites advises that the engines of pumps and compressors be shut down and allowed to cool before refuelling, to prevent flash fires.[20] A fault in a heating system can also lead to gas build-up. In 1954, a gas build-up in a school attic was ignited and produced a flash fire in an unoccupied area. Because discovery was delayed, the fire spread into occupied areas and 15 people died.[21]

Dust and lint form a second group. Mattern warns that dusts of organic materials such as wood, food products and paper, at a depth of less than 3 mm (⅛ in.), can under the right conditions result in a flash fire or explosion.[3] Some believe that as little as 0.8 mm (1/32 in.) of finely divided dust can propagate a flash fire.[3] Flash fires occur with smaller amounts of dust than explosions. A flame impinges on the dust layer and spreads along building components, utility lines or ductwork, rapidly with lint and more slowly with many dusts.[3] Poor housekeeping that lets lint or dust accumulate therefore creates the potential for flash fires or dust explosions.[22]

Some metals present a special case. Christman describes a cloud of zirconium dust in air as a serious flash fire hazard, in addition to its explosion hazard. An inert atmosphere of argon or helium in equipment and storage containers is one method used to prevent flash fires and explosions.[23] Air-moving equipment is another source. Lataille notes that flash fires can result from accumulations of lint in exhaust systems, and that flash fires or explosions can occur in ducts.[24][25]

Estimating the size of a flammable cloud

The size of the flammable cloud sets the zone in which people are exposed. A simple upper bound follows from the volume of vapour and the LFL. Slye gives the vapour volume produced by 1 L of liquid from its specific gravity and the vapour density of its vapour relative to air:[18]

Vv=0.83SGVD

The lower flammable limit marks the lean edge of flame propagation.[18] Below it, a vapour-air mixture is too lean to burn. At that limit, the air-to-vapour volume ratio is:

VaVv=100−LFLLFL

Symbols
Symbol Description Unit
Vv volume of vapour from 1 L of liquid m³
SG specific gravity of the liquid (water = 1) –
VD vapour density relative to air (air = 1) –
Va volume of air for dilution to the LFL m³
LFL lower flammable limit % by volume

Slye's worked example uses acetone, with a specific gravity of 0.792, a vapour density of 2 and a flammable range of 2.6 to 12.8 percent.[18] One litre gives 0.83 × 0.792 / 2 ≈ 0.33 m³ of vapour. Each volume of vapour needs (100 − 2.6) / 2.6 ≈ 37 volumes of air to reach approximately the LFL. Using Slye's rounded values, 0.33 m³ of vapour thus needs about 12.2 m³ of air; slightly more air makes the mixture too lean.[18]

Using unrounded inputs, 1 L of evaporated acetone could, if evenly mixed, form some 12.6 m³ of mixture at the LFL. For most simple hydrocarbons, an approximate LFL of 48 g/m³ means that each kilogram of vapour could form about 21 m³ of mixture at the LFL.[12] Real clouds are not evenly mixed, and parts of them are richer than this limit.

Barry's chapter shows how such zones are plotted in risk assessment. His illustrative example is a 30 minute release of liquefied petroleum gas, calculated with a computer model for a wind speed of 2.24 m/s (5 mph) and stable atmospheric conditions. The LFL cloud profile reached 48.2 m (158 ft) downwind. The profile at half the LFL reached 69.8 m (229 ft).[26] Barry notes that the cloud could drift in any direction.[26] The same zone is used to count the ignition sources that a drifting cloud might reach.[27]

Effects on people and protective clothing

The thermal exposure in a flash fire is intense but short. Barry's general method for assessing damage and human exposure assumes fatalities within the flame envelope of the flash fire, and estimates secondary damage to equipment or structures within the flame exposure zone.[4] Stull and Chines report early studies which found that the principal injuries to exposed workers came from the continued burning of their clothing, not from the flash fire exposure itself.[6] Clothing that resists ignition over the relatively short duration of a flash fire therefore gives a much larger level of safety. The 2008 handbook describes flame-retardant-treated or inherently flame-resistant clothing as required for petrochemical workers because of the potential for flash fire.[6]

Several test methods simulate a flash fire, and they form part of the wider field of textile flammability. The Thermal Protective Performance (TPP) test was developed to simulate the exposure in a flash fire. A horizontal specimen is exposed to a combined convective and radiant heat flux of 84 kW/m² (2.0 cal/cm²s).[28] A copper calorimeter behind the specimen measures the heat transfer, which is related to human skin tolerance data to predict the times to pain and to a second-degree burn.[28] A full manikin test, standardised as ASTM F1930, places a garment on a human-form manikin with more than 100 heat sensors. The manikin is engulfed by flames from propane burners for 3 to 12 seconds, and the sensors predict where second- and third-degree burns would occur.[28][29]

The handbook lists NFPA 2112 and the Canadian standard CGSB 155.20 as specifications for industrial flash fire protection. Both cover secondary protective clothing, which is worn where exposure is possible but incidental.[30][6] Structural firefighting protective clothing under NFPA 1971 is primary protective clothing, designed for situations in which thermal exposure is likely.[30][6] Veghte estimated tolerance times for firefighters of 10 to 20 minutes in routine conditions, 3 to 5 minutes in ordinary conditions and only 10 to 30 seconds in emergency conditions.[31] Stull and Chines note some controversy over how well the TPP test predicts the performance of whole garments. Differences between TPP rankings and manikin results have led to research on other test approaches.[28]

Prevention and design

Prevention rests on the same principles as for any flammable vapour. Slye lists the exclusion of ignition sources, the exclusion of air, storage in closed containers, ventilation to keep vapour below the flammable range and the use of an inert gas atmosphere.[32] Because most flammable vapours are heavier than air, removal at floor level, including pits, is usually the proper method of ventilation.[13] For dusts and lint, good housekeeping is the main defence. Mattern recommends soft brooms, brushes or suitable vacuum equipment and warns against blowing dust into suspension with compressed air.[3] In dust conveying systems, a "choke" at suitable points helps to stop the spread of a flash fire.[33]

Flash fires also affect the design of fire protection systems. A dust flash fire can drop burning material onto combustibles near the floor, starting many spot fires. These can open many sprinkler heads and often overtax the water supply.[3] Martin notes that where a flash fire hazard is present, it is usually necessary to provide enough water to operate all the sprinklers in any individual fire area.[34] Huggins records that NFPA had no record of a fire killing more than two people in a completely sprinklered building with a properly operating system. The exceptions were explosions, flash fires and deaths of brigade members or employees during fire suppression.[35]

Common misconceptions

A flash fire is not the same as the "flash" in a flash point test. Kanury explains that in such a test the flame usually flashes through the vapour above the liquid, consumes the combustibles in its sweep and then goes out. Only when the liquid evaporates copiously does the flame become self-sustained.[36] Both involve a flame passing through a premixed vapour-air mixture. A flash fire in the open, however, can involve a cloud tens of metres across, as in Barry's example.[26]

A flash fire is also distinct from a smoke explosion inside a burning room. Introduction to Fire Safety Engineering describes a smoke explosion as the very fast burning of flammable gases from decomposition or incomplete combustion. These gases are reasonably premixed with air and lie between the lower and upper explosive limits.[37] The physics is similar, but the fuel comes from the fire itself rather than from a release. Finally, the absence of blast does not make a flash fire harmless. Barry's definition stresses that it produces both near-field damage and effects on people far from the release point.[1]

See also

Notes

  1. ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 Barry (2002), p. 5-184.
  2. ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 Maness and Sargent (2008), p. 9-98.
  3. ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 Mattern (2008b), p. 11-31.
  4. ↑ 4.0 4.1 Barry (2002), p. 5-186.
  5. ↑ Hall and Cote (2008), p. 3-26.
  6. ↑ 6.0 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 Stull and Chines (2008), p. 6-87.
  7. ↑ 7.0 7.1 Barry (2002), p. 5-182.
  8. ↑ 8.0 8.1 Barry (2002), p. 5-183.
  9. ↑ 9.0 9.1 9.2 Zalosh (2008), p. 2-104.
  10. ↑ Cholin (2008d), p. 9-3.
  11. ↑ Van Rossum (2027), §4.3.
  12. ↑ 12.0 12.1 12.2 12.3 Beyler (2002b), p. 2-172.
  13. ↑ 13.0 13.1 Slye (2008), p. 6-207.
  14. ↑ Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. 1-8.
  15. ↑ Simmons (2002), p. 1-144.
  16. ↑ Simmons (2002), p. 1-146.
  17. ↑ Zalosh (2008), p. 2-99.
  18. ↑ 18.0 18.1 18.2 18.3 18.4 Slye (2008), p. 6-202.
  19. ↑ Katunar (2008), p. 9-50.
  20. ↑ Davis (2008a), p. 11-54.
  21. ↑ Hall and Cote (2008), p. 3-23.
  22. ↑ Mattern (2008b), p. 11-28.
  23. ↑ Christman (2008), p. 6-160.
  24. ↑ Lataille (2008), p. 8-3.
  25. ↑ Lataille (2008), p. 8-7.
  26. ↑ 26.0 26.1 26.2 Barry (2002), p. 5-187.
  27. ↑ Barry (2002), p. 5-191.
  28. ↑ 28.0 28.1 28.2 28.3 Stull and Chines (2008), p. 6-93.
  29. ↑ Stull and Chines (2008), p. 6-95.
  30. ↑ 30.0 30.1 Stull and Chines (2008), p. 6-88.
  31. ↑ Veghte, as cited in Stull and Chines (2008), p. 6-87.
  32. ↑ Slye (2008), p. 6-198.
  33. ↑ Lataille (2008), p. 8-11.
  34. ↑ Martin (2008), p. 15-66.
  35. ↑ Huggins (2008), p. 16-32.
  36. ↑ Kanury (2002b), p. 2-189.
  37. ↑ Van Rossum (2027), §4.10.

References

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