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High-expansion foam is used to control LNG pools. Scheffey describes foams with expansion ratios of 400 to 500 that control LNG spill fires and help disperse the vapour cloud.<ref name="Scheffey-17-46">Scheffey (2008), p. 17-46.</ref> Water draining from a foam of about 500:1 forms a thin ice layer on the LNG that supports the foam blanket. Fixed and portable high-expansion foam systems of this type have been provided at LNG storage and manufacturing plants.<ref name="Scheffey-17-48">Scheffey (2008), p. 17-48.</ref> A thick foam blanket can also warm the vapour so that it rises instead of flowing along the ground. This works only on an established pool, not during the initial phase of rapid vaporisation.<ref name="Lemoff-6-176" /> Foam can control a fire in a pool or tank of cryogenic gas but cannot extinguish it.<ref name="Lemoff-6-177">Lemoff (2008), p. 6-177.</ref> | High-expansion foam is used to control LNG pools. Scheffey describes foams with expansion ratios of 400 to 500 that control LNG spill fires and help disperse the vapour cloud.<ref name="Scheffey-17-46">Scheffey (2008), p. 17-46.</ref> Water draining from a foam of about 500:1 forms a thin ice layer on the LNG that supports the foam blanket. Fixed and portable high-expansion foam systems of this type have been provided at LNG storage and manufacturing plants.<ref name="Scheffey-17-48">Scheffey (2008), p. 17-48.</ref> A thick foam blanket can also warm the vapour so that it rises instead of flowing along the ground. This works only on an established pool, not during the initial phase of rapid vaporisation.<ref name="Lemoff-6-176" /> Foam can control a fire in a pool or tank of cryogenic gas but cannot extinguish it.<ref name="Lemoff-6-177">Lemoff (2008), p. 6-177.</ref> | ||
[[File:fse-liquefied-natural-gas-v4.jpg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=High-expansion foam blanket covering an LNG test pool at a fire training ground|High-expansion foam applied to an LNG pool; the foam controls the fire and reduces vaporisation but cannot extinguish the fire. Based on Scheffey (2008), p. 17-48, and Lemoff (2008), p. 6-177.]] | |||
In the United States, Rivkin lists spill containment provisions that LNG vehicle fuelling facilities should include. The impounding area should hold the largest volume that a single leak could discharge in 10 minutes. The transfer point should be at least 7.6 m (25 ft) from the nearest important building not associated with the facility. Insulated containment materials can reduce the vaporisation rate by as much as 30 %, and compressors and other CNG equipment should stay outside the LNG containment.<ref name="Rivkin-21-66">Rivkin (2008b), p. 21-66.</ref> Containment limits the area of a spill, reduces its vaporisation rate and so shortens the distance the cloud travels before it becomes buoyant.<ref name="Rivkin-21-65">Rivkin (2008b), p. 21-65.</ref> Because LNG has no odour, LNG facilities normally require a gas detection system.<ref name="Rivkin-21-75">Rivkin (2008b), p. 21-75.</ref> | In the United States, Rivkin lists spill containment provisions that LNG vehicle fuelling facilities should include. The impounding area should hold the largest volume that a single leak could discharge in 10 minutes. The transfer point should be at least 7.6 m (25 ft) from the nearest important building not associated with the facility. Insulated containment materials can reduce the vaporisation rate by as much as 30 %, and compressors and other CNG equipment should stay outside the LNG containment.<ref name="Rivkin-21-66">Rivkin (2008b), p. 21-66.</ref> Containment limits the area of a spill, reduces its vaporisation rate and so shortens the distance the cloud travels before it becomes buoyant.<ref name="Rivkin-21-65">Rivkin (2008b), p. 21-65.</ref> Because LNG has no odour, LNG facilities normally require a gas detection system.<ref name="Rivkin-21-75">Rivkin (2008b), p. 21-75.</ref> | ||
Revision as of 08:18, 8 November 2026
Liquefied natural gas (LNG) is natural gas that has been cooled by cryogenic refrigeration until it becomes a liquid, and that is stored at about −162 °C.[1] It consists mainly of methane, with smaller amounts of ethane, propane and butane.[2] Liquefaction reduces the volume of the gas by a factor of about 600, which makes it practical to store natural gas for periods of peak demand and to ship it across oceans.[2][3] LNG is a flammable cryogenic fluid and a fuel.[2]
A spill boils rapidly and produces cold vapour that is heavier than air. This vapour can travel along the ground as a flammable cloud until it warms and becomes buoyant.[4] Ignition can lead to a vapour fire through the cloud and a pool fire at the spill.[5] LNG containers are theoretically subject to a BLEVE (boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion), but Lemoff judges the probability low.[2] LNG is normally not odorised, so leaks must be found with methane detectors.[6] In the United States, the production, storage and handling of LNG are covered by NFPA 59A and LNG vehicle fuel systems by NFPA 52.[7] The rules quoted here are US codes and practice as the Fire Protection Handbook (2008) described them, not current or universal requirements.
Composition and properties
LNG is a mixture of hydrocarbons whose principal component is methane. The composition depends mainly on the source of the gas. Gas from a transmission pipeline has had more of its propane and butane removed than gas taken directly from wells.[2] Before liquefaction, carbon dioxide, water, hydrogen sulphide, the odorant and trace metal oxides are removed, because they would solidify at LNG storage temperatures.[1] Natural gas supplied as a vehicle fuel contains 95 to 99 % methane.[1] LNG is not toxic, but it is a simple asphyxiant.[2]
The table gives the approximate properties of LNG listed in the Fire Protection Handbook.[2]
| Property | Value |
|---|---|
| Composition (methane, ethane, propane, butane) | 83 to 99 %, 1 to 13 %, 0.1 to 3.0 %, 0.2 to 1.0 % |
| Normal boiling point | −250 to −260 °F (about −157 to −162 °C; the handbook prints −160 to −164 °C) |
| Liquid density at the normal boiling point | 0.42 to 0.48 g/cm³ |
| Vapour density at the boiling point, relative to air at 21 °C | 1.47 |
| Liquid-to-vapour expansion | 600 to 1 |
| Heat of vaporisation | 512 to 577 kJ/kg |
| Flammable range in air | 5 to 14 % (methane at normal temperatures) |
| Heat of combustion | 51.2 MJ/kg (22,000 Btu/lb) |
| Steady burning rate of a pool | 5 to 15 mm/min (0.2 to 0.6 in./min) |
Rivkin gives a similar expansion: 1 ft³ (0.028 m³) of LNG becomes 618 ft³ (17.4 m³) of natural gas at ambient conditions.[6] For fire calculations, Babrauskas lists LNG (mostly methane) with a liquid density of 415 kg/m³ and a net heat of combustion of 50.0 MJ/kg. The same values appear in the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission's fire dynamics tools.[8][9] Rivkin notes that the flammability limits and autoignition temperature of natural gas are the same whether it is stored as LNG or as compressed natural gas. Its flammable range is narrow and its autoignition temperature is high.[4]
The defining feature of LNG is its temperature. The handbook classes as cryogenic those liquefied gases that are held in their containers below −90 °C. Heat from the surroundings can be slowed but not stopped from entering such a container, so a cryogenic gas cannot be kept indefinitely. If it were fully confined, the rising pressure could greatly exceed any feasible container strength.[10] For methane, Drysdale gives a boiling point of −161.5 °C and a specific gravity of only 0.55 at ambient temperature.[11]
Production, storage and transport
LNG supplements pipeline gas during periods of extreme demand, a practice known as peak shaving. It also supplies gas distribution systems far from central networks, serves as a basic supply of natural gas, and to a small extent fuels vehicles.[2] Beyler notes that LNG is stored for peak demand and carried by sea in bulk carriers designed for cryogenic cargoes.[12] On land it travels in insulated cargo trucks built to US Department of Transportation (DOT) specifications. It is stored in insulated tanks built to the ASME pressure vessel code or to American Petroleum Institute (API) standards, protected by pressure-relief valves.[2]
Eberly describes LNG carriers that hold about 125,000 m³ of LNG at about −161 °C and atmospheric pressure, with larger designs in preparation. They have no onboard refrigeration. Instead, the cargo tanks are heavily insulated and a small amount of liquid boils off during the voyage. The tanks are either freestanding spheres of aluminium or nickel steel or prismatic membrane tanks within the hull. Fixed dry chemical monitors or hand hose lines are required to protect the cargo area.[3] At 600 to 1, a full carrier of this size holds the equivalent of about 75 million m³ of natural gas.
All cryogenic liquefied gas containers are insulated as a matter of functional necessity. North American standards require the insulation of flammable cryogenic gas containers to be noncombustible. Where loss of the jacket would release powder or granular insulation, the jacket must be steel or concrete rather than aluminium.[13] Most cryogenic storage tanks are pressure vessels, but their design pressure could not hold the contents if the liquid warmed to atmospheric temperature. The liquid is kept at or slightly above its boiling point.[14]
LNG is seldom used indoors. Where it is, the handbook states that the structure is designed for a combustion explosion hazard in accordance with national standards and regulations.[2] For an LNG vehicle container to lose liquid, the outer steel shell, the insulation and the inner vessel must all fail. Rivkin judges each of these components less likely to fail than the single-wall tanks of gasoline or diesel vehicles. Spills nevertheless remain a design consideration.[4]
Behaviour of spilled LNG
A noncryogenic liquefied gas such as propane carries its own heat of vaporisation and often flashes to vapour without forming a pool. A cryogenic liquid must draw nearly all its heat from the ground or the air. It therefore forms a pool if the leak lasts long enough.[15] The pool boils rapidly and forms a white cloud as the cold vapour condenses water from the air.[4] The gas near the pool is always heavier than air because of its low temperature, so even gases that are lighter than air at room temperature hug the ground for some distance.[15]
The vapour stays negatively buoyant until it warms to about −118 °C (−180 °F), after which it begins to rise.[4] Near its normal boiling point the vapour is about 1.5 times as heavy as air at 21 °C.[2] Methane at ambient temperature, by contrast, has a specific gravity of 0.55, so a warmed cloud rises and disperses.[11] Before that point, the cold, dense cloud can create large volumes of flammable methane-air mixture well beyond the spill.[1]
Rivkin names four factors that govern how fast a spill evaporates and how far the cloud travels.[4] Higher wind speed increases evaporation but also mixes the vapour and breaks the cloud into smaller puffs. A larger spill area evaporates faster and gives a larger cloud. The ground matters too: vaporisation is fast on wet surfaces such as muddy soil, and dark asphalt also promotes it. Finally, at night the lack of solar heating slows evaporation but lengthens the distance over which the cloud remains flammable.[4][6]
The visible fog only roughly marks the hazardous area, and ignitable mixtures can extend beyond it.[2][16] Once it has changed phase, LNG vapour is colourless and odourless at normal temperatures and pressures. Rivkin therefore states that only gas detection equipment designed for methane can establish safe exclusion and operating zones.[6] The odorant is removed before liquefaction.[1] San Diego Gas and Electric Company developed an odorisation method using a propane carrier in the 1970s, and a Gas Research Institute study found mercaptans that could be used with such carrier gases. Rivkin reports, however, that NFPA 59A does not require LNG to be odorised.[7]
Fire and explosion hazards
LNG presents both combustion explosion and fire hazards when it escapes.[2] Rivkin notes that the vapour cloud above an LNG pool is fairly difficult to ignite. The large volume of flammable mixture still makes a substantial spill a major safety risk.[1] Based on experiments with LNG spilled on water, Beyler describes three stages of a vapour fire. A transient turbulent flame first spreads through the cloud both upwind and downwind. The flame then moves steadily back towards the pool, and the fire ends as a pool fire at the source.[5]
The maximum laminar burning velocity of methane is 0.45 m/s, compared with 0.52 m/s for propane. Measured flame propagation in LNG and LPG vapour fires showed no significant difference between the two fuels.[5] Tests with LNG and LPG vapour clouds also did not confirm the theory that an unconfined cloud burns only as a fireball.[17] Whether a burning cloud becomes a vapour cloud explosion depends on turbulence, partial confinement, congested obstacles, ignition delay and the reactivity of the gas.[18]
Large LNG pool fires have been studied in some detail. Heskestad cites large-scale data for square LNG pools with effective diameters of 2 to 28 m.[19] Beyler gives a flame length correlation by Moorhouse derived from large-scale LNG pool fire tests, and correlations for LNG trench fires that rest only on LNG data.[20][21] Alpert notes that pool fires of virtually all fuels, even LNG, begin to form an obscuring smoke mantle above a critical diameter of 3 to 6 m.[22] Drysdale adds that atmospheric water vapour absorbs thermal radiation. This helps explain why large LNG fires are relatively less hazardous on humid days.[23]
For judging radiation exposure, Beyler cites the US Federal Safety Standards for LNG facilities, 49 CFR Part 193 (1980). They suggest 5 kW/m² as an acceptable level for direct exposure of people. At that flux, bare skin reaches unbearable pain in about 13 s, and second-degree burns may occur in about 40 s.[24]
Rivkin counts LNG containers among those susceptible to BLEVEs, which occur when a liquid is stored under pressure above its boiling point.[6] Lemoff calls LNG containers theoretically subject to BLEVEs but with a low probability.[2] The vacuum-jacketed insulation of ASME code LNG containers, together with the cold liquid, is expected to give substantial protection against radiant heat from a pool fire. Fire tests found that the relief valves of an uninsulated cryogenic vessel open within 1 hour. With the insulation and vacuum intact, the relief valve does not open for several days.[6]
Pool fire calculation
For pools larger than about 0.2 m in diameter, burning is dominated by radiation from the flames. Babrauskas correlates the heat release rate of such pools with the net heat of combustion, an asymptotic burning rate per unit area, and an empirical term that accounts for the pool diameter. The term in brackets approaches 1 for large pools, so the burning rate per unit area then becomes constant.[25]
| Symbol | Description | Unit |
|---|---|---|
| Heat release rate of the pool fire | kW | |
| Net heat of combustion | kJ/kg | |
| Burning rate per unit area of an infinitely large pool | kg/(m²·s) | |
| Empirical constant for the effect of pool diameter | m⁻¹ | |
| Pool diameter | m | |
| Pool area, πD²/4 for a circular pool | m² |
For LNG, Babrauskas gives a net heat of combustion of 50.0 MJ/kg, a burning rate of 0.078 (±0.018) kg/(m²·s) and kβ = 1.1 (±0.8) m⁻¹.[8] As a worked example, take a circular LNG pool 10 m in diameter, within the 2 to 28 m range of the large-scale tests.[19] The area is π × 10²/4 = 78.5 m². With kβD = 11, the bracket equals 1.000, so the pool burns at the full 0.078 kg/(m²·s). The heat release rate is 50,000 × 0.078 × 1.000 × 78.5 ≈ 306,000 kW, or about 310 MW. The pool consumes about 6.1 kg of LNG per second.
The result can be checked against the handbook. Dividing the burning rate by the liquid density gives 0.078/415 = 1.9 × 10⁻⁴ m/s, or about 11 mm of liquid per minute. This lies within the steady pool burning rate of 5 to 15 mm/min given in the handbook table.[8][2] A pool of 5 m gives about 76 MW and a pool of 20 m about 1,200 MW, because the area grows with the square of the diameter. The constants carry wide uncertainty bands, especially kβ. The method also applies only to open-burning pools, not to pools that receive extra radiation from a hot enclosure.[8]
Fire protection and emergency response
Control of an LNG release follows the general approach for gas emergencies. It combines directing and dispersing the gas, keeping it from ignition sources and, if possible, stopping the flow.[15] Water spray is the most common carrier fluid, and fixed water spray systems for dispersing gas have been installed at a few outdoor ethylene and LNG facilities.[15] Contact between water and the pool should be avoided, however, because it increases vaporisation, unless the vapour can be controlled.[16] On cryogenic containers, water must also be kept off the pressure-relief valve, where it can freeze and disable this safety device.[15] For these reasons, water application might not always be appropriate for cryogenic storage tanks.[14]
High-expansion foam is used to control LNG pools. Scheffey describes foams with expansion ratios of 400 to 500 that control LNG spill fires and help disperse the vapour cloud.[26] Water draining from a foam of about 500:1 forms a thin ice layer on the LNG that supports the foam blanket. Fixed and portable high-expansion foam systems of this type have been provided at LNG storage and manufacturing plants.[27] A thick foam blanket can also warm the vapour so that it rises instead of flowing along the ground. This works only on an established pool, not during the initial phase of rapid vaporisation.[15] Foam can control a fire in a pool or tank of cryogenic gas but cannot extinguish it.[28]

In the United States, Rivkin lists spill containment provisions that LNG vehicle fuelling facilities should include. The impounding area should hold the largest volume that a single leak could discharge in 10 minutes. The transfer point should be at least 7.6 m (25 ft) from the nearest important building not associated with the facility. Insulated containment materials can reduce the vaporisation rate by as much as 30 %, and compressors and other CNG equipment should stay outside the LNG containment.[29] Containment limits the area of a spill, reduces its vaporisation rate and so shortens the distance the cloud travels before it becomes buoyant.[30] Because LNG has no odour, LNG facilities normally require a gas detection system.[31]
At vehicle incidents, fire apparatus is placed upwind and away from the path of flowing LNG. Rivkin warns that applying water from fire streams greatly increases the vaporisation of a pool of liquid methane. He recommends potassium bicarbonate, ammonium phosphate or sodium bicarbonate dry chemical extinguishers for LNG fires.[32] An LNG vehicle tank has a liquid valve and a vent valve. Responders close the liquid valve, which can be recognised by its covering of ice and frost, but leave the vent open so that the tank can relieve pressure in a fire.[32]
Use as a vehicle fuel
Rivkin's review of the alternative fuel vehicle covers compressed natural gas, LNG and LP-gas. He reports that these three fuels were used by over 85 % of light and over 95 % of heavy alternative fuel vehicles in the United States.[33] In 2006 the United States had only 37 LNG refuelling sites out of more than 5000 alternative fuel sites.[7] LNG suits medium and heavy trucks such as refuse trucks and transit vehicles, and also railway locomotives and ships. Engines cannot burn a cryogenic liquid, so a heat exchanger turns it into gas first.[34] Rivkin associates LNG fuelling with large fleets in densely populated urban areas, such as transit, taxi and government fleets. He does not expect self-service public LNG fuelling to become common.[30]
Vehicle tanks are vacuum-jacketed double-walled containers on the Dewar principle. Their "hold time" is how long a vehicle can stand unused before the tank pressure must be vented, and an empty space of 5 to 10 % of the tank volume is kept for expansion. Most tanks have both a relief valve and a rupture disk. A rupture disk does not reclose, so once it operates the tank vents until empty. Under the US vehicle rules described by Rivkin (2008b), a container compartment holding unodorised LNG required continuous methane detection, designed to sound an alarm above 20 % of the lower flammable limit.[34] NFPA 52, 2006 edition, contains the US requirements for LNG vehicle fuel systems, because NFPA 57 was incorporated into it in 2005.[7]
Fuelling stations raise the transfer pressure either by warming part of the liquid in a vaporiser or by using cryogenic pumps. Typical transfer rates are 0.11 to 0.19 m³/min (30 to 50 gal/min).[35] Bulk storage at a typical site totals about 57 m³ (15,000 gal), enough to unload one road tanker of 42 to 49 m³.[30] LNG contact causes frostbite or cryogenic burns, and prolonged exposure to the cold vapour can cause hypothermia or lung damage.[7]
Limits and common misconceptions
LNG is sometimes confused with liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), but the two behave differently. LPG is odorised and its vapours always remain heavier than air. LNG is normally unodorised and its vapours eventually become buoyant.[32] Treating a cold LNG cloud as a light gas that will simply rise is therefore wrong in the first phase of a spill.[4]
Water, the usual agent for gas emergencies, can make an LNG spill worse if it reaches the liquid.[16] The visible white cloud is also a poor guide, because flammable mixture can extend beyond it.[16] Finally, the code values in this article are those of US standards as summarised in the 2008 handbook. Rivkin's chapter itself records that NFPA 57 had been merged into NFPA 52 in 2005, although parts of the chapter still cite NFPA 57.[7][34]
See also
Notes
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 Rivkin (2008b), p. 21-55.
- ↑ 2.00 2.01 2.02 2.03 2.04 2.05 2.06 2.07 2.08 2.09 2.10 2.11 2.12 2.13 2.14 Lemoff (2008), p. 6-182.
- ↑ 3.0 3.1 Eberly (2008), p. 21-169.
- ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7 Rivkin (2008b), p. 21-58.
- ↑ 5.0 5.1 5.2 Beyler (2002a), p. 3-303.
- ↑ 6.0 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 Rivkin (2008b), p. 21-59.
- ↑ 7.0 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 Rivkin (2008b), p. 21-60.
- ↑ 8.0 8.1 8.2 8.3 Babrauskas (2002b), p. 3-26.
- ↑ Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. 3-4.
- ↑ Lemoff (2008), p. 6-167.
- ↑ 11.0 11.1 Drysdale (2008), p. 2-6.
- ↑ Beyler (2002a), p. 3-302.
- ↑ Lemoff and Rivkin (2008), p. 7-38.
- ↑ 14.0 14.1 Lemoff and Rivkin (2008), p. 7-40.
- ↑ 15.0 15.1 15.2 15.3 15.4 15.5 Lemoff (2008), p. 6-176.
- ↑ 16.0 16.1 16.2 16.3 Lemoff (2008), p. 6-183.
- ↑ Beyler (2002a), p. 3-304.
- ↑ Zalosh (2008), p. 2-104.
- ↑ 19.0 19.1 Heskestad (2002), p. 2-15.
- ↑ Beyler (2002a), p. 3-270.
- ↑ Beyler (2002a), p. 3-272.
- ↑ Alpert (2008), p. 2-22.
- ↑ Drysdale (2008), p. 2-11.
- ↑ Beyler (2002a), p. 3-310.
- ↑ Babrauskas (2002b), p. 3-25.
- ↑ Scheffey (2008), p. 17-46.
- ↑ Scheffey (2008), p. 17-48.
- ↑ Lemoff (2008), p. 6-177.
- ↑ Rivkin (2008b), p. 21-66.
- ↑ 30.0 30.1 30.2 Rivkin (2008b), p. 21-65.
- ↑ Rivkin (2008b), p. 21-75.
- ↑ 32.0 32.1 32.2 Rivkin (2008b), p. 21-74.
- ↑ Rivkin (2008b), p. 21-41.
- ↑ 34.0 34.1 34.2 Rivkin (2008b), p. 21-71.
- ↑ Rivkin (2008b), p. 21-64.
References
- Alpert, R. L. (2008). Physics of fire configuration. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 2-21–2-29). National Fire Protection Association.
- Babrauskas, V. (2002b). Heat release rates. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 3-1–3-37). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
- Beyler, C. L. (2002a). Fire hazard calculations for large, open hydrocarbon fires. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 3-268–3-314). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
- Drysdale, D. (2008). Physics and chemistry of fire. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 2-3–2-20). National Fire Protection Association.
- Eberly, R. (2008). Marine vessels. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 21-151–21-185). National Fire Protection Association.
- Heskestad, G. (2002). Fire plumes, flame height, and air entrainment. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 2-1–2-17). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
- Iqbal, N., & Salley, M. H. (2004). Fire Dynamics Tools (FDTs): Quantitative fire hazard analysis methods for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Fire Protection Inspection Program (NUREG-1805). U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
- Lemoff, T. C. (2008). Gases. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 6-165–6-186). National Fire Protection Association.
- Lemoff, T. C., & Rivkin, C. H. (2008). Storage of gases. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 7-35–7-42). National Fire Protection Association.
- Rivkin, C. H. (2008b). Vehicle fueling using gaseous fuels. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 21-41–21-76). National Fire Protection Association.
- Scheffey, J. L. (2008). Foam extinguishing agents and systems. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 17-45–17-70). National Fire Protection Association.
- Zalosh, R. (2008). Explosions. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 2-93–2-106). National Fire Protection Association.